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Preface 
T
HE publication of the Model Probate Code, together 
with related monographs and appendix notes, serves 
a dual purpose. It is the report of a committee of the 
Prob(!te Division of the American Bar Association. It is also 
the product of a research project carried on by the University 
of Michigan Law School. Mr. R. G. Patton, in his "Presenta­
tion of the Report of the Committee on Model Probate Code," 
printed elsewhere in th is volume, has provided an appropriate 
preface for this publication in its first aspect. As a product of 
research, however, some prefatory remarks may be added at 
this point. 
· 
In the fall of I 942 the University of Mich igan Law School 
entered into negotiations with Mr. Patton, as Chairman of the 
Committee on I mprovement of Probate Statutes, of the Real 
Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the American 
Bar Association, whereby the Law School undertook to do the 
research necessary for the preparation of a Model Probate 
Code. Professor Thomas E. Atkinson, then of the University 
of Missouri Law School, had already written his noteworthy 
articles in the Journal of the American Judicature Society on 
probate reform; the Committee had laid the groundwork for 
probate research by setting up advisers in various states and 
by approving a general outline which indicated the scope of 
the proposed Code. 
The general plan of procedure in carrying forward this 
· research project was as follows. The probate statutes of the 
various states were read and classified by members of the re­
search staff of the Law School. On more difficult points 
memoranda were prepared, summarizing the applicable-stat­




by members of the research staff on some of the most basic 
topics. Preliminary drafts of portions of the proposed Model 
Code were prepared and mimeographed and were distributed 
to members of the Committee and to other persons whose 
comments might prove valuable. Conferences were held from 
time to time,-sometimes of the entire Committee and some­
times of the sub-committee on drafting,-at which these 
drafts were criticized and revised. Ten tentative drafts -were 
prepared and criticized prior to the final draft which is printed 
in this volume. Besides the five monographs which appear 
as a part of this volume, many memoranda of statute or case 
law, which were prepared as a part of the research incident 
to the Code, are published herewith. The latter appear as 
Appendix A to the Code. 
While I assumed responsibility for the research and pre­
liminary drafting incident to the Model Code, much of this 
was done by other members of the research staff of the Law 
School. Mr. Paul E. Basye, as Research Associate, for a 
period of approximately a year devoted his entire time to the 
work of the Code, drafting many sections as well as participat­
ing in numerous aspects of the research, and since that time he 
has continued to assist in the work connected with the Code. 
Professor Thomas E. Atkinson, in addition to cooperating 
actively in the work of the Committee from the beginning 
of the movement in I 940 until the final report of the Com­
mittee in 1 945, came to Ann Arbor in the summer of 1 945 as 
Visiting Research Professor in the University of Michigan 
Law School and for a period of six weeks devoted his entire 
t ime 'to the Model Code. During tha� period, he drafted 
much of the division of the Code concerned with guardianship, 
and participated in the final revision of the entire Code. 
Throughout the period of three years during which the Uni­
versi ty of Michigan participated in the project, Miss 
Elizabeth Durfee, Research Assistant of the Law School staff, 
., 
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has been assigned to this research. Most of the appendix notes 
on the Code were prepared by her. She also collected and 
- classified materials in connection with the preparation of 
the monographs entitled "The Organization of the Probate 
Court in America," "The Administration of a Decedent's 
Estate as a Proceeding in Rem" and "The Function of Will 
Contests." I am glad to acknowledge here the.great assist­
ance rendered by these services. 
No series of acknowledgments would be complete without 
a reference to the financial assistance for this research project 
which has been provided from gifts to the University of Mich­
igan by the late William W. Cook. Without these funds the 
research would have been impossible. They have provided 
salaries for members of the research staff engaged in the proj­
ect and have made possible this publication. 
It must not be supposed, however, that the project was 
without valuable advice and assistance from persons who are 
not on the research staff of the Law School. First of all, 
recognition should be made of the work of Mr. R. G. Patton 
who, as chairman of the Committee, cooperated with the re­
search staff throughout the period in which the research and 
drafting were in progress. In addition to the advice of mem­
bers of the Committee on Model Probate Code and state ad­
visers appointed by Mr. Patton, the counsel of other experts 
on various branches of probate law was sought. Specifically, 
I desire to acknowledge valuable suggestions received from 
the following: Dean Alvin E. Evans, College of Law, Uni­
versity of Kentucky; Mr. H. R. Pool and Mr. Y. D. Mathes, 
attorneys on the staff of the Veterans Administrati�n ;  Hon. 
Stephen H. Clink, Probate Judge, of Muskegon, Michigan; 
Hon. Frank L. McAvinchey, Probate Juclge, of Flint, Mich­
igan ; Mr. H. W. Nichols, General Counsel of the National 
Surety Corporation, and members of his staff ; Mr. Gilbert T. 
Stephenson, Director of the Trust Research Department, 
Vlll PREFACE 
Graduate School of Banking of the American Bankers As­
sociation; Mr. James C. Shelor, Chairman of the Committee 
on Fiduciary Legislation, Trust Division, American Bankers 
Association ; Mr. D. H. Redfearn, Chairman of the Com­
mitte of the Florida Bar Association appointed to draft a new 
guardianship act ; Miss Mary Stanton, consultant on guardian­
ship, of the Children's Bureau, United States Department of 
Labor ; and Mr. Elbridge D. Phelps, of the Cleveland bar. 
Mimeographed copies of later drafts of the Model Code 
were sent to those who requested them, as well as to a selected 
list of other persons, and criticisms were solicited. All criti­
cisms received-prior to the completion of the final draft were 
carefully considered by the sub-committee on drafting. I am 
glad to acknowledge the assistance furnished by those criti­
Cisms. 
A few criticisms were received after the report of the Com-
' 
mittee was completed and in process of publication. One of 
these, prepared by Mr. Nathan A. Wagner, of the Judicial 
Department of the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Mary­
land, and transmitted by its Vice-President and Manager, 
Mr. Wm. H. C. Griffith, to Mr. Walter W. Land, Chairman 
of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, con­
tains suggestions which can be summarized here. First, it is 
suggested that, in place of the present § 1 o6 of the Model 
Probate Code, which gives a discretion to the judge in fixing 
the amount of the personal representative's bond, the follow­
ing be substituted : 
"Except as provided in section 1 07, every personal repre­
sentative shall, before entering upon the duties of his office 
execute and file a bond procured at the expense of the estate 
with sufficient surety or sureties in an amount not less than 
the value of the personal estate to be administered plus the 
probable value of the annual rents, issuance and profits of all 
the property of the estate; in case real estate is to be sold by 
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the terms of the will, the amount of the bond shall not be less 
than the value of the personal estate to be administered, and 
the value of the real estate to be sold plus the probable value 
of the annual rents, issuance and profits of all the property of 
the estate ; except that where the person or persons about to 
be appointed is or are entitled to the whole estate, or where 
acknowledged consents that a bond be dispensed with or fixed 
at a reduced amount are executed and filed by all of the per­
sons interested in the estate, the court may dispense with the 
bond or fix the penalty at such sum as will adequately protect 
the rights of all creditors." It is also suggested that the Code 
should include "a provision making it incumbent upon the 
court to inquire into the amount of the bond at the time the 
appraisal is filed and to make such order, either increasing or 
decreasing it, as may then appear necessary in order to comply 
with the statute." It is further suggested that subsection 
I I 8 (a) be deleted and that notice be given to the surety of 
all proceedings pertaining to the administration of the estate. 
The following recommendations are made as to § I I 6, which 
concerns the release of sureties before the estate is fully ad­
ministered: 
"I. That the statute specify by whom the petition for the 
release of the bond can be filed; 
"2 .  That even if the right to be released is conditio.ned 
upon the showing of good cause that the word 'shall' be sub­
stituted for the word 'may' in the first line, so that it would 
read-'For good cause, the court shall before . . . ' It 
would seem that this would grant the court sufficient discretion 
but would not permit it to decline to grant the release ir­
respective of whether or not cause therefor had been shown. 
"3 ·  That before the original sureties are released the per­
sonal representative shall file a full and complete accounting 
so that there may be an absolute cutoff of liability between the 
first and the succeeding sureties." 
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It is also suggested, with respect to this section, that it be 
so amended "that the liability of the new bond would be 
limited to acts and omissions occurring from and after its ex­
ecution. In the event that for some reason this is not done, 
. . . that the date from which the new bond is to be liable 
should be determined by the court at the time it is ordered 
to be given. . . ." 
It would be inappropriate for me to present arguments at 
this point for the positions of the Committee which are incon­
sistent with these recommendations. In connection with the 
question of notice, however, attention should be directed to 
§§ 67 and 209 as well as to other provisions in the Model Code 
on this subject. 
Since statutory citations play such a large part in the ma­
terial presented in this volume, a word may be said as to their 
date. In the comments to the Model Code and in the appendix 
notes, statutory citations were revised as of January I ,  I 945 ;  
also, in so far as I 945 amendments were available at the time 
of going to press, they have been inserted. In each of the 
monographs, the statutory citations are, in general, brought 
down to the date on which that monograph was published in 
the Michigan Law Review. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
January I ,  I946 
LEWIS M. SIMES 
Director of Legal Research, 
The University of Michigan 
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Presentation of the Report of the Committee 
on Model Probate Code 
T
. · ·· · · 0 the Probate Law Division, Section of Real Prop­
erty, Probate and Trust Law, American Bar As-
.. . sociation : 
Your Committee on Model Pr.obate Code presents here­
With its final report, consisting of a Model Probate Code of 
260 sections, with introduction and critical comments. 
In view of the extent and nature of the task, it may not be 
inappropriate to recount briefly the history of this project in 
legislative .drafting. During the years 1 939  and 1 940 the 
Journal of the American Judicature Society carried a series of 
articles by .Professor Thomas E. Atkinson on probate courts 
and procedure which was concluded in the issue of February, 
1 940, . under . the �eading "Wanted-A Model Probate 
Code." 1 After pointing out a few of the archaic and incon­
sistent provisions of the codes of some states, Professor Atkin­
son called attention to the fact that in recent years several 
states had enacted new probate codes, all of them undoubted 
improvements over their previous codes. The drafting was 
done by committees, councils or commissions and the new acts 
indicate the borrowing of provisions from other states. How­
ever, as pointed out by the author, it is important for such 
draftsmen to consult and fully consider the statutes of all the 
other states so as to select the best ideas and the most ap­
propriate phraseology. He raised the question, is the remedy 
a uniform probate act ; and if so, under whose auspices should 
it be prepared? He concluded that such an act would be an 
improvement upon the best of existing probate codes and called 
1 2 3  Am. Jud. Soc. J. 1 83  ( 1940) .  
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attention to various organizations which have been interested 
in the improvement of statutes : The National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, The American Judi­
cature Society, The American Law Institute, The National 
Conference of Judicial Councils and the Committees on Im­
provement in Probate Practice and on Uniformity in Probate 
Codes, of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law 
of the American Bar Association. 
At the meeting of the American Bar Association held in 
Philadelphia in September, I 940, the Section of Real Prop­
erty, Probate and Trust Law included in its program a dis­
cussion of the proposal for a Model Probate Code.2 At this 
meeting of the section the foregoing discussion of Professor 
Atkinson was reviewed and as a result a committee was ap­
pointed which has since then been actively engaged upon the 
project. 
In addition to work by the section's committee, · the latter 
has had the assistance of advisory committees appointed by 
the state bar associations of most of the states. The initial 
work consisted in the preparation of a list of proposed general 
headings of matters which should be included in a Model 
Probate Code and the order of classification. Most of the 
consultation was of necessity by correspondence but the com­
mittee has held open meetings during the subsequent annual 
sessions of the American Bar Association. On account of the 
distance separating the committee from its advisory commit­
tees, the initial work proceeded slowly. Nevertheless, by the 
time of the Indianapolis meeting ( I  94I ) there had been 
compiled a tentative but fairly definite classification of major 
titles and subtitles. 
Having completed this initial work of classification, inclu­
sion and exclusion, the committee was squarely faced with the 
problem of finding members or others who could give the nee� 
1 Section Proceedings, 1 940, p. 1 7. 
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essary time to examining the existing probate statutes of all the 
states, of selecting from them the best worded sections for in­
clusion as the section or as an alternative section of .the proposed 
model. The committee had arrived at the same stone wall 
which has faced state groups charged with the duty of propos­
-ing a draft which would be superior to the existing law. It had 
no members who could spare the necessary time to make the 
research which the importance of the subject demanded; nor 
did the committee know of any foundation or endowment to 
which it might appeal for financial assistance. At this critical 
point it received the suggestion that the University of Mich­
igan was carrying on a number of legal research projects and 
that a program might be worked out by which its assistance to 
the committee could be procured. From that beginning a plan 
was formulated under which the research could be made under 
the supervision of our own member, Professor Lewis M. 
Simes, and, as a result, a Model Probate Code could be pro­
mulgated jointly by the section and by the university. Com­
mencing late in I 942, this research has been in progress. 
A sub-committee on drafting was set up consisting of three 
persons : the Chairman, Professor Simes and Professor Atkin­
son. Mr. Paul E. Basye, now of the San Francisco bar, who 
was formerly a research associate at the University of Michigan 
Law School, was subsequently added to the sub-committee. 
In the preparation of the Model Probate Code, six conferences, 
either of the sub-committee or of the entire committee, have 
been held since 1 942, four at Ann Arbor, Michigan, and two 
at Chicago at the time of American Bar Association meetings. 
In carrying on the research incident to the drafting of the 
code at Ann Arbor, Professor Simes was ,assisted for approxi­
mately a year by Mr. Basye, as research associate, and for the 
entire period since the University of Michigan Law School 
undertook to cooperate in the project by Miss Elizabeth 
Durfee, as research assistant. During the academic year 
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1 944-45, arrangement was made for Professor Simes to be 
relieved of half his teaching duties so that he could devote 
the remainder of his time to research and drafting in con­
nection with the Model Code. In the summer of 1 945 Pro­
fessor Atkinson was appointed visiting research professor at 
the University of Michigan Law School for a term of six 
weeks, and devoted his entire time to the completion of the 
Model Code. 
In addition to the assistance of research staff and state ad­
visers, the committee has had the benefit of valuable advice 
from other experts. Two members of the legal staff of the 
United States Veterans Administration gave extensive critical 
comments on a draft of the subdivision of the code dealing with 
guardianship, as did also the consultant on guardianship of the 
Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Labor. 
Other helpful criticisms were received from experts on surety­
ship and on corporate fiduciaries, as well as from leading pro­
bate j udges and other experts on the whole field of probate 
law. 
In presenting this Cod� as the product of five years of prepa­
. ration and unremitting toil, it is believed that the viewpoint 
of no important social group has been over looked and that 
the content of every important probate statute now on the 
books has been considered. It would be too much to say that 
the Code is free from all imperfection. Yet in presenting it 
to the Section in its final form, it is the belief of your Com­
mittee that either as a code complete in itself, or as a funda­
mental probate law. on which to build a larger legislative super­
structure, it can be recommended without qualification to the 
legislative authorities of any jurisdiction in which probate 
reform is sought. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. G. PATToN, Chaw�n 
Introduction 
T
HIS Code is offered to meet the rapidly increasing 
demand for a coherent, efficient and economical pro­
bate system. 
THE NEED FOR PROBATE REFORM 
In many states an outmoded judicial organization and an 
inadequate procedure hamper the functioning of probate 
courts and breed delay and injustice. Even where the legal 
devices conceived by legislators are reasonably well adapted 
to their purpose, faulty draftsmanship has rendered probate 
statutes a prolific source of litigation. Moreover, probate 
judicial organizations and procedural systems have, in many 
instances, been built up piece by piece, with little or no regard 
to considerations of coherence and consistency in the body of 
the legislation as a whole. 
THE M OVEMENT FOR REFORM IN PROBATE LEGISLATION 
To eliminate such evils, a movement for probate reform 
began in this country more than a decade ago, and is still con­
tinuing. Already probate codes have been adopted by the 
following legislation on the dates indicated: Ohio Laws 
( 193 I )  p. 320; California Stat. ( I  93 I )  c. 28 I ;  Florida Laws 
( 1933 )  c. I 6 I03 ; Minnesota Laws ( I935)  c. 72 ;  Kansas 
Laws ( I939) c. I 8o;  Illinois Laws ( I939) p. 4 ;  Michigan 
Public Acts ( I 939) No. 2 8 8 ;  Nevada Stat. ( I94I )  c. I07. 
The recent, comprehensive revision of the New York law of 
decedents' estates should also be noted. See New York Laws 
( I929) c. 229. At the present time extensive reform in the 
probate law is under way in a number of other states, and it 
is entirely possible that the movement may become nation-
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wide in extent. To provide an adequate and authoritative 
guide for such legislation, this Code was prepared. 
UNIFORMITY NOT AN OBJECTIVE 
This is a model code, not a uniform act. Its objective is 
not the attainment of uniformity among the several states, 
but the improvement of probate procedure wherever revision 
of probate legislation is sought. Primarily, it is intended as 
a reservoir of ideas, and of acceptable legislative formulations 
of those ideas, from which legislative committees may draw 
the framework of new probate codes. Just as a good form 
book for wills loses none of its value because the draftsman 
of a will adapts the form to his particular problems, likewise 
it is believed that this Code will prove no less valuable though 
it may be thought advisable to adapt its provisions to the 
judicial organization and legal system of the particular state. 
STEPS IN THE PREPARATION OF THIS CODE 
Before any part of this Code was drafted, the statutes of 
all common-law American states were read and classified. 
Those of Louisiana, being based on the civil law, were only 
used occasionally. In addition to the s·tudy of contemporary 
statute law, an examination was also made of the case law with 
respect to particular problems, and of the legislative history 
of particular provisions. While the probate legislation of 
the states in which probate codes have been recently adopted 
has been generally helpful in this connection, older statutes 
have also sometimes furnished valuable suggestions for the 
Model Code. This is particularly true in the case of Massa­
chusetts where excellent solutions of many problems were 
found in well drafted statutes. 
While much of the research incident to the preparation of 
the Code has been preserved only in the form of unpublished 
memoranda, in a few instances it has crystallized into law re­
view articles. The following are by-products of this research : 
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Simes and Basye, "The Organization of the Probate Court in 
America," 42 Mich. L. Rev. 965 ( I 944), 43 Mich� L. Rev. 
I I 3 ( I 944) ; Basye, "The Venue of Probate and Administra­
tion Proceedings," 43 Mich. L. Rev. 4 7 I ( I  944) ; Simes, 
"The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding 
in Rem," 43 Mich. L. Rev. 67 5 ( I  945) ; Basye, "Dispensing 
with Administration," 44 Mich. L. Rev. 329 ( I 945) ;  and 
Simes, "The Function of Will Contests," 44 Mich. L. Rev. 
503 ( I 946) .  
Though a critical, comparative study was made of existing 
probate statutes, the task was not limited to a selection of the 
best type found in the statute books. If no satisfactory legisla­
tion could be found as to a problem the Code proceeds upon 
original lines. Extensive litigation on a question was taken 
as some indication that the rules of law should be clarified. If 
the subject matter was of a sort which could be satisfactorily 
dealt with ·by statute, legislation was attempted even though 
none existed before. But not infrequently the problem was of 
a sort which could only be solved by judicial pronouncement 
and not by statutory rules. 
RELATION OF THE MODEL PROBATE CODE TO ACTS PRO­
MULGATED BY THE UNIFORM LAWS CONFERENCE 
Recognizing the excellent work of the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of the American 
Bar Association, it was agreed that, in drafting the Model 
Probate Code, legislation promulgated by the Commissioners 
should be incorporated wherever ·the same subject matter had 
been dealt with. Accordingly, the following Uniform or 
Model Acts, promulgated or in preparation, have been in­
corporated in whole or in part in this Code at the points indi­
cated : 
Model Execution of Wills Act, §§  45 to so. 
Uniform Act Governing Secured Creditors' Dividends in 
Liquidation Proceedings, § 13 9· 
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Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, Part IV. 
Uniform Powers of Foreigft Representatives Act, Part V. 
Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates Act, Part V. 
It is also contemplated that when and if a new Uniform Wills 
Act, Foreign Probated, is promulgated by the National Con­
ference, that also will be incorporated into the Model Code. 
Attention should also be called to the following Acts pro­
mulgated by the Commissioners which were not incorporated 
in this Code, but which have a close relation to it and might _ 
prove useful to the draftsman of a probate code: 
Uniform Absence as Evidence of Death and Absentees' 
Property Act. 
Model War Service Validation Act. 
Uniform Fiduciaries Act. 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. 
Uniform Illegitimacy Act. 
Uniform Joint Obligations Act. 
Uniform Marriage and Marriage License Act. 
Uniform Partnership Act. 
Uniform Principal and Income Act. 
Uniform Property Act. 
Uniform Reciprocal Transfer Tax Act. 
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. 
Uniform Trustees' Accounting Act. 
Uniform Trusts Act. 
ADAPTATION OF MODEL CODE TO LOCAL LEGISLATION­
QUESTIONS O F  CONSTITUTIONALITY 
In some jurisdictions it will be impracticable to enact this 
Code without a few modifications to adapt it to local conditions. 
It will have to be fitted into the local judicial organization ; 
for the scheme presented herein contemplates a probate court 
which is an integral part of the judicial organization of the 
state. Great care has been taken to avoid provisions in the 
Code which may conflict with usual constitutional provisions. 
Moreover, a reference to such constitutional questions has 
INTRODUCTION 
been made in a number of the comments. But it is impracti­
cable to discuss or refer to every constitutional provision which 
might, in one particular state, be in conflict with a provision 
of this Code. For example, in Illinois it is held that the probate 
court has no jurisdiction under the Illinois constitution to pass 
on claims arising out of the torts of the decedent. Howard v. 
Swift, 356 Ill. 8o, 1 90 N. E. 102 ( 1 934) ; Gordon v. Bauer, 
373 Ill. 357, 26 N. E. (2d) I IO ( 1 940). In the same state 
it has been held that a statute which gives the probate court 
· jurisdiction over testamentary trusts is unconstitutional. In 
re Estate of Mortenson, 248 Ill. 520, 94 N. E. 1 20 ( 1 9 1 1 ) . 
Doubtless it would require a constitutional amendment in 
some states to abolish the probate court as a separate court and 
to give exclusive original jurisdiction in probate matters to 
the trial court, as is here advocated. For this reason, alter­
native language has been inserted in the comment, whenever 
necessary, to permit a separate probate court. But it is es­
sential to the satisfactory operation of this Code that the court 
which has judsdiction over probate matters be co()rdinate with 
the court of general jurisdiction, and, therefore, in a state 
where it is not the same court, a change in the constitution 
should be sought, if necessary. 
COM MENTS AND APPENDICES 
Much of the research incident to the preparation of this 
Code has been preserved in Appendix A. There it is possible 
to find a summary of existing statutes on important questions 
dealt with. For the draftsman who seeks a somewhat dif­
ferent solution of the problem than that adopted by the Code, 
the Appendix provides a method of finding related legislation. 
The comments, while serving also to preserve some of the 
results of the research, do much more. They are a part of the 
report of the Committee on the Model Probate Code and 
suggest the rationale of important sections. 
14 INTRODUCTION 
ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS IN COMMENT 
In keeping with the primary objective to make the Code 
a guide to draftsmen and not a uniform act, suggestions for 
alternative statutory provisions have been inserted in the com­
ments to some of the sections. Sometimes this was done be­
cause of a difference of opinion on the part of the members of 
the drafting committee. Sometimes it was due to a feeling 
that, although one solution of a given problem was ordinarily 
to be preferred, another solution was not seriously objection­
able and might, under some circumstances, be actually more 
desirable. 
GENERAL PLAN OF THE CODE 
In some probate codes an attempt is made to consolidate 
to a very considerable extent provisions for the administration 
of decedents' estates, testamentary trusts' and estates under 
guardianship. Thus, provisions for bonds, letters, account­
ing and discharge may be found in a division of the code pro­
viding for fiduciaries in general. See, for example, Mich. 
Probate Code, c. 4, Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943)  § §  27.3 178  (25 r ) 
to 27.3 1 78 (307) .  That plan has not been followed herein. 
In selecting language which applies to all types of fiduciaries, 
much may be lost in the way of precision and detail. It seems 
better to state the provisions for decedents' estates first, fol­
lowing those by a separate part on guardianship in which 
analogous provisions in the part on decedents' estates are in­
corporated by reference so far as possible. See introductory 
comment to Part IV. Part I and the first two divisions of 
Part V of the Code have general application to decedents' 
estates, guardianships and testamentary trusts. Indeed, Part 
I, being concerned largely with general provisions, compre­
hends any proceeding within the probate jurisdiction. Part 
V on "Ancillary Administration" is simply an incorporation 
of three acts prepared, or under consideration, by the Confer-
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ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Part II, on 
"Intestate Succession and Wills" is largely concerned with 
those two branches of substantive law. Part III is mainly 
procedural and covers the subject of "Administration of De­
cedents' Estates." Part IV is devoted to the subject , of 
"Guardianship." 
IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE CODE 
It is believed that a Code which merely presents a well 
drawn formulation of ideas commonly found in existing pro­
bate legislation would be worth promulgating. But this Code 
does something more. While it is a careful codification of 
the American system of probate law, it seeks to improve that 
law at certain points. 
Probate Judge to Be Same as or Coordinate with 
Trial Judge 
First, it provides a court organization coordinate with, and 
a part of, the trial court of general jurisdiction. See § 6. In 
the early history of our probate law following the model of 
the English ecclesiastical courts which had probate jurisdiction, 
our probate courts were commonly regarded as inferior 
tribunals. But as their jurisdiction was gradually extended, 
the tendency has been to give them a status more nearly like 
that of the trial court of general jurisdiction. Indeed, in 
some states this trial court is the tribunal which sits in probate 
matters. It is believed that such a type of judicial organ­
ization is desirable. There is no more reason for separate 
probate courts in most localities than there is for separate 
criminal courts. But, far more important than the matter of 
separation of function, is the proposition that the judge in 
probate matters should be as well qualified and should receive 
as large a salary as the trial judge. This Code is so drawn 
that it can be enacted whether a separate probate court is 
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desired or whether the judge of the trial court of general 
jurisdiction is given jurisdiction over probate matters. 
General A dministration May Be Initiated Without Notice 
A second important feature of this Code is that it permits 
probate and the appointment of an executor or a. general ad­
ministrator without requiring prior notice to interested per­
sons. See § 68 . This accords with the English practice of 
probate in common form, and also with the practice in a 
considerable number of states. On the other hand, in another 
large group of states, neither an executor nor a general ad­
ministrator can be appointed without reasonable notice to 
interested persons. The difference between these two pro­
cedures is not as great as might at first be supposed. Under 
this Code, if no notice is given prior to the appointment of the 
personal representative, notice must be given as soon as the 
appointment is made, anp interested persons then have an 
opportunity to have all matters reheard which were passed 
upon prior to the notice. In states where notice is required 
prior to the appointment of an executor or a general adminis­
trator, statutes permit the appointment of a special administra­
tor without notice. The advantage of the appointment of an 
executor or general administrator without notice is that some 
one may take charge of the estate and preserve it as soon as 
the decedent dies. There is no delay for the giving of notice, 
nor is there the additional expense of a special administrator­
ship. However, under this Code a court or an interested 
person may always require notice; or a court could adopt a 
rule requiring notice in all cases. Notice is required, however, 
in the case of guardianship estates. 
Court to Have Jurisdiction Over Land 
Although the English ecclesiastical courts, which to some 
extent provided the model for our probate system, had no 
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jurisdiction over land, the modern tendency is to give the 
probate court more and more control over the lanqs of the 
decedent. Indeed, there is no good reason why probate juris­
diction should not extend just as fuliy to a decedent's lands 
as to his personalty. This Code so provides. �ee §§ 6, 8 4, 
1 24, 1 52, r 83. While the personal representative does not 
take title to the lands of the decedent nor to his personalty, he 
is entitled to possession of both unless the court otherwise 
orders in a particular case. 
Only One Contest Permitted 
One of the objections to existing probate procedure which 
this Code seeks to obviate is the wide latitude given to will 
contests. If the probate of the will is upon notice to interested 
persons there is no reason why more than one trial and one 
appeal of the issue of will or no will should be permitted. 
Yet in some states a trial de novo of the issue is permitted 
in the trial court of general jurisdiction as a matter of course 
after the issue has already been determined .in the probate 
court. In this Code, with one exception, it is provided that, 
if the will is admitted to probate on notice to interested persons, 
no further trial of the issue is permitted. See § 73 · An in­
terested heir must take a true appeal to an appellate court. 
The one exception is as follows : if the basis of contest is 
another will, then a contest is permitted on that ground at 
any time before final distribution of the estate is ordered. 
See § 73· 
Notice to Creditors Combined with Original Notice 
In this Code the published notice to creditors and the notice 
of the appointment of the personal representative
' 
are �om­
bined; or, if notice by publication is given prior to the hearing 
for the appointment of a personal representative, then the 
notice to creditors is combined with that notice. See §§ 69, 
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70. In small estates the cost of publication of notices is an 
importan.t item, and these provisions are designed to reduce 
that expense. In addit\on, there is a saving of time. 
Time Schedule to Insure Speedy Administration 
Throughout this Code time provisions have been fixed with 
a view to securing as speedy an administration as is consistent 
with justice to all interested persons. A time schedule sum­
marizing these periods of time appears as Appendix B. Any 
legislative determination of periods of time is necessarily 
somewhat arbitrary and legislatve bodies may sometimes find 
it advisable to modify the periods to suit their own particular 
problems. However, it must be noted .that, in the time 
periods for various procedures, one period can be modified 
only in relation to other time periods. Thus, ordinarily the 
surviving spouse should not be compelled to elect until the 
time for the filing of creditors' claims has expired. Hence, if 
modification is to be made in any procedural provisions as to 
time, the time schedule in Appendix B should first be consulted. 
Decree of Distribution Significant in Determining Title 
In this Code the decree of distribution and not the order 
admitting the will to probate is the significant decree in deter­
mining the title to the real and personal property of the de­
cedent. See § 1 83 (d).  Every effort ha� been made to render 
the decree of distribution conclusive in determining who are 
the successors in interest of the decedent. Much uncertainty 
and consequent litigation will thereby be avoided. 
Reduction in Number of Appeals 
One of the evils of existing probate procedure is that, since 
nearly every probate court order is appealable, a whole series 
of appeals to the higher court is possible with consequent delays 
INTRODUCTION 19 
a.,nd expense. To reduce this evil, provision has been made in 
this Code permitting,the appellate court to review prior orders 
in the administration of decedents' estates as well as the par­
ticular order from which the appeal is taken. See § 20. It 
is expected that with such legislation in force, litigants will 
not usually appeal from anything but the final order of dis­
tribution, the order admitting the will to probate, or the order 
appointing the personal representative. 
Dispensing with Administration 
This Code presents several provisions to take care of cases 
where it might be desirable to dispense with administration 
in whole or in part. See §§ 8 6  to 92, 235 and 23 7· While it 
is believed that there are definite limits beyond which pro­
visions dispensing with administration should not go, within 
those limits it is important to avoid the expense and delay of 
administration by appropriate legislation. 
OMITTED MATTERS 
Something should be said with respect to subjects which 
are excluded from this Code. Some of these, as will be here­
inafter indicated, are excluded because such provisions are 
inherently undesirable. Others are excluded merely because 
it was impracticable or unnecessary to include them. This 
may be because they are axioms of the common law, assumed 
but not stated, because they impinge on other fields of law 
or because, though recognized by the common law, they can­
not satisfactorily be expressed in statutory form. Indeed, no 
code, however complete, could be expected to codify all the 
law of decedents' estates and of guardianship. So much of 
the business of the probate court is administrative that the 
judge must often make a new rule for the actual situation 
when it arises. However, in so doing, he is aided by that great 
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body of judicial opinion which may well be described as the 
American common law of probate and administration and on 
which this Code is built. 
While statutes are found in a number of states providing 
for public administrators, no such provision is included herein 
or is recommended. It is believed that a common result of 
establishing the office of public administrator is to encourage 
the official administration of estates solely because of the fees 
involved, although administration may be entirely unneces­
sary. 
No special provisions are included herein concerning the , 
probate of lost or destroyed wills. See, however, §§ 64(a) 
and 6 5 (e) of the Code. Where such statutes have been en­
acted it is believed that their operation has not been entirely 
satisfactory. Formal restrictions on the probate of such wills 
have often been found to be too rigid; and it seems impossible 
to lay down any hard and fast rules which would work justly 
in all cases. This matter is best developed in the case law. 
See, in general, Ferrier, "Statutory Restrictions on Probate 
of Lost Wills," 32  Cal. L. Rev. 221  ( 1 944) . 
After careful consideration of the subject it was determined 
to exclude any legislation on ante-mortem probate. The 
practical advantages of such a device are not great in view 
of the fact that few testators would wish to encounter the 
publicity involved in such a proceeding. 
This Code makes no attempt to deal generally with prob- , 
lems of ademption. It is true, much well-merited criticism 
has been directed toward the present state of the law. See 
Mechem, "Specific Legacies of Unspecified Things-Ash­
burner v. Macguire Reconsidered," 8 7  U. of Pa. L. Rev. 546 
( 1 939) ; Page, "Ademption by Extinction : Its- Practical Ef­
fects," ( I  943) Wis. L. Rev. I r ; Warren, "History of Ademp­
tion," 25 Iowa L. Rev. 290 ( I 940) .  But the problems are 
believed to involve a subject matter which can better be 
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handled by unwritten law than by statutes. I f  the courts 
would adopt a less rigid definition of a specific legacy, many 
of the difficulties would disappear without 'legislation. How­
ever, in one situation, a single aspect of the subject is dealt 
with in connection with guardianship. See § 2J I .  
No provisions are presented with respect to the effect of 
the murder of the test�tor or intestate by a person interested 
in his estate. Any adequate legislation on this subject would 
extend beyond the probate field and include analogous prob­
lems involved in the murder of the insured by the beneficiary 
of a life insurance policy, the murder of a life tenant by a re­
mainderman, and the murder of a joint tenant or tenant by 
the entireties by anothe� co-tenant. Moreover, ah adequate 
statement of common-law doctrines covering all these situ­
ations is to be found in the American Law Institute Restate­
ment of the Law of Restitution, § § I 8 7-I 8 9 ( I  9 3 7 ) .  If the 
courts adhere to this Restatement, little, if any, legislation will 
be needed. However, it must be conceded that, according to 
the law of some states, the murderer of the decedent may 
take as heir or devisee. See cases cited in 5 I A. L. R. I696. 
Where this is the case, legislation would be desirable. For 
helpful suggestions as to. legislation on this subject, see Wade, 
"Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A 
Statutory Solution," 49 Harv. L. Rev. 7 I 5 ( I  93 6) .  
Aside from the fact that testamentary trusts are within the 
scope of Part I of this Code, containing general provisions, 
and Part V, on Ancillary Administration, no general provisions 
are included on this subject. - A probate code might well con­
tain a separate part devoted solely to the subject of testa­
mentary trusts. However, no good reason is perceived why 
testamentary trusts should, for most purposes, be differentiated 
from inter vivos trusts ; and a judicial organization which 
gives to one set of courts exclusive jurisdiction over testa­
mentary trusts a.nd to another exclusive jurisdiction over inter 
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vivos trusts is open to criticism. If the judge having probate 
jurisdiction is also the judge of the trial court of general juris­
diction, then this difficulty does not arise. If, however, there 
is a separate probate court, with jurisdiction over testamentary · 
trusts, then something more on this subject in a probate code 
may be desirable. However, a better solution of the problem, 
even in that situation, would be to enact a separate body of 
statute law entirely outside the probate code, dealing with 
the administration of both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. 
No provisions for the administration of partnership estates 
when a partner dies have been included. Several states have 
statutes providing that unless the surviving partner files a 
bond with the probate court, the personal representative of 
the deceased partner may administer the partnership estate 
upon giving an additional bond. Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp� 
1 943 ) §§ 59-IOOI to 59-!005 ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) 
§§ 8 I  to 93·  In these states the administration of partnership 
estates upon the death of a partner is brought more or less 
completely under the jurisdiction of the probate court. While 
the provisions afford security to parties in interest, they have 
caused complications in the settlement of partnership estates 
and have produced much litigation. Woerner, Administration 
(3rd ed., 1 923) §§  1 28 to 1 30 ;  annotation, 1 2 1  A. L. R. 860. 
These statutes have been held to be inconsistent with section 
3 7  of the Uniform Partnership Act providing for winding up 
by the surviving partner. Davis v. Hutchinson (C. C. A. 9th, 
1 929) 36  F. (2d) 309. Hence the Model Probate Code con­
tains no provision regarding partnership property except for 
inclusion in the inventory of the decedent's proportionate 
share of any partnership. See § 1 20. However, it is sug­
gested that the Uniform Partnership Act should be included 
in the statutes of the states which have not already enacted it� 
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PART I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
§ I. Short title. This Act shall be known and may be 
cited as the Probate Code. 
§ 2. How Code to take effect. 
(a) Effective date. This Code shall take effect and be in 
force on and after January I ,  I 9-. The procedure herein 
prescribed shall govern all proceedings in probate brought 
after the effective date of the act and also all further procedure 
in proceedings in probate then pending, except to the extent 
that in the opinion of the court their application in particular 
proceedings or parts thereof would not be feasible or would 
work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall 
apply. 
(b) Rights not affected. No act done in any proceeding 
commenced before this Code takes effect and no accrued right 
shall be impaired by its provisions. When a right is acquired, 
extinguished or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed 
period of time which has commenced to run by the provision of 
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any statute in force before this Code takes effect, such provision 
shall remain in force and be deemed a part of this Code with 
respect to such right. 
(c) Severability. If any provision of this Code or the 
application thereof to any person or circumstances is held 
invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or ap­
plications of the Code which can be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions 
of this act are declared to be severable. 
Comment. Statutes of this type are usual in codes and in acts of any 
considerable length. Subsection (a) is modeled after Fed. Rules 
Civ. Proc., Rule 86. North Dakota Compiled Laws ( I 9 I 3 )  §§ 8509 
and 8 5 I o furnished the model for subsection (b) . Subsection (c) 
follows the form recorpmended by the National Conference of Com­
missioners on Uniform State Laws. See Handbook of the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ( I  943) p. 288.  
§ 3. Definitions and use of terms. When used in this 
Code, unless otherwise apparent from the context : 
(a) "Child" includes an adopted child but does not in­
clude a grandchild or other more remote descendants, 
nor, except as provided in section 26, an illegitimate 
child. 
(b) "Claims" include liabilities of the decedent which sur­
vive, whether arising in contract or in tort or other­
wise, funeral expenses, the expense of a tombstone, 
expenses of administration and all estate and inherit­
ance taxes. 
(c) "Devise," when used as a noun, means a testamentary 
disposition of real or personal property or both. 
(d) "Devise," when used as a verb, means to dispose of 
real or personal property or both by will. 
(e) "Devisee" includes legatee. 
(f) "Distributee" denotes those persons who are entitled 
to the real and personal property of a decedent under 
his will or under the statutes of intestate succession. 
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(g) "Estate" denotes the real and personal property of 
the decedent or ward, as from time to time changed in 
form by sale, reinvestment or otherwise, and aug­
mented by any accretions and additions thereto and 
substitutions therefor and diminished by any decreases 
and distributions therefrom. 
(h) "Exempt property" refers to that property of a de­
cedent's estate which is described in section 43 hereof. 
(i) "Fiduciary" includes personal representative, guard­
ian and testamentary trustee. 
(j ) "Heirs" denotes those persons, including the surviv­
ing spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of 
intestate succession to the �eal and personal property 
of a decedent on his death intestate. 
(k) "Interested persons" means heirs, devisees, spouses, 
creditors or any others having a property right in or 
claim against the estate of a decedent being adminis­
tered. This meaning may vary at different stages 
and different parts of a proceeding and must be de­
termined according to the particular purpose and mat­
ter involved. 
( 1) "Issue" of a person, when used to refer to persons who 
take by intestate succession, includes all lawful lineal 
descendants except those who are the lineal descend­
ants of living lineal descendants of the intestate. 
( m) "Lease" includes an oil and gas lease or other mineral 
lease. 
( n) "Legacy" means a testamentary disposition of per­
sonal property. 
( o) "Legatee" means a person entitled to personal prop­
erty under a will. 
(p) "Letters" includes letters testamentary, letters of ad­
ministration and letters of guardianship. 
( q) "Mortgage" includes deed of trust, vendor's lien and 
chattel mortgage. 
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( r) "Net estate" refers to the real and personal property 
of a decedent exclusive of homestead rights, exempt 
property, the family allowance and enforceable claims 
against the estate. 
( s) "Person" includes natural persons and corporations. 
( t) "Personal property" includes interests in goods, 
money, choses in action, evidences of debt and chattels 
real. 
( u) "Personal representative" includes executor, adminis­
trator, and special administrator. 
( v) "Property" includes both real and personal property. 
( w) "Real property" i.q.cludes estates and interests in land, 
corporeal or incorporeal, legal or equitable, other than 
chattels real. 
(x) "Will" includes codicil ; it also includes a testamentary 
instrument which merely appoints an executor and a 
testamentary instrument which merely revokes or re­
vives another will. 
(y) The singular number includes the plural ; the plural 
number includes the singular. 
( z) The masculine gender includes the feminine and 
neuter. 
Comment. Definitional sections such as this are sometimes found 
in various codes. They are believed to be important aids to clearness 
and precision. An example of such a statute in the Florida probate 
Code is Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I  94 I )  § 7 3 1 .03. See, also, a statute of this 
type in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, I 94 I )  § I 7 .  
For definitional sections applicable only to particular parts of this 
Code, see § §  I 96, 238  and 256. 
§ 4. Qualifications of judge. No-person shall be eligible 
to the office of [ judge] unless he shall have been 
admitted to practice in this state for a period of at least [five] 
years immediately before assuming his office and shall have 
practiced law or held judicial office in this state for [ five] 
years. 
Comment. As is indicated in the introduction to this Code, the 
most desirable form of judicial organization is one in which the judge 
• 
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of the trial court of general jurisdiction is also a judge in probate 
matters. If such a form of organization is provided, this and the next 
succeeding section would normally be found in the general provisions 
on judicial organization. But whether there is a separate court for 
probate matters or not, high standards for the office of judge are in­
dispensable to the successful operation of this Code ; and it is con­
templated that the requirements for judges be substantially the same 
as those for judges in the trial court of general jurisdiction. 
In any jurisdiction where probate judges have not, in the past, been 
required to be members of the bar, it may be desirable to insert in this 
section a further provision to the effect that all persons otherwise 
qualified to hold the office of probate judge, who have held that office 
immediately prior to the date when this Code becomes· operative, shall 
be qualified to hold the office of judge in probate matters. Examples 
of provisions of this kind may be found in existing legislation. Thus, 
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1937)  § 1 050 1-1 is as follows: "Quadren­
nially, in each county having a separate probate court, one probate 
judge shall be elected who shall have been admitted to practice as 
attorney and counselor at law in this state, or who shall have previously 
served as probate judge immediately prior to his election." Wis. Stat. 
( 1 943) § 253.02, in stating the qualifications for county judge in 
counties of over 1 4",000 population, adds "Such provision shall not dis­
qualify any person who held such office in this state on or before the 
first day of July, I 933·" The Missouri Constitution, just adopted, 
provides (Art. V, § 25) ". . . every judge and magistrate shall be 
licensed to practice law in this state, except that probate judges now in 
office may succeed themselves as probate judges without being so 
licensed." 
§ 5. Salaries of judges. The salaries of [ 
judges] shall be $ [ ] per annum, which shall not be 
decreased during their respective terms of office . 
. 
§ 6. Jurisdiction. The [ ] court shall have 
plenary jurisdiction of the administration, settlement and 
distribution of estates of decedents, . whether consisting of real 
or personal property or both, the probate of wills, the granting 
of letters testamentary, of administration and of guardianship, 
the construction of wills, whether incident to the administra­
tion of an estate or as a separate proceeding, the determination 
of heirship, the administration of testamentary trusts, and the 
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administration of guardianships of minors and other incom­
petents. It shall have the same legal and equitable powers to 
effectuate its jurisdiction and to carry out its orders, judgments 
and decrees, and the same presumptions shall exist as to the 
validity of such orders, judgments and decrees in probate as 
in other matters. 
Comment. It is assumed that the jurisdiction to probate and to 
administer estates is exch.1sive except to the extent that legislation other­
wise provides. Administt:ation of decedents' estates in chancery as 
recognized in English law would not be permissible under this Code. 
If the former practice of a jurisdiction is such that the opposite con­
clusion might be reached by a court, it would be desirable to insert at 
the end of the first paragraph of this section a statement to the effect 
that administration of decedents' estates in Chancery is hereby 
abolished. As to the jurisdiction to administer estates under guardian­
ship, see § 1 99 and Introductory Comment to Part IV. 
The chief reason for giving a probate court jurisdiction over testa­
mentary trusts is that the judge's familiarity with the decedent's estate 
from which the trust is set up enables him to decide questions about the 
trust with a fuller appreciation of the factual problems involved than 
would another judge. Sometimes, ho:wever, an inter vivos trust has 
been set up by a testator prior to his death which has a very close rela­
tion to a trust set up by his will. Indeed, the provisions in the will may 
be such that it is difficult to determine whether there is a separate testa­
mentary trust or whether the testator has merely increased the corpus 
of the inter vivos trust. To take care of these and similar situations, it 
would be desirable to have a statute in the general procedural or court 
organization sections of the statutes of a state which would permit the 
transfer of a testamentary trust tt> a judge or court handling a related 
inter vivos trust or vice versa. No such provision is included in this 
Code because its scope would be somewhat broader than probate 
matters. 
If there is a separate probate court, there should be substituted for 
the phrase "in probate as in other matters" the following : "as in the 
trial court of general jurisdiction." The sentence of which this phrase 
is a part is designed to eliminate any trace of the notion that the court 
of general jurisdiction sitting as a probate court, or that the probate 
court, is a court of inferior jurisdiction. Since this idea was once very 
widespread, it is important to negative it expressly. For an excellent 
statute which accomplishes this purpose, see M·ass. Ann. Laws ( 1 932) 
c. 2 15, § 2. 
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It shou!'d be observed that, if the Uniform Declaratory Judgments 
Act is in force, it would apply to the jurisdiction of the court to make 
declaratory judgments in probate matters. Compare also § 6o of this 
Code which specifically provides for declaratory judgments in the con­
struction of a will. 
§ 7. Distribution of business. In all counties in which 
the court is composed of two or more judges, such court shall 
provide by local rule for the distribution of the business of the 
court between the judges and also for the order of business. 
Comment. If probate matters are handled by the trial court of 
general jurisdiction, the business would normally be distributed so that 
one or more of the judges handles probate matters exclusively. In 
California, where probate matters are handled by the Superior Court, 
such a provision is employed to accomplish this result in the larger 
counties of that state. See Rules 2 I-24 inclusive of the Rules of 
Superior Courts, in Larmac, Index to California Laws ( I  94 3) pp. 
I 786-I 790. 
If a separate probate court is provided for and the�;e are two or 
more probate judges, this section can still be used to bring about some 
distribution of business on the basis of its character. Thus, one judge 
may handle exclusively matters of decedents' estates, while to another 
may be assigned matters of guardianship and related matters. 
In general, as to the subject matter of this section, see Pound, 
Organization of Courts ( I  940) ; Arnold, What Is My Jurisdiction ? 
-A Treatise on the Constitutional Jurisdiction of Probate Courts in 
Missouri ( I  944) . 
§ 8. Court open at reasonable hours. The court shall 
be open for the transaction of probate business at all reasonable 
hours. 
Comment. Due to the nature of its business, the court should not 
be subject to the strictures of terms of court, but should be open at all 
reasonable hours for the conduct of probate business. Fiduciaries must 
be appointed promptly in order to preserve the estates ; and emer­
gencies in administration may arise at any time which require a prompt 
decision. Statutes such as this section are not uncommon. See, for 
example, Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 5 9-2 I I ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. 
( I 943)  § 27 .3 I 7 8 (3o) ; Minn. Stat. ( I94 I )  § 525 .0 I .  Indeed, 
some legislation provides that the probate court shall be open at all 
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times. See Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § 732.02 ; N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, 
§ 34· 
§ 9. Disqualification of judge. 
(a) When and how judge disqualified. When any 
judge or his spouse shall be related within the third degree of 
consanguinity according to the civil law to any of the parties 
or their attorneys, shall have drawn the will of the decedent, 
or shall be interested or have been counsel in any probate pro­
ceeding or any matter therein, the same shall be grounds for 
disqualifying such judge from acting in such proceeding or the 
particular matter with respect to which his disqualification ex­
ists. When grounds fer disqualification exist, the judge may 
refuse to act as judge therein ; or, upon the filing of a petition 
to disqualify such judge, stating the grounds therefor, by any 
person interested in the estate or the particular matter with 
respect to w]lich his disqualification exists, the judge must not 
act therein. 
(b) How another judge obtained; validity of his acts. 
When any judge shall be disqualified, or unable to act as judge 
due to illness or absence from the county, or when in his 
opinion the interest of the public or of any person interested 
in any matter requires that another judge act in his stead, such 
judge or the presiding judge, if any, may request another 
judge of a court of record of the same or another district to 
act in his place ; but in either case, if all persons or their at­
torneys interested in the proceeding or matter shall agree by 
written stipulation, a member of the bar having the same 
- qualifications as are required for judge may be requested and 
appointed to act as judge therein. All orders, judgments and 
decrees made by such acting judge shall have the same force 
and effect as if made by the regular judge. 
Comment. The provisions of this section were suggested by Minn. 
Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § §  5 25 .05, 525 .05 1 ,  525.052. Compare Kan. Gen. 
Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 59-203. The only disqualifications considered 
here are those in connection with probate proceedings. If a judge is 
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prejudiced against any party in a particular matter, or is temporarily or 
permanently disabled from performing his duties, other provisions may 
be necessary, but will ordinarily be contained in other statutes on 
judicial organization. 
§ 10. Power of courts to make rules. The [supreme 
court] may, on the recommendation of the majority of the 
[ judges] ,  or on its own motion,- promulgate rules 
and forms of procedure for probate proceedings, not incon­
sistent with the provisions of this Code. Each [ ] 
court may promulgate rules and forms of procedure for pro­
bate proceedings, not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Code nor with such rules and forms as are promulgated by the 
[supreme court] .  If in any probate proceeding a situation 
arises which is not provided for by any statute or rule of pro­
cedure, the court may formulate and declare a rule of proce­
dure for that particular case. 
Comment. Provisions regarding the making of court rules show 
some variation from state to state. Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 
I 94 I )  c. 3, § I 54, is similar in substance to the Model Probate Code. 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-250 I  provides simply for the 
making of rules by the supreme court, without any such power in the 
probate judges. Under the provisions of Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I ) 
§ 525 .06, the probate judges themselves make rules at an annual as­
sembly. Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 2 7 .3 1 78 (53) and Ohio Gen. 
Code (Page, I 937 )  § I 050 I-I3 are similar to the Minnesota statute 
except that the rules must be submitted to and adopted by the supreme 
court. 
In some states it is provided by statute that where there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, the rules of civil procedure may be applied . .  
See Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § 1 5 5 ,  and Ohio Gen. 
Code (Page·, Supp. 1 944) § I 050 I-22 .  Such legislation is not 
recommended. Much of the proceedings in matters of probate is 
administrative in character and not adversary. It is believed, therefore, 
that rules of civil procedure designed primarily for adversary proceed-
ings should not be applied. _ 
The term "supreme court" as used in this section refers to the high­
est appellate court of the state to which appeals are taken. If that 
court is referrerd to by some other designation in a given state, that 
designation should be substituted in this section. The blanks preceding 
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the word "judges" and the word "court" in this section are to be filled 
by the name of the court of original jurisdiction in probate matters. 
§ I I .  Powers of clerk. 
(a) Ministerial matters. The clerk shall have power to 
take acknowledgments, administer oaths, and to certify and 
authenticate copies of instruments, documents and records of 
the court, and to perform the usual functions of his office. 
(b) Notices of hearing. Subject to control of the judge, 
the clerk shall have power to issue notices and to make all neces­
sary orders for the hearing of any petition or other matter to 
be heard in the court. 
(c) Judicial powers. If a matter is not contested, the 
clerk may hear and determine it and make all orders, judg­
ments and decrees in connection therewith which the judge 
could make, subject to be set aside or modified by the judge at 
any time within thirty days thereafter ; but if not so set aside 
or modified such orders, judgments and decrees shall have the 
same effect as if made by the court or judge. 
Comment. In most states clerks of probate courts have been given 
some judicial powers, or are authorized to exercise judicial powers 
under special circumstances, as in the absence of the judge, or in non­
contentious matters. This is believed justified in the interests of the 
efficient conduct of the business of the court, provided that general 
supervision or revision of the acts of the clerk is adequately provided 
for. See Simes and Basye, "Organization of the Probate Court in 
America," 42 Mich. L. Rev. 96 5 ( I  944) and 4 3 Mich. L. Rev. I I  3 
at 1 45-150  ( 1 944) . For a provision in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure giving certain judicial powers to the clerk, see Fed. Rules 
Civ. Proc., Rule 7 7 (c ) .  
Due to the nature o f  probate business, the court should b e  easily ac­
cessible to all persons. Hence, it is almost the universal practice, where 
there are separate courts of probate, to have at least one in each county. 
Upon the adoption of the recommendations made herein to the effect 
that probate matters be handled by the trial court of general jurisdic­
tion, that court may be organized to serve a larger district than a 
county as a circuit or district court. Nevertheless, it is desirable that 
such a court sit in each county, and that a clerk and probate records be 
found in each county. This is the practice in some' states where such 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 5 1  
a judicial organization is now in force, and it is assumed that such 
practice would be followed where this Code is adopted. 
§ 12. Application to court by verified petition. Every 
application to the court, unless otherwise provided, shall be by 
petition signed and verified by or on behalf of the petitioner. 
No defect of form or substance in any petition, nor the absence 
of a petition, shall invalidate any proceedings. 
Comment. In civil procedural rules there · has been a modern 
tendency to do away with a requirement of verification of pleadings. 
See, for example, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 1 I. However, in 
probate matters the situation is believed to call for verification. Often 
the proceeding is ex parte or is not contested and little or no evidence is 
introduced other than the verified petition. Moreover, in such a case, 
if the petitioner is present in court, the verified petition not only may 
be accepted in lieu of his testimony, but may be substituted for a written 
record of such testimony. 
The last line of this section is similar to Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 
1 943 ) § 5 9-2201  and Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .8 1 .  It should be 
noted that it merely states that such a defective petition or the absence 
of a petition does not make the proceeding void. It does not prevent 
an opposing litigant from insisting upon the filing of an amended peti­
tion, nor does it dispense with proof of the necessary facts. 
§ 13.  Filing objections to petition. Any interested per­
son, on or before the day set for hearing, may file written ob­
jections to a petition previously filed, and, upon special order 
or general rule of the court, objections to such petition must 
be filed in writing as a prerequisite of being heard by the court. 
§ 14. Notice. 
(a) When notice to be given. No notice to interested 
persons need be given except as specifically provided for in this 
Code or as ordered by the court. When no notice is required 
by this Code, the court may require such notice as it deems de­
sirable by a general rule or by an order in a particular case. 
(b) Kinds of notice required. Unless waived and ex­
cept as otherwise provided by law, all notices required by this 
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Code to be served upon any person shall be served as the court 
shall direct, by rule or in a particular case, either 
( 1 ) By delivering a copy of the same at least seven 
days before the hearing to such person per­
sonally; or 
( 2)  By publishing once in each week for three weeks 
consecutively in some newspaper printed and 
circulating in the county where said court is 
held, the first day of publication to be at least 
thirty days prior to the date set for hearing; or 
in case there be no newspaper printed in said 
county, then in some newspaper published in 
this state and designated by the judge or clerk, 
circulating in the county where the proceeding 
is pending; or 
(3)  By registered mail, requesting a return receipt 
signed by addressee only, addressed to such per­
son located in the United States at his address 
stated in the petition for the hearing, to be 
posted by depositing in any United States post 
office in this state at least fourteen days prior to 
the date set for hearing in said notice ; or 
( 4) By any combination of two or more of the above. 
In all cases where service by publication is ordered, but per­
sonal service or service by registered mail is not ordered, all 
persons whose names and addresses are given in the petition 
shall be served by ordinary mail in the same manner and with 
the same requirements as provided herein for service by reg­
istered mail except that no registration shall be required. 
(c) By whom service made. Service by publication and 
by registered and ordinary mail shall be made by the clerk at 
the instance of the party who requires such service to be made. 
Personal service may be made in any part of this state by any 
competent person. 
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(d) Service on attorney. If an attorney shall have 
entered his appearance in writing for any party in any probate 
proceeding or matter pending in the court, all notices required 
to be served on the party in such proceeding or matter shall be 
served on the attorney and such service shall be in lieu of serv-
ice upon the party for whom the attorney appears. 
· 
Comment. In some instances the Code requires a particular kind 
of notice to be given. See, for example, § § 69 and 70  requiring notice 
by publication and by registered mail either prior to the hearing on the 
petition for probate or administration or on the appointment of the 
personal representative. In other instances the Code merely states that 
notice must be given. In such case this section provides the different 
kinds of notices from which the court makes a selection. This selec­
tion may be made in each particular case or by a rule of court. More­
over, in any case where the Code requires no notice, the court may in 
its discretion order notice or may make a general rule as to notice in 
any class of cases. The kind of notice so ordered is to be determined 
by the court. For example, a court order could make express provi­
sion for service by ordinary mail, or for service in any other reasonable 
manner whether expressly provided for in subsection (b) hereof or 
not. Under § I I (b) the clerk may, subject to the control of the 
court and any standing rules of court, direct the manner of service. 
§ 15. Proof of service. Proof of service in all cases re­
quiring notice, whether by publication, mailing or otherwise, 
shall be filed before the hearing. Service made by a private 
person shall be proved by the affidavit of the person; service 
made by the clerk or other official shall be proved by certificate 
or return of service. In the case of service by registered mail, 
the return receipt shall be attached to the proof of service if a 
receipt has been received; if no receipt has been received the 
court may, in its discretion, order further service on the party. 
§ 16. Waiver of notice. Any person legally competent 
who is interested in any hearing in a probate proceeding may 
in person or by attorney waive in writing notice of such hear­
ing. A guardian of the estate or a guardian ad litem may make 
such a waiver on behalf of his ward, and a trustee may make 
' 
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such a waiver on behalf of the beneficiary of his trust. A consul 
or other representative of a foreign government, whose ap­
pearance has been entered as provided by law on behalf of any 
person residing in a foreign country, may make such waiver of 
notice <;:>n behalf of such person. Any person who submits to 
the jurisdiction of the court in any hearing shall be deemed to 
have waived notice thereof. 
§ 17. Stenographic record. The judge may of his own 
motion, or on the request of an interested person, direct the 
stenographer of his court to attend any hearing in a probate 
proceeding and make a stenographic record of the same. 
Comment. In metropolitan areas it might be desirable to provide 
for a court stenographer who would make a stenographic record of all 
hearings. This can easily be accomplished under the Code by a rule 
of court to t�at effect. However, in less populous areas the rule laid 
down in this section would appear to be sufficient. 
§ 18. Jury trial. 
(a) Right to jury trial; waiver. Whenever the right to 
trial by jury is guaranteed by the constitution of this state, any 
person entitled thereto may file a written demand for trial by 
jury prior to the hearing of the issues of fact. The right to 
trial by jury is waived if a demand is not so filed, or if the person 
claiming the right fails to appear at the hearing or fails to object 
to trial by the court before evidence is commenced. 
(b) When not of right. When, under subsection (a) 
hereof, there is no right to trial by jury or if the right is·waived, 
the court in its discretion may call a jury to decide any issues of 
fact, but the verdict in such case shall be advisory only. 
Comment. Most of the questions of fact likely to arise in connec­
tion with probate matters can be decided mor� satisfactorily by the 
judge than by the jury and at less expense. Therefore, if it were not 
for the possibility of violating constitutional provisions which preserve 
the right to jury trial, it would be desirable to provide that there shall 
be no trial by jury except under the circumstances stated in subsection 
(b) hereof. It is clear that there was no right of trial by jury in 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 55 
England- in chancery or in the ecclesiastical courts, which were the 
predecessors of probate courts. But certain steps in a modern proceed­
ing for the administration of the estate of a decedent may be regarded 
as merely proceedings at law which, for convenience, have been trans-" 
ferred to the court having jurisdiction of probate matters. Most im­
portant among these are the adjudication of creditors' claims and the 
determination of title in disclosure proceedings. This section seeks to 
insure that the constitutional right to trial by jury is not violated and at 
the same time to minimize as far as possible the use of the jury. 
Similar provisions are found in Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rules 38  and 
39, and N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § §  67 and 68. 
It should be noted that, if the constitution of a state does not 
guarantee � right to trial by jury in probate matters, then a statute 
which denies such a jury trial would not violate any provision of the 
Federal constitution, either as to jury trial or as to due process of law. 
Hence, if it is clear that a state constitution does not guarantee a right 
to trial by jury in pmbate matters, it would be desirable, instead of the 
form of § I 8 here proposed, to substitute a provision to the effect that 
there should be no right to a jury trial but that the court might, in its 
discretion, order a trial of issues of fact by a jury, the verdict of which 
would be purely advisory. 
By the great weight of authority there is no constitutional right to 
jury trial of a will contest. Annotation, 62 A.L.R. 82 ; but see 
Corley v. McElmeel, 149 N. Y. 228, 43 N. E. 628 ( 1 896) .  Many 
jurisdictions, however, grant jury trial of right by statute. See annota­
tion, 62 A.L.R. 82, 85 .  This is not recommended ; but i f  it were 
thought to be desirable, a subsection to this effect could be added to 
§ I 8, and appropriate changes made in subsections (a) and (b) . In 
Massachusetts and New York a jury issue in a probate pr()ceeding may 
be transferred for trial to the ordinary trial court of general jurisdic­
tion. Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 932)  c. 2 1 5 , § 1 6 ;  N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act, 
§ 68. 
§ 19.  Vacation and modification of judgments. For 
good cause, at any time within the period allowed for appeal 
after the final termination of the administration of the estate 
of a decedent or ward, the court may vacate or modify its 
orders, judgments and decrees, or grant a rehearing therein, 
except that no such power shall exist as to any orders, judg­
ments or decrees from which an appeal has been taken, prior to 
a final disposition thereof on su�h appeal, or to set aside the 
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probate of a will after the time allowed for contest thereof. 
No vacation or modification under this section shall affect any 
act done or any right acquired in reliance on any such order, 
judgment or decree. 
Commmt. One of the reasons for the inferior position of probate 
courts in our system of judicial organization has been their lack of 
power over their own orders and judgments such as exists in courts 
of general jurisdiction. It is true that over a long period of years some 
small amount of control has been granted with respect to particular 
orders and usually for short periods of time ; but it has been wholly 
inadequate for the needs. Obviously some effective control is neces­
sary in the interests of efficient administration. The very fact of the 
ex parte nature of much of probate procedure makes this highly de­
sirable. 
If the need for such control is granted, the time element is also im­
portant. A few statutes have restricted this control to a time cor­
responding to the period allowed for filing a motion for a new trial ; 
others to a period corresponding to the time for taking an appeal. In 
view of the fact that an administration proceeding is one proceeding 
consisting of many steps or stages which are inextricably connected and 
related, it seems advisable to extend this control throughout the entire 
proceeding and also for a time thereafter corresponding to the time for 
taking an appeal. 
It is not intended that this power be arbitrary, but must depend for 
its exercise upon the existence of facts constituting "good cause." 
Furthermore, the exercise of such power may not affect acts done or 
rights acquired in reliance on any order, judgment or decree prior to its 
vacation or modification. 
In addition to statutory provisions such as this for relief against a 
judgment or decree, there are rules of equity giving relief from the 
judgment of a court of general jurisdiction in certain cases of fraud, 
duress and error. See Restatement, Judgments ( I  942) § § I I 8-I 26 .  
As will be seen from § 6 of this Code, the court having jurisdiction in 
probate matters is a court of general jurisdiction. Hence, the relief 
provided for in § I 9 hereof is supplementary to the relief given in equity 
against judgments in the absence of statute. 
§ 20. Appeals. 
(a) Appeal to [supreme court] permitted. Except as 
provided in subsection (b) hereof, a person aggrieved by an 
order, judgment or decree of the [ ] court, in pro-
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ceedings under the provisions of this Code, may obtain a review 
of the same by the [supreme court] . 
(b) Orders which are not appealable. There shall be 
no appeal from any order removing any fiduciary for failure to 
give a new bond or to render an account as required by the 
court, nor from an order appointing a special administrator, 
nor from an order granting a rehearing, nor, by any person 
except the widow or children affected thereby, from an order 
granting an allowance to the widow or children of a decedent 
pending settlement of the estate or setting apart exempt pet:­
sonal property to them. 
(c) When appeal heard with appeal from decree of 
final distribution. When an appeal is taken with respect to 
any appealable order, judgment or decree in the administra­
tion of a decedent's estate, made prior to the decree of final 
distribution, other than an order admitting or denying the 
probate of a will or appointing or refusing to appoint a per­
sonal representative, the [ ] court may, in its dis­
cretion, order that the appeal be stayed until the decree of 
final distribution is made and that the appeal be heard only as 
a part of any appeal which may be taken from the decree of 
final distribution. This subsection shall not apply to guardian­
ships and testamentary trusts. 
(d) When appeal from decree of final distribution in­
cludes appeal from prior orders . .  When an appeal is taken 
from the decree of final distribution in the administration of a 
decedent's estate, all prior appealable orders, judgments and 
decrees to which the appellant has filed objections in writing 
within five days after the order, judgment or decree was 
rendered and from which an appeal has not theretofore been 
taken, except orders admitting or denying the probate of a 
will or appointing a personal representative shall, at the elec­
tion of the appellant, be reviewed. The appellant shall in­
dicate such election by clearly stating in the appeal the orders, 
judgments and decrees which he desires to have reviewed. 
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(e) Stay. An appeal shall stay other proceedings in the 
court from which the appeal is taken unless, or to the extent 
that, such court finds that neither the interested persons nor 
the court will be prejudiced and by order permits other pro­
ceedings to be had. 
(f) When fiduciary not required to give appeal bond. 
No appeal bond shall be required of a fiduciary when he ap­
peals on behalf of the estate. 
(g) Applicability of general appellate rules. Except 
as provided in this section, the provisions as to time, manner, 
notice, appeal bonds, stays, scope of review and all other mat­
ters relating to appellate review shall be determined by the 
rules applicable to appeals to the [supreme court] in equity 
cases except that in cases where jury trial has been had of right, 
the rules applicable to the scope of review in jury cases shall 
apply. 
Comment. This section follows the lead of several states in dis­
carding the notion of an appeal from the probate court as a trial de novo 
in the trial court of general jurisdiction. For the reasons in favor of 
the position taken herein, see Simes and Basye, "The Organization of 
the Probate Court in America," 4.2 Mich. L. Rev. 96 5 ( I  944),  
and 43 Mich. L. Rev. I I 3 ( I 944) . 
The general plan of making all orders appealable except such as are 
expressly excluded follows the Michigan statute. See Mich. Stat. 
Ann. ( I 943) § 27.3 I 78 (37 ) .  It is believed that this form is much 
less cumbersome than that of the Kansas statute which purports to 
list practically all appealable orders. See Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) 
§ 5 9�240I·. 
In subsections (a) and (c) , the name of the trial court or the 
probate court, as the case may be, should be supplied in the bracketed 
blank preceding the word "court." 
The provisions of subsections (c) and (d) for postponing appeals 
as to particular orders are designed to mitigate the evils involved in 
permitting numerous appeals to the supreme court in the same probate 
proceeding. As to the applicability of subsections (b), (c) and (d) 
to guardianship, see comment to § 2 I 5. 
The appeal follows the procedure of an appeal in equity in most cases. 
The provision to that effect was suggested by Mass. Ann. Laws ( I  932) 
c.  2 I 5, § 9· If, in a given state, equity and law appeals are the. same, 
then subsection (g) should be modified. Of course, if the supreme 
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court is not the tribunal to which cases are appealed from the · trial 
court of general jurisdiction, then the name of the proper appellate 
tribunal should be substituted. 
§ 21 .  Records. The court shall keep the following 
records : 
(a) An index in which files pertaining to estates of de­
ceased persons shall be indexed under the name of the 
decedent, and those pertaining to guardianships under 
the name of the ward; after the name of each file shall 
be shown the file number and the book and page of 
the register. 
(b) A register, in which shall be listed in chronological 
order under the name of the decedent or ward, all 
documents filed or issued and all orders, j udgments 
and decrees made pertaining to the estate, the date 
thereof, and a reference to the volume and page of any 
other book in which any record shall have been made 
of such document. 
(c) A record ot wills, properly indexed, in which shall be 
recorded all wills admitted to probate with the certifi­
cate of probate thereof; 
(d) A record of bonds, properly indexed, in which shall 
be recorded all bonds filed ; 
(e) A record of letters, properly indexed, in which shall 
be entered all letters issued; 
(f) A record of probate proceedings, which shall contain 
the minutes of the proceedings, and all orders, judg­
ments and decrees of the court. 
PART II.  INTESTATE SuccEssioN AND WILLS · 
INTESTATE SUCCESSION 
§.22. General rules of descent. The net estate of a per­
son dying intestate shall descend and be distributed as follows: 
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(a) Share of surviving spouse. The surviving spouse 
shall receive the following share : 
( I ) One-half of the net estate if the intestate is 
survived by issue; or 
( 2) The first five thousand dollars and one-half of 
the remainder of the net estate, if there is no 
surviving issue, but the intestate is survived by 
one or more of his parents, or of his brothers, 
sisters or their issue; or 
( 3 ) All of the net estate, if there is no surviving 
issue nor parent nor issue of a parent. 
(b) Shares of others than surviving spouse. The share 
of the net estate not distributable to the surviving 
spouse, or the entire net estate if there is no surviving 
spouse, shall descend and be distributed as follows : 
( I )  To the issue of the intestate ; if they are all in 
the same degree of kinship to the intestate they 
shall take equally, or if of unequal degree, then 
those of more remote degrees shall take by 
representation. 
( 2) If there is no surviving issue of the intestate, 
then to the surviving parents, brothers and 
sisters and the issue of deceased brothers and 
sisters of the intestate. Each living parent of 
the intestate shall be treated as of the same 
degree as a brother or sister, and shall be en­
titled to the same share as a brother or sister. 
Issue of deceased brothers and sisters shall take 
by representation. 
(3)  If there is  no surviving parent or brother or 
sister of the intestate, then to the issue of 
brothers and sisters. If such distributees are all 
in the same degree of kinship to the intestate 
they shall take equally,. or if of unequal degree, 
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then those of more remote degrees shall take by 
representation. 
( 4) If there is no surviving issue, or parent of the 
intestate, or issue of a parent, then to the sur­
viving grandparents of the intestate equally. 
( 5)  If there is no  surviving issue, or parent, or issue 
of a parent, or grandparent of the intestate, 
then to the issue of deceased grandparents in the 
nearest degree of kinship to the intestate per 
capita without representation. The degree of 
kinship shall be computed according to the rules 
of the civil law; that is, by counting upward 
from the intestate to the nearest common an­
cestor and then downward to the relative, the 
degree of kinship being the sum of these two 
counts. 
( 6) If there is no person mentioned in the preceding 
five parts of this subsection, then to the State of 
[ ] .  
(c) Meaning of representation. "Representation" re­
fers to a method of determining distribution in which 
the takers are in unequal degrees of kinship with re- . 
spect to the intestate, and is accomplished as follows : 
after first determining who are in the nearest degree 
of kinship of those entitled to share in the estate, the 
estate is divided into equal shares, the number of 
shares being the sum of the number of living persons 
who are in the nearest degree of kinship and the num­
ber of persons in the same degree of kinship who died 
before the intestate, but who left issue surviving; each 
share of a deceased person in the nearest degree shall 
in turn be divided in the same manner among his 
surviving children and the issue of his children who 
have died leaving issue who survive the intestate ; this 
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division shall continue until each portion falls to a 
living person. All distributees except those in the 
nearest degree are said to take by representation. 
Comment. This section is in accord with certain modern trends. 
First, real and personal property are distributed in exactly the same 
way. While in feudal England a person might well desire one person 
to inherit his real estate on his death intestate and another to be the 
distributee of his personalty, there is no reason why such a differentiation 
should be made today. Examples of statutes of descent and distribution 
in which real and personal estate pass in exactly the same way are : Fla. 
Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 7 3 1 .23 ; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 93 7 )  
§ 10503-I .  
Second, no distinction is made between ancestral and non-ancestral 
real estate. Under English rules it was once the law that the heir 
must trace descent from the person last seized. This doctrine was 
adapted to American statutes of descent and distribution in a number 
of states by provisions for a different line of descent when real property 
came to the intestate by "descent, devise or deed of gift" from some 
one of his ancestors. Gradually such provisions have been repealed, 
although some of them remain on the statute books. See Pa. Stat. 
Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t. 20, § 7 5, and Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 
I 9 3 7 ) § I O  5 03-I for statutes which eliminate any distinction as to 
ancestral land. It is believed that such a distinction only complicates 
land titles and does not serve to carry out any wish of the intestate. 
Third, this section, unlike many American statutes, does not permit 
all persons of the blood of the intestate, however remote, to take as 
heirs. This is believed to accord with the wishes of the average person 
who dies intestate. Relatives may be so distant that the decedent might 
well prefer that his property go to the state rather than to such relatives. 
The present English statute of descent and distribution recognizes this 
principle. See Administration of Estates Act, I 5 Geo. V, c. 23, § 46 
( I  92 5 ) .  Some American states also cut off the line of inheritance 
short of the most remote relative of the blood of the intestate. See D. 
C. Code ( I  940) § I 8-7 I 7 (as to personalty only) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. 
(Supp. I 943 ) § 59-509 ; Md. Code ( I 939) art. 93, § 143. 
The general scheme of this Code is first to give a very substantial 
share to the surviving spouse. Then, lineal heirs take to the most 
remote degree, which. is in accordance with the statutes in all states. 
According to the English rule, lineal descendants take per stirpes, 
the children being the stirpes even though all children are dead. Such 
is the rule in some states. However, in a larger number of states the 
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rule here announced is followed, namely, that distribution is per stirpes 
only if the claimants are in unequal degrees, and in that case the stirpes 
are those represented by the claimants in the nearest degree to the 
intestate.' See, for example, Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 2 7-3 I 78 {  ISO) 
subd. 2 ;  Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 237.0 I ,  subd. I .  But compare the 
interpretation of Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § §  222  and 
250 in Maud v. Catherwood (Cal. App. I 94S ) ,  I SS  P. ( 2d) I I I .  
In general, Anglo-American statutes dealing with inheritance by 
collateral heirs are based on two systems, the parentelic system and the 
civil law system, although most of them represent a combination of 
these two. Under the parentelic system, if there are no lineal descend­
ants, the nearest ascendants, namely, the parents, take, and then their 
issue to the remotest degree take by representation. In the absence of 
parents and their issue, then grandparents take; and if there are none, 
then the issue of grandparents in like manner as the issue of parents. 
This process may be continued indefinitely as more and more remote 
ascendants and their issue are permitted to take. 
In accordance with the civil law system, the heirs are those who are 
nearest in degree to the intestate. Degrees are determined by counting 
from the decedent up to the common ancestor and then down to the 
claimant. The total is the degree of relationship of the claimant to 
the testator. As between two claimants, the one who is removed 
from the intestate by the smaller number of degrees is the distributee. 
With some modifications, the parentelic scheme is followed in this 
statute up to a certain point. As is commonly provided in statutes, 
however, parents take equally with, and not in preference to, brothers 
and sisters. See, for example, Ga. Code Ann. ( I  936) § I I  3-903, 
subd. 6 ;  Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § I 62 ; Miss. Code 
( I  942) § 468 ;  Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I  942) § 306. · When we 
come to provide for inheritance by issue of deceased grandparents, the 
civil . law system is followed. 
It is, of course, recognized that any scheme of intestate succession 
is, to some extent, arbitrary. It should in the main express what the 
typical intestate would have wished had he expressed his desires in the 
form of a will or otherwise. This is a highly speculative matter, and 
legislators may deem it desirable to modify the scheme herein set out. 
For a similar scheme of intestate succession set out in a statute which 
was once drafted for the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, see Eagleton, "Introduction to the Intestacy Act and the 
Dower Rights Act," 20 Iowa L. Rev. 24 I ( I 93S ) ; Eagleton, "The 
Intestacy Act," 20 Iowa L. Rev. 244 ( I 93S ) ·  
It will be noticed that this section deals with the net estate and does 
not include the homestead ( §  42) ,  exeJ;Dpt property ( §  43) or family 
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allowances ( § 44) . See the definition of "net estate" in § 3 ( r) and 
of "claims" in § 3 (b) . 
§ 23. Partial intestacy. If part but not all of the estate of 
a decedent is validly disposed of by will, the part not disposed 
of by will shall be distributed as provided herein for intestate 
estates. 
§ 24. Kindred of the half blood. Kindred of the half 
blood shall inherit the same share which they would have in­
herited if they had been of the whole blood. 
Comment. The modern tendency is in the direction of abolishing 
distinctions between persons of the half blood and the whole blood. 
In twelve states all distinctions have been abolished, while in a score 
of others the only distinction is in the case of ancestral estates, persons 
not of the blood of the ancestor being barred or deferred. This proviso 
for ancestral estates does not logically fit in with the half blood statute. 
Thus, the ancestral clause has been applied where none of the claim­
ants were of the half blood. In re Wortmann's Estate, 2 1  o Mich. 
54 1 ,  1 7 7 N. W. 967 ( 1 920) . In a few states the half bloods take 
after the whole bloods of the same degree of kinship, while in a few 
others half bloods take half as much as whole bloods of the same degree. 
Jurisdictions in which the distinction has been abolished are as follows: 
D. C. Code ( 1 940) § §  1 8-104 and 1 8-7 1 5 ;  Ga. Code Ann. ( 1 936) 
§ 1 1 3-903, subd. 5 ;  Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § 1 6 2 ;  
Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) c .  1 5 6, § 2 ;  Md. Code ( 1 939) art. 93, § 1 3 8 ;  
Mass. Ami. Laws ( 1 932) c .  1 90, § 4 ;  N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, § 83, 
subd. I I ;  Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 937)  § 1 0503-4 ; Ore. Comp. 
Laws ( I 940) § I 6-2o4 ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t. 20, 
§ 62 ; Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 933)  § 2967 ; Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 932) 
§ 1 347· 
§ 25. Afterbom heirs; time of determining relation­
ships. Descendants and other relatives of the intestate, be­
gotten before his death but born thereafter, shall inherit as if 
they had been born in the lifetime of the intestate and had 
survived him. With this exception, the descent and distribu­
tion of intestate estates shall be determined by the relationships 
existing at the time of the death of the intestate. 
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§ 26. Illegitimate children. For the purpose of inherit­
ance to, through and from an illegitimate child, such child 
shall be treated the same as if he were the legitimate child of 
his mother, so that he and his issue shall inherit from his mother 
and from his maternal kindred, both descendants and collat­
erals, in all degrees, and they may inherit from him. Such 
child shall also be treated the same as if he were a legitimate 
child of his mother for the purpose of determining homestead 
rights, the distribution of exempt property and the making of 
family allowances. When the parents of an illegitimate child 
shall marry subsequent to his birth, such child shall be deemed 
to have been made the legitimate child of both of the parents 
for purposes of intestate succession. 
§ 27. Adopted children. For the purpose of inheritance 
to, through and from a legally adopted child, such child shall 
be treated the same as if he were the natural child of his adopt­
ing parents, and he shall cease to be treated as the child of his 
natural parents for purposes of intestate succession. 
Comment. In some states general provisions as to adoption cover­
ing this and other matters may be found outside the probate code. If 
such statutes exist in a given state, this section should be made to con­
form with them or should be omitted altogether. An adopted child is 
not issue (See § 3 (I) hereof) ; but § 2 7 gives him rights of issue as 
to intestate succession. 
§ 28. Persons related to intestate through two lines. · 
A person who is related to the intestate through two lines of 
relationship, though under either one alone he might claim 
as next of kin, shall, nevertheless, be entitled to only one share 
which shall be the share based on the relationship which would 
entitle him to the larger share. 
§ 29. Advancements. 
(a) In general. If a person dies intestate as to all his 
estate, property which he gave in his lifetime as an advance-
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ment to any person who, if the intestate had died at the time 
of making the advancement, would be entitled to inherit a part 
of his estate, shall be counted toward the advancee's intestate 
share, and to the extent that it does not exceed such intestate 
share shall be taken into account in computing the estate to be 
distributed. Every gratuitous inter vivos transfer is deemed 
to be an absolute gift and not an advancement unless shown to 
be an advancement. 
(b) Valuation. The advancement shall be considered 
as of its value at the time when the advancee came into pos­
session or enjoyment or at the time of the death of the intestate, 
whichever first occurs. 
(c) Death of advancee before intestate. If the ad­
vancee dies before the intestate, leaving a lineal heir who takes 
from the intestate, the advancement shall be taken into account 
in the same manner as if it had been made directly to such heir. 
If such heir is entitled to a lesser share in the estate than the 
advancee would have been entitled had he survived the intes­
tate, then the heir shall only be charged with such proportion 
of the advancement as the amount he would have inherited, 
had there been no advancement, bears to the amount which the 
advancee would have inherited, had there been no advance­
ment. 
Comment. According to the statutes of all but one state, if an 
intestate in his lifetime makes an advancement to a child, the value of 
the. property so advanced may be charged against the child's intestate 
share in determining its amount. In a few states this doctrine is ap­
plicable to advancements to all heirs. This section so provides, and, 
in accordance with § §  3 (j) and 22 hereof, a surviving spouse is an 
heir and therefore can be an advancee. It may be argued that the recog­
nition of an advancement is illogical in that we ordinarily require the 
formalities of a will to accomplish a variation in the course of intestate 
succession, because of the danger of fraud and misunderstanding. Yet 
in the case of the advancement such a variation may be accomplished 
orally. Doubtless, the justification for a doctrine of advancements is 
that people will attempt such transactions whether the statutes provide 
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for them or not, and if no provision for them is made, the intent of 
donors will often be frustrated. Moreover, the overt act of transfer­
ring title by way of advancement is somewhat less likely to be susceptible 
to fraud or misunderstanding than the execution of an oral will. 
In a number of states, a provision is made for a writing stating the 
terms of the advancement. See, for example, Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith­
Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § 1 66. No such provision is made here because it 
is believed the intent of the donor would thereby often be frustrated. 
But it is provided that a gratuitous inter vivos transfer is presumed not 
to be an advancement, thus throwing the burden of proving that it is an 
advancement on the one claiming that an advancement should be 
charged against an intestate share. 
There is authority for the proposition that, where the person to whom 
an advancement is made dies before the intestate, the advancement is 
charged to his lineal descendant only if the descendant takes by repre­
sentation. See In re Person's Appeal, 7 4 Pa. St. I 2 I ( I  8 73 ) .  Thus, 
suppose A makes an advancement to his son B, and B dies before A 
· leaving a son X. When A dies his heirs are his sons C and D and his 
grandson X. Under most statutes, since X takes by representation, his 
share is charged with the advancement made to his father. But suppose 
C and D had died before A and A's heirs at the time of his death were 
X, and C's children Y and Z. Under § 22  of this Code, and under 
many statutes, X,, Y and Z take per capita. But there would seem 
to be no sound reason why X should not be charged with the advance­
ment here as well as in the case where he took by representation. Sub­
section (c) so provides. 
Closely related to the law of advancements, and overlapping it, is 
the law permitting a release of the entire expectancy of the distributee. 
This doctrine, however, has a common law basis and is broader than 
the principles of advancements. Thus, an advancement is only to be 
recognized when the decedent dies intestate as to all his property. But, 
though a person is testate, it is possible to have a release of the expect­
ancy of a prospective devisee. An advancement is gratuitous, but a 
release of an expectancy requires fair consideration. Moreover, the 
doctrine of advancements is applicable only if there are two or more 
heirs. But, atcording to Restatement, Property ( I  940) § 3 I 6, com­
ment f, illustration 6, if a release of the expectancy of the sole heir is 
attempted, it can exclude the heir and the estate will be distributed 
to the persons who would have been the heirs had the sole heir died 
before the intestate. See, however, con.tra, Pylant v. Burns, 1 53  Ga. 
529, 1 1 2 S. E. 455,  28 A.L.R. 423 ( I 922 ) .  In general, as to the 
release of expectancies, see Restatement, Property ( I  940) c. 24. 
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§ 30. Alienage. In making title by descent, it shall be 
no bar to a person that he, or any person through whom he 
traces his descent, is, or has been an alien. 
§ 31 .  Dower and curtesy abolished. The estates of ' 
dower and curtesy are hereby abolished. 
Comment. Estates of curtesy and dower tend to clog land titles 
and make alienation more difficult. Moreover, at the present time, 
when so much of the wealth of a decedent is likely to be in the form 
of bonds and shares, these estates do not make adequate provision f9r 
a surviving spouse. For this reason, this section, which is in accordance 
with modern statutory trends, abolishes dower and curtesy. For the 
statutes in various states on this subject, see appendix note. 
The substitutes for dower and curtesy provided in the Model Code 
are § 2 2 (a), the share of the surviving spouse in case of intestacy, and 
§ 32, the spouse's share in case of election against the will. While 
these shares are ordinarily much more liberal than dower in case of 
a solvent estate, they are both subject to the decedent's debts. 
To the effect that a statute which extinguishes existing inchoate 
dower interests is not unconstitutional on that ground, see cases col­
lected in 20 A.L.R. 1330. It should be noted that accrued rights are 
excepted by § 2 (b) hereof. Hence, to the extent that existing dower 
or curtesy interests are deemed accrued rights, they are excepted from 
the operation of this Code. 
TAKING AGAINST WILL 
§ 32. When surviving spouse may elect to take against 
the will. When a married person dies testate as to any part 
of his estate, a right of election is given to the surviving hus­
band or wife solely under the limitations and conditions here­
inafter stated. 
(a) Extent of election. The surviving sp01;se may elect 
to receive the share in the estate that would have 
passed to him had the testator .died intestate, until 
the value of such share shall amount to [$s,ooo] , 
and of the residue of the estate above the part from 
which the full intestate share a�ounts to [ $5 ,ooo] ,  
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one-half the estate that would have passed to him had 
the testator died intestate. 
(b) Effect of election. When a surviving .spouse elects 
to take against the will, he shall be deemed to take by 
descent, as a modified share, such part of the net estate 
as comes to him under the provi.sions of this section. 
Comment. The general plan of subsection (a) follows the provi­
sions for a widow's election against the will as to personal property as 
provided in Mich. Stat. Ann. § 2 7. 3 I 7 8 ( I 3 9) . Doubtless, a statute 
of this type can be regarded as caring for the needs of a surviving 
spouse in that the percentage of the estate given by it is greater in 
small estates. In a sense it may be said to provide a kind of allowance, 
subject, however, to the rights of creditors. 
In determining how much the surviving spouse is to receive under 
this section, reference must first be made to § 22. Two illustrations 
will show how this application is made. Suppose the net estate is 
$ I  2,000 and the decedent is survived by a wife and one or more chil­
dren. Under § 2 2 (a) ( I ) , if there were no will, the wife would 
receive one-half the net estate, or $6,ooo. In electing to take against 
the will she receives that amount up to $5,000, and half of the re­
mainder of her intestate share under § 2 2 (a) ( I ) .  This remainder 
would be $ I ,ooo (the difference between $5,000 and $6,ooo) ,  half 
of which would amount to $500. Therefore, the total share which 
she may elect to take against the will is $5,500. Or suppose the 
decedent's net estate is of the value of $ 8,ooo, and he is survived by a 
widow and a brother. Under § 22 (a) ( 2 )  the widow would receive 
as an intestate share the first $5 ,000 of the estate and half the residue, 
or $ I ,5oo, a total of $6,500. Under § 32, in electing to take against 
the will she receives the first $ 5 ,000 of the amount she otherwise would 
take as an intestate share, and half of the remainder of such amount. 
Half of this remainder is $7 5o, making her total share upon election 
against the will $5,750. 
Subsection (b) is inserted to eliminate a prolific source of litigation. 
Much difficulty has arisen under some election statutes in determining 
whether the share which the surviving spouse takes against the will is 
taken as heir or in some other capacity. This problem has arisen in 
connection with the construction of devises "to heirs" and in statutes 
in which the word "heirs" is used with reference to inheritance taxes 
and many other matters. This subsection specifically states that the 
surviving spouse takes by descent. 
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As to the effect of a spouse's election to take an intestate share on 
other provisions in the will, see comment to § 58 and Restatement, 
Property ( 1 936) c. 1 6, topic 2 .  
In view of  the fact that there is no single accepted theory on which 
statutory provisions for the election of a surviving spouse are based 
and that a satisfactory statute could be drawn based on entirely different 
theories from those involved in the above section, it seems desirable to 
present, as an alternative, the following provisions, which can be 
substituted for § 32 hereof: 
' . 
"§ 32. When surviving spouse may elect to take against 
the will. When a married person dies testate as to any part of his 
estate, a right of election is given to the surviving husband or wife 
solely under the limitations and conditions hereinafter stated. 
"(a) Net estate not over [$20,000] . If the value of the net 
estate does not exceed [ $2o,ooo] and the value of all legacies 
and devises given absolutely to the surviving spouse plus the 
value of any portion of the net estate undisposed of by the 
will which passes to the surviving spouse as an intestate share 
is less than half the value of the net estate, then the surviving 
spouse may elect to receive that amount which, when added 
to the value of such items, will equal one-half the value of 
the net estate. In so electing, the surviving spouse is deemed 
to renounce any legacies and devises not given absolutely. 
"(h) Net estate over [$20,000]. If the value of the net estate 
exceeds [ $2o,ooo] , the surviving spouse may act under the 
provisions of one or the other, but not both, of the following 
subdivisions : 
"( I )  Election to  receive one-half with life income 
from a trust credited at value of principal. 
If the value of the net estate exceeds [ $20,000] 
and if the total value of the legacies and devises 
given to the surviving spouse, when valued in the 
manner hereinafter stated, plus the portion of the 
net estate undisposed of by the will which passes 
to the surviving spouse as an intestate share, is less 
than half the value of the net estate, then the sur­
viving spouse may elect to receive, in addition to 
all legacies and devises given to . him by the will 
and the intestate share in any portion of the net 
estate undisposed of by the will, the difference be­
tween the value of such items and the · value of 
half the net estate. When, by the terms of the 
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will, property of the net estate is left in trust with 
the income to be paid to the surviving spouse for 
life, the value of such gift, for purposes of deter­
mining the amount the surviving spouse is entitled 
to receive under the will, shall be the value of the 
principal from which such income is to be paid. 
All other legacies and devises given to the surviving 
spouse from the net estate shall be valued at the 
actual value of the interests given to the surviving 
spouse. 
"(2) Election to receive [$10,000] in value abso­
lutely. If the value of the net estate exceeds 
[$2o,ooo] the surviving spouse may nevertheless , 
treat the net estate as if it were of the value of not 
over [$2o,ooo] and make an election in .accord­
ance with the provisions of subdivision (a) hereof, 
provided, however, that the total value of all items 
which the surviving spouse may receive from the 
net estate when this election is made shall be 
[ $ 1  o,ooo] and no more. 
"(c) Effect of election. When a surviving spouse elects to take 
against the will, he shall be deemed to take by descent, as a 
modified share, such part of the net estate as does not come 
to him by the terms of the will." 
The alternative provisions just stated proceed on the theory that, 
except in larger estates, a surviving spouse should receive one-half of 
the estate of a deceased spouse. However, they also follow a modern 
trend to limit the surviving spouse to a life interest in a trust of half 
of the estate which the surviving spouse may elect to receive. It is 
believed that in the case of a smaller estate one spouse probably con­
tributed about as much to its accumulation as the other. Moreover, such 
a share is in recognition of the strong moral obligation to prc;>Vide sup­
port for a surviving wife. However, it is likely that larger estates 
were acquired by the testator from some ancestor ; and it is deemed fair 
to permit him to pass them on pretty much as he wishes after he ·has 
made adequate provision for the maintenance of the surviving spouse. 
The plan of limiting the spouse to life interests in the case of larger 
estates follows legislation in New York and Massachusetts. See Mass. 
Ann. Laws ( 1 932 )  c. 1 9 1 , § 1 5, and N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, § r 8. 
The general scheme of 'this proposed substitution is as follows : If 
the value of the net estate does not exceed $2o,ooo, the surviving 
spouse is entitled to take absolutely one-half the net estate. This 
amount is first satisfied by crediting to the surviving spouse any part 
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of the net estate which is undisposed of by the will and which comes 
to him or her by intestate succession. The surviving spouse is also 
credited with all legacies and devises given absolutely. These are 
regarded as being received under the will. If this does not make up 
one-half, the surviving spouse can elect to take against the will a 
sufficient additional amount to equal one-half. In so doing the surviv­
ing spouse renounces all legacies and devises not given absolutely, such 
as leases, legal life estates, determinable fees, and future interests. If 
the value of the net estate exceeds $2o,ooo, the surviving spouse may 
elect against the will in either of two ways. He may elect to take 
$ 1  o,ooo absolutely in the same manner as if the estate were valued at 
$zo,ooo. In that case, he receives no more, regardless of how large 
the estate is. The other election against the will gives the surviving 
spouse one-half of the net estate ; but he must take all interests given 
under the will even though they are not absolute interests. Further­
more, if the will gives the surviving spouse a beneficial interest for life 
in a trust, that gift is credited to the share of the surviving spouse at 
the value of the principal from which the life income is payable, and 
not at the value of the life estate. Thus, it is possible for a testator in 
an estate in excess of $2o,ooo in value, however large it may be, to 
set up a trust with half his estate, giving his wife only the income for 
life from that half. The wife must then either accept the beneficial 
interest under the trust or be limited to taking $ I o,ooo absolutely. 
It should be observed that, although the proposed substitution is 
quite liberal in permitting a surviving spouse to demand a large share 
in the estate, it goes much farther than most statutes in compelling a 
surviving spouse to take what is given under the will. Thus, the 
tendency to upset a testamentary scheme by an election is minimized 
as far as is consistent with an adequate provision for the surviving 
spouse. 
By way of comparison, it may be noted that § 32  represents an older 
but simpler solution of the problem. The proposed substitution is more 
complicated but goes much farther in leaving a testator's will intact. 
In both sections, the amounts stated are necessarily somewhat arbitrary 
and. may be varied to suit local needs. 
In general, on election by the surviving spouse, see comment to § 40 
hereof. 
§ 33. Gifts in fraud of marital rights. 
(a) Election to treat as devise: Any gift made by a 
person, whether dying testate or intestate, in fraud of the 
marital rights of his surviving spouse to share in his estate, 
shall, at the election of the surviving spouse, be treated as a 
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testamentary disposition and may be recovered from the donee 
and persons taking from him without adequate consideration 
and applied to the payment of the spouse's share, as in case of 
his election to take against the will. 
(b) When gift deemed fraudulent. Any gift made by 
a married person within two years of the time of his death is 
deemed to be in fraud of the marital rights of his surviving 
spouse, unless shown to the contrary. 
Comment. This section makes no attempt to define the expression 
"in fraud of marital rights." It is believed that only by judicial decision 
can that be done. Among the situations which courts would have 
to classify in this connection is that where a married person sets up an 
inter vivos trust reserving to himself a life estate and a power to revoke 
the trust. It has sometimes been held that such a transfer could be set 
aside at the instance of the surviving spouse, particularly where it 
deprived the settlor of most of his estate. It is sometimes said that the 
transfer is set aside because it is illusory. See 44 Mich. L. Rev. I 5 I 
( I  945 ) .  But it is believed to be more satisfactory to say that it is 
fraudulent as to the share of the surviving spouse. A similar problem 
arises where a married person sets up a so-called savings bank trust. 
It is believed that no statute could adequately indicate all cases which 
might properly be regarded as actually or constructively fraudulent 
as to the share of the surviving spouse. 
Subsection (b) lays down an aid in determining whether a gift is 
fraudulent where the proof is slight. Under this section it is possible 
to show that a gift made within two years of the death of a married 
person is not fraudulent, but the burden of proof is upon the person 
asserting the absence of fraud. 
§ 34. Notice of right to elect. It shall be the duty of 
the clerk of the court, within one month after the will of a 
married person is admitted to probate, to mail a written notice, 
directed to the testator's surviving spouse at his last known 
residence address, informing him of the date before which a 
written election must be filed by or on behalf of such surviving 
spouse in order to take against the will. 
§ 35. Time limitation for filing election. The elec­
tion by a surviving spouse to take the share hereinbefore pro­
vided may be made at any time within one month after the 
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expiration of the time limited for the filing of claims ; provided 
that if, at the expiration of such period for making the election, 
litigation is pending to test the validity or to determine the 
effect or construction of the will, or to determine the existence 
of issue surviving the deceased, or to determine any other mat­
ter of law or fact which would affect the amount of the share 
to be received by the surviving spouse, the right of such sur­
viving spouse to make an election shall not be barred until the 
expiration of one month after the final determination of the 
litigation. 
§ 36. Form of election; filing. The election to take the 
share hereinbefore provided shall be in writing, signed and 
acknowledged by the surviying spouse or by the guardian of 
his estate and shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the court. 
It may be in the following form : 
I, A.B., surviving wife (or husband) of C.D., late of the 
county of and state of do hereby 
elect to take my legal share in the estate of the said C.D., and 





Comment. If the alternative form proposed in the comment to 
§ 32 is used, the following sentence should, be added to the form of 
election, immediately before the signature : 
"If it is determined that the net estate exceeds [ $20,000] in value, 
I elect to take against the will under the terms of section 32 (b) ( 1 )  
[or section 32 (b) ( 2 )  ] ." 
§ 37. Right of election personal to surviving spouse. 
The right of election of the surviving spouse is personal to him. 
It is not transferable and cannot be exercised subsequent to 
his death ; but if the surviving spouse is incompetent, the court 
may order the guardian of his estate to elect for him. 
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§ 38. Election not subject to change. An election by 
or on behalf of a surviving spouse to take the share provided in 
section 3 2 hereof once made shall be binding and shall not be 
subject. to ,change except for such causes as would justify an 
equitable decree for the rescission of a deed. 
§ 39. Waiver of right to elect. The right of election of 
a surviving spouse hereinbefore given may be waived before 
or after marriage by a written contract, agreement or waiver 
signed by the party waiving the right of election, after full 
disclosure of the nature and extent of such right, provided the 
thing or the promise given to such waiving party is a fair con­
sideration under all the circumstances. This written contract, 
agreement or waiver may be filed in the same manner as here­
inbefore provided for the filing of an election. 
Comment. It is clear that at common law the right of a surviving 
spouse to take an intestate share against the will tnay be waived under 
certain circumstances. But the rules applied to determine the validity 
of the waiver are unique and involve something quite distinct from the 
requirements for the execution of a simple contract. This section is 
designed to express the common-law doctrine. For an analogous 
doctrine with respect to the release of expectancies generally, see Re­
statement, Property ( I  940) § 3 I 9, and particularly commept (d) 
to that section. 
§ 40. Election by surviving spouse to take under will. 
When a surviving spouse makes no election to take against the 
will, he shall receive the benefit of all provisions in his favor 
in the will, if any, and shall share as heir, in accordance with 
the provisions of sections 2 2  and 23 hereof, in any estate un­
disposed of by the will. By taking under the will or consent­
ing thereto, he shall not thereby waive the rights of homestead, 
to exempt property or to a family allowance, unless it clearly 
appears from the will that the provision therein made for him 
was intended to be in lieu of such rights. 
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Comment. The first sentence of this section is in accord with the 
general rule that mere expressions in a W111 of intent to disinherit an 
heir do not exclude him from the inheritance ; there must be an effective 
devise of the entire estate to someone else. In general, see Phelps, 
"The Widow's Right of Election in the Estate of her Husband," 37 
Mich. L. Rev. 236, 401  ( 1 938-39) and Sayre, "Husband and Wife 
as Statutory Heirs," 42 Harv. L. Rev. 330 ( 1 929) . 
The second sentence of this section follows in substance Kan. Gen. 
Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 59-404. 
§ 41 .  Pretermitted children. 
(a) Children hom or adopted after will made. When 
a testator fails to provide in his will for any of his children 
born or adopted after the making of his last will, such child, 
whether born before or after the testator's death, shall receive 
a share in the estate of the testator equal in value to that which 
he would have received if the testator had died intestate, un­
less it appears from the will that such omission was intentional, 
or unless when the will was executed the testator had one or 
more children known to him to be living and devised substan­
tially all his estate to his surviving spouse. 
(h) Children believed to he dead when will made. 
If, at the time of the making of his will, the testator believes 
any of his children to be dead, and fails to provide for such 
child in his will, the child shall receive a share in the estate of 
the testator equal in value to that which he would have re­
ceived if the testator had died intestate, unless it appears from 
the will or from other evidence that the testator would not 
have devised anything to such child had he known that the 
child was alive. 
Comment. Most pretermitted heir statutes are designed, not to 
force a moral obligation upon a parent, but to carry out a testator's 
probable intent. If this is their purpose, then subsection (b) should 
be limited to the one fact situation therein stated, for it is very unlikely 
that a testator would, by accident or mistake, omit to provide for a liv­
ing child in his will, except in the case covered by that subsection. In 
subsection (b) , since extrinsic evidence is necessary to show that the 
testator believed his child to be dead, it is only reasonable to allow 
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extrinsic evidence as to his intent to exclude the child. In  subsection 
(a) , however, an intent to exclude the child will rarely exist ; if it is 
to be proved, it must be shown from the will. 
The last clause in subsection (a) is designed to apply to the follow­
ing situation. Suppose A has a small estate and feels that he should 
devise substantially all of it to his wife. He, therefore, so states in his 
will giving his two children, B and C, one dollar each, and the residue 
to his wife. Before his death a third child, D, is born. If it were not 
for the last clause in subsection (a) ,  D would take as a pretermitted . 
heir, but B and C would not. To avoid this obviously unfair result, 
the last clause was inserted ; it is modeled on Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
(Vernon, 1 939) arts. 8291  and 8292. 
It should be noted that subsection (a) covers only cases where the 
last will is made before the child is born or adopted. Thus, if a testator 
makes a will and afterward has children born ()r adopted and still later 
executes a second will or a codicil to his will, the facts do not come 
within subsection (a) . 
This section makes no provision for omitted grandchildren or more 
remote issue. See § 3 (a) . 
HOMESTEAD) EXEMPT PROPERTY AND FAMI LY ALLOWANCE 
§ 42. Homestead. At any time after the retur� of the 
inventory the court, of its own motion or upon application, 
shall set apart the homestead to the persons entitled thereto. 
The homestead so set apart shall not be subject to administra­
tion and shall be exempt from all claims against the estate 
excepting any lien thereon at the time of the decedent's death. 
The title to the land set apart for the homestead property shall 
pass, subject to the right of homestead, the same as other prop­
erty of the decedent and shall b!! included in the decree of final 
distribution. 
Comment. Statutes or constitutional provisions are found in nearly 
every state, exempting the homestead from the claims of unsecured 
creditors. While there is great diversity in these legislative provisions, 
their principal function appears to be to reserve a residence for the use 
of the family. See, for example, Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 938)  § 2 7 . 1 5 72 .  
I t  is obviously impracticable to work out in detail legislation of  this 
sort as a part of a model probate code. In the first place the homestead 
law is much broader than the law of decedents' estates. Thus, it deals 
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with claims of creditors which are asserted by action before the 
decedent dies ; and, also, with claims of creditors of the wife and 
children of the decedent, if a homestead is subsequently established for 
them. In the second place, in a number of states, provisions for the 
homestead are inserted in the constitution, and it is hardly to be expected 
that these provisions will be amended in the near future. Furthermore, 
the diversity of legislative provisions for the homestead makes it im­
possible to indicate in this code more than in barest outline, the relation 
of the law of decedents' estates to them. Therefore, in this section, 
homestead is not defined, nor are the requirements for this exemption 
from the claims of creditors of the decedent stated. But it is assumed 
that adequate provisions along these lines will be found elsewhere in 
the statute books. 
While in a few jurisdictions the homestead is a fee simple interest, 
in most states it appears to be either a much more limited possessory 
estate or else is regarded merely as a privilege of occupation exempt 
from claims of creditors. In either of these two cases, if the decedent 
owned the property covered by the homestead in fee, there would be 
a non-possessory interest not covered by the exemption. According 
to the last sentence of this section, this interest passes like any other 
property of the decedent. 
If the homestead is limited in value, as is the case in many states, it 
may be necessary to add provisions for its sale and a division of the 
proceeds where the property exceeds the value fixed in the statute 
and is not susceptible of division without injury. See, for example, 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § §  27 .3 1 78 (520) to 27 .3 1 78 (522)  and 
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) § §  664 to 666. Moreover, 
even if there is no such limitation, it might be desirable to sell, since 
the surviving members of the family may wish to live somewhere else 
and there is no reason for forcing them to remain in the homestead 
in order to retain the benefit of their exemption. For such a statute 
see Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 932) c. 1 88, § 8. If provisions for sale are 
added, it might be desirable to ha':e a specific statement as to the ex­
emption of the proceeds or of the substituted residence. Of course, if the 
homestead is regarded as an estate, it should be possible to alienate it 
without specific legislation. See Roberts v. First National Bank, 1 26 
Kan. 503, 268 P. 799 ( 1928) .  But in some s'tates it is held that 
an attempted sale is an abandonment. See Graves v. Simms Oil Co., 
1 89 Ark. 9 1 0, 75 S.W. (2d) 809 ( 1 934) . Moreover, there may 
be a question whether the surviving spouse can sell without the consent 
of minor children. If a section providing for sale of the homestead 
is desired, the following form might be inserted: 
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"The surviving spouse may convey the homestead interest and pass 
good title thereto regardless of the existence of minor children. 
If the minor children are entitled to possession of the homestead, 
their interests may be conveyed by the guardians of their estates upon 
order of the court as in other cases for sale of lands of minors. If 
two or more �inors become entitled to the proceeds of the sale of 
the homestead interest the proceeds shall be divided between them 
in proportion to the number of years during which they would other­
wise have been entitled to the possession of the homestead." 
Commonly the homestead exemption may be asserted against all 
creditors except lien creditors whose liens attached prior to the death 
of the decedent. But in some states a mechanic's lien for improve­
ments might attach after the owner dies. See Minn. Stat. ( I  94 I )  
§§ 5 1 0.0 1  and 5 1 0.05. 
It is thus apparent that in many states a substantial amount of adapta­
tibn may be necessary before the provision for the homestead herein 
presented can be used. Moreover, a legislature might well consider 
whether it would not be desirable to revise, simplify and rationalize the 
whole law of homestead exemption, in its relation to exemption statutes 
generally, to the fai:nily allowance and to the provisions for the election 
of a distributive share by a surviving spouse. But such a task is obviously 
far beyond that undertaken in this Code. 
As to liability of the homestead for debts, see comment to § 44. 
§ 43. Distribution of exempt property. The surviv­
ing spouse or minor children of a decedent shall be entitled 
absolutely to such personal property of the estate as may be 
exempt from execution or forced sale under the constitution 
and laws of this state or such other personal property as shall be 
selected, of the total appraised value of [ $2000] , whichever 
is greater, any portion or all of which may be taken in money. 
Such property shall belong to the surviving spouse, if any, 
otherwise to the minor children in equal shares. The selec­
tion shall be made by the surviving spouse, if living; other­
wise by the guardian of the estate of each minor child for such 
child, or by the court. At any time after the return of the 
inventory the court, of its own motion or upon application, 
shall set apart the exempt property to the persons entitled 
So . MODEL PROBATE CODE 
thereto. Such property shall not be subject to administration 
and shall be exempt from all claims against the estate except 
any lien thereon at the time of the decedent's death. 
Comment. This section, similar to the preceding one on home­
stead, sets off to the surviving spouse or children, the property exempted 
to the head of the family under other. provisions of the constitution and 
statutes. Because of the diversity of these provisions, no attempt is 
made here to enumerate such property. Many of these exemption 
statutes are now archaic and in view of the tendency to permit a selec­
tion of other property or money in lieu of the property so exempt, such 
a provision is incorporated here. It permits the greatest degree of 
flexibility in accordance with the needs and desires of the individual 
members of the family. It also permits the selection of articles of 
sentimental family value and of an automobile for family use. As to 
liability of the exempt property for debts, see comment to § 44· 
§ 44. Family allowance. In addition to the right to 
homestead and exempt property the . surviving spouse and 
minor children of a decedent shall be entitled to a reasonable 
allowance in money out of the estate for their maintenance 
during the period of administration according to their previous 
standard of living, which allowance must not continue for 
longer than one year in the case of an insolvent estate. Such 
allowance may be made upon petition at any time after the 
filing of the inventory, but a temporary allowance may be 
made prior thereto in case of great need. The allowance so 
ordered may be made payable in one payment or in periodic 
installments, and shall be payable to the surviving spouse, if 
living, for the use of such surviving spouse and the minor chil­
dren ; otherwise to the guardians or other persons having the 
care and custody of any minor children ; but in case any minor 
child shall not be living with the surviving spouse, the court 
may make such division of the allowance for maintenance as 
it deems just and equitable. 
C ornment. The purpose of this section is to provide an allowance 
to the surviving spouse and minor children of the decedent during the 
period of administration. for their support in the manner to which they 
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have been accustomed. See § I 42, providing that administration and 
funeral expenses have priority over the family allowance ; but the 
homestead and exempt property are not liable for these expenses, and 
do not constitute assets for any purpose except to benefit the family. 
EXECUTION AND REVOCATION OF WILLS 
§ 45. Who may make. Any person of sound mind 
eighteen years of age or older may make a will. · 
Comment. Sections 4 5 to 5o inclusive are § § 2 to 7 inclusive of 
the Model Execution of Wills Act. 
§ 46. Who may witness. 
(a) Any person competent to be a witness generally in 
this state may act as attesting witness to a will. 
(b) No will is invalidated because attested by an inter­
ested witness ; but any interested witness shall, unl�ss the will 
is also attested by two disinterested witnesses, forfeit so much 
of the provisions therein made for him as in the aggregate 
exceeds in value, as of the date of the testator's death, what he 
would have received had the testator died intestate. 
(c) No attesting witness is interested unless the will gives 
to him some personal and beneficial interest. 
§ 47. Execution. The execution ofa will, other than a 
holographic or nyncupative will, must be by the signature of 
the testator and of at least two witnesses as follows : 
(a) Testator. The testator shall signify to the attesting 
witnesses that the instrument is his will and either 
( I )  
(2) 
(3) 
Himself sign, or 
Acknowledge his signature already made, or 
At his direction and in his presence have some­
one else sign his name for him, and 
In any of the above cases the act must be done in 
the presence of two or more attesting witnesses. 
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(b) Witnesses. The attesting witnesses must sign 
( I )  In the presence of the testator, and 
( 2)  In the presence of each other. 
§ 48. Holographic will. No witness to a holographic 
will is necessary, but the signature and all its material pro­
visions must be in the handwriting of the testator and his hand- · 
writing must be proved by two witnesses. 
§ 49. Nuncupativewill. 
(a) A nuncupative will may be made only by a person in 
imminent peril of death, whether from illness or otherwise, 
shall be valid only if the testator died as a result of the im­
pending peril, and must be 
( I ) Declared to be his will by the testator before 
. two disinterested witnesses ; 
( 2) Reduced to writing by or under the direction of 
one of the witnesses within thirty days after 
such declaration ; and 
(3) Submitted for probate within six months after 
the death of the testator. 
(b) The nuncupative will may dispose of personal prop­
erty only and to an aggregate value not exceeding one thousand 
($woo) dollars, except that in the case of persons in active 
· military, air or naval service in time of war the aggregate 
amount may be ten thousand ( $ Io,ooo) dollars. 
(c) A nuncupative will neither revokes nor changes an 
existing written will. 
§ 50. Foreign execution. A will executed outside this 
state in a manner prescribed by this [Code] , or a written will 
executed outside this state in a manner prescribed by the law of 
the place of its execution or by the law of the testator's domicile 
at the time of its execution, shall have the same force and effect 
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in this state as if executed in this state in compliance with the 
provisions of this [Code]. 
§ 51 .  Revocation by written will or by act on docu­
ment. A will, or any part thereof, can be revoked 
(a) By a written will ; or 
(b) By being burnt, torn, canceled, obliterated or de­
stroyed, with the intent and for the purpose of revok­
ing the same, by the testator himself or by another 
person in his presence and by his direction. If such 
act is done by any person other than the testator, the 
direction of the testator and the facts of such injury 
or destruction must be proved by two witnesses. 
§ 52. Revocation of nuncupative will. A nuncupa­
tive will or any part thereof can be revoked by another nun­
cupative will. 
§ 53. Change in circumstances; divorce. If  after 
making a will the testator is divorced, all provisions in the 
will in favor of the testator's spouse so divorced are thereby 
revoked. With this exception, no written will, nor any part 
thereof, can be revoked by any change in the circumstances or 
condition of the testator. 
Comment. In some states the statute on revocation includes a 
statement to the effect that "nothing contained in this section shall 
prevent the revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in the 
condition or circumstances of the testator." See, for example, Mich. 
Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § 27.3 1 78 (79) . Moreover, such a doctrine is 
sometimes implie,d in the absence of any statement to the contrary in 
the statute. In either case, the result is believed to be unsatisfactory. 
Such a doctrine introduces an undesirable element of uncertainty into 
the question of the validity of a duly executed will. No revocation 
by circumstances should be permitted except on such grounds as are 
specifically named in the statute and these grounds should be as few as 
possible. Section 54  of this Code makes the grounds for revocation 
named in the statute exclusive. 
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In a number of jurisdictions, marriage of the testator, or marriage 
and birth of issue, revoke a will. Such a provision is believed to be 
unnecessary in this Code. Section 32 allows a surviving spouse to 
elect to take a share of the estate against the will. And § 4 I provides 
for after born children taking an intestate share against the will. These 
sections are believed to be adequate to protect a surviving spouse or 
afterborn children. The only extrinsic circumstance which revokes 
a will, under the provisions of this Code, is a divorce. Legislation to 
the effect that a divorce revokes a will is not common, but does exist 
in a few states. See Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp., I 943) § 5 9-6 IO ;  Minn. 
Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 5 25 . I 91 ; Wash. Rev. Stat. ( I 932)  § I 399· In 
general, as to revocation of a will by circumstances, see Durfee, "Rev­
ocation of Wills by Subsequent Change in the Condition or Circum­
stances of Testator," 40 Mich. L. Rev. 406 ( I  942) . 
§ 54. Specific provisions for revocation exclusive. 
No will, nor any part thereof, can be revoked except as specif­
ically provided in sections 5 r to 53 hereof. 
§ 55. Revival of rev.oked or invalid will. No will, nor 
any part thereof, which shall be in any manner revoked, or 
which shall be or become invalid, can be revived otherwise 
than by a re-execution thereof, or by the execution of another 
will in which the revoked or invalid will or part thereof is in­
corporated by reference. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
§ 56. Will to operate on after-acquired property. 
Any estate, right or interest in land or other things acquired 
by the testator after the making of his will may pass thereby 
and in like manner as if title thereto was vested in him at the 
time of making the will, unless the contrary manifestly ap­
pears by the will to have been the intention of the testator. 
Comment. This section is modeled after Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. 
(Deering, I 944) § 12 1 .  Prior to the English Wills Act of I 837, 7 
Wm. 4 an,d I Viet. c. 26, a will did not pass real esta�e acquired by the 
testator after its execution. As to the history of this matter, see 
Warren, "The History of Ademption," 25 Iowa L. Rev. 290 ( 1 940) . 
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Hence legislation is desirable to make it clear that after-acquired real 
estate can pass by a will. This result was accomplished in § 3 of the 
English \Vilis Act of I 8 3 7 by a provision to the effect that it is lawful 
for every person to devise or bequeath all real and personal estate to 
which he shall be entitled at the time of his death. 
§ 57. Failure of testamentary provisions by lapse or 
otherwise. 
(a) General rule. If a devise of real or personal prop­
erty, not included in the residuary clause of the will, is void, 
is revoked, or lapses, it shall become a part of the residue, and 
shall pass to the residuary devisee, unless a contrary intent 
is indicated by the terms of the will. 
(b) A voidance of failure of devise when devisee dies 
before testator. Unless a contrary intent is indicated by the 
will, when any adopted child of the testator or blood relative 
within the fourth degree 
( I  ) Is designated as a devisee, or 
( 2) Would have been a devisee under the terms of a class 
gift, had he survived the testator, 
and such adopted child or blood relative dies after the makmg 
of the will and before the testator leaving
. 
issue surviving the 
testator, or is dead at the making of the will leaving issue sur­
viving the testator and the fact of his death is unknown to the 
testator, then such issue as represent the deceased devisee shall 
be deemed substituted for him so as to take the interest under 
the will which their deceased ancestor would have taken had 
he survived. 
Comment. Lapse statutes of vary\ng scope are found in � large 
majority of the states. One of the questions most commonly litigated 
with respect to such statutes concerns their application to class gifts. Do 
they apply to class gifts at all ? If they do apply, to what extent do 
they apply to potential members of the class who are dead when the 
will is made ? In a few jurisdictions, where the lapse siatute makes no 
reference to class gifts, it is held that the lapse statute has no 
application to such gifts, because there is in fact no lapse. Thus, if 
the testator devises the residue of his estate to the chilfren of A, it is 
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said that such language means "the children of A who are living at 
the death of the testator." Hence, if potential members of the class 
die before the testator, they never were within the terms of the devise 
and so no problem of lapse arises. Most courts, however, do apply 
lapse statutes to class gifts where a potential member of the class-dies 
before the testator but after the will is executed. The reason would 
seem to be that to do so helps to effectuate the testator's desires. 
The most serious difficulty in applying lapse statutes arises where a 
potential member of the class dies before the will is executed. In 
the case of a devise to a named person who dies before the will is 
made, such as a testamentary gift of a piece of land or a sum of money 
to A, it is evident that the testator supposed A was alive when he made 
his will or A would not have been named as a devisee. Therefore, in 
a proper case, it would effectuate the testator's intention to apply the 
lapse statute to the devise to A. But suppose the testator devises a 
portion' of his estate "to the children of A," and at the time the will 
is executed A has four children, and has had two others who died more 
than ten years before the execution of the will, leaving issue. It would 
seem highly unlikely that the testator would intend to include the 
children already dead within the phrase "children of A." Indeed, 
practically the only case in which he would intend to include potential 
members of the class dead when the will is executed is a case where he 
does not know they are dead. This section of the Code limits the 
application of the lapse statute to such cases, and is believed to avoid 
most of the litigation concerning class gifts which commonly arises 
in connection with such statutes. 
In general, as to the application of lapse statutes to class gifts, see 
Restatement, Property ( 1 940) § 298, together with comments and 
special notes thereto. 
As to what issue "represent the deceased devisee," see the definition 
of "representation" in § 2 2 (c) hereof. 
§ 58. Renunc;iation by heir or devisee. An heir or 
devisee may renounce the succession to the real and personal 
property of a decedent, but the renunciation shall be subject 
to the rights of creditors of the heir or devisee and of the taxing 
authorities. In case of an effective renunciation by the heir, 
the property shall descend as if he had died before the ·de..: 
cedent. 
Comment. At common law a devisee could renounce but an heir 
could not as to land. The rule as to the devisee is·here stated prin;. · 
� I 
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cipally because it might otherwise be implied that a statute as to re­
nunciation by the heir repeals the common law rule permitting a 
devisee to renounce. No good reason is perceived why the heir as 
well as the devisee should not be permitted to renounce. 
However, neither the heir nor the devisee should be permitted to 
prejudice his creditors or the taxing authorities by a renunciation. The 
common law is not clear as to whether the devisee is able to defeat 
the rights of creditors and taxing authorities. Hence, this section 
makes express provision on that point. 
The effect of the renunciation by a devisee on other distributees of 
the decedent's estate is a matter of common law and is too complex a 
matter to be dealt with satisfactorily in a statute. Thus, if the interest 
renounced is a life estate, the whole question of the acceleration of 
future interests is involved. See, as to that matter, Restatement, Prop­
erty ( 1 936) c. 1 6, topic 2. Moreover, if the interest renounced is 
an interest in joint tenancy in fee simple, it would commonly devolve 
upon other Joint tenants. If the interest renounced is given in severalty 
in fee simple or absolutely, it would ordinarily fall into the residuary 
estate unless it were a part of the residuary estate or there were no 
residuary clause in the will. In the latter case, the renounced interest 
would commonly devolve upon the heir. 
§ 59. Deposit of will with court in testator's lifetime. 
(a) Deposit of will. A will may be deposited by the 
person making it, or by some person for him; with any [ ] 
court, to be safely kept until delivered or disposed of as here­
inafter provided. The clerk of the court, on being paid the 
fee of [one dollar] therefor, shall receive and keep such will, 
and give a certificate of deposit for it. 
(b) How enclosed. Every will intended to be deposited 
as aforesaid shall be enclosed in a sealed wrapper, which shall 
have indorsed thereon "Will of," followed by 'the name of 
the testator. The clerk of the court shall indorse thereon the 
day when, and the person by whom, it was delivered. The 
wrapper may also be indorsed with the name of the person to 
whom the will is to be delivered after the death of the testator. 
It shall not be opened or read until delivered to a person en­
titled to receive it, or otherwise disposed of as hereinafter 
provided. 
· 
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(c) To whom delivered. During the lifetime of the 
testator, such will shall be delivered only to him, or to some 
person authorized by him by an order in writing duly proved 
by the oath of a subscribing witness. After his death, the clerk 
shall notify the person named in the indorsement on the wrap­
per of the will, if there be a person so named, and deliver it 
to him. 
(d) When will to be opened. If the will is not delivered 
to a person named in the indorsement on the wrapper, it shall 
be publicly opened in the court within thirty days after notice 
of the testator's death, and be retained by the court until of­
fered for probate. Notice shall be given to the executor 
named therein and to such other persons as the court may des­
ignate. If the proper venue is in another court, the will shall 
be transmitted to such court ; but before such transmission a 
true copy thereof shall be made and retained in the court in 
which the will was deposited. 
Comment. Statutes of this kind appeared early in American statute 
books. See N.Y. Rev. Stat. ( 1 829) parq, c. 7, t. 3, art. 7, §§  67-70 ;  
Mass. Rev. Stat. ( 1 836) part II, t. 3 ,  c. 62, §§  10-13 .  Many states 
still have such legislation. The principal object of enacting such a 
statute is to protect a testator who fears that his will may be lost or 
wrongfully destroyed before it can be probated. The statute presented 
herewith is modeled after Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1937)  § §  1 0504-6 
to 10504-9. The last subsection also contains some clauses found in 
Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 5 25 .22 .  
It  i s  possible that a provision might be added to the effect that the 
court should keep an index of all wills deposited under the provisions 
of this section. See N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1942) c. 350, § 1 8, for such 
a provision. However, in many localities little use will be made of 
this section, and if the wills deposited under it are filed alphabetically, 
that would seem to be sufficient. If something more is thought de­
sirable, this can be taken care of by rule of court. 
§ 60. Construction of will . . The court in which a will 
is probated shall have jurisdiction to construe it at any time · 
during the administration. Such construction may be made 
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on the petition of the personal representative or of any other 
person interested in the will ; or, if a construction of the will 
is necessary to the determin;1tion of an issue properly before 
the court, the court may construe the will in connection with 
the determination of such issue. When a petition for the 
construction of a will is filed, notice of the hearing thereon 
shall be given to interested persons, 
Comment. T�is section does not preclude the construction of a 
will in a proper case in suits other than probate proceedings. 
PART III. ADMINISTRATION OF DEcEDENTs' EsTATEs 
PROBATE AND GRANT OF ADMINISTRATION 
§ 61 .  Venue. 
(a) Proper county. The venue for the probate of a will 
and for administration shall be 
( I )
. In the county in this state where the decedent 
had his domicile at the time of his death. 
( 2) If the decedent had no domicile in this state, 
then in any county wherein he left any prop­
erty or into which any property belonging to 
his estate may have come. 
(b) Proceedings in more than one county. If proceed­
ings are commenced in more than one county, they shall be 
stayed except in the county where first commenced until final 
determinati�n of venue in the county where first commenced. 
If the proper venue is finally determined to be in another 
county, the court, after making and retaining a true copy of 
the entire file, shall transmit the original to the proper county. 
The proceeding shall be deemed commenced by the filing of 
a petition ; and the proceeding first legally commenced shall 
extend to all of the property of the estate in this state. 
(c) Transfer of proceeding. If it appears to the court 
at any time before the decree of final distribution in any pro-
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ceeding that the proceeding was commenced in the wrong 
county or that it would be for the best interests of the estate, 
the court, in its discretion, may order the proceeding with all 
papers, files and a certified copy of all orders therein trans- ' 
ferred to another [ ] court which other court shall there­
upon proceed to complete the administration proceeding as if 
originally commenced therein. 
Comment. Subsection (a) follows closely the ianguage of Minn. 
Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .82 and Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 59-2203. 
Subsection (b) is designed to resolve conflicts between probate courts 
of different counties in the same state. Its language also corresponds 
closely to the above statutes of Minnesota and Kansas. 
As between concurrent proceedings, it is a common provision of 
statutes to provide for priority in favor of the one "first commenced" 
or some similar phrase. But all too often there is no statement as to 
what constitutes the commencement of a proceeding. This has re­
sulted in two views, diametrically opposed, one holding that the pro­
ceeding is commenced by the filing of a petition, the other that the 
proceeding is not commenced until the court acts on !he petition by 
appointing a personal representative. A few statutes explicitly provide 
that the filing of the petition operates as a commencement of the pro­
ceeding. Others resolve priority upon the filing of a petition in cases 
where there is an alternative venue. The last sentence of subsection 
(b) is intended to define the manner in which and the point of time 
when a proceeding is commenced. In addition it provides that one 
administration extends to all property of the estate throughout the state, 
in order to preclude the practice of having an administration in every 
county in which any property of the decedent is located. 
Subsection (c) providing for transfer of venue is intended to make 
possible the transfer at any time of a proceeding to another county 
when it is in the best interests of the estate or when it appears that 
the proceeding was commenced in the wrong county. Thus con­
venience, the prime purpose of venue, is made possible during the 
entire period of administration. Similar provisions are found in Minn. 
Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .57  for the transfer of guardianship proceedings ; 
in Mass. Ann. Laws ( I  932) c. 2 I 5, § SA for the ttansfer of an ad­
m.inistration proceeding, at any time before final decree, when origi­
nally begun in the wrong county ; and in Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 937) 
§ §  229 to 238, upon application of the administrator or of a majority of 
the heirs, upon proof that the greater portion of the property of the 
' 
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estate is in another county or merely,that the larger portion o f  the heirs 
wish such removal. 
For a discussion of the subject matter of this section, together with 
the citation of authorities showing conflicting views, see Basye, "The 
Venue of Probate and Administration Proceedings,", 43 Mich. L. Rev. 
4 7 I  ( I944) .  
§ 62. Character of proceeding. The administration 
of the estate of a decedent from the filing of the petition for 
probate and administration or for administration until the de­
cree of final distribution and the discharge of the last personal 
representative shall be considered as one proceeding for pur­
poses of jurisdiction. Such entire proceeding is a proceeding 
in rem. No notice shall be jurisdiGtional except as provided 
in sections 69 and 70. 
Comment. By the great weight of authority a proceeding for the 
administration of the estate of a deceased person is a proceeding in rem. 
For this reason personal service on interested persons is not necessary 
to give the. court jurisdiction. Indeed, in many cases personal service 
on all interested persons is quite impossible. It has also frequently 
been held that the entire course of administration is one proceeding, 
thus eliminating any jurisdictional requirements as to subsequent notice. 
See Simes, "The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceed­
ing in Rem," 43 Mich. L. Rev. 675 ( I 945 ) ·  O f  course, in those 
states where the probate court does not assume jurisdiction of the land 
of the decedent, except where it is necessary to sell it to pay debts and 
legacies, it has sometimes been held that the proceeding to sell land is 
an independent proceeding. However, the scheme contemplated in 
this Code assumes that the court takes jurisdiction of the land of the 
decedent as well �s his personalty from the start. It is true, special 
provisions are hereafter made for notice of proceedings to sell land. 
But it would seem that they should be comparable to an execution sale 
pursuant to a money judgment in a civil action at law, in that they 
constitute one step in a judicial proceeding already initiated. Thus 
in the example of the execution sale no notice is necessary for juris­
diction to complete the sale. The proceeding is still a unit though a 
will of the same decedent is later discovered and probated or 
though a successor personal representative is appointed and qualifies. 
However, this section does not apply where adverse interests of third 
parties in the estate are being litigated. See § § I 30 and I 62 hereof. 
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Throughout this Code the term "proceeding," when used in con· 
nection with probate or administration matters, indicates the entire 
course of probate and administration of an estate. However, the term 
"proceedings" is often used to indicate various steps which are only 
parts of such proceeding. 
§ 63. Duty of custodian of will; liability. After the 
death of a testator the person having custody of his will shall 
deliver it to the court which has jurisdiction of the estate. 
Every person who wilfully refuses or fails to deliver a will 
after being duly ordered by the court to do so shall be guilty 
of contempt of court. He shall also be liable to any party 
aggrieved for the damages which may be sustained by such 
refusal or failure. 
Comment. Statutes in practically every state provide that the 
custodian of a will may be compelled to produce it. Some stop with 
a general statement, while others go into more or less detail. In some 
jurisdictions criminal penalties are provided for the refusal to produce 
a will. The statute here presented is almost identical with Kan. Gen. 
Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-62 1 .  
§ 64. Petition for probate and appointment of per­
sonal representative; who may petition. Any interested 
person may petition the court of a proper county 
(a) To have the will admitted to probate, whether the 
same is written or unwritten, in his possession or not, 
is lost, is destroyed or is without the state; 
(b) For the appointment of an executor if one is desig­
nated in the will ; 
(c) For the appointment of an administrator, if no execu­
tor is designated in the will, or if the person so named 
is disqualified or unsuitable, or refuses to serve, or if 
there is no will. 
A petition for probate may be combined with a petition for the 
appointment of an executor or administrator; and a person 
interested in either the probate of the will or in the appoint­
ment of a personal representative may petition for both. 
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Comment. A person interested in the appointment of a personal 
representative is not necessarily interested in the probate of the will. 
This is true of a creditor of the decedent. However, creditors are 
interested in obtaining the appointment of a personal representative in 
order to obtain proceeds of the estate, and under the section are proper 
persons to petition for probate as well as for the appointment either 
of an executor or an administrator. 
§ 65. Contents of petition for probate and appoint­
ment of personal representative. A petition for probate of 
a will or for the original appoint]1lent of a general personal 
representative or for both shall state: , 
(a) The name, age, domicile and date of death of the 
decedent ; 
(b) The names, ages and residence addresses of the heirs 
and devisees, if any, so far as known or can with rea­
sonable diligence be ascertained ; 
(c) . The probable value of the real and �f the personal 
property; 
(d) If the decedent was not domiciled in the state at the 
time of his death, what property is within the county 
in which the petition is filed; 
(e) If the decedent died testate and the will has not been 
delivered to the court, the contents of the will, either 
by attaching a copy of it to the petition, or, if the will 
is unwritten, lost, destroyed or suppressed, by includ­
ing a statement of the provisions of the will so far as 
known; 
(f) The names and residence addresses of the persons, if 
any, named as executors ; and 
(g) If the appointment of a personal repres�ntative is 
sought, the name and residence address of the person 
for whom letters are prayed; and his relationship to 
the decedent or other facts, if any, which entitle such 
person to appointment. 
Comment. It may be deemed desirable for the judges having 
probate jurisdiction to promulgate standard forms for petitions for 
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probate and for the appointment of a personal representative. This 
can be done under the powers given in § I o of this Code. 
§ 66. Demand for notice of proceedings for probate 
or appointment of personal representative. If any inter­
ested person desires to be notified before a will is admitted to 
probate or before a general personal representative is ap­
pointed, he may file a demand for notice with the court. No 
demand for notice is effective unless it contains a statement 
of the interest of the person filing it, and his address or that 
of his attorney. After filing the same, no will shall be ad­
mitted to probate and no personal representative shall be 
appointed, other than a special administrator, until the notice 
provided for in section 69 hereof has been given. 
Comment. This section has been developed from the device used 
in the English ecclesiastical and probate courts, known as a caveat. 
The caveat is alSo provided for in a number of jurisdictions in this 
country. Where, as in this Code, provision is made for probate and 
grant of administration without notice, the caveat, or something 
comparable to it, is a desirable safeguard for the protection of interested 
persons who otherwise may not have notice of the hearing. There is 
no reason, however, why the caveat should not be applied to the 
appointment of the personal representative as well as to the probate of 
the will. Provision for this has accordingly been made in this section 
of the Code. 
§ 67. Request for special notice of hearings. At any 
time after the issuance of letters, any person interested in the 
estate may, in person or by attorney, serve upon the personal 
representative, or upon his attorney, and file with the clerk of 
the court where the proceedings are pending, with a written 
admission or proof of such service, a written request, stating 
that he desires written notice by ordinary mail of the time and 
place of all hearings. on the settlement of accounts, on final 
distribution, and on any other matters for which any notice is 
required by law, by rule of court or by an order in the particu­
lar case. The applicant for such notice must include in his writ-
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ten request his post office address or that of his attorney. Un­
less the court otherwise directs, upon filing such request such 
person shall be entitled to notice of all hearings for which any 
notice is required as aforesaid, or of such of those hearings as 
he designates in his request. 
Comment. This section is modeled after. Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. 
(Deering, 1 944) § 1 202. 
§ 68. Hearing on petition without notice. Upon fil­
ing the petition for probate or for the appointment of a general 
personal representative, if no demand for notice has been filed 
as provided in section 66, and if such petition is not opposed by 
any interested person, the court may, in its discretion, hear it 
forthwith or at such time and place as it may direct, without 
requiring notice. 
Comment. This and the sections which immediately follow it are 
drawn on the theory that it is desirable to permit a summary hearing 
on an application for probate or administration, and that such hearing 
is permissible without any notice whatever. This was the English 
probate in common form and · has been followed in a considerable 
number of states. It is still a part of the English probate system. On 
the other hand, a large number of states require notice before any 
hearing can be had other than for a grant of special administration. 
A hearing without notice permits an immediate supervision of the estate 
of the decedent as soon as his death occurs. In jurisdictions requiring 
notice that result may be obtained only when a special administrator 
is appointed,-often a cumbersome and expensive procedure. On 
the other hand, it may be said that in the summary proceeding without 
notice, there is danger that unscrupulous persons get control of the 
estate. However, this danger is largely obviated by the fact that the 
judge may always, in his discretion, require notice before the hearing. 
Moreover, control by an improper person is not likely to continue 
long in view of the provision of § 70 requiring notice of the appoint­
ment of the personal representative as soon as letters are issued. In 
Florida, where probate without notice is permitted, notice of the ad­
mission of a will to probate may be made on the request of the personal 
representative or any other interested person. Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I  94 I )  
§ 732.28.  In other states the personal representative is sometimes 
required to give notice of his appointment. In general, as to the re­
quirement of notice, see 43 Mich. L. Rev. 1 1 53  ( 1945) .  
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If a court should deem it advisable, a general rule requiring notice 
in all cases unless otherwise ordered could be promulgated under the 
provisions of § § I o and I 4 hereof. 
§ 69. Notice of hearing on petition. 
(a) When and to whom notice given. If the petition 
for probate or for the appointment of a general personal rep­
resentative is opposed, or if a demand for notice has been filed, 
under the provisions of section 66 hereof, the court must, and 
in all other cases the court may, fix a time and place for a hear­
ing on such petition, and direct 
( I )  That notice be given by publication and 
( 2) That a copy of such notice be served personally 
or by registered mail on each heir and devi­
see whose name and address is known and on 
each person who has filed such demand for 
notice. 
(b) Notice to alleged decedent. If it appears by the 
petition or otherwise that the fact of the death of the person 
whose estate is to be administered may be in doubt, or on the 
written demand of any interested person, a copy of the notice 
of the hearing on said petition shall be sent by registered mail 
to the last known residence address of the alleged decedent. 
(c) Form of notice. The publication of notice required 
by this section shall include a notice to creditors of the decedent 
to file their claims in the court or be forever barred; and shall 
be substantially in the following form: 
In the [ ] court, county, 
State of ------
Estate of , deceased 
To all persons interested in the Estate of -------
and to the said , if he be not deceased : 
You are hereby notified that a petition has been filed in said 
court [ to admit to probate the will of , and] 
for the appointment of a personal representative for said estate; 
that said petition will be heard at on 
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the day of , I 9-, or' at such subsequent 
time or other place to which said hearing may be adjourned 
or transferred. 
All persons having claims against said estate are hereby 
notified to file the same in said court within four months from 




Clerk of the [ ] Court for 
------ County, --------
Comment. This section makes provision for notice when there 
is a contest or when a demand for notice has been filed, or when the 
court determines that it would be desirable. If notice is ordered, then 
this notice accomplishes two things : it notifies interested parties of 
the beginning of the proceeding ; it also notifies creditors to come in 
and present their claims. In this way the expense of a separate pub­
lication of notice to creditors is eliminated. The part of the notice 
which is bracketed is to be omitted if there is no will. 
This section is designed to give the court jurisdiction over the prop­
erty even if the person whose estate is to be administered be not deceased. 
Subsection (b) provides for notice to him ; and the form set out in 
subsection (c) provides that he be made a party. It should be pointed 
out that, under the provisions of § 8 1 ,  infra, even if the court has 
jurisdiction over the presumed decedent when he is not, in fact, dead, 
he has a very good chance of recovering back his property . .  However, 
his attack on the probate proceeding must be direct; he cannot make 
a collateral attack. Thus, the personal representative who has acted 
in good faith is protected. 
§ 70. Notice of appointment of personal representa· 
tive. In all cases where notice by publication of the hearing 
on the petition for probate or for the appointment of a general 
personal representative has not been given, the clerk shall, 
as soon as general letters are issued, cause to be published a 
notice of the appointment of the personal representative, in 
which shall be included a notice to creditors of the decedent 
to file their claims in the court or be forever barred. A copy. 
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of such notice shall also be served personally or by registered 
mail on each heir and devisee whose name and address is 
known. Such notice shall be in substantially the following 
form: 
In the [ ] court of --- county, 
State of ------
Estate of , deceased 
To all persons interested in the Estate of -------
and to the said , if he be not deceased : 
You are hereby notified that on the -- day of , 
I 9-, [ the last will of was admitted to 
probate and that] was appointed the 
[executor] administrator of the estate of-------­
deceased. 
All persons having claims against said estate are hereby 
notified to file the same in said court within four months from 
the date of the first publication of this notice or be forever 
barred. 
Date ------
Clerk of the [ ] Court for 
----- County, -----
C ommmt. This is the notice which is to be given if the first hearing 
is without notice by publication. Thus notice is given to interested 
persons in all cases very early in the proceeding, and in time to make 
good any objections they may have to the probate or to the appoint­
ment of the personal representative. 
§ 71 .  Search for alleged decedent. Whenever there is 
any doubt that the person whose estate is to be administered 
is dead, the court, upon application of any interested person, 
may direct the personal representative to make search for the 
alleged decedent in any manner which the court may deem 
advisable, including any or all of the following methods : 
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(a) By inserting in one or more suitable periodicals a 
notice requesting information from any person hav­
ing knowledge of the whereabouts of the alleged 
decedent ; 
(b) By notifying officers of justice and public welfare 
agencies in appropriate locations of the disappearance 
of the alleged decedent ; 
(c) By engaging the services of an investigation agency. 
Comment. This section is inserted because the proceeding makes 
the alleged decedent a party and is intended to bind him. If the 
court exercises a sound discretion in ordering notice as provided in this 
section, it is clear that due process requirements are complied with in 
so far as the alleged decedent's property is concerned. Indeed, the 
inclusion of the decedent as a party to the notice by publication would 
seem to amount to a compliance with due process requirements. See 
the comment to § 8 I .  
This section is modeled after § 5 of the Uniform Absence as Evidence 
of Death and Absentees' Property Act as promulgated by the Confer­
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It does not, however, 
take the place of the uniform act. This section would be used only 
where the alleged decedent is believed to be dead and where it is de­
sirable to have the whole matter determined in one probate proceeding. 
§ 72. How will is contested. Any interested person may 
contest the probate of a will by stating in writing the grounds 
of his objection thereto and filing the same in the court. 
Comment. No attempt is made to enumerate the grounds of con­
test. See, however, § So. This section, of course, implies the well 
recognized proposition that a part of a will can be contested. See 69 
A.L.R. I I29 and 32 Yale L.J. 294 ( I 923) . 
§ 73. Time within which contest must be filed. No 
will can be contested unless the grounds of objection are filed 
within the periods hereinafter provided. 
(a) If the ground of objection is that another will of the 
decedent has been discovered; the ground of objection 
must be filed before final distribution of the estate is 
decree� and within the period stated in section 83 .  
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(b) If the contest is on any other ground, and 
( I ) If notice of the hearing of the petition for pro­
bate has been given as provided in section 69, 
the grounds of objection must be filed at or be­
fore the time of the hearing on the petition for 
probate. 
( 2) If notice of the hearing of the petition for pro­
bate has not been given as provided in section 
69, the grounds of objection must be filed 
within four months after the first publication 
of the notice of appointment of the personal 
representative. 
Comment. See comment to § 7 5 as to another will subsequently 
produced. 
§ 74. Notice of contest. 
(a) Contest before probate. If a statement of grounds 
of objection to admitting the will to probate is filed before it 
has been admitted, and the court has already ordered the no­
tice provided for in section 69, no further notice is necessary 
unless ordered by the court. If the court has not already 
ordered the notice provided for in section 69, the notice 
therein provided for shall be given, and the notice shall further 
· state that the will is being contested. 
(b) Contest after probate. · If a statement of objection 
to admitting the will to probate is filed after the will has been 
admitted and within the time limitations stated in section 73, 
the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same and 
shall direct that notice be given to each heir and devisee whose 
place of residence is known, and, if the grounds for contest 
include the presentation of another will, to each devisee in such 
other will, whose place of residence is known, and to such other 
persons as the court may direct. 
Comment. See comment to § 75· 
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§ 75. Will subsequently presented for probate. 
(a) Where original petition not yet heard. If, after a 
petition for the probate of a will or for the appointment of a 
general personal representative has been filed, and before such 
petition has been heard, a petition for the probate of a will of 
the decedent, not theretofore presented for probate, is filed, 
the court shall hear both petitions together and determine 
what instruments, if any, should be admitted to probate or 
whether the decedent died intestate. 
(b) Where one will already admitted or administra-
tion granted. If, after a will has been admitted to probate 
or after letters of administration have been granted, a petition 
for th� probate of a will of the decedent, not theretofore pre­
sented for probate is filed, the court shall determine whether 
the former probate or t_he former grant of letters should be 
revoked and whether such other will should be admitted to 
probate or whether the decedent died intestate. 
(c) Time limitation on probate under this settion. 
No will shall be admitted to probate under the provisions of 
this section unless it is presented for probate before the court 
decrees final distribution of the estate. 
(d) Character of proceedings under this section; no­
tice. When a will is presented for probate under the provi­
sions of this section, the proceedings shall be deemed a part of 
the proceedings for probate or for administration already in­
itiated. If notice by publication has been ordered as provided 
in section 69 or in section 70, no further notice by publication 
is necessary unless ordered by the court ; but the court shall 
direct that notice of the hearing be given to each heir and to 
each devisee in this or in any other will offered for or admitted 
to probate, whose place of residence is known, and to such other 
persons as the court may direct. 
Comment. This section and § §  73  and 74 on contest overlap · 
somewhat, but all are necessary. A subsequently presented will may 
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have a double function ; it may revoke a prior will, and thus be the 
basis of a contest of that prior will, and it may also contain dispositive 
provisions which the proponent wishes to have recognized by securing 
its probate. Sections 7 3, 7 4 and 7 5 all take the position that the con­
test of the old will and the probate of the new are both determined 
at the same hearing .. 
However, the attempted probate of another will may not necessarily 
constitute a contest of the first. Thus, if the testator makes one will 
disposing of all his real estate and another will disposing of all his per­
sonal estate, these wills are obviously not inconsistent. Nevertheless, 
since the order admitting the first of these wills to probate would be a 
determination that such will was the testator's last and only will and 
that as to all property not covered by it he died intestate, it would be 
necessary to reopen the order or judgment made at the first hearing, 
but it would not be necessary to revoke the probate of the first will. 
Much confusion exists in the statutes and cases as to the matter of 
introducing a subsequent will. Some jurisdictions bar it by the ordinary 
period of contest ; others allow it to be introduced after the period for 
contest has expired ; some allow it to be probated at any time. Logic­
ally, it would seem that it does not differ from any other newly dis­
covered evidence, and that time limitations on contest should apply 
to it. On the other hand, if a later will is discovered before the order 
of distribution, it seems reasonable that it should be admitted. This 
Code takes the latter position. 
§ 76. Testimony of subscribing witnesses. If the pro­
bate of a written, attested will is contested, at least two of the 
subscribing witnesses shall be examined if they are within the 
state and competent and able to testify. If the will is not con­
tested, at least one of the subscribing witnesses shall be exam­
ined if such witness is within the state and competent and able 
to testify. 
§ 77. Proof of written attested will by other evidence. 
The provisions of section 76 as to the testimony of subscribing 
witnesses shall not exclude the production of other evidence 
at the hearing on the petition for probate ; and the due execu- · 
tion of the will may be proved by such other evidence. 
Comment. Common-law rules as to the proof. of the execution 
of wills are assumed to be in force without the necessity of any statute. 
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Thus, if attesting witnesses are not available, it is possible to prove the 
genuineness of their signatures and to raise a presumption that the 
will was duly executed. 5 \Vigmore, Evidence (3d ed., I 940) 
§ § I 5 I I, I 5 I 2. This section is designed i:o indicate that such rules 
are in force. 
§ 78 . Commission to take testimony of subscribing 
witnesses. When it is inconvenient for one or more of the 
subscribing witnesses to a written, attested will to be present 
at a hearing with respect to the probate of such will, or where 
such witness or witnesses are without the state, the court may, 
if there be no contest, issue a commission to take the testimony 
of such witness or witnesses, either without notice or upon such 
notice as the court shall direct. If there is a contest with re­
spect to the probate of the will, a commission may be issued in 
accordance with the practice in civil actions. 
§ 79. Proof of holographif; or nuncupative will. Proof 
of holographic and nuncupative wills are subject to the re­
quirements of sections 48 and 49 of this Code. 
Comment. This provision is inserted because of the terms of the 
Model Execution of Wills Act, which appears as § §  45 to 50 of this 
Code. 
§ 80. Proof required for probate and for grant of ad· 
ministration. 
(a) On petition for probate. On a petition for the pro­
bate of a will, if the court finds that the testator is dead and 
that the will was executed in all respects accor�ing to law when 
the testator was competent to do so and was not acting under 
undue influence, fraud or restraint, and does not find that the 
will was revoked the will shall be admitted to probate as the 
last will of the testator. 
(b) On petition for appointment of personal repre· 
sentative. On a petition for the appointment of an executor 
or general administrator the court shall determine whether the 
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deceased died testate or intestate and shall grant letters ac­
cordingly or, on ptoper grounds, may deny the petition. 
§ 8 1 .  Effect of probate or grant of administration. If 
the court determines the facts as provided in section So, such 
order shall, if uncontested or unappealed from, be final, sub­
ject to the following exceptions: 
(a) It may be reopened at any time prior to the decree of 
final distribution for the purpose of admitting a will 
to probate not theretofore presented to the court ; 
(b) . It may be vacated or modified for good cause as pro­
vided in section I 9 ;  
(c) The finding of the fact of death shall be conclusive 
as to the alleged decedent only if ( I ) the notice of the 
hearing on the petition for probate or for the appoint­
ment of a personal representative is sent by registered 
mail addressed to the alleged decedent at his last' 
known residence address and ( 2) ,  when search is 
ordered for the alleged decedent as provided in sec­
tion 7 I ,  the court finds that the search was made. If 
such notice is sent and search made, and the alleged 
decedent is not dead, he may nevertheless at any time 
recover the estate from the personal representative 
if it be in his hands, or he may recover the estate or its 
proceeds from the distributees, if either be in their 
hands. 
Comment. Tpe effect of the first part of this section is to say that 
the order admitting a will to probate determines that it is the last and 
only effective will of the testator and that the order granting adminis­
tration to a personal representative, when no will is admitted to probate, 
determines that the decedent died intestate. Hence, any presentation 
of a will at a later time can be made only by reopening the order ad­
mitting the first will to probate or the order granting administration. 
However, the later will may be admitted by reopening the order at 
any time before the decree of final distribution is: made. 
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The third exception to the conclusiveness of these orders is with 
respect to the fact of death. According to the decision in the case of 
Scott v. McNeal, I 54 U. S. 34, I 4 S. Ct. I I  o8 ( I  894) ,  an ordinary 
probate proceeding in which the alleged decedent is not made a party 
and is not given notice does not bind him, and he may attack the whole 
proceeding collaterally. This is because due process requirements have 
not been complied with. But if reasonable notice is given to the alleged 
decedent, and he is made a party to the proceeding, he is bound. The 
form of notice provided for in this Code makes the alleged decedent a 
party ; and if the steps referred to in exception (c) hereof are taken, 
he would receive reasonable . notice. This simply means that he is 
bound by the proceeding and cannot attack it collaterally. But, ac­
cording to the provisions of this section, he can recover his property 
back to the. extent that it is in the hands of the personal representative 
or distributees. He cannot recover it back from creditors, and the 
personal representative is protected to the extent that he acted in good 
faith. 
§ 82. Certificate of probate. When proved as herein 
provided, every written will, if in the custody of the court, 
shall have endorsed thereon or annexed thereto a certificate 
by the court of such order of probate. If for any reason a writ­
ten will is not in the custody of the court, or if the will is oral, 
the court shall find the contents thereof, and the order admit­
ting the will to probate shall state the c_ontents and a certificate 
shall be annexed as above provided. Every will certified as 
herein provided, or the record thereof, or a duly certified tran­
script of the record, may be read in evidence in all the courts 
within this state without further proof. 
§ 83. Time limit for probate and administration. In 
addition to the limitations of time provided in section 73 
hereof, no written will shall be admitted to probate and no 
administration shall be granted unless application is made to 
the court for the same within five years from the death of the 
decedent ; and no oral will shall be admitted to probate except 
in accordance with the provisions of section 49 hereof. 
1 06 MODEL PROBATE CODE 
Comment. The section last referred to is the portion of the Model 
Execution of Wills Act dealing with oral wills. 
The five-year limitation laid down in this section is designed to take 
care of situations where there has been no probate or grant of ad­
ministration during the period of five years. It is not intended to 
modify the restrictions laid down in § § 7 3 to 7 5 ,  except to the extent 
that it sets an outside limit of five years. This section is intended to 
prohibit and to render ineffective any grant of letters if the petition is 
filed after five years. Section I 35  (d) and this section both have legal 
effect after the five-year period. By the operation of these sections 
the heirs may deal with the property as owners after the five-year 
period. 
§ 84. Devolution of estate at death. When a person 
dies, his real and personal property, except exempt property 
and homestead interests, passes to the persons to whom it is 
devised by his last will, or, in the absence of such disposition, 
to the persons who succeed to his estate as his heirs ; but it 
shall be subject to the possession of the personal representative 
and to the election of the surviving spouse and shall be charge­
able with the expenses of administering the estate, the payment 
of other claims and allowances to the family, except as other­
wise provided in this Code. 
Comment. See § I 24 and comment thereto. 
§ 85. No will effectual until probated. Except as pro­
vided in sections 8 6 and 8 7 hereof, no will shall be effectual 
for the purpose of proving title to, or the right to the posses­
sion of, any real or personal property, disposed of by the will, 
until it has been admitted to probate. 
Comment. · Statutes of this general character are common. Some 
even go so far as to say that no will shall be effectual to pass real or 
personal estate until it has been admitted to probate. But it is uniformly 
held that this is a matter of the productio� of evidence and does not 
prevent the passing of .title at the time of testator's death. 
It is not the purpose of this section to preclude the use of an un­
probated will to prove a tort or to establish a constructive trust in a 
proper case. Thus an unprobated will might be introduced in evidence 
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to secure a remedy for actual fraud or duress. But the mere fact that 
a will was not presented for probate within the statutory time for 
contest or for probate, or that its existence was not known within that 
time, would furnish no basis for imposing a constructive trust in favor 
of b.eneficiaries of the unprobated will. 
It would seem, moreover, that such indirect remedies as an action 
for tort or a constructive trust would rarely be needed under this 
Code, for an after discovered will may be introduced at any time until 
final distribution. See § 7 5 .  Likewise, § 1 9  is very liberal in permit­
ting the reopening of an order or decree for cause. 
DISPENSING WITH ADMINISTRATION 
Comment to § §  86-92.  The seven sections which follow are in­
tended to provide three distinct methods by which administration may 
be dispensed with, in whole or in part, in small estates. ( See, also, 
§§  229, 235  and 237 in part IV on Guardianship.) 
Sections 86 and 87 are intended to cover the small estate in which 
administration is neither had nor contemplated. It is intended merely 
to enable the surviving family of a decedent to collect assets of the 
estate without the necessity of resorting to administration. They are 
modeled after Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § §  630, 63 1 
and Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § §  478, 4 8 1 .  Being 
limited to estates not exceeding $ 1 ,ooo, they will for the most part be 
utilized to collect bank deposits, wage claims, insurance proceeds and 
the like, and to transfer registered securities and automobiles. They 
are not intended, however, to preclude the subsequent granting of an 
administration if the same be desired. Where there is a surviving 
spouse or minor child, they will ordinarily be entitled to such assets 
absolutely as exempt property irrespective of the existence of creditors. 
On the other hand, if the surviving heirs are not so closely related to 
the decedent, such assets may be subject to administration, and the 
distributees to whom such assets are paid or delivered will be account­
able to a personal representative, ,  if one should be appointed subse­
quently. A lapse of thirty days is required before this section may be 
employed, in order to afford creditors an opportunity to demand ad­
ministration. Of course, the distributees may prevent the initiation 
of administration by paying creditors who otherwise might insist upon 
administration. 
Sections 88-9 1 provide a method for the summary distribution of a 
small estate to the surviving spouse or minor children where the same, 
exclusive of homestead and exempt property, would otherwise be 
entirely consumed in the payment of a family allowance. The upper 
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limit of $2,500 is suggested as a maximum value of an estate to which 
these sections should apply. In these estates, also, ordinary creditors 
would not share and consequently there is no reason why distribution 
cannot be made immediately. These provisions are not a required, 
but only an optional, course of procedure. They have the advan�age 
of providing a judicial method of accomplishing their purpose, whereas 
the procedure contemplated by § §  86 and 87  is entirely without 
judicial supervision. 
Section 92 differs from the preceding sections in that it applies to 
estates in which administration has been commenced but which are · so small in size that general creditors will not share in their distribution. 
A summary and early distribution is thus provided. 
§ 86. Collection of small estates by distrihutees upon 
affidavit. The distributees of an estate shall be entitled 
thereto without awaiting the appointment of a personal repre­
sentative or the probate of a will when 
(a) No petition for the appointment of a personal repre­
sentative is pending or has been granted, and 
(b) Thirty days have elapsed since the death of the de­
cedent, and 
(c) The value of the entire assets of the estate, not in­
cluding homestead and exempt property, does not 
exceed [ $ I ,ooo] ,  and 
(d) There is furnished to any person owing any money, 
having custody of any property, or acting as registrar 
or transfer agent of any evidence of interest., indebted­
ness, property or right, an affidavit showing the exist-· 
ence of the foregoing conditions and the right of the 
distributees to receive such money or property or to 
'have such evidences transferred. 
§ 87. Same; effect of affidavit; release; suit. The per­
son making payment, delivery, transfer or issuance pursuant 
to the affidavit described in section 86  shall be released to the 
same extent as if made to a personal representative of the de­
cedent and he shall not be required to see to the application 
thereof or to inquire into the truth of any statement in the 
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affidavit, but the distributees to whom payment, delivery, 
transfer or issuance is made shall be answerable therefor to any 
person having a prior right and be accountable to any personal 
representative thereafter appointed. If the person to whom 
such affidavit is delivered refuses to pay, deliver, transfer, or 
issue the property as above provided, it may be recovered or 
compelled in an action brought for such purpose by or on be­
half of the distributees entitled thereto, upon proof of the facts 
required to be stated in the affidavit. 
§ 88. Petition for order of no administration. If the 
value of the entire assets of an estate, not including homestead 
and exempt property, does not exceed [ $2,500] and does not 
exceed the amount to which the surviving spouse and minor 
children of the decedent are entitled as a family allowance, 
there may be filed by or on behalf of the surviving spouse or 
minor children a petition in any court of proper venue for 
administration, or if a petition for the appointment of a per­
sonal representative has been filed but not yet granted, then in 
the court where such petition has been filed, P.raying the court 
to make a family allowance and to make an order. that no ad­
ministration shall be necessary. The petition shall state the 
names of the heirs or devisees, a list of creditors of the estate 
together with the amounts of the claims so far as the same are 
known, and a description of all real and personal property be­
longing to the estate, together with the estimated value thereof 
according to the best knowledge and information of the peti­
tioner, and the liens and encumbrances thereon, with a prayer 
that the court make a family allowance and that, if the entire 
assets of the estate are thereby exhausted, the same be set aside 
to the surviving spouse, if there be one, otherwise to the minor 
chi�dren. 
Comment. This section is similar in substance to Cal. Prob. Code 
Ann. {Deering, 1 944) §§  640, 642. It is intended to be applicable 
if there is real as well as personal property, and whether the decedent 
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died testate or intestate. If there is a will, its probate will not affect 
the right to pursue the procedure provided in this section. Procedure 
similar to the above for a judicial dispensing with administration under 
certain circumstances exists in many states at the present time. See 
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § 735 .02. The procedure for making a 
family allowance is provided by § 44· 
§ 89. Same; hearing and order. Upon the filing of a 
petition for no administration the court may hear the same 
for�hwith without notice, or at such time and upon such notice 
as the court may require. Upon the hearing of the petition, 
if the court finds that the facts contained therein are true and 
that the expenses of the last illness, funeral charges and ex­
penses of the proceeding have been paid or secured, the court 
shall make a family allowance and, if the entire assets of the 
estate are thereby exhausted, shall order that no administration 
be had in the estate and shall assign to the surviving spouse or, 
if there be no surviving spouse, then to the minor children the 
whole of the estate, subject to the liens and encumbrances 
thereon. 
Comment. The above section follows in part Fla. Stat. Ann. 
( 1 94 1 )  § 735 .03 �nd Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 645. 
§ 90. Same; effect of order. The order that no admin­
istration be had on the estate shall, until revoked, constitute 
sufficient legal authority to all persons owing any money, hav­
ing custody of any property, or acting as registrar or transfer 
agent of any evidence of interest, indebtedness, property or 
right belonging to the estate and to persons purchasing or 
otherwise dealing with the estate, for payment or transfer to 
the persons described in the order as entitled to receive the 
estate without administration. 
Comment. This section follows in general the form of Fla. Stat. 
Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § 735 .04. 
§ 91 . Same; proceedings to revoke order. At any time 
within one year after the making of an order of no administra-
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tion, any person interested in the estate may file a petition to 
revoke the same alleging that other property has been dis­
covered, or that property belonging to the estate was not in­
cluded in the petition for no administration, or that the prop­
erty described in the petition was improperly valued, and that 
if said property were added, included or properly valued� as 
the case may be, the total value of the property would exceed · 
that necessary to justify the court in ordering no administra­
tion. Upon proof of any of such grounds, the court shall re­
voke the order of no administration ; but the order of no 
administratibn shall not be revoked on these grounds after 
the expiration of one year from the date of the order. In case 
of any contest as to the value of any property, the court may 
appoint two appraisers to appraise the same in accordance with 
section 1 20 of this Code. 
Comment. This section contemplates a direct attack upon the 
order of no administration in the probate court. It is in addition to 
the remedy by appeal. But it embodies reasons some of which would 
not be available by appeal ; and, because the petition may have been 
granted without notice, a longer time is allowed. 
If an order of no administration is  revoked, the court may then 
grant administration upon the filing of a petition therefor. 
§ 92. Summary proceedings for small estates after per­
sonal representative appointed. Whenever, after the in­
ventory and appraisement has been filed by a personal 
representative, it is established that the estate of a decedent, 
exclusive of the homestead and exempt property and family 
allowances to the surviving spouse and minor children, does 
not exceed an amount sufficient to pay the claims of classes I 
to 6 inclusive, the personal representative upon order of the 
court shall pay the same in the order provided and thereafter 
present his account with an appliCation for the settlement and 
allowance thereof. Thereupon the court, with or without 
notice, may adjust, correct, settle, allow or disallow such ac-
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count and, if the account is settled and allowed, decree final 
distribution, discharge the personal repre.sentative and close 
the administration. 
Comment. The above section follows the general plan of Kan. 
Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-1507 and Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  
§ 525 .5 I .  It contemplates a minimum of administration. It differs 
from the preceding sections which actually dispense with administra­
tion, in that it contemplates some administration by a personal repre­
sentative under the supervision of the court until it appears that further 
administration is unnecessary. See § 142 for the classification of claims. 
ADJUDICATED COMPROMISE OF CONTROVERSIES 
§ 93. Agreement to compromise controversies author· 
ized. The compromise of any contest or controversy as to 
(a) Admission to probate of any instrument propounded 
as the last will of any decedent, 
(b) The construction, validity or effect of any such instru­
ment, 
(c) The rights or interests in the estate of the decedent of 
any person, whether claiming under a will or as heir, 
(d) The rights or interests of any beneficiary of any tes­
tamentary trust, or 
(e) The administration of the estate of any decedent or 
of any testamentary trust, 
whether or not there is or may be any person interested who is 
a minor or otherwise without legal capacity to act in person or 
whose present existence or whereabouts cannot be ascertained, 
or whether or not there is any inalienable estate or future con­
tingent interest which may be affected by such compromise, 
shall, if made in accordance with the provisions of this Code, 
be lawful and binding upon all the parties thereto, whether 
born or unborn, ascertained or unascertained, including such 
as are represented by trustees, guardians of estates and guard- -
ians ad litem; but no such compromise shall in any way im­
pair the rights of creditors or of taxing authorities. 
ADMINISTRATION OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES 1 13 
Comment. It would seem that, even in the absence of legislation, 
interested persons who are sui juris should be able to enter into a com­
promise agreement as to the validity or effect of a will or as to other 
controverted matters with respect to an estate, which would be fully 
binding upon them. In view of the decision in Will of Dardis, 1 3 5  
Wis. 457,  I I 5 N.W. 332  ( 1 908) ,  and other similar cases, however, 
legislation is desirable. Moreover, it frequently happens that some of 
the interested parties are incompetent, unascertained or even unborn ; 
in which case legislation is necessary in order that such parties may be 
bound by the compromise agreements of their guardians or guardians 
ad litem. This and the two sections which follow are designed to 
make possible an adjudicated compromise even in situations where in­
terested parties are unborn or unascertained. Legislation of this kind 
is believed to be desirable in avoiding the expense of litigation and in 
clearing titles. These sections are modeled in substance after 
the Michigan compromise statute, Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I  943) 
§ § 2 7 .  3 I 7 8 ( I I 5 )  to 2 7 .  3 I 7 8 ( I I  9 ) .  For other statutes of this type, 
see Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 932) c. 204, § §  1 4- 1 8 ;  N. Y. Dec. Est. 
Law, § 1 9. 
§ 94. Compromise agreement to be executed and de­
livered to the court; appointment of guardian ad litem. 
(a) Execution of compromise agreement by compe· 
tent persons. The terms of such compromise shall be set forth 
in an agreement in writing which shall be executed by all com­
petent persons having interests or claims which will or may be 
affected by such compromise, except those who may be living 
but whose present existence or whereabouts is unknown and 
cannot after diligent search be ascertained. 
(b) Submission to court for execution by fiduciaries. 
Any interested person may then submit the agreement to the 
court for its approval and for the purpose of directing the 
execution thereof by the personal representative of the estate, 
by the trustees of every testamentary trust which will be af­
fected by the compromise, and by the guardians of the estates 
of minors and other incompetents and of unborn and unascer­
tained persons and of persons whose present existence or 
whereabouts is unknown and cannot after diligent search be 
ascertained, who might be affected by the compromise. 
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(c) Appointment of guardian ad litem. If there shall 
be any person who, if living, has an interest which may be af­
fected by such compromise but whose present existence or 
whereabouts cannot after diligent search be ascertained, or who 
is a minor or otherwise incompetent and has no guardian of 
his estate, or if there is any future contingent interest which 
might be taken by any person not then in being and which 
might be affected by the compromise, the court shall appoint 
a guardian ad litem to represent such person. 
§ 95. Order approving agreement and directing ex· 
ecution by fiduciaries. Upon due notice, in the manner di­
rected by the court, to all interested persons in being, or to their 
guardians, and to the guardians of all unborn persons who may 
take contingent interests by the compromise, and to the per­
sonal representative of the estate and to all trustees of testa­
mentary trusts which would be affected by the compromise, 
the court shall, if it finds that the contest or controversy is in 
good faith and that the effect of the agreement upon the in­
terests of persons represented by fiduciaries is just and reason­
able, make an order approving the agreement and directing 
the fiduciaries and guardians ad litem to execute such agree­
ment. Upon the making of such order and the execution of 
the agreement, all further disposition of the estate shall be in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement. 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 
§ 96. Persons entitled to domiciliary letters. 
(a) Order of persons entitled. Domiciliary letters testa­
mentary or domiciliary letters of general administration may 
be granted to one or more of the persons hereinafter men­
tioned, natural or corporate, who are not disqualified, in the 
following order: 
( I  ) To the executor or executors designated in the 
will; 
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( 2) To the surviving spouse or next of kin, or both, 
or to some person or persons nominated by 
them or any of them, as the court may, in its 
discretion, determine ; 
( 3 )  I f  there are no executors nor a surviving spouse 
nor any next of kin, or if none of such persons 
files a petition for letters within thirty days 
after the death of the . decedent, then to any 
other qualified person. 
(b) Who are disqualified. No person is qualified to 
serve as a domiciliary personal representative who is 
( r ) Under twenty-one years of age ; 
( 2 )  Of unsound mind; 
(3 )  A convicted felon, either under the laws of the 
United States or of any state or territory of the 
United States; 
( 4) A non-resident of this state who has not ap­
pointed a resident agent to accept service of 
process in all actions or proceedings with re­
spect to the estate and caused such appointment 
to be filed with the court ; 
(5)  A corporation not authorized to  act as  a fidu"7 
ciary in this state ; 
( 6) A person whom the court finds unsuitable. 
Comment. Statutes determining who are entitled to appointment 
as personal representatives are found in all states. While they differ 
widely, they seem in general to be based on two principles. Either the 
administrator is selected because of his interest in the estate or he is 
selected because of his close relationship to the decedent. Of  course, 
the decedent's choice, if he names an executor, is preferred. In some 
states, such as Michigan, the idea of requiring an interest in the estate 
for appointment as an admin.istrator is carried very far. An assignee 
of the surviving spouse or next of kin is given a priority. Mich. Stat. 
Ann. ( 1 943) § 27 .3 1 7 8 ( 1 2 2 ) .  As a corollary, the surviving spouse 
or next of kin loses his priority if he assigns his interest. The other 
basis of choice is relationship to the decedent. Clearly this seems 
reasonable when applied to a surviving spouse who probably knows 
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more about the property and business of the decedent than anyone 
else and who may have helped to accumulate the estate. It also seems 
reasonable in most cases when applied to heirs or next of kin. Some 
statutes, such as the Illinois statute, carry this principle even farther 
and give preference to relatives who are not next of kin but who would 
be next of kin if nearer relatives were dead. Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith­
Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § 248. Many statutes give the preferred person 
also a right to nominate someone else, e. g., Illinois statute cited supra. 
Sometimes this right to nominate is given only to the surviving spouse. 
In other instances it is given to the next of kin also. In drafting this 
section, it was believed that the person who had a preference should 
also have the right to nominate in all cases except in the case of an 
executor. 
In a number of states a preference is given to distributees on the 
ground of pecuniary interest in the estate, e. g., Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I  944) 
§ 395 .040. That seems reasonable in many instances but has not been 
followed in the proposed section because there are so many cases where 
it might not work out well. A wealthy testator bequeaths $ I  oo to a 
worthy servant, yet the servant should have no preference as ad­
ministrator ; or the testator gives the residue of his estate to a charity in 
which he is not greatly interested, believing that there will not be a very 
large residue. This charity would hardly have the interest to become 
a suitable administrator. If, as some statutes do, a distinction is made 
between the principal devisee and other devisees, there would be many 
cases where it could not be decided whether the person was the prin­
cipal devisee. On the whole, it has seemed best not to give devisees, 
as such, a preference to appointment. In reviewing the state statutes, 
attention should be called to particular classes which seem to come in 
for express disfavor. In a number of states the testator's partner is 
either excluded or discriminated against. In Michigan, a creditor of 
the deceased is excluded, Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 27 .3 I 7 8 ( I 22 ) ,  
though in many other states a creditor has a preference, e .  g., Colo. 
Stat. ( I 935)  c. I 7 6, § 74 ·  Massachusetts gives a preference not only 
to next of kin but also to their guardians. Mass. Ann. Laws ( I  932) 
c. I 93, § 1 .  Some statutes give a preference to the foreign consul of 
the country of which the decedent was a citizen, e .  g., Ore. Comp. 
Laws ( I 940) § I 9-2 I O. 
No fixed order of preference seems very satisfactory and for that 
reason the section has been made as flexible as possible, giving the court 
a wide discretion. 
The above section permits non-resident persona:! representatives. 
In some Jurisdictions the personal representative must always be a 
resident. In others there is no requirement that the personal repre-
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sentative be a resident. Still others, like the section presented herewith, 
take a middle ground, and permit a non-resident personal represen­
tative subject to restrictions. It would seem that it is occasionally 
desirable to have a non-resident act as personal representative. 
Numerous situations could be suggested where that would be true. 
For example, the decedent may have resided near the state line an� 
the bulk of his estate may te in the ad joining state. Or his relatives, 
or those who knew him best and on whom he relied in business matters, 
may reside just over the state line. It would be unfortunate to pre­
clude them from qualifying as personal representatives. 
§ 97. When letters to be issued. When a duly appointed 
personal representative has given such bond as may be re­
quired and the bond has been approved by the court, letters 
under the seal of the court shall be issued to him. 
§ 98. When personal representative may be removed. 
When the personal representative becomes mentally incom­
petent, disqualified, unsuitable or incapable of discharging his 
trust, has mismanaged the estate, failed to perform any duty 
imposed by law or by any lawful order of the court, or has 
ceased to be a resident of the state without filing the authoriza­
tion of an agent to accept service as provided oy section 96(b) 
hereof, then the court may remove him. The court on its own 
motion may, or on the petition of any person interested in the 
estate shall, order the representative to appear and show cause 
why he should not be removed. The removal of a personal 
representative after letters are duly issued to him does· not 
invalidate his official acts performed prior to removal. 
Comment. Modeled after Minn. Stat. ( I 9· U )  § 525.501 . 
§ 99. Appointment of successor personal representa· 
tive. When a personal representative dies, is removed by the 
court, or resigns and s�ch resignation is accepted by the court, 
the court may, and if he was the sole or last surviving .personal 
representative and administration is not completed, the court 
shall, appoint another personal representative in his place. 
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§ 100. Successor personal representative and adminis­
trator with will annexed; rights and powers. When a suc­
cessor personal representative or an administrator with the will 
annexed is appointed, he shall have all the rights and powers 
of his predecessor or of the executor qysignated in the will, ex­
cept that he shall not exercise powers given in the will which 
by its terms are personal to the executor therein designated. 
§ 101 .  Powers of surviving personal representative. 
Every power exercisable by j oint personal representatives may 
be exercised by the survivor of them when one is dead or by the 
other when one appointment is terminated by order of the 
court, unless the power is given in the will and its terms other­
wise provide as to the exercise of such power. 
§ 102. What powers of personal representatives joint 
and what several. Where there are two or more personal 
representatives, the following powers can be exercised only by 
all of them : 
(a) To institute suit on behalf of the estate ; 
(b) To employ an attorney; 
(c) To carry on the business of the deceased; 
(d) To vote corporate shares of the estate ; 
(e) To exercise those powers given by the will which, by 
the terms of the will, are to be exercised only by all of . 
the personal representatives, or by all the survivors of 
them. 
All other powers can be exercised by any one of the personal 
representatives, unless the will otherwise provides. 
§ 103. Compensation. If a testator by will makes pro­
.vision for the compensation of his executor or administrator, 
that shall be taken as his full compensation unless he files in 
the court a· written instfument renouncing all claim for the 
compensation provided by the will before qualifying as per-
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sonal representative. The personal representative, when no 
compensation is provided in the will, or when he renounces all 
claim to the compensation provided in the will, shall be' allowed 
such compensation for his services as the court shall deem just 
and reasonable. Additional compensation may be allowed for 
his services as attorney and for other services not required of a 
personal representative. An attorney performing services for 
the estate at the instance, of the personal representative shall 
have such compensation therefor out of the estate as the court 
shall deem just and reasonable. Such compensation may be 
allowed at the final settlement ; but at .any time during ad­
ministration a personal representative or his attorney may 
apply to the court for an allowance upon the compensation of 
the personal representative and upon attorney's fees. If the 
court finds that the personal representative has failed to dis­
charge his duties as such in any respect, it may deny him any 
compensation whatsoever or may reduce the compensation 
which would otherwise be allowed. 
Comment. This. section follows a number of statutes in leaving 
the fixing of fees to the discretion of the court. See, for example, Ill. 
Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § §  490 and 49 1 .  In view of 
the wide variety of situations which may determine the amount of fees, • 
a hard and fast rule expressed in the statute seems undesirable. If it 
be thought helpful to have some sort of standard percentage basis to 
guide the court in ordinary cases, the local court may establish this 
by a rule of its own. 
· 
The idea of the executor renouncing his fee and accepting the fee 
fixed by the court is embodied in a number of statutes in various states. 
See 38  Mich. L. Rev. 3 8 i  ( 1 940) . While at first blush it may appear 
to go too far in overriding testamentary intent, it is believed that it is 
justified. Primarily, this is based upon the propositions that the 
court, for the benefit of all persons interested in the estate, exer­
cises a sound discretion to appoint a suitable personal representative, 
and that the estate will be administered in a more competent manner if 
an adequate fee is paid. If we were to say that the testator ;hould be 
able to set a low fee and compel his executor to accept that amount 
or renounce the office, then unsatisfactory results might follow. This 
executor might be the most highly qualified . to administer the estate, 
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and an inferior administrator would be appointed who would receive 
a larger fee than the person named in the will. While this might 
not often happen, it is entirely possible that the testator might name 
a series of executors to be appointed according to a given order 
of preference, none of them to receive more than the low fee named 
in the will. By this means he could name all the competent persons 
in the community and thus preclude adequate payment for the services 
of administering his estate by any well qualified person. Yet it is 
clear that the law should not allow a testator to deny to the ad­
ministrator all compensation beyond the amount he should name. If 
he could do that he could provide in his will that no fee whatever 
should be paid to any person for administering his estate. And it 
would be but one step further for him to provide that his estate should 
not be administered at ail. It is believed that the only place to draw 
the line is at the point where this section draws it. 
§ 104. Allowance for defending will. When any per­
son designated as executor in a will, or the administrator with 
the will annexed, defends it or prosecutes any proceedings in 
good faith and with just cause for the purpose of having it 
admitted to probate, whether successful or not, he shall be 
allowed out of the estate his necessary expenses and disburse­
ments including reasonable attorney's fees in such proceedings. 
Comment. If a personal representative prosecutes or defends in 
• proceedings to construe a will, he can recover expenses and attorney's 
fees without a statute such as this. This section is necessary only be­
cause, if probate is denied, it might be'' claimed that a personal repre­
sentative nameq in it or defending it is not entitled to expenses and at­
torney's fees. 
§ 105. Special administrators. for good cause shown 
a special administrator may be appointed pending the appoint­
ment of an executor or a general administrator or after the 
appointment of an executor or a general administrator without 
removing the executor or general administrator. A special 
administrator may be appointed without notice or upon such 
notice as the court may direct. The appointment may be for 
a specified time, to perform duties respecting specific proper-ty, 
or to perform particular acts, as stated in the order of appoint-
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ment. The special administrator shall make such reports as 
the court shall direct, and shall account to the court upon the 
termination of his authority. Otherwise, and except as the 
provisions of this Code by terms apply to general personal 
representatives, and except as ordered by the court, the law and 
procedure relating to personal representatives in this Code 
shall apply to special administrators. The order appointing a 
special administrator shall not be appealable. 
BOND OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
§ I 06. Personal representative to give bond. Except . 
as provided in s�ction 107, every personal representative shall, 
before entering upon the duties of his office and within such 
time as the court directs, execute and file a bond, procured at 
the expense of the estate, with sufficient surety or sureties in 
such amount as the court finds necessary for the protection 
of interested parties, conditioned upon the faithful discharge 
of all duties of his trust according to law, including his duty to 
account as provided in section 1 72. In the absence of special 
circumstances, the court shall fix the bond in the amount of the 
value of any part of the estate which it can determine from ex­
amination that the personal representative might easily con­
vert during the period of administration plus the value of the 
gross annual income of the estate. 
· 
Comment. This section follows a number of jurisdictions in giv,. 
ing the court a discretion with respect to the amount of tl}e bond. In 
other jurisdictions the amount of the bond is determined by a more 
or less rigid rule. Thus, it is common to require a bond in double the 
appraised value of the personal estate plus double the probable income 
of the real estate. However, it is believed to be impossible to determine 
fairly in all cases the amount of the bond by a fixed rule. The 
character of the assets, the fact that the personal representative is the 
principal distributee and that there are no debts, the fact that other 
assets may soon be received, and many other factors may well enter 
into the discretion of the court in determining the amount of the bond. 
However, the determination of the amount should not be capricious; 
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. 
and in the absence of special circumstances, the rule laid down in the 
last sentence of this section should be followed. Since, under § I I 5 the 
amount of the bond may be increased if a sale takes place, it may be 
desirable to take the probability of such sale into consideration in fixing 
the original bond if it is reasonably certain that the sale will take place 
and its approximate terms can be anticipated. 
This and the succeeding sections on bonds of personal representa­
tives apply to special administrators, as well as general administrators 
and executors. See § 3 ( u) . Under this section, the bond of a special 
administrator may be fixed at a nominal amount, since the very circum­
stances calling for the appointment of a special administrator may also 
constitute the !'special circumstances" referred to in this section. 
§ 107. When bond not required. 
(a) Provisions of will. When, by the terms of the will, 
the testator expresses a wish that no bond shaH be required of 
the executor, no bond shall be required unless the court, for 
good cause, finds it proper to require it ; but the court, for good 
cause, may at any subsequent time require a bond to be given. 
(b) Deposit of collateral by personal representative. 
A personal representative may at any time turn over to and 
deposit with the clerk of the court cash or collateral in an 
amount and nature satisfactory to the court in lieu of all or a 
part of the amount of his bond. The clerk shall be liable for 
the safekeeping thereof and shall pay out or deliver the same 
only on order of the court. 
(c) Deposit of personal assets of estate. Personal assets 
�f the estate may be deposited with a domestic banking or 
trust compatiy upon such terms as may be prescribed by order 
of the court. The amount of the bond of the personal repre­
sentative may be reduced in proportion to the value of the 
assets so deposited ; or the court may, if the assets so deposited 
be deemed sufficient, accept the deposit in lieu of requiring a 
bond of the personal representative. 
(d) Corporate fiduciary as personal representative. If 
the personal representative is a trust company or bank existing 
or doing business under the laws of this state, the deposit of 
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cash or collateral with the state treasurer required by such laws 
may, if satisfactory to the court, be accepted in lieu of requiring 
a bond. 
Comment. Even though a will provides that the executor need 
not give bond, the court is empowered to require it for good cause. 
Thus, if there is a testamentary power of sale, the court should, in case 
of doubt, require a bond for the protection of creditors. See § I I 5 of 
this Code. 
It should be pointed out that subsection (d) must be adapted to the 
local trust company and banking laws. A number of states do not 
have any such provisions requiring the deposit of cash or collateral with 
the state treasurer. In those states it will be necessary to omit this sub­
section. Moreover, if the deposit of cash or collateral with the state 
treasurer is not likely to be adequate, then subsection (d) should not be 
enacted. 
§ 108. Agreement between personal representative 
and surety as to deposit of assets. It shall be lawful for the 
personal representative to agree with his surety for the deposit 
of any or all moneys and other assets of the estate with a bank, 
safe deposit or trust company, authorized by law to do business 
as such, or other depository approved by the court, if such de­
posit is otherwise proper, in such manner as to prevent the with­
drawal of such moneys or other assets without the written con­
sent of the surety, or on order of the court made on such notice 
to the surety as the court may direct. 
Comment. The provision embodied in this section is similar to 
statutes found in many states. See Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, I 944) , 
Act 83 I 7 .  While some courts have held that such an agreement as 
to withdrawals is valid without any statute, there is authority to the 
contrary ; and it is believed that this statute should be included in order 
to remove any doubt about the matter. 
§ 109. Obligees of bond; joint and several liability. 
The bond of the personal representative shall run to [the State 
of to the use of] all persons interested in the estate 
and shall be for the security and benefit of such persons. The 
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sureties shall be j ointly and severally liable with the personal 
representative and with each other. 
§ 1 10. Bonds of joint personal representatives. When 
two or more persons are appointed personal representatives of 
the same estate and are required by the provisions of this Code 
to give a bond, the court may require either a separate bond 
from each or one bond from all of them. No personal repre-
. sentative shall be deemed a surety for another personal 
representative unless the terms of the bond so provide. 
§ I l l .  Affidavit of personal sureties. Each personal 
surety shall execute and file with the court an affidavit that he 
owns property subject to execution, of a value over and above 
his liabilities, equal to the amount of the bond, and shall in­
clude in such affidavit the total amount of his obligations as 
surety on other official or statutory bonds. If the amount of 
his bqnd exceeds $ 1 ,ooo, the affidavit shall also state 
(a) An adequate description of the real property within 
this state offered by him as security, which identifies 
it sufficiently to establish the lien of the bond thereon 
as hereinafter provided ; 
(b) The total amount of the liens, unpaid taxes and other 
encumbrances against each property offered ; 
(c) The assessed value of such property offered, its market 
value and the value of the equity over and above all 
encumbrances, liens and unpaid taxes ; 
(d) That the equity of such real property offered is equal 
to the amount of the bond. 
Comment. As to the provisions for a lien on real property of the 
surety, see comment to § 1 1 3 hereof. 
§ 112. Approval of bond by judge. No bond of a per­
sonal representative shall be deemed sufficient unless it shall 
have been exf!niined ·and approved by the judge, or in his ab-
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sence by the clerk, and the approval endorsed thereon in writ­
ing. Before giving approval the judge or clerk may require 
evidence as to the value and character of the assets of personal 
. sureties, including an abstract, certificate or other satisfactory 
evidence of title of every tract of real property which is offered 
as security. In the event that the bond is not approved, the 
personal representative shall, within such time as the judge 
or in his absence the clerk may direct, secure a bond with satis­
factory surety or sureties. 
' 
§ 1 13. Bond as lien on real property of personal surety; · 
recording of lien. Upon the approval and recording of the 
bond of a personal surety, when the amount of such bond ex­
ceeds $ I  ,ooo, a lien on the real property of the surety in this 
state, offered in the affidavit of the surety, shall arise as se­
curity for the performance of the obligation of the bond. The 
clerk of the court shall, before letters are issued to the personal 
representative, cause to be recorded in the office of the [register 
of deeds] of each county in which may be located any real prop­
erty as set forth in the affidavit of the surety, a statement signed 
by the clerk, giving a sufficient description of the land, the 
name of the principal and sureties, the amount of the bond, and 
the name of the estate and the court in which the bond is given. 
The [register of deeds] shall record such statement, either in 
the book of liens or in a suitable book provided for liens on real 
property of sureties. All such recorded statements shall be 
duly indexed in such manner that the existence and character 
of the liens may conveniently be determined. 
Comment. The effect of this section, together with provisions in 
§ § I I I ,  I I 2, I I 6 and I I 7, is to require each personal surety, on bonds 
fixed in an amount in excess of $ I ,ooo, to give a lien on one or more 
tracts of his own real estate within the state as security for the perform­
ance of the obligation of the bond. The advantages of such a statute 
are obvious. If the title of the prospective bondsman to real estate is 
investigated, and if the bond becomes a lien on such real estate when 
it is approved by the court, the danger of loss from financial irresponsi-
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bility of the bondsman is largely eliminated. Certainly in large 
metropolitan areas where "straw" bondsmen are common, strong 
arguments can be made for the adoption of such legislation. On the 
other hand, the probable result of such a statute is that corporate bonds­
men would be secured in most cases, and the personal bondsman who 
acts as such without charging a fee wduld be relatively uncommon. 
In rural areas the use of personal bondsmen is likely to be more satis­
factory, and in states having no cities of any considerable size it may be 
thought undesirable to adopt this feature of the Code. For a statute 
which adopts the principle of requiring a specific lien on real estate of 
the personal bondsman, see N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act, § I So-a. 
If it is deemed best not to require a specific lien on the real estate of 
the personal bondsman, the Code can be enacted with the following 
changes : Omit all except the first sentence of § I I r .  In § I I 2, omit 
the following phrase at the end of the second sentence, "including an 
abstract, certificate or other satisfactory evidence of title of every tract 
of real property which is offered as security." Omit all of § I I 3· 
In § I I 6 omit subsection (b) . Omit all of § I I 7 .  
§ 1 14. Letters deemed rewked on failure to give bond. 
If at any time a personal representative fails to give a bond as 
required by the court, within the time fixed by the court, some 
other person shall be appointed in his stead. If letters have 
been issued, they shall be revoked. 
§ 1 15. Court may increase or decrease bond. The 
court may at any time increase or decrease the amount of the 
bond of the personal representative when good cause therefor 
appears. In the absence of special circumstances, the court 
shall increase the bond on a sale of real property, or of personal 
property which could not easily be converted. 
§ 1 16. Release of sureties before estate fully ad­
ministered. 
' . 
(a) Release for cause. For good cause, the court may, 
before the estate is fully administered, order the release of the 
sureties of the personal representative, and require the personal 
representative to furnish a new bond. 
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(b) Release of personal surety who has given lien on 
real property. If a personal surety who has given a lien on 
specific real property as security applies to the court to have the 
lien released, the court shall order the release requested, if 
sufficient other real property ;f the surety is substituted o� the 
same terms and conditions as required for the lien to be dis­
charged. If such personal surety who requests the release of 
the lien does not offer a lien on other real property, the court 
shall order the personal representative to offer other security 
within a reasonable time to be fixed in the order, and'upon the 
approval of such new security, the court shall order the release 
of such personal surety. 
(c) Extent of liability of original and new sureties. 
The original sureties shall be liable for all breaches of the 
obligation of the bond up to the time of filing of the new bond 
and approval thereof by the court, but not for acts and omis­
sions of the personal representative thereafter. The new bond 
shall bind the sureties thereon with respect to acts and omissions 
of the personal representative from the time when the sureties 
on the original bond are no longer liable therefor or from such 
prior time as the court directs. 
Comment. In some states a surety may be released at any time on 
his request, without a showing of cause. N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 109. 
In other states a showing is necessary. Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 
1 937 )  §§ 1 0506-26, 1 05o6-27 .  As far as the corporate surety is 
concerned, it is felt that it should not be allowed to resign at the _very 
moment when it is needed. Therefore under the provisions of this 
section such a surety may be released only when there is good cause. 
The same reasoning applies to the personal surety, with one exception. 
If the personal surety who has given a lien on land wishes to dispose 
of the land it may be desirable to discharge the lien. Subsection (b) 
provides for this situation, requiring the discharge of the lien upon the 
request of the surety. 
§ 1 1 7. Recording of release of lien. The lien on the real 
property of a personal surety shall be cancelled of record by 
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the [register of deeds] upon filing with him a certified copy of 
the order duly discharging the surety or releasing the lien. 
Comment. See comment to § 1 13. 
§ 1 18. Suit on bond. 
(a) Execution of bond deemed an appearance. The 
execution of the bond of a personal representative shall be 
deemed an appearance by the surety in the proceeding for the 
administration of the estate including all hearings with respect 
to the bond. 
(b) Summary enforcement in proceeding for adminis­
tration. Subject to the provisions · of subsection (c) hereof, 
the court may, on breach of the obligation of the bond of the 
personal representative, after notice to the obligors in the bond 
and to such other persons as the court directs, summarily de­
termine the damages as a part of the proceeding for the admin­
istration of the estate, and by appropriate process enforce the 
collection thereof from those liable on the bond. Such deter­
mination and enforcement may be made by the court upon its 
own motion or upon application of a successor personal repre­
sentative, or of any other personal representative, or of any 
other interested person. The court may hear the application 
at the time of settling the accounts of the defaulting personal 
representative or at such other time as the court may direct. 
Damages shall be assessed on behalf of all interested persons 
and may be paid over to the successor or other non-defaulting 
personal representative and distributed as other assets held by 
the personal representative in his official capacity. 
(c) Enforcement by separate suit. If the estate is al­
ready distributed, or if, for any reason, the procedure to re­
cover on the bond provided in subsection (b) hereof is in­
adequate, any interested person may bring a separate suit in a 
court of competent jurisdiction on his own behalf for damages 
suffered by him by reason of the default of the personal repre­
sentative. 
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(d) Bond not voi� upon first recovery. The bond of 
the personal representative shall not be void upon the first 
recovery, but may be proceeded upon from time to time until 
the whole penalty is exhausted. 
(e) Denial of liability by surety; intervention. If the 
court has already determined the liability of the personal 
representative, the sureties shall not be permitted thereafter 
to deny such liability in aay action or hearing to determine their 
liability ; but the surety may intervene in any hearing to de­
termine the liability of the personal representative. 
Comment. Subsection (b) providing for summary enforcement 
of the bond is suggested by the provision on bonds in the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act. Fed. Code Ann., t. I I ,  § 78  n. As there is a pro­
vision for separate suit, under the Federal Act, a similar provision is 
made in this section of the Probate Code. It is believed that separate 
suits would rarely be brought, but that occasionally it would be im­
practicable to bring a summary action as a part of the probate proceed­
ing. 
§ 1 19. Limitation of action on bond. Proceedings 
upon the bond of a personal representative shall not be brought 
subsequent to two years after his discharge. 
Comment. This section is modeled after the section of the 
Federal Bankruptcy Act limiting proceedings on receivers' or trustees' 
bonds. Fed. Code Ann., t. I I , § 78  m. 
INVENTORY 
§ 120. Inventory and appraisement. 
(a) Requirements as to inventory. Within two months 
after his appointment, unless a longer time shall be granted by 
the court, every personal representative shall make and re­
turn a verified inventory and appraisement in one written in­
strument, of all the property of the decedent which shall come 
to his possession or knowledge, including a statement of all 
encumbrances, liens and other charges on any item. Such 
property shall be classified therein as follows : 
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( I ) Real property, with plat or survey description, and 
if a ·homestead, designated as such ; 
(2) Furniture, household goods, and wearing apparel ; 
(3)  Corporation stocks described by certificate numbers ; 
(4) Mortgages, bonds, notes and other written .evidences 
of debt, described by name of debtor, recording data, 
and other identification; 
( 5) Bank accounts, insurance policies and money; 
( 6 )  All other personal property accurately identified, 
including the decedent's proportionate share in any 
partnership, but no inventory of the partnership 
property shall be required. 
(b) Requirements as to appraisement. At the time ad­
ministration is granted, the court shall appoint two suitable, 
disinterested persons, as appraisers, to whom the personal 
representative shall exhibit the inventory. The appraisers 
shall determine and state in figures opposite each item con­
tained in the inventory the fair net value thereof, as of the date 
of decedent's death, after deduc�ing the encumbrances, liens 
and charges thereon, and forthwith deliver such inventory and 
appraisement, certified by them under oath, to the personal 
representative who shall file it with the court. The appraisers 
shall be allowed such reasonable fees, necessary disbursements 
and expenses as may be fixed by the court, which shall be paid 
, by the personal representative as expenses of administration. 
(c) Dispensing with appraisers in certain cases. If 
the inventory shows that the estate consists solely of personal 
assets of definitely liquidated values, or of property of negligi­
ble value, the court may in its discretion accept the verified 
appraisal of the' personal representative in lieu of appraisal by 
appraisers ; and in such case the court need not appoint ap­
praisers, or may revoke their appointm�nt if already made. 
Comment. The purpose of an inventory and appraisement is .to 
make a record of the property belonging to the estate, to indicate its 
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presumptive value and to furnish the basis upon which the personal 
representative makes his accounts and for which he is chargeable. It 
also indicates to creditors and other persons interested in the estate the 
nature and extent of the property. 
The above section is �aken largely from Minn. ' Stat. ( I  94 I )  
§§ 525.33 and 5i5.33 I and Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § § 59-
I20I ,  59-I202. The idea of the inventory and appraisement being 
one instrument is implicit in the Minnesota and Kansas statutes. A 
separate statement to this effect is found in Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I  9�2) 
§ 58. 
· Provisions for the time of filing the inventory and appraisement vary 
from one to three mon�hs. The earlier filing seems preferable. How­
ever, most of the states providing for the shorter period are those in 
which a notice (up to one month) precedes the pro pate of the will and 
grant of letters. This ordinarily affords additional time to the in­
terested persons to ascertain the nature and extent of the property 
belonging to the estate. Under this Code, administration may be 
granted without any notice. Hence, a two-month period was thought 
to be necessary but ample to make and return the inventory and ap­
praisement. 
A few statutes provide for a complete inventory of any partnership 
property to be included in the inventory of the individual decedent's 
estate . .  In view of th.e special nature of partnership property and of its 
primary liability for the payment of partnership debts, it was thought 
better not to require such an inventory. Hence, an appraisement of 
the decedent's proportionate interest only is provided in the above sec­
tion. In general as to the administration of partnership assets, see the 
last paragraph of the Introduction to this Code. 
The Kansas statute mentioned above provides for a separate listing 
of homestead and exempt property. Whether such property is home­
stead or exempt property would seem to require judicial determination 
necessitating some action by the court, rather than such a classification 
by appraisers or the personal representative. 
A long statement as to the qualifications of appraisers is deemed un­
necessary. They are merely required to be suitable and disinterested. 
Also, an oath by the appraisers before entering upon their duties is 
believed unnecessary. Their certificate of the appraisement under 
oath seems sufficient. As in the case of compensation for personal 
representatives, a reasonable compensation for the appraisers is to be 
determined by the court. 
Where the property belonging to the estate is located in counties 
other · than where administration is taken out some statutes provide 
,thadfie court, or the· judge cif the probate court of such other county, 
. .  � . ' -
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may appoint residents of such other county as appraisers for the prop­
erty located therein. See Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) 
§ 607. Other statutes contemplate the appraisal of all property 
wherever located by the same appraisers, and such is the effect of 
§ I 20 (b) hereof. 
A few statutes provide for a listing of claims against the estate along 
with the inventory. This serves to indicate the net worth of the estate, 
but it cannot be more than guess work by the personal representatives 
in many cases, since a much longer time is given to creditors to estab­
lish their claims. No such provision is included in the above section. 
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 935) art. 34I3  provides for the 
approval or disapproval of the inventory and appraisement. Such 
action would seem to have no particular significance in case a later 
question arises as to the accuracy or completeness of the inventory. 
See § § I 2 I and I 23 hereof. 
A number of statutes expressly provide for citation, punishment or 
removal of the personal representative upon failure to make and file 
an inventory and appraisement or for making an imperfect one. Such 
a special provision seems unnecessary. The terms of § 98, hereof, 
would permit removal on this ground. 
Statutes in a few states, notably. those having the community prop­
erty system, provide for a separate statement of all property held by 
husband and wife together. In view of the tendency to subject prop­
erty held by the entirety or in joint tenancy td inheritance taxes, a 
provision requiring a separate statement of any property held in joint 
tenancy, by the entirety or by the community might be added in cer­
tain states. 
§ 121 .  Supplementary inventory and appraisement. 
Whenever any property not mentioned in the inventory comes 
to the knowledge of a personal representative, he shall either 
make a supplemental inventory thereof and cause such prop­
erty to be appraised, such supplemental inventory and ap­
praisement to be returned within thirty days after the discovery 
thereof, or include the same in his next accounting, unless the 
court shall order a particular manner of return. 
Comment. For similar statutes, see Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) 
§ 59-1 203, Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 61 I and Nev. 
Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 1 )  § 9882. 1 05. 
§ 122. Debt of executor. The naming of any person ex� 
ecutor in a will shall not operate as a discharge or bequest of 
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any right of action which the testator had against such executor, 
but such right of action, if it survives, shall be included among 
the assets of the decedent in the inventory. If the personal 
representative is or becomes insolvent, debts owed to the de:­
cedent shall not be deemed assets in his hands in determining 
the liability on his bond. 
Comment. The above section follows Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 
1 943) § 5 9-1 205. 
§ 123. Inventory and appraisement as evidence. In­
ventories and appraisements may be given in evidence in all 
proceedings, but shall not be conclusive, and other evidence 
may be introduced to vary the effect thereof. 
. 
Comment. This section follows Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) 
§ 7 4· It is similar to statutes found in several states. See Fla. Stat. 
Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § 733.06. 
COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF ASSETS 
§ 124. Possession. Every personal representative shall 
have a right to, and shall take, possession of all the real and 
personal property of the decedent except the homestead and 
exempt property of the surviving spouse and minor children. 
He shall pay the taxes and collect the rents and earnings 
thereon until the estate is settled or until delivered by order of 
the court to the distributees. He shall keep in tenantable re­
pair the buildings and fixtures under his control and may pro­
tect the same by insurance. He may maintain an action for the 
possession of the real property or to determine the title to the 
same. 
Comment. Early in the history of American probate courts there 
was· a tendency in the administration of decedents' estates, to treat 
both real and personal property alike, at least for some purposes. 
Atkinson, "The Development of the Massachusetts Probate System," 
42 Mich. L. Rev. 425, 437 ( 1 943) .  However, where there is no 
statute, American
. 
courts now generally adhere to the common-law 
view that title and right to possession of personal property pass to the 
personal representative, but that both title and right to possession of 
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real property pass to the heirs or devisees immediately upon the death 
of decedent. 2 Woerner, Administration (3rd ed., 1 923)  § 1 85 .  
The modern English statutory rule is that real property devolves upon 
the personal representative just as chattel interests formerly devolved 
upon him. Administration of Estates Act, 1 5-1 6 Geo. v, c. 23, § I 
( I 9 2 5 ) .  No American system proceeds on the theory that title to 
real property passes to the personal representative. Cf. Honsinger v. 
Stewart, 34 N. D. 5 I 3, I 59  N. W. I 2 ( I  9 I 6 ) .  California and a few 
other states provide that title to both real and personal property passes 
to the heirs and devisees, subject to the possession of the personal repre­
sentative. Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 300. How­
ever, the California Probate Code ( § 5 7  I )  declares that the personal 
representative must take possession of all real and personal property. 
See also § §  5 74, 5 75 ,  5 8 I ,  582 of the California Probate Code. 
Statutes in other states depart from the common-law rule but only give 
the personal representative the permissive right to possess the real 
property. Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 5 9-I40 1 ; Minn. Stat. 
( 1 94 I )  § 5 25 .34 ;  Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  § 9882 . 106 ;  
Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 3 1 2.04. It seems preferable that the personal 
representative should have not only the" right but also the duty of 
possession of the entire estate until distributed or delivered over to the 
heir or devisee upon a showing that it is not needed for the purposes of 
administration. Section I 24 therefore follows the California code in 
this regard. See also § §  6, 84, I 5 2, I 82 and I 83 of the Model Pro­
bate Code. See generally Simes and Basye, "Organization of the 
Probate Court in America," 43 Mich. L. Rev. I I 3, 1 23-1 25 
( I 944) ; note, 2 I  Iowa L. Rev. 7 93 ( I 936) . 
§ 125. Assets for payment of creditors' claims. The 
real and personal property liable for the payment of debts of a 
decedent shall include all property transferred by him with 
intent to defraud his creditors or any of them, or transferred by 
any other means which is in law void as against his creditors or 
any of them ; and the right to recover such property, so far as 
necessary for the payment of the debts of the decedent, shall 
be exclusively in the personal representative, who shall take 
such steps as may be necessary to recover the same. Such prop­
erty shall constitute general assets for the payment of all 
creditors ; but no property so transferred shall be taken from 
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anyone who purchased i t  for a valuable consideration, in  good 
faith and without knowledge of the fraud. 
. 
Comment. In view of the uncertainty and consequent litigation 
which has arisen concerning the subject matter of this section, it is 
desirable to have the applicable rule clearly stated. As to conflicting 
doctrines, 'see Evans, "The Intermeddler and the Fraudulent Trans­
feree as Executor," 25 Georgetown L. J. 7 8  ( I 936) ,  and cases cited 
in I 48 A. L. R. 230. For statutes similar to t�is section, see Kan. 
Gen. Stat .. (Supp. I 943) § 5 9-I4 I I  and Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 933) 
§ 2 88 1 .  This section is consistent with the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyances Act. It will supplement that act in the jurisdictions 
where the act has been adopted. 
§ 126. Compromise. When it appears for the best in­
terest of the estate, the personal representative may on order 
of the court effect a fair and reasonable compromise with any 
debtor or other obligor, or extend, renew or in any manner 
modify the terms of any obligation owing to the estate. If the 
personal representative holds a mortgage, pledge or other lien 
upon property of another person, he may, in lieu of foreclosure, 
accept a conveyance or transfer of such encumbered assets from 
the owner thereof in satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by 
such lien, if it appears for the best interest of the estate and if 
the court shall so order. In the absence of prior authorization 
or subsequent approval of the court, no compromise shall bind 
the estate. 
Comment. This section follows in part Minn. Stat. ( I  94 I ) 
§ 5 25.36 and Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 5 78. The 
second sentence is a counterpart of § I 4 7 and that part of § I 49' which 
provides for conveyances by the personal representative of property 
belonging to the estate to the holder of an encumbrance, in satisfaction 
thereof, in whole or in part. 
§ 127. Conversion. 
(a' When realty treated as personalty. Unless fore­
closure shall have been completed and th� redemption period 
shall have expired prior to the death of a decedent, real prop-
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erty mortgages, the interest in the mortgaged premises con 
veyed thereby and the debt secured thereby or any real 
property acquired by the personal representative in settlement 
of a debt or liability shall be deemed personal assets in the 
hands of his personal representative and be distributed and ac­
counted for as such, but any sale, mortgage, lease or exchange 
of any such real property shall be made pursuant to sections 
I 50 to I 7 I inclusive unless otherwise provided in the will. 
(b) When personalty treated as realty. In all cases of 
a sale of real property by a personal representative upon order 
of the court the surplus of the proceeds of such sale remaining 
on the final settlement of the account shall be considered as 
real property and disposed of among the persons and in the 
same proportions as the real property would have been if it had 
not been sold. 
Comment. Subsection (a) is �odeled in part after Ohio Gen. 
Code (Page, I 93 7 )  § I 0509-68, Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 3 I 2 . I O  and 
Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .38. As real and personal property are 
treated alike in this Code, this section is unnecessary for most purposes 
and will be infrequently applied. But it may nevertheless be desirable 
in cases where a will distinguishing between real and personal prop­
erty must be construed in connection with the administration of an 
estate. Subsection (b) follows Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 3 16.43. 
§ 128. Abandonment of property. When any property 
is valueless, or is so encumbered, or is in such condition that it is 
of no benefit to the estate, the court may order the personal 
representative to abandon it. 
Comment. This section follows Minn. Stat. ( I  94 I )  § 5 2  5 .40 I .  
§ 129. Property embezzled or converted. I f  any person 
embezzles or converts to his own use any of the personal prop­
erty of a decedent before the appointment of a personal repre­
sentative, such person shall be liable to the estate for the value 
of the property so embezzled or converted. No person shall 
be charged as executor de son tort. 
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Comment. The term "any person," as used in this section, in­
cludes the personal representative. This section follows Minn. Stat. 
( 1 94 1 )  § 525 ·392. . 
§ 130. Disclosure and determination of title _to prop· 
erty. Upon the filing of a petition by the personal representa­
tive or any other person interested in the estate, alleging that 
any person has, or is suspected to have, concealed, embezzled, 
converted or disposed of any real or personal property belong­
ing to the estate of a decedent, or has possession or knowledge 
of any such property or of any instruments in writing relating 
to such property, the [ ] court, upon such notice as 
it may direct, may order such person to appear before it for 
disclosure, and may finally adjudicat� the rights of the parties 
before the court with respect to such property. In so far as 
concerns parties claiming an interest adverse to the estate, such 
procedure for disclosure or to determine title is an independent 
proceeding and not within section 62 hereof. 
Comment. The term "any person," as used in this section, in­
cludes the personal representative. This section is a combination of 
Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .85 ,  Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-
22 1 6, and Wis. Stat. ( 1·94 3)  § 3 12.06. See also Mich. Stat. Ann. 
( 1 943) § §  27 .3 1 7 8 (385)  and (386) ,  and Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith­
Hurd, Supp. 1 943) c. 3, § §  335 to 339· Legal or equitable remedies 
are always available to recover property belonging to the estas,.e. Most 
states, however, provide some summary proceedings in the probate 
court for making discovery. Some make such proceedings plenary, 
empowering the court, after a hearing, to determine title and compel 
the surrender of such property. Some statutes are very elaborate in 
describing the procedure to be followed. In line with the more recent 
codes, the details of such procedure are not incorporated in this section, 
but left to the general sections on procedure. It is contemplated, 
however, that the proceeding be had in the court exercising probate 
jurisdiction and adequate notice be given and full opportunity be af­
forded to present evidence both in support of and in opposition to the 
petition. If the person mentioned in the petition has knowledge only, 
but not possession, of the property, the rights of third persons cannot be 
affected without making them parties. 
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This section does not allow recovery on a chose in action owed to 
the decedent. No good reason is perceived why the personal repre­
sentative should not proceed in the usual way by independent action to 
recover against the obligor. 
It should be noted that, wherever this section is applied to determine 
the title to real or personal property as between the parties, it resembles 
an action at law in ejectment or replevin. For that reason it may well 
be that the person proceeded against could insist on a constitutional 
right to a jury trial. To that effect are Tappy v. Kilpatrick, 337 Ill. 
6oo, I 69 N. E. 739 ( I 93o) ; Johnson v. Nelson, 34 1 Ill. I I 9, I 7 3  
N. E .  7 7  ( I 93o) ; Matter of \Vilson, 2S2  N. Y. I S S ,  I 69 N .  E. 
I 2 2  ( I  929) .  I f  it is desired to make sure that a jury trial could be 
secured in the matter involved in this section, the following language 
could be added at the end of § I 30 :  "Any interested person is entitled 
to a .jury trial of the issues of fact in accordance with the provisions of 
section I 8." It should be noted that, even though this addition is not 
made, a jury trial could be secured on an issue of fact within this 
section under the provisions of § I 8, provided the court determines 
that it is within the protection of the constitutional provision as to jury 
trial. 
§ 131 .  Continuation of business. Upon a showing of 
advantage to the estate, the court may authorize the personal 
representative to continue any business of the decedent for the 
benefit of the estate; but if the decedent died testate and his 
estate is solvent, the order of the court shall be subject to the 
provisions of the will. The order may be with or without 
notice. If notice . is not given to all interested persons before 
the order is made, notice of the order shall be given within five 
days after the order, and any such person not previously noti­
fied by publication or otherwise may show cause why the order 
should be revoked or modified. The order may provide : 
(a) For the conduct of the business solely by the personal 
representative or jointly with one or more of the de­
cedent's surviving partners, or as a corporation to be 
formed by the personal representative ; 
(b) The extent of the liability of the estate, or any part 
thereof, or of the personal representative, for obliga­
tions incurred in the continuation of the business ; 
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(c) 
(d) 
As to whether liabilities incurred in the conduct of the 
business are to be chargeable solely to the part of the 
estate set aside for use in the business or to the estate 
as a whole ; and 
As to the period of time for which the business may be 
conducted, and such . other conditions, restrictions, 
regulations and requirements as the court may order. 
Comment. Statutes making provision for the conduct of a 
decedent's business exist in a number of states. See, for example, Kan. 
Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § . 59-1402. In general, see Adelman, 
"Power to Carry on the Business of a Decedent," 36 Mich. L. Rev. 
1 85 at 2 1 3  ( 1 93 7 ) .  
§ 132. Contract to convey or lease land. 
(a) Procedure applicable to cases generally. When 
any person legally bound to make a conveyance or lease dies 
before making the same, the court, with or without notice, may 
direct the personal representative to make the conveyance or 
lease to the person entitled thereto. A petition for this purpose 
may be made by any person claiming to be entitled to such con­
veyance or lease, or by the personal representative, or by any 
other person interested in the estate or claiming an interest in 
the real property or contract, and shall show the description of 
the land and the facts upon which such claim for conveyance or 
lease is based. Upon satisfactory proofs the court may order 
the personal representative to execute and deliver an instru­
ment of conveyance or lease to the person entitled thereto upon 
performance of the contract. 
(b) Warranties and recording. It the contract for a 
conveyance requires the giving of warranties, the deed to be 
given by the personal representative shall contain the war­
ranties required. Such warranties shall be binding on the 
estate as though made by the decedent but shall not bind the 
personal representative personally. A certified copy of the 
order may be recorded with the deed of conveyance in the 
' 
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office of the [register of deeds] of the county where the land 
lies, and shall be prima facie evidence of the due appointment 
and qualification of the personal representative, the correct­
ness of the proceedings and the authority of the personal repre­
sentative to make the conveyance. 
(c) Conveyance or lease under testamentary power. 
If a personal representative has been given power by will to 
make a conveyance or lease, he may, in lieu of the foregoing 
procedure, and without order of the court, execute a convey­
ance or lease to the person entitled thereto upon performance 
of the contract. 
Comment. If the inventory describes the contract binding the 
decedent to make such a conveyance or lease, this may be sufficient to 
justify the court in ordering the conveyance without notice under sub­
section (a) • 
The last sentence of subsection (b) is highly significant as a method 
of simplifying land title problems by making the deed and order of 
court, in and of themselves, adequate and sufficient evidence to be 
recorded and shown on an abstract of title for the purpose of showing 
a marketable title. This is intended to eliminate the necessity of 
showing the appointment of the personal representative, his qualifica­
tions, and the numerous other orders in an administration proceeding 
usually regarded as necessary to meet the requirements of a marketable 
title. 
This section follows partly Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 5 25.69 and 
partly Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 3 1 6.38. Its primary purpose is to provide 
for a simple and expeditious method for conveying the legal title to 
land under a contract made by the decedent as vendor during his life­
time but which remained uncompleted at the time of his death. The 
power to do this is essentially equitable and is one which the probate 
court would not be able to exercise in the absence of statute. It in­
volves the completion of a contract which the decedent himself would 
have been under obligation to complete had he been alive. The kind 
and manner of notice to be given is to be provided for by the order 
of court in setting the petition for hearing. 
§ 133. Investment of funds. Subject to his primary duty 
to preserve the estate for prompt distribution, and to the terms 
of the will, if any, the personal representative shall, whenever 
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i t  i s  reasonable to  do so, invest the funds of the estate and make 
them productive. Such investments shall be restricted-to the 
kinds of investments permitted to trustees by the laws of this 
state. 
§ 1_34. Ba
�k deposits. Whenever it is consistent with a 
proper administration of the estate, the personal representative 
may deposit, as a fiduciary, the funds of the estate in a bank in 
this state as a general deposit, either in a checking account or 
in a savings account. 
Comment. See § 1 08 and comment thereon. 
CLAIMS 
§ 135. Limitations on filing of claims. 
(a) Statute of nonclaim. Except as provided in section 
r 3 6, all claims against a decedent's estate, other than expenses 
of administration and claims of the United States, but including 
claims of the state and any subdivision thereof, whether due or 
to become due, absolute or contingent, "liquidated or unliqui­
dated, founded on contract or otherwise, shall be forever 
barred against the estate, the personal representative, the heirs, 
devisees and legatees of the decedent, unless filed with the 
court within four months after the date of the first published 
notice to creditors. 
(b) Statute of limitations. No claim shall be allowed 
which was barred by any statute of limitations at the time of de­
cedent's death. 
(c) When statute of nonclaith not affected by statutes 
of limitation. No claim shall be barred by the statute of limi­
tations which was not barred thereby at the time of the dece­
dent's death, if the claim shall be filed within four months after 
the date of the first published notice to creditors. 
(d) Claims barred when no administration com­
menced. All claims barrable under the provisions of sub-
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section (a) hereof shall, in any event, be barred if administra­
tion of the estate is not commenced within five years after the 
death of the decedent. 
(e) Liens not affected. Nothing in this section shall af­
fect or prevent any action or proceeding to enforce any mort­
gage, pledge or other lien upon property of the estate. 
Comment. This section covers the usual statute of nonclaim, 
statutes of limitations, and cases where a conflict may result if both are 
applied. The language of subsection (a) is traditional except that it 
includes claims of the state or any subdivision thereof. Subsections 
(b) and (c) are often found in separate sections but are included here 
because of their close relationship to one another. Subsection (c) 
takes care of the case where the statute of limitations expires after the 
date of the decedent's death but before the statute of nonclaim. For 
discussion of this last problem see Cook, "Executors and Adminis­
trators-Comparison of Nonclaim Statutes and the General Statute 
of Limitations," 36 Mich. L. Rev. 973 ( 1 938) .  Compare subsec­
tion (d) with § 8 3, which prohibits the appointment of a personal 
representative and the probate of a will after five years. 
The older view was that the purpose of a nonclaim statute is to 
protect the personal representative, and that it does not prevent a 
creditor from asserting his claim against an heir, devisee or legatee who 
has received assets. This view, however, is abandoned today, at least 
to the extent that most claims, other than contingent claims, are barred 
as to distributees as well as to the personal representative by the opera­
tion of the nonclaim statute. · In the case of the contingent claim, how­
ever, the position has been taken that it is unfair to the creditor to 
compel him to file before he is certain either of the amount or of the 
existence of his claim. And since the distributee is a donee and not a 
bona fide purchaser, it is thought that he should be liable whenever the 
contingent claim becomes absolute. For well drawn statutory provi­
sions which accomplish this objective, see Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 
1 937  and 1 944 Supp.) § §  10509-1 1 2, and 10509-2 16  to 1 0509-
223. On the other hand, the tendency of modern legislation is cfefi­
nitely to bar contingent claims along with other claims by the operation 
of the nonclaim statute. For a statute of this kind, see Fla. Stat. Ann. 
( 1 941 ) § 733·  16.  And, in general, see the discussion in 4 1  Mich. L. 
Rev. 920 ( 1 943) .  If contingent claims are not barred, the dis­
tributee can never spend his legacy or his inheritance safely ; for he 
never would know when SlJCh a claim would be asserted against him. 
Moreover, such provisions are in accordance with the policy of the 
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Federal Bankruptcy Act and with modern legislation for the liquidation 
of corporations. Death of a debtor is a hazard which all creditors 
should assume, and if the creditor seeks to avoid it, he c�n do so by 
taking security for his claim. The provisions of this section are in ac­
cordance with this view, and bar the contingent creditor who does not 
file. It is true, the court may then make an order to the effect that 
the claim, if the contingency happens, will constitute a liability of the 
distributees ; and on a distribution under such circumstances, dis­
tributees would be reluctant to spend their legacies, but at least they 
know the character of the claim. Under the older view they have no 
way of knowing what claims may be asserted against them at some­
future time. If it is sought to follow the view that contingent claims 
need not be filed in order to be asserted as a liability against distributees, 
then it is suggested that the provisions of the Ohio statute be considered 
as a model. But if this change is made, it should be noted that changes 
must also be made in § §  1 37 ,  140, 1 4 1  and 1 83 .  
Subsection (e)  includes judgment liens which arose before the death 
of the decedent. The lien would be treated as a secured claim under 
§ I 39· But compare § I 45 as to judgments where there is no lien. 
§ 136. Commencement of separate action or revivor 
equivalent to filing of claim. The provisions of section 1 3 5  
shall not preclude the commencement or continuance of sepa­
rate actions against the personal representative as such for the 
debts and other liabilities of the decedent, if commenced or 
revived within the periods stated in section I 3 5 ·  Any action 
pending against any person at the time of his death, which 
survives against the personal representative, shall be con­
sidered a claim duly filed against the estate from the time such 
action is revived. Any action commenced against a personal 
representative as such after the death of the decedent shall be 
considered a claim duly filed against the estate from the time 
such action is commenced. Nothing in this section shall impair 
the individual liability of the personal representative for his 
own acts and contracts in the administration of the estate. 
Comment. The above section follows Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith­
Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § 359, and Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-
2238. 
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§ 137. Form and verification of claims. 
(a) General requirements. No claim shall be allowed 
against an estate on application of the claimant unless it shall 
be in writing, describe the nature and the amount thereof, if 
ascertainable, and be accompanied by the affidavit of the 
claimant or someone for him that the amount is justly due, or 
if not yet due, when it will or may become due, that no pay­
ments have been made thereon which are not credited, and that 
there are no offsets to the same, to the knowledge of the af­
fiant, except as therein stated. If the claim is contingent, the 
nature of the contingency shall also be stated. 
(b) Requirements when claim founded on written in­
strument. If a claim is founded on a written instrument, the 
original or a copy thereof with all indorsements must be at­
tached to the claim. The original instrument must be ex­
hibited to the personal representative or court, upon demand, · 
unless it is lost or destroyed, in which case its loss or destruction 
must be stated in the claim. 
Comment. This section provides the form to be followed in filing 
every kind of claim. The provision of subsection (b) is found in many 
forms. The language used in this section follows Cal. Prob. Code 
Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § §  705 and 706, which was found to be among 
the best of the many statutes examined. For the meaning of "offsets," 
see § I 44 hereof and comment thereto. 
§ 138. Claims not due. Upon proof of a claim which will 
become due at some future time, the court shall allow it at the 
present value thereof, and payment may be made as in the case 
of an absolute claim which has been allowed: provided, if the 
obligation upon which such claim was founded was entered into 
before the effective date of this Code, payment may be made 
as above, if the creditor agrees thereto ; otherwise the court 
may order the personal representative to retain in his hands 
sufficient funds to satisfy the claim upon maturity ; or if the 
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distributees shall give a bond to be approved by the court for 
the payment of the creditor's claim in accordance with the 
terms thereof, the court may order such bond to be given in 
satisfaction of suc;h claim and the estate may be closed. 
Comment. This section is similar to Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 3 13.07 
and Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-2240. The first sentence of 
this statute expresses the general policy to be achieved by it. It is re­
stricted by its terms to claims which are certain to becopte due in the 
future, but does not include contingent claims. As to the contracts 
entered into before the effective date of this statute, however, it would 
be unconstitutional. The second sentence is added to provide an 
a.lternative method for the payment of such unmatured claims and has 
the effect of making the section comply with constitutional require­
ments. Compare § 2 (b) . 
§ 139. Secured claims. When a creditor holds any se­
curity for his claim the security shall be described in the claim. 
If the claim is secured by a mortgage, pl�dge or other lien 
which has been recorded, it shall be sufficient to describe the 
lien by date, and refer to the volume, page and place of record­
ing. The claim shall be allowed in the amount remaining un­
paid at the time of its allowance, and the judgment allowing it 
shall describe the security. Payment of the claim shall be 
upon the basis of the full amount thereof if the creditor shall 
surrender his security; otherwise payment shaH be upon the 
basis of one of the following: 
(a) If the credior shall exhaust his security before re­
ceiving payment, then upon the full amount of the 
claim allowed less the amount realized upon exhaust­
ing the security; or 
(b) If the creditor shall not have exhausted or shall not 
have the right to exhaust his security, then upon the 
full amount of the claim allowed less the value of the 
security determined by converting the same into 
money according to the terms of the agreement pursu-
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ant to which the security was delivered to the creditor, 
or by the creditor and personal representative by 
agreement, arbitration, compromise or litigation, as 
the court may direct. 
Comment. This section follows in part Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. 
(Deering, I 944) § 7 o6, Minn. Stat. ( I  94 I )  § 5 2  5 .44 I and Kan. 
Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59 . I 303. The alternative methods for 
payment follow the principle laid down in the Bankruptcy Act, § 5 7  h, 
and the Uniform Act Governing Secured Creditors' Dividends in 
Liquidation Proceedings. Any state desiring to adopt or having al­
ready adopted the Uniform Act should simply provide at this place in 
its probate code that the allowance and payment of secured claims shall 
be made pursuant to the provisions of that act. 
§ 140. Contingent claims. Contingent claims which 
cannot be allowed as absolute debts shall, nevertheless, be filed 
in the court and proved. If allowed as a contingent claim, the 
order of allowance shall state the nature of the contingency. 
If such claim shall become absolute before distribution of the 
estate, it shall be paid in the same manner as absolute claims 
of the same class. In all other cases the court may provide for 
the payment of contingent claims in any one of the following 
methods : 
(a) The creditor and personal representative may deter­
mine, by agreement, arbitration or compromise, the 
value thereof, according to its probable present 
worth, and upon approval thereof by the court, it may 
be allowed and paid in the same manner as an absolute 
claim. 
(b) The court may order the personal representative to 
make distribution of the estate but to retain in his 
hands sufficient funds to pay the claim if and when 
the same becomes absolute ; but for this purpose the 
estate shall not be kept open longer than two years 
after distribution of the remainder of the estate has 
been made; and if such claim has not become absolute 
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within that time, distribution shall be made to the 
distributees of the funds so retained, after paying any 
costs and expenses accruing during such period and 
such distributees shall be liable to the creditor to the 
extent of the estate received by them, if such contin­
gent claim thereafter becomes absolute. When dis­
tribution is so made to distributees, the court may re­
quire such distributees to give bond for the satisfaction 
of their liability to the contingent creditor. 
(c) The court may order distribution of the estate as 
though such contingent claim did not exist, but the 
distributees shall be liable to the creditor to the ex­
tent of the estate received by them, if the contingent 
claim thereafter becomes absolute; and the court may 
require such distributees to give bond for the perform­
ance of their liability to the contingent creditor. 
Comment. This section provides alternative methods for the dis­
position of contingent claims. M'Wy statutes do not provide for con­
tingent claims at all. In many instances those that do provide for them 
do so incompletely or unsatisfactorily. The above section has some of 
the provisions of the following stafutes: Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) 
§§  2 7.3 1 7 8 (435 ) ,  (436) , (438) ,  (439), Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) 
§§  3 1 3.22,  3 1 3.25 and the Bankruptcy Act, § 5 7d. 
§ 141.  Payment of contingent claims by distributees; 
contribution. If a contingent claim shall have been filed and 
allowed against an estate and all the assets of the estate includ­
ing the fund, if any, set apart for the payment thereof, shall 
have been distributed, and the claim shall thereafter become 
absolute, the creditor shall have the right to recover thereon in 
the [ ] court against those distributees whose dis­
tributive shares have been increased by reason of the fact that 
the amount of said claim as finally determined was not paid 
out prior to final distribution, provided an action therefor shall 
be commenced within six months after the claim becomes ab-
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solute. Such distributees shall be jointly and severally liable, 
but no distributee shall be liable for an amount exceeding the 
amount of the estate or fund so distributed to him. If more 
than one distributee is liable to the creditor, he shall make all 
distributees who can be reached by process parties to the action. 
By its judgment the court shall determine the amount of the 
liability of each of the defendants as between themselves, but 
if any be insolvent or unable to pay his proportion, or beyond 
the reach of process, the others, to the extent _of their respective 
liabilities, shall nevertheless be liable to the creditor for the 
whole amount of his debt. If any person liable for the debt 
fails to pay his just proportion to the creditor, he shall be liable 
to indemnify all who, by reason of such failure on his part, have 
paid more than their just proportion of the debt, the indemnity 
to be recovered in the same action or in separate actions. 
Comment. Provisions similar to the above are found in Ohio Gen. 
Code (Page, 1 937  and Supp. I 9H) §§ 1 0509-2 I 7  to 1 0509-223 ; 
Mi:h. Stat. Ann. ( I 943 )  §§  27�3 I 7 8 (446 )  and 27.3 I 78(447 ) ; 
W1s. Stat. ( I 943) §§  287 . I 8  to 287 .2 I ,  3 I 3 .30 to 3 I 3.32 ; Mass. 
Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. I 971 § §  29  to 34 ; N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, 
§ § I 7 2, I So. The court referred to in the brackets is the court having 
probate jurisdiction. · 
§ 142. Classification of claims and allowances. At the 
time of their allowance, all claims and allowances shall be 
classified in one of the following classes. If the applicable 
assets of the estate are insufficient to pay all claims and al­
lowances in full, the personal representative shall make pay­
ment in the following order : 
1 .  Costs and expenses of administration. 
2. Reasonable funeral expenses. 
3 .  Allowance made to the surviving spouse and children 
of the decedent. 
4· All debts and taxes having preference under the laws 
of the United States. 





Reasonable and · necessary medical expenses o.f the last 
sickness of the decedent, including compensation of 
persons attending him. 
All debts and taxes having preference under the laws 
of this state ; but no personal representative shall be 
required to pay any taxes on any property of the dece­
dent unless such taxes are due and payable before pos­
session thereof is delivered by the personal representa­
tive pursuant to the provisions of this Code. 
All other claims allowed. 
No preference shall be given in the payment of any claim over 
any other claim of the same class, nor shall a claim due and pay­
able be entitled to a preference over claims not due . 
. Comment. The statutes on classification of claims vary somewhat 
in their method of classification. The above section ( I )  provides that 
each claim shall be classified upon its allowance and ( 2 )  specifies the 
order of priority in the payment of expenses of administration, claims 
and allowances in case the estate is insolvent. The provisions of the 
last sentence follow Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-1301 .  It 
should be noted that the allowance under 3 is that referred to in 
§ 44 hereof; but it does not include the homestead and exempt prop­
erty referred to in § § 42 and 4 3, since the latter are not liable for the 
expenses of administration nor for funeral expenses, and do not con­
stitute assets for any purpose except to benefit the family. 
It should be pointed out that the first three classes of claims and 
allowances designated in this section are not debts of the decedent. 
Under federal statutes as interpreted by the courts, debts due to the 
United States must be satisfied before other debts due from the de-· 
ceased. See 3 1  Fed. Code Ann. § §  1 9 1 , 1 92 ;  United States v. 
Weisburn, (D. C. Pa. 1 943) 48 F. Supp. 393 ; United States v. 
Pate, (D. C. Ark. 1 942) 47 F. Supp. 965. For this reason, debts 
·owed to the United States are placed in the fourth class, ahead of all 
other debts owed by the decedent. 
§ 143. Allowance of claims. 
· (a) In general. Except as provided in subsection (b) 
hereof, no claimant shall be entitled to payment unless his 
daim shall . have· been duly filed and allowed by the court. 
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Each court may provide by rule for the hearing and disposi­
tion of claims filed therein, or may set any individual claim or 
claims for hearing irrespective of rule. Upon the adjudica­
tion of any claim the court shall allow it in whole or in part, 
or disallow it. The order allowing the claim shall have the 
effect of a judgment and bear interest at the legal rate, unless 
the claim provides for a higher rate in which case the judgment 
shall be rendered accordingly. Except in case of the personal 
representative's own claim, any claim which is approved by 
him in writing and which has been duly filed, may be allowed 
by the court at any time without formal hearing. 
(b) Expenses of administration. Claims for expenses 
of administration may be allowed upon application of the 
claimant or of the personal representative, or may be allowed 
at any accounting, regardless of whether or not they have been 
paid by the personal representative. 
Comment. The above section follows in .part Ill. Ann. Stat. 
(Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § 350 ;  Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 I )  § 525 .42, and 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-2237 .  In a number of jurisdic­
tions, the statutes guarantee a jury trial in a litigation to determine a 
claim. Indeed, it is entirely possible that it might be held that actions 
on claims are within constitutional guaranties of trial by jury. See 
comment to § I 8 hereof. If it is desired to insure a jury trial of issues 
of fact concerning claims, the following sentence should be added to 
§ 1 4  3 (a) : "Either the creditor or the personal representative is en­
titled to a jury trial of common law issues of fact in accordance with 
the provisions of § I 8." Of course, a jury trial can be secured under 
the provisions of § I 8 without this sentence, if the court is convinced 
that the situation is within existing constitutional guaranties. 
As to claims of the personal representative, see § I 46 hereof. As to 
the individual liability of the personal representative for expenses of 
administration, see § I 36. 
§ 144. Offsets to claims. On or before the hearing on 
any claim, the personal representative shall file a statement of 
all offsets claimed against the creditor. Upon the hearing of 
claims and offsets the court shall determine the amount due by 
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and 'against the estate and shall render judgment in favor of or 
against the estate for the net amount. If a judgment is ren­
dered against a claimant for any net amount, execution may 
issue in the same manner as on judgments in civil cases. An 
offset may or may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought 
by the opposing party. It may claim relief exceeding in amount 
or different in kind from that sought in the claim of the credi­
tor. 
Comment. The last sentence of § I44 is substantially the same as 
Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule I 3 (c) . The word "offset" has been 
used here and im§ I 3 7 instead of "counterclaim" which appears in the 
Federal Rules. "Offset" is used in California, in the states which 
follow its code and in Minnesota and Kansas. As indicated in the 
above section it includes unliquidated claims and claims for specific 
property. 
§ 145. Execution and levies prohibited. No execution 
shanissue upon nor shall any levy be made against any prop­
erty of the estate under any judgment against a decedent or 
a personal representative, but the provisions of this section 
shall not be construed to prevent the enforcement of mort­
gages, pledges or liens upon real or personal property in an 
appropriate proceeding. 
Comment. This section withdraws the estate of a decedent from 
ordinary execution by creditors and subjects it solely to the orderly 
process of administration. This may be implied from the other provi­
sions of the Code but is included here to remove all doubts as to the 
matter and also to specifically authorize such executions as are neces­
sary for the enforcement of liens upon the property of the estate. See 
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 733· I 9. 
§ 146. Claims of personal representative. If  the p�r­
sonal representative is a creditor of the decedent, he shall file 
his claim. as other persons and the court may appoint any suit­
able person, whether interested in the estate or not, to repre­
sent the estate on the hearing thereof. 
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Comment. This section follows Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 
1 944) § 7 03, Ill. Ann. Stat. ( Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § 352 ,  and 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I  942)  § 202. 
§ 14 7. Compromise of claims. When a claim against the 
estate has been filed or suit thereon is pending, the creditor 
and personal representative may, if it appears for the best in­
terests of the estate, compromise the claim, whether due or 
not due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated. 
In the absence of prior authorization or subsequent approval 
by the court, no compromise shall bind the estate. 
( 
Comment. The above section is based on Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. 
(Deering, 1 944) § 7 1 8 .5, Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 1 )  
§ 9882 . 1 2 7 ,  and Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § 2 7.3 1 7 8 (429) .  Com­
pare § 1 26  of this Code. 
§ 148. Payment of claims. Upon the expiration of four 
months after the date of the first published notice to creditors 
and the final adjudication of all claims filed against the estate, 
the personal representative shall proceed to pay the claims 
allowed against the estate in accordance with the provisions of 
this Code. If it appears at any time that the estate is or may be 
insolvent, that there are insufficient funds on hand, or that 
there is other good and sufficient cause, the personal represent­
ative may report that fact to the court and apply for any order 
that he deems necessary in connection therewith. Prior to the 
expiration of such period of four months, the personal repre­
sentative shall pay such of said claims as the court shall order, 
and the court may require bond or security to be given by the 
creditor to refund such part of such payment as may be neces­
sary to make payment in accordance with the provisions of this 
Code, but all payments made by the personal representative 
without order of court shall be at his own peril. 
Comment. Provisions of the above section are taken partly from 
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1 944) § 1 05 09-1 2 7  and Wis. Stat. 
( 1 943) § 3 1 3 . 13 ·  
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§ 149. Encumbered assets. When any assets of the 
estate are encumbered by mortgage, pledge or other lien, the 
personal representative may pay such encumbrance or any part 
thereof, renew or extend any obligation secured by the en­
cumbrance or may convey or transfer such assets to the creditor 
in satisfaction of his lien, in whole or in part, whether or not 
the holder of the encumbrance has filed a claim, if it appears 
to be for the best interest of the estate and if the court shall so 
order. The making of such payment shall not increase the 
share of the distributee entitled to such encumbered assets. 
C om.ment. The above section follows Minn. Stat. ( I  94 I )  
§ 525 .442 and Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-1304. See also 
Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 3 I6 .47 .  The following related sections of this 
Code should be noted : § 1 26,  as to a compromise in lieu of foreclosure 
of a lien ; § I 3 5,  ·as to the inapplicability of the nonclaim statute to 
liens ; § 1 39, as to marshalling assets in satisfaction of secured claims; 
§ 1 43, as to a hearing on claims ; § 1 6 1 ,  as to a sale of mortgaged 
real property subject to the lien, and § I 89, as to the exoneration of 
encumbered property. 
SALES, MORTGAGES, LEASES, EXCHANGES 
In General 
§ 150. No priority between real and personal prop· 
erty. In determining what property of the estate shall be sold, 
mortgaged, leased or exchanged for any purpose provided in 
section I 52, there shall be no priority as between real and per­
sonal property, except as provided by the will, if any, or by 
order of the court or by the provisions of section I 84. 
C om.ment. Since . the historical distinction between real and 
personal property is becoming less important, and because of the wide­
spread tendency to subject real property to the possession and control 
of the personal representative during the period of administration to 
the same extent as personal property, as is done in § §  84 and I 24 of 
this Code, it is desirable to express this assimilation in connection with 
sales and similar transactions. The substance of this section is taken 
from Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 7 54· 
'\ 
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§ 151 .  When power given in will. When power to sell, 
mortgage, lease or exchange property of the estate has been 
given to any personal representative under the terms of any 
will, the personal representative may proceed under such 
power, or may proceed under the provisions of this Code, as 
he may determine. 
Comment. The purpose of this section is to recognize as valid 
testamentary provisions to sell, mortgage, lease or exchange property, 
and also to provide that the personal representative may nevertheless 
proceed under the terms of this Code. The latter course may be 
deemed by him to be for the best interests of the estate, or the power 
given to him may be doubtful or inadequate. Statutes of this kind 
exist in several states. See Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1 944) 
§ 1 05 1 0-1 ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1941 ) § 733.22. 
§ 152. Transfer under court order; purposes. Any 
real or personal property belonging to an estate may be sold, 
mortgaged, leased or exchanged under court order when nec­
essary for any of the following purposes : 
(a) For the payment of claims allowed against the estate; 
(b) For the payment of any allowance made to the sur­
viving spouse and minor children of the decedent ; 
(c) For the payment of any legacy given by the will of 
the decedent ; 
(d) For the payment of expenses of administration; 
(e) For the payment of any gift, estate, inheritance or 
transfer taxes assessed upon the transfer of the estate 
or due from the decedent or his estate ; 
(f) For making distribution of the estate or any part 
thereof; • 
(g) For any other purpose in the best interests of the 
estate. 
Comment. In the absence of provisions in the will, a statute was · 
necessary to authorize a sale in all cases where the decedent had not 
taken affirmative steps to make the land liable for his debts. Gradually 
these purposes have been broadened, many of the statutory purposes 
ADMINISTRATION OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES I S S  
appearing in current statutes being that expressed in (g), viz., for any 
purpose beneficial to the estate. Thus if a small tract of land were to 
be divided among many heirs or devisees, some of whom were under 
disabilities, a serious problem of marketability would be presented if it 
were distributed to them in kind. under this section it could be sold 
by the personal representative and the proceeds distributed, thus 
eliminating a difficult and otherwise expensive problem for the in­
terested persons. The above section was taken in part from N. Y. 
Surr. Ct. Act, § 234. 
It should be noted that a sale cannot be ordered solely on the ground 
that there is any rule of law to the effect that it is necessary to make 
distribution in cash. See § I 90 hereof. 
§ 153. Order to sell, mortgage or lease to be refused if 
bond given. An order authorizing a personal representative 
to sell, mortgage or lease real or personal property for the pay­
ment of obligations of the estate shall not be granted if any 
of the persons interested in the estate shall execute and file in 
the court a bond in such sum and with such sureties as the court 
may approve, conditioned to pay all obligations of the estate to 
the extent that the other property of the estate is insufficient 
therefor, within such time as the court shall direct. An action 
may be maintained on such bond by the personal representative 
on behalf of any person interested in the estate who is preju­
diced by breach of any obligation of the bond. 
Comment. This section follows in substance N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, 
§ 235,  and Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 3 1 6. 1 3. 
§ 154. Terms of sale. In all sales of real or personal 
property, the court may authorize credit to be given by the 
personal representative for a period not exceeding one year 
from the date of his qualification and for an amount not ex­
ceeding fifty per cent of the purchase price, the payment of 
which shall be secured by notes or bonds with approved sur­
eties or by a purchase money mortgage. If credit is authorized, 
the order shall specify the time of payment, the minimum rate 
of interest on deferred payments and the manner in which such 
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payments shall be secured. If the estate is solvent, credit may 
be extended by the personal representative for a time longer 
than one year with the written consent of the distributees. 
Comment. This section follows in part Minn. Stat. ( I  94 I )  
§ 525 .642 and Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § §  5 9-2244 and 5 9-
2305. 
§ 155. When personal representative may purchase. 
Any personal representative may purchase, take a mortgage 
on, lease or take by exchange, real or personal property belong­
ing to the estate, but such transaction shall always be reported 
to the court and be subject to confirmation. 
Comment. This section modifies the common law rule as to the 
fiduciary duty owed by a trustee or personal representative. How­
ever, in the interests of benefit to the estate, a few statutes have relaxed 
the common law rule by provisions of this kind. See Fla. Stat. Ann. 
( I  94 I )  § 7 33·3 I and Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. I 944) t. 20, 
§ 7 I 4. I .  Since such transactions are to be reported to the court and 
confirmed, this section is believed to be desirable. Of course, report 
and confirmation would be required without this section in the case of 
real property (see § I 66) ,  but in the case of personal property it is not 
generally required. See § I 58 .  
§ 156. Purchase by holder of lien. At any sale of real 
or personal property upon which there is a mortgage, pledge 
or other lien, the holder thereof may become the purchaser 
and may apply the amount of his lien on the purchase price in 
the following manner. If no claim thereon has been filed or 
allowed, the court, at the hearing on the report of sale and for 
confirmation of the sale, may examine into the validity and 
enforceability of the lien or charge and the amount due there­
under and secured thereby and may authorize the personal 
representative to accept the receipt of such purchaser for the 
amount due thereunder and secured thereby as payment pro 
tanto. If such mortgage, pledge or other lien is a valid 
claim against the estate and has been allowed, the receipt of the 
purchaser for the. amount due him from the proceeds of the 
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sale is a payment pro tanto. I f  the amount for which the prop­
erty is purchased, whether or not such claim was filed or al­
lowed, is insufficient to defray the expenses and discharge his 
mortgage, pledge or other lien, the purchaser must pay an 
amount sufficient to pay the balance of such expenses. Nothing 
permitted under the terms of this section shall be deemed to . 
be an allowance of a claim based upon such mortgage, pledge 
or other lien. 
Comment. This section is taken in substance from Cal. Pro b. 
Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 764. It includes liens on property 
owned by the estate for the payment of which the estate was not liable, 
as where the decedent purchased property subject to a mortgage but 
did not assume its payment, or where a mortgagee could have filed a 
claim but did not do so. 
· 
§ 157. Validity of proceedings. No proceedings for 
sale, mortgage, lease, exchange or conveyance by a personal 
representative of property belonging to the estate shall be sub­
ject to collateral attack on account of any irregularity in the 
proceedings if the court which ordered the same had juris­
diction of the estate. 
Comment. This section is the modern version of a statute intended 
to be a substitute for the Massachusetts statute of I 836 based upon the 
philosophy of that time that probate courts were courts of limited and 
inferior jurisdiction, but that their sales should be upheld unless de­
fective in certain particulars. The above 'section is taken from Minn. 
Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 5 25 .70 (first adopted in 1 935  at which time their 
statute based upon the early Massachusetts statute was repealed) and 
is predicated upon the assumption that probate courts now have the 
same superior status within their sphere as do courts of general jurisdic­
tion. It should be noted that, according to § 62 hereof, failure to give 
the required notice is not jurisdictional and therefore under § I 5 7  
would not invalidate the transfer. 
Personal Property 
§ 158. Sale, mortgage or lease of personal property. A 
personal representative may file a petition to sell� mortgage 
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or lease any personal property belonging to the estate. The 
petition shall set forth the reasons for the application and de­
scribe the property involved. The petition may be heard with 
or without notice as the court may direct. Notice of the hear­
ing, if required, shall state briefly the nature of the application 
and shall be given as provided in section I 4  hereof. At the 
hearing and upon proof of the petition the court may order 
the sale, mortgage or lease of the property described or any 
part thereof, at such price and upon such terms and conditions 
as the court shall require. No report or confirmation of such 
transaction shall be necessary except as required by section I 5 5  
or as required by the court ; but no sale, mortgage or lease, 
except as provided in section I 59, shall be valid unless prior 
authorization or subsequent approval of the court is secured. 
Comment. If report and confirmation are ordered the procedure 
in § r66 would be followed. 
§ 159. Sales of perishable or depreciable property. 
Perishable property and other personal property which will 
depreciate in value if not disposed of promptly, or which will 
incur loss or expense by being kept, and so much other per­
sonal property as may be necessary to provide allowance to 
the surviving spouse and children pending the receipt of other 
sufficient funds, may be sold without notice, and title shall pass 
without confirmation ; but the personal representative shall be 
responsible for the actual value of the property unless, after 
making a report of such sale, and on a proper showing, the 
court shall approve the sale. 
Comment. This section follows Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. (Deering, 
1 944) § no. 
§ 160. Sale, mortgage or lease of real and personal 
property as a unit. Whenever it is for the best interests of 
the estate, real and personal property of the estate may be sold, 
mortgaged or leased as a unit, but the provisions of this Code 
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with respect to the sale, mortgage or lease of real property 
shall apply so far as may be. 
Real Property 
§ 161 .  Petition to sell, mortgage or lease real property; 
notice; hearing. A personal representative may file a peti­
tion to sell, mortgage or lease any real property belonging to 
the estate. The petition shall set forth the reasons for the 
application and describe the property involved. It may apply 
for different authority as to separate parts of the property; or 
it may apply in the alternative for authority to sell, mortgage 
or lease. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall fix 
the time and place for the hearing thereof, provided, however, 
that as to any real property which was last appraised at not 
more than $sao, the court may, in its discretion, hear the peti­
tion without notice. Notice of the hearing shall state briefly 
the nature of the application and shall be given as provided in 
section I 4 hereof. At the hearing and upon satisfactory proofs, 
the court may order the sale, mortgage or lease of the property 
described or any part thereof. When a claim secured by a 
mortgage on real property is, under the provisions of this Code, 
payable at the time of distribution of the estate or prior 
thereto, the court with the consent of the mortgagee may, 
nevertheless, order the sale of the real property subject to the 
mortgage, but such consent shall release the estate should a 
deficiency later appear. 
Comment. This section is taken partly from Minn. Stat. ( I  94 I )  
§ 5 2 5 .64 and Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 5 9-2304. As to the 
matter of increasing the bond of the personal representative on a sale, 
see § I I 5 hereof. To the eifect that notice is not jurisdictional, see 
§ 62  hereof. 
§ 162. Quieting adverse claims. Upon any petition to 
sell or mortgage real prqperty the court shall have power to 
investigate and determine all questions of conflicting and con-
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troverted title, remove clouds from any title or interest in­
volved, and invest purchasers or mortgagees with a good and 
indefeasible title to the property sold or mortgaged. When 
the petition to sell or mortgage seeks such relief notice shall 
be given as in civil actions of like nature and the court is au­
thorized to issue appropriate process and notices in order to 
obtain jurisdiction to so proceed against adverse parties. 
Comment. See Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § 388, 
subd. (a}; Newell v. Montgomery, I29 Ill. 58, 2 I  N. E. so8 
(I 889) ; Schottler v. Quinlan, 263 Ill. 637, 1 05 N. E. 7 I o (I 9 I 4 ) .  
§ 163. Order for sale, mortgage or lease of real prop­
erty. The order shall describe the property to be sold, mort­
gaged or leased and may designate the sequence in which the 
several parcels shall be sold, mortgaged or leased. An order 
for sale shall direct whether the property shall be sold at pri­
vate sale or public auction, and, if the latter, the place or places 
of sale. If real property is to be sold it shall direct that the 
same shall not be sold for less than the appraised value ; or if 
real property is to be leased, it shall direct that the same shall 
not be leased for less than the appraised rental value. An order 
of sale shall direct whether the sale shall be for cash or for cash 
and deferred payments, and tht: terms on which such deferred 
payments are to be made. If real property is to be mortgaged, 
it shall fix the maximum amount of principal, the maximum 
rate of interest, the earliest and latest date of maturity, at\d 
shall direct the purpose for which the proceeds shall be used. 
An order for sale, mortgage or lease shall remain in force until 
terminated by the court, but no sale or lease shall be made after 
one year from the date of the order unless the real property or 
rental value thereof shall have been reappraised under order 
of the court within three months preceding the sale or lease. 
Comment. The above section follows in part Minn. Stat. ( I  94 1 )  
§ 525.64 1 and Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943} § 59-2305. 
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§ 164. Appraisement of real property . . Before any per­
sonal representative shall sell or lease any real property he 
shall, unless the court directs that he be permitted to use the 
appraisal filed with the inventory, have it appraised by two 
disinterested persons appointed by the court, who are residents 
of the county in which at least part of it lies. The appraisers 
shall appraise such real property or its rental value, as the case 
may be, at its full and fair value, and forthwith deliver the 
appraisement certified by them under oath to the personal 
representative. 
Comment. Corresponding to § 120  providing for the making of 
an inventory and appraisement, two appraisers only are provided for. 
The above section follows in substance Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) 
§ 5 9-2307. 
§ 165. Sales at public auction. In all sales of real prop­
erty at public auction the personal representative shall give 
notice thereof particularly describing the property to be sold, 
and stating the time, terms, and place of sale. The notice 
shall be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in 
some newspaper, authorized to publish legal notices, of the 
county in which the real property is situated, but if no news­
paper is published in the county or the real property is ap­
praised at not more than $sao, the personal representative 
may, in lieu of publication, post a copy of the �otice in three 
public places in the county where the real property or some 
part thereof lies, at least two weeks before the sale is made. 
_ If the notice is published, the date set for the sale shall not be 
earlier than one day nor later than seven days after the date 
of the third publication of notice. Proof of publication or 
posting shall be filed before confirmation of the sale. If the 
tracts to be sold are contiguous and lie in more than one county, 
notice may be given and the sale made in either county. The 
personal representative may adjourn the sale from time to 
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time, if for the best interests of the estate, but not for longer 
than three months in all. Every adjournment shall be an­
nounced publicly at the time and place fixed for the sale. 
Comment. Parts of this section follow Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. 
(Deering, 1 944-) § 780, Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .6 5  and Kan. 
Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 59-2308. 
§ 166. Report and confirmation. Within ten days after 
making any sale, mortgage or lease of real property, the per­
sonal representative shall make a verified report of his pro­
ceedings to the court, with the certificate of appraisement in 
case special appraisement is required, and with proof of publi­
cation or posting in case the sale is made at public auction, which 
report shall state that he did not directly or indirectly acquire 
any beneficial interest in the real property, or the lease thereof, 
except as stated in his report. Any person interested in the 
estate desiring to object to confirmation may file objections in 
writing, setting forth the reasons therefor. The court shall 
examine said report and if satisfied that the sale, mortgage or 
lease has been at the price and terms most advantageous to the 
estate and in all respects made in conformity with law and 
ought to be confirmed, shall confirm the same and order the 
personal representative to make a deed, mortgage, lease or 
other proper instruments. to the person entitled thereto ; but 
no report shall be confirmed within five days after the filing 
thereof unless all persons interested in the estate shall in per­
son, or by attorney or guardian, consent in writing to such con­
firmation, or unless, in the opinion of the court, such delay 
would not be for the best interests of the estate. Such instru­
ment shall refer to the order of sale, mortgage or lekse by its 
date, and the court by which it was made, and shall transfer to 
the grantee, mortgagee or lessee all the right, title and interest 
of the decedent granted by the instrument, discharged from 
liability for all debts and obligations incident to the admin-
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istration of the estate, except encumbrances assumed. If not 
satisfie--d that the sale, mortgage.or lease has been made in con­
formity with law or that it is for the best interests of the estate, 
the court may reject the sale, mortgage or lease or require a re­
execution of the order upon such terms and conditions as it 
may direct. 
Comment. J'his section follows in part N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, 
§ 240, Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § 27 .3 1 7 8 (485)  and Kan. Gen. 
Stat. (Supp. 1943) § 5 9-2309. 
§ 167. Execution of conveyance or other instrument 
by personal representative; recording. Upon the confir­
mation of any sale, mortgage or lease in accordance with .sec­
tion I 66, the personal representative shall execute a convey­
ance to the grantee or mortgagee or a lease with the lessee 
according to the order of confirmation. A certified copy of 
the order may be recorded with the deed or other instrument 
in the office of the [register of deeds] of the county where the 
land lies, and shall be prima facie evidence of the due appoint­
ment arid qualification of the personal representative, the 
correctness of the proceedings and the authority of the per­
sonal representative to execute the instrument. 
Comment. This section corresponds to § 1 3 2  pr�viding for a 
conveyance by the personal representative under a land contract 
executed by the decedent. The purpose of both of these sections is to 
simplify land title problems by making the deed of the personal repre­
sentative and the order of the court confirming the transaction 
adequate and sufficient evidence to be recorded and shown on the ab­
stract of title for the purpose of showing a marketable title, thus 
eliminating the necessity of showing all the antecedent steps at the 
probate proceedings. 
No attempt is made to set out in this Code the rules with respect to 
the rights of purchasers where the title of the decedent totally fails. 
Common law doctrines deal with that situation adequately ; and it 
would be unsatisfactory to state them in statutory form. As to these 
doctrines, see Atkinson, Wills ( 1 93 7 )  635, 636, 
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Miscellaneous Provisions 
.. 
§ 168. Taxes not to be liens in hands of transferee. 
The lien of the state for inheritance or estate taxes shall not 
extend to any interest acquired by a purchaser, mortgagee, or 
lessee through any transfer made by a personal representative 
under a power contained in a will or under order of the court. 
Comment. The purpose of this section is to make it clear that 
the disposition of property for the payment of taxes shall pass title to 
such property free from such claims. Otherwise purchasers would 
not buy and the purpose of authorizing the disposition of property 
would be thwarted. 
This section is modeled after Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 525 .693 and 
Wash. Rev. Stat. (Supp. I 940) § I I  20 I .  The Washington statute 
was amended after the decision in In re Kennedy's Estate, I 88 Wash. 
84, 6 I  P. (2d) 998 ( I 936) . . 
§ 169. Brokers' fees and title documents. In connec­
tion with the sale, mortgage, lease or exchange of property, 
the court may authorize the personal representative to pay, 
out of the proceeds realized therefrom or out of the estate, the 
customary and reasonable auctioneers' and brokers' fees and 
any necessary expenses for abstracting, title insurance, survey, 
revenue stamps and other necessary costs and expenses in con­
nection therewith. 
Comment. Provisions for payment of a real estate commission are 
·contained in Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 76o, Wis. 
Stat. ( I 943) § 3 I 6.23, and Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § § 59-
23 I 2 , 5 9-23 I 3· 
§ 170. Platting. When it is for the best interests of the 
estate in order to dispose of real property, the court, upon ap­
plication by the personal representative or any other interested 
person, may authorize the personal representative, either alone 
or together with other owners, to plat any land belonging to 
the estate in accord;mce with the statutes in regard to platting. 
Comment. For other statutes authorizing a personal representative 
to plat real estate see Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 5 2  5 .6 8 and Wis. Stat. 
( 1 943) § 3 1 6. 1 0. 
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§ 171 .  Exchange of property. Whenever it shall ap­
pear upon the petition of the personal representative or of any 
person interested in the estate to be to the best interests of the 
estate to exchange any real or personal property of the estate 
for other property, the court may authorize the exchange upon 
such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, which may in­
clude the payment or receipt of part cash by the personal repre­
sentative. If personal property of the estate is to be ex­
changed, the proceedings required for the sale of such property 
shall apply so far as may be; if real property of the estate is 
to be exchanged, the procedure for the sale of such property 
shall apply so far as may be. 
Comment. This section is similar in substance to Cal. Pro b. Code 
Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 86o. See also N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 250-a 
authorizing exchanges by testamentary trustees under the direction of 
the court. 
ACCOUNTING 
§ 172. Liability of personal representative. 
(a) Property of estate. Every personal representative 
shall be liable for and chargeable in his accounts with all of the 
estate of the decedent which comes into his possession at any 
time, including all the income therefrom ; but he shall not be 
accountable for any debts due to the decedent or other assets 
of the estate which remain uncollected without his fault. He 
shall not be entitled to any profit by the increase, nor be charge­
able with loss by the decrease in value or destruction without 
his fault, of any part of the estate. 
(b) Property not a part of estate. Every personal rep­
resentative shall be chargeable in his accounts with property 
not a part of the estate which comes into his hands at any time 
_ and shall be liable to the persons entitled thereto, if 
( I ) The property was received, under a duty im­
posed on him by law in the capacity of per­
sonal representative ; or 
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( 2) He has commingled such property with the 
assets of the estate. 
(c) Breach of duty. Every personal representative shall 
be liable and chargeable in his accounts for neglect or unrea­
sonable delay in collecting the credits or other assets of the 
estate or in selling, mortgaging or leasing the property of the 
estate ; for neglect in paying over money or delivering prop­
erty of the estate he shall have in his hands ; for failure to 
account for or to close the estate within the time provided by 
this Code ; for any loss to the estate arising from his embezzle­
ment or commingling of the assets of the estate with other 
property; for loss to the estate through self-dealing; for any 
loss to the estate arising from wrongful acts or omissions of 
his co-representatives which he could have prevented by the 
exercise of ordinary care ; and for any other negligent or wil­
ful act or nonfeasance in his administration of the estate by 
which loss to the estate arises. 
Comment. Section I 7 2 (b) ( I )  covers cases of damages received 
under wrongful death statutes, or appointed property where the de­
cedent was the donee of a general power of appointment and was in­
solvent. 
Section I 7 2 (b) ( 2 )  includes a situation when: a personal representa­
tive commingles the proceeds of a life insurance policy with assets of 
the estate, although the estate is not the beneficiary of the policy. 
For a discussion of this matter, see 29 Va. L. Rev. 95 I ( 1 943) .  
§ 173. Duty to close estate. Every personal representa­
tive shall close the estate as promptly as possible. The time 
for closing the estate shall not exceed nine months from the 
filing of the petition for the appointment of a personal repre­
sentative unless for cause the time is extended by the court. 
§ 1 7  4. When personal representative must account. 
Every personal representative must file in the court a verified 
account of his administration 
(a) Upon filing a petition for final settlement ; 





Upon the revocation of his letters ; 
Upon his application to resign and before his resigna-
tion is accepted by the court ; 
/ 
Annually during the period of administration unless 
the court otherwise directs ; 
At any other time when directed by the court either 
of its own motion or on the application of any inter­
ested person. 
§ 175. What accounts to contain. Accounts rendered 
to the court by a personal representative shall be for a period 
distinctly stated and shall consist of three schedules, of which 
the first shall show the amount of the property according to 
the inventory, or, if there be a prior accounting, the amount of 
the balance of the next prior account, and all income and other 
property received, and gains from the sale of any property or 
otherwise ; the second shall show payments, charges, losses and 
distributions ; the third shall show the property on hand con­
stituting the balance of such account, if any, by reference to 
the inventory or otherwise. When an account is filed, the 
personal representative shall also file receipts for disburse­
ments of assets made during the period covered bylhe account. 
The court may provide for an inspectio� of the ·balance of 
assets on hand. 
Comment. This is modeled after Mass. Ann. Laws ( I  932) c. 
206, § 2 .  See § 143 (b) as to administration expenses to be allowed 
at accounting before payment. 
§ 176. Account to include petition for settlement and 
distribution. At the time of filing of an account the personal 
representative shall petition the court to settle and allow his 
account ; and if the estate is in a proper condition to be closed, 
he shall also petition the court for an order authorizing him to 
distribute the estate, and shall specify in the petition the per-
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sons to whom distribution is to be made and the proportions or 
parts of the estate to which each is entitled. 
§ 1 77. Hearing on settlement of account; notice. 
Upon the filing of any account, the matter shall be set for hear­
ing and notice thereof shall be given. If there is also a petitior1 
for distribution, it shall be heard at the same time as the ac­
count, and the notice of hearing on the account shall so state. 
§ 178. Objections to account. At any time prior to the 
hearing on an account of a personal representative, any inter­
ested person may file written objections to any item or omis­
sion in the account. All such objections shall be specific and 
shall indicate the modification desired. 
§ 179. Conclusiveness of order settling account. Upon 
the approval of the account of a personal representative, the 
personal representative and his sureties shall, subject to the 
right of appeal and to the power of the court to vacate its final 
orders, be relieved from liability for the administration of his 
trust during the accounting period, including the investment 
of the assets of the estate. The court may disapprove the ac­
count in whole or in part and surcharge the personal repre­
sentative for any loss caused by any breach of duty. 
§ 180. Statement of receipts and disbursements after 
final account and before final distribution. Any receipts 
and disbursements of the personal representative subsequent 
to the filing of his final account must be reported to the court 
before making final distribution. A settlement thereof, to­
gether with an estimate of the expenses of closing the estate, 
must be made by the court and included in the order of distri-
. bution, or the court may treat such statement as a supplemen­
tary account and order notice to be given as in other cases of 
the settlement of accounts. 
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Comment. Similar to Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) 
§ 1 020.5. 
§ 181 .  Account of deceased or incompetent personal 
representative. If the personal representative dies or be­
comes incompetent, his account may be presented by his per­
sonal representative or the guardian of his estate to, and settled 
by, the court in which the estate of which he was personal repre­
sentative is being administered, and, upon petition of the 
successor of the deceased or incompetent personal representa­
tive, the court shall compel the personal representative or 
guardian of the deceased or incompetent personal representa­
tive to render an account of the administration of the estate of 
the decedent and the court shall settle the account as in other 
cases. 
Comment. This is substantially identical with Cal. Prob. Code 
Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 932. 
DISTRIBUTION AND DISCHARGE 
§ 182. Partial distribution. 
(a) Delivery of specific property to distributee before 
final decree. Upon application of the personal representative 
or of any distributee, with or without notice as the court may 
direct, the court may order the personal representative to 
deliver to any distributee who consents to it, possession of any 
specific real or personal property to which he is entitled under 
the terms of the will or by intestacy, provided that other dis­
tributees and claimants are not prejudiced thereby. The court 
may at any time prior to the decree of final distribution order 
him to return such property to the personal representative, if 
it is for the best interests of the estate. The court may require 
the distributee to give security for such return. 
(b) Distribution of part of estate. After the expiration , 
of the time limited for the filing of claims and before final 
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settlement of the accounts of the personal representative, a 
partial distribution may be decreed, with notice to interested 
persons, as the court may direct. Such distribution shall be 
as conclusive as a decree of final distribution with respect to 
the estate distributed except to the extent that other distributees 
and claimants are deprived of the fair share or amount which 
they would otherwise receive on final distribution. Before a 
partial distribution is so decreed, the court may require that 
security be given for the return of the property so distributed 
to the extent necessary to satisfy any distributees and claimants 
who may be prejudiced as aforesaid by the distribution. 
Comment. The two subsections of § r 82 are designed to ac­
complish quite different things. The purpose of subsection (a) is to 
take care of a case where there is a specific thing which can much more 
conveniently remain in the possession of an heir or devisee than of the 
personal representative. Thus, a musical instrument, a painting or a 
valuable piece of furniture would have to be stored by the personal 
representative at the expense of the estate unless so
.
me such provision 
as this exists. This subsection also applies to real estate so that a specific 
tract of land may under its terms be turned over to a particular dis­
tributee .  
Subsection (b) , unlike the preceding subsection, provides for a more 
or less final distribution of a part of the estate. The partial distribu­
tion may consist either in a cash payment or in the distribution of 
specific real or personal property. Subsection (a), on the other hand, 
merely involves the handing over of the possession of specific things 
for all or a part of the period of distribution, and may be employed 
merely for the convenience of the personal representative. 
§ 183. Decree of final distribution. 
(a) Petition for decree. After the expiration of the time 
limit for the filing of claims, and after all claims against the 
estate, including state and federal inheritance and estate taxes, 
have been finally determined and paid, except contingent 
and unmatured claims which cannot then be paid, the personal 
representative shall; if the estate is in a condition to be closed, 
render his final account and at the same time petition the court 
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to decree the final distribution of the estate. Notice of the 
hearing of the petition shall be given to all interested persons. 
(b) What decree to include. In its decree of final ,dis­
tribution, the court shall designate the persons to whom 
distribution is to be made, and the proportions or parts of the 
estate, or the amounts, to which each is entitled under the will 
and the provisions of this Code, including the provisions re­
garding advancements, election by the surviving spouse, lapse, 
renunciation, adjudicated compromise of controversies and 
retainer. Every tract of real property so distributed shall be 
specifically described therein. The decree shall find that all 
state and federal inheritance and estate taxes are paid; and if 
all claims have been paid, it shall so state; otherwise the decree 
shall state that all Claims except those therein specified are 
paid and shall describe the claims for the payment' of which a 
special fund is set aside, and the amount of such fund; if any 
contingent claims which have been duly allowed are still un­
paid and have not become absolute, such claims shall be 
described in the decree, which shall state whether the distri- · 
butees take subject to them. If a fund is set aside for the 
payment of contingent claims, the decree shall provide for the 
distribution of such fund in the event that all or a part of it is 
not needed to satisfy such contingent claims. If a decree of .. 
partial distribution has been previously made, the decree of 
final distribution shall expressly confirm it, or, for good cause, 
shall modify said decree and state specifically what modifica­
tions are made. 
(c) Provisions for deceased distributees. If a distrib­
utee dies before distribution to him of his share of the estate, 
such share may be distributed to the personal representative 
of his estate, if there be one ; or if no administration on his 
estate is had and none is necessary according to the provisions 
of sections 86  to 9 1  inclusive, hereof, the share of such dis­
tributee shall be distributed in accordance therewith. 
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(d) Conclusiveness of decree. The decree of final dis­
tribution shall be a conclusive determination of the persons 
who are the successors in interest to the estate of the decedent 
and of the extent and character of their interests therein, sub­
ject only to the right of appeal and the right to reopen the 
decree. It shall operate as the final adjudication of the trans­
fer of the right, title and interest of the decedent to the dis­
tributees therein designated; but no transfer before or after 
the decedent's death by an heir or devisee shall affect the de­
cree, nor shall the decree affect any rights so acquired by 
grantees (rom the heirs or devisees. 
(e) Recording of decree. Whenever the decree of final 
distribution includes real property, a certified copy thereof 
shall be recorded by the personal r.epresentative in every 
county of this state in which any real property distributed by 
the decree is situated. The cost of recording such decree shall 
be charged to the estate. 
Comment. Under the provisions of this Code, the decree of final 
distribution, and not the will, is the significant muniment of title. 
Hence, if real estate is involved, provision is made for recording a copy 
of the former but not of the latter. If this is done, no one should, or 
is likely to, purchase real estate in reliance on the will, even though 
it has been admitted to probate ; but he will rely solely on the recorded, 
certified copy of the decree of distribution. 
It is believed that little would be gained and considerable confusion 
would result if it were provided, as some states do, that the property 
may be distributed to the assignee of an heir or devisee. See part ( 3 )  
o f  the appendix note to this section. This section does not deny the 
right of the assignee to pursue an appropriate remedy to reach the 
interests of his assignor, nor does it prevent his intervention at various 
stages of the probate proceeding as an interested person under § 3 (k) . 
§ 184. Order in which assets appropriated; abatement. 
(a) General rules. Except as provided in subsection (b) 
hereof, shares of the distributees shall abate, for the payment 
of claims, legacies, the family allowance, the shares of preter­
mitted heirs or the share of the surviving spouse who elects to 
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take against the will, without any preference or priority as be­
tween real and personal property, in the following order: 
( r ) Property not disposed of by the will ; 
( 2) Property devised to the residuary devisee ; 
(3 ) Property disposed of by the will but not specifically 
devised and not devised to the residuary devisee; 
(4) Property specifically devised. 
A general devise charged on any specific property or fund 
shall, for purposes of abatement, be deemed property spe­
cifically devised to the extent of the value of the thing on which 
it is charged: Upon the failure or insufficiency of the thing on 
which it is charged, it shall be deemed property not specifically 
devised to the extent of such failure or insufficiency. 
(b) Contrary provisions, plan or purpose. If the pro­
visions of the will or the testamentary plan or the express or 
implied purpose of the devise would be defeated by the order 
of abatement stated in subsection (a) hereof, the shares of 
distributees shall abate in such other manner as may be found 
necessary to give effect to the intention of the testator. 
Comment. A testator may determine the order in which the assets 
of his estate are applied to the payment of his debts. If he does not, 
then the provisions of this section lay down rules which may be re­
garded as approximating his intent. However, his intent may be indi­
cated not only by an express designation of a property or fund or by an, 
express statement of the order in which assets are to be applied, but 
also by the implied purpose of the devise or by the general testamentary 
plan. Thus, it is commonly held that, even in the absence of statute, 
general legacies to a wife, or to persons with respect to which the 
testator is in loco parentis, are to be preferred to other legacies in the 
same class because this accords with the probable purpose of the 
legacies. Moreover, the general testamentary plan is often important 
in determining matters of abatement when the surviving spouse elects 
to take against the will. The same may be true where abatement takes 
place to provide for the share of a pretermitted heir. The provisions 
of subsection (b) embrace these and other situations of similar charac­
ter. 
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§ 185. Contribution. When real or personal property 
which has been specifically devised, or charged with a legacy, 
shall be sold or taken by the personal representative for the 
payment of claims, general legacies, the family allowance, the 
shares of pretermitted heirs or the share of a surviving spouse 
who elects to take against the will, other legatees and devisees 
shall contribute according to their respective interests to the 
legatee or devisee whose legacy or devise has been sold or 
taken, so as to accomplish an abatement in accordance with the 
provisions' of section I 84 hereof. The court shall, at the time 
of the hearing on the petition for final distribution, determine 
the amounts of the respective contributions and whether the 
same shall be made before distribution or shall constitute a 
lien on specific property which is distributed. 
§ 186. Determination of advancements. All questions 
of advancements made, or alleged to have been made, by an 
intestate to any heir may be heard and determined by the court 
at the time of the hearing on the petition for final distribution. 
The amount of every such advancement shall be specified in 
the decree of final distribution. 
§ 187. Right of retainer. When a distributee of an 
estate is indebted to the estate, the amount of the indebtedness 
,if due, or the present worth of the indebt�dness, if not due, 
may be treated as an offset by the personal representative 
against any testate or intestate property, real or personal, of the 
estate to which such distributee is entitled; but such distributee 
shall be entitled to the benefit of any defense which would be 
available to him in a direct proceeding for the recovery of such 
debt. 
Comment. 'With the exception of the last clause, this is · sub­
stantially the same as Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 937 )  § I 0509-I 86. 
The last clause follows Ala. Code ( I  940) t. 6 I, § 360, and marks a 
departure from the common-law rule according to which the ,right oj 
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retainer was permitted with respect to debts barrecJ. by the statute of 
limitations or a discharge in bankruptcy. This prevents litigation such 
as has arisen in ,connection with these matters. See comment in 34 
Mich. L. Rev. 395 ( I 936) .  As to the broad meaning of "offset," 
see § I 44 and comment thereto. 
§ 188. Interest on general legacies. General legacies 
shall bear interest at the legal rate for a period beginning nine 
months from the filing of the petition for the appointment of a 
personal representative until the p�yment of such legacies, 
unless a contrary intent is indicated by the will. 
§ 189. Exoneration of encumbered property. When 
any real or personal property subject to a mortgage is specifi­
cally devised, the devisee shall take such property so devised 
subject to such mortgage unless the will provides expressly or 
by necessary implication that such mortgage be otherwise paid. 
The term "mortgage" as used in this section shall not include 
a pledge of personal property. 
Comment. The purpose of this section is to abolish the common­
law rule that the devise of specific property subject to an encumbrance 
is entitled to exoneration out of the personal estate. The basis of the 
common-law rule that the personal estate has benefited from the crea­
tion of the debt .. all too often has no foundation in fact. The other 
basis of the rule that the decedent's personalty is the primary fund for 
the payment of debts is no longer tenable. Furthermore, it is contrary 
to the express provisions of § I SO of this Code. 
' 
The doctrine of exoneration in any case rests upon an expressed or 
presumed intention. Consequently the terms of the act are restricted 
to mortgages, which include by definition vendors' liens and deeds of 
trust. See § 3 ( q) hereof. ·But pledges of personal property are ex­
cluded from the operation of this section. 
The language of this section follows N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, § 20, 
which in turn was borrowed from the English Real Estate Charges 
Act, I 7-1 8 Viet., c. I I 3 ( I  8 54) ,  as amended by 30-3 1 Viet., c. 69 
( I  867 ) and 40-41 Viet., c. 34 ( 1 87 7  ) .  Compare § 1 49 hereof, 
which deals with the privilege of the personal representative to pay off 
encumbrances, as distinguished from this section, which deals with the 
right of the distributee to require the personal representative to pay 
off encumbrances. 
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§ 190. Payment to distributees in kind. 
(a) When distributees to take in kind. When the 
estate is otherwise ready to be distributed, it shall be distributed 
in kind, unless the terms of the will otherwise provide or un- . 
less a partition sale is ordered. Except as provided in subsec­
tion (b) hereof, any general legatee may elect to take the value 
of his legacy in kind, and any distributee, who by the terms 
of the will is to receive land or any other thing to be purchased 
by the personal representative, may, if he notifies the personal 
representative before the thing is purchased, elect to take the 
purchase price or property of the estate which the personal 
representative would otherwise sell to obtain such purchase 
pnce. 
(b) Exception where will directs purchase of annuity. 
If the terms of the will direct the purchase of an annuity, the 
person to whom the income thereof shall be directed to be paid 
shall not have the right to elect to take the capital sum di­
rected to be used for such purchase in lieu of such annuity 
. except to the extent that the will expressly provides that an 
assignable annuity be purchased. Nothing herein contained 
shall affect the rights of election by a surviving spouse against 
a testamentary provision as provided in this Code. 
Comment. It is not clear in all jurisdictions that a distributee of 
personal property can elect to take a general or residuary legacy in any 
form except in cash. See Atkinson, Wills ( 1 937)  § §  229, 262. How­
ever, it would seem that there is no good reason why the distributee 
should not be permitted to take in kind if he desires. Such is the effect 
of subsection (a) hereof. 
If a testator directs his executor to purchase specific property and 
deliver it to a devisee, it is commonly held that the devisee may elect to 
t�ke the money set aside for this purpose. See cases collected in 1 30 
A. L. R. 1 379 at 1394. This is because the devisee could immediately. 
sell the property and get the money, and it would be a useless thing to 
compel him to take the property if he prefers the money set aside for 
its purchase. That situation, however, is clearly distinguishable from 
a direction in the will to purchase an annuity. The only reason for 
such a direction is that the testator wished the legatee to have an as-
ADMINISTRATION OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES 1 7 7  
sured income for life, and did not wish to give him a lump sum which 
he might spend foolishly. Thus, to allow the legatee to take the price 
of the annuity would defeat the testator's intent. If the legatee 
receives the annuity, he cannot readily convert it into cash ; indeed, by 
the terms of the annuity contract, it may not be assignable at all. 
The direction in a will to purchase an annuity for a legatee is doubt­
less intended to operate much like a trust to pay income to a named 
beneficiary and to withhold the principal until a future date. Thus, if 
A devises a sum of money to T on trust to pay the income to B udtil 
B is thirty years of age, and then to pay him the corpus of the trust, 
the great weight of authority in the United States is to the effect that 
the trust is indestructible until B reaches the named age, and that the 
beneficiary cannot demand a termination of the trust prior to that time. 
The leading case to that effect is Claflin v. Claflin, 1 49 Mass. I 9, 20 
N.  E .  454 ( 1 889) . And see Restatement, Trusts ( 1 935 ) § 337, 
comment j ;  3 Scott, Trusts ( 1 939) § 337·3· In England, however, 
it is held that the sole beneficiary of such a trust, who is sui juris, may 
secure a termination of the trust. Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. I I S  
( 1 84 1 ) .  Following the analogy of Claflin v. Claflin, supra, it would 
seem that American courts should hold that, even in the absence of 
statute, a direction in a will that an annuity be purchased should be 
given effect and that the legatee cannot demand the price of the 
ann.1ity. It was, indeed, so held in Berry v. President and Directors of 
the Bank of Manhattan Co., 1 33 N. ]. Eq. 1 64, 3 1  A. (2d) 203 
( 1 943 ) .  But in Parker v. Cobe, 208 Mass. 260, 94 N. E. 476 
( 1 9 I I ) , and in a few other cases, it was held that the annuitants could 
demand the price of the annuity. It is possible that these cases may 
have been influenced by English decisions to that effect and may have 
overlooked the fact that the English cases could be justified uri.der · 
the doctrine of Saunders v. Vautier, supra, which is not the law in most 
of the United States. In New York it was necessary to provide by 
legislation that the annuitant, in the situation under consideration, 
cannot receive the price of his annuity if that is contrary to the intent 
of the testator as indicated by the will. See Estate of Cole, 2 1 9  N. Y. 
435, 1 14· N. E. 7 85 ,  Ann. Cas. I 9 I 8  E 807 ( 1 9 1 6) ; N. Y. Dec. Est. 
Law, § 4 7 b. The New York statute is believed to establish the better 
rule. Such is the effect of subsection (b) hereof. In general, see 3 
Scott, Trusts ( I 939) § 346 ; 4 1  Mich. L. Rev. 276  ( 1942 ) .  
§ 19 1 .  Partition for purpose of distribution. When 
two or more distributees are entitled to distribution of undi­
vided interests in any real or personal property of the estate, 
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distribution shall be made of undivided interests therein unless 
the personal representative or one or more of such distributees 
shall petition the court not later than the hearing on the peti­
tion for final distribution, to make partition thereof. If such 
petition is filed, the court, after such notice to all interested 
persons as it shall direct, shall proceed to make partition, allot 
and divide the property in the same manner as provided by the 
statutes with respect to civil actions for partition, so that each 
party receives property of a value proportionate to his interest 
in the whole, and for that purpose the court may direct the 
personal representative to sell any property which cannot be 
partitioned without prejudice to the owners and which cannot 
conveniently be allotted to any one party. If partition is made 
in kind, the court may appoint two commissioners to partition 
said property, who shall have the powers and perform the 
duties of [ commissioners] in civil actions for partition, and the 
court shall have the same powers with respect to their report 
as in such actions. In case equal partition cannot be had be­
tween the parties without prejudice to the rights or interests 
of some, partition may be made in unequal shares and by 
awarding judgment for compensation to be paid by one or . 
more parties to one or more of the others. Any two or more 
·parties may agree to accept undivided interests. Any sale 
under this section shall be conducted and confirmed in the 
same manner as other probate sales. The expenses of the 
partition, including reasonable compensation to the commis­
sioners for their services, shall be equitably apportioned by 
the court among the parties, but each party must pay his own 
attorney's fees. The amount charged to each party shall con­
stitute a lien on the property allotted to him. 
Comment. The above section is modeled after Cal. Prob. Code 
Ann. (Deering, I 9H) § §  1 1 00-1 1 05.  
§ 192. Disposition of unclaimed assets. 
(a) Heirs unknown. If there shall be no known heir of 
the decedent, all of his net estate not disposed of by will shall 
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be ordered paid to the [state treasurer] to  become a part of the 
[state escheat fund] ,  subject to the further provisions of this 
section. 
(b) , Unclaimed property or money. If any distributee 
or claimant cannot be found, the personal representative shall 
sell the share of the estate to which he is entitled, pursuant to 
an order of court first obtained, and pay the proceeds to the 
[state treasurer ] to become a part of the [state escheat fund] .  
(c) Receipts to be given and filed. When the personal 
representative shall pay any money to the [state treasurer] 
pursuant to this section, he shall take a receipt therefor and file 
it with the court with the other receipts filed in the proceeding. 
Such receipt shall be sufficient to discharge the personal repre­
sentative in the same manner and to the same extent as though 
such distribution or payment were made to a distributee or 
claimant entitled therefo. 
(d) Refunds of money so paid. The moneys received 
by the [state treasurer] pursuant to the provisions of this sec­
tion shall be paid to the person entitled on proof of his right 
thereto or, if the [state treasurer] refuses or fails to pay be­
cause he is doubtful as to his duties in the premises, such person 
may apply to the court in which the estate was administered, 
whereupon the court upon notice to the [state treasurer] may 
determine the person entitled thereto and order the [ treas­
urer] to pay the same accordingly. No interest shall be al­
lowed thereon and such distributee or claimant shall pay all 
costs and expenses incident to the proceedings. If such pro­
ceeds are not paid or no application is made to the court within 
seven years after such payment to the [state treasurer] ,  no 
recovery thereof shall be had. 
Comment. See § 22 (b) (6)  as to escheat. 
§ 193. Discharge of personal representative. Upon 
the filing of receipts or other evidence satisfactory to the court 
that distribution has been made as ordered in t�e final decree, 
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the court shall enter an order of discharge. The discharge so 
obtained shall operate as a release from the duties of personal 
representative and shall operate as a bar to any suit against 
the personal representative and his sureties unless such suit be 
commenced within two years from the date of the discharge. 
Comment. This section follows very closely the language of Fla. 
Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § 734.23. There is danger of confusion arising 
from the language of some statutes, as to the precise significance of the 
term discharge. As used in this Code, a discharge does not mean that 
the personal representative is thenceforth absolved from all liability 
for his acts in his official capacity. As this section clearly indicates, he is 
not relieved from liability for past acts by a discharge, but merely ceases 
to be under any further duties to act as personal representative . 
Therefore, the last clause of this section is needed to bar his liability for 
past acts by lapse of time, if no suit is brought. Of course, the settle­
ment of the account of a personal representative would be a bar to most 
proceedings to impose liability for his acts prior to that time. See 
§ 1 79· 
§ 194. Reopening administration. If, after an estate 
has been settled and the personal representative discharged, 
other property of the estate shall be discovered, or if it shall 
appear that any necessary act remains unperformed on the 
part of the personal representative, or for any other proper 
cause, the court, upon the petition of any person interested in 
the estate and, without notice or upon such notice as it may 
direct, may order that said estate be reopened. It may reap­
point the personal representative or appoint another personal 
representative to administer such property or perform such 
acts as may be deemed necessary. Unless the court shall other­
wise order, the provisions of this Code as to an original adminis­
tration shall apply to the proceedings had in the reopened ad­
ministration so far as may be ; but no claim which is already 
barred can be asserted in the reopened administration. 
Comment. Under the provisions of this section, an estate may be 
reopened solely for the purpose of determining distributees. See com­
ment to § 1 95 ·  In such a case no appointment of a personal repre­
sentative is necessary. 
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§ 195. Determination of heirship. 
(a) When proceedings may be had. Whenever any 
person has died leaving property or any interest therein and 
no administration has been commenced on his estate in this 
state, nor has any will been offered for probate in this state, 
within five years after his death, any person claiming an in­
terest in such property as heir or through an heir may file a 
petition in any court which would be of proper venue for the 
administration of such decedent's estate, to determine the heirs 
of said decedent and their respective interests as heirs in the 
estate. 
(b) Contents of petition. The petition shall state 
( I ) 
(2) 
(3 )  
( s) 
The name, age, domicile and date of death of 
the decedent ; 
The names, ages and residence addresses of the 
heirs, so far as known or can with reasonable 
diligence be ascertained; 
The names and residence addresses of any per­
sons claiming any interest · in such property 
through an heir, so far as known or can with 
reasonable diligence be ascertained; 
A particular description of the property with re­
spect to which such determination is sought ; 
The net value of the estate. 
(c) Procedure. Upon the filing of the petition, the court 
shall fix the time for the hearing thereof, notice of which shall 
be given to 
( I ) All persons known or believed to claim any 
inter:est in the property as heir or through an 
heir of the decedent, 
All persons who may at the date of the filing 
of the petition be shown by the records of con­
veyances of the county in which any real prop-
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erty described in such petition is located to 
claim any interest therein through the heirs of 
the decedent and 
( 3 )  Any unknown heirs of the decedent. 
Such notice shall be given by publication and, in addition, per­
sonal notice or notice by registered mail shall be given to every 
such person whose address is known to the petitioner. Upon 
satisfactory proofs the court shall make a decree determining 
the heirs of said decedent and their respective interests as heirs 
in said property. 
(d) Certified copy pf decree to be recorded. A certified 
copy of the decree shall be recorded at the expense of the peti­
tioner in each county in which any real property described 
therein is situated, and shall be conclusive evidence of the facts 
determined therein as against all parties to the proceedings. 
Comment. In the administration of a decedent's estate normally 
the heirs wi11 be determined in connection with the decree of distribution 
on final settlement. In two situations, however, something more is 
needed: ( I )  where the decree of distribution fails to cover some of 
the property of the estate, either because its existence was unknown at 
the time of the decree, because it was then believed to have belonged to 
some person other than the decedent or merely because of a mistake 
in the wording of the decree ; and ( 2 )  where no administration has 
been commenced and the time for commencing administration has, by 
the provisions of § 83, expired. In the first situation, no determination · 
of heirship, as such, is needed. The administration can be reopened 
under the provisions of § I 94 solely for the purpose of amending the 
decree of distribution, and the modifications of this decree will ac­
�omplish everything which a separate determination of heirship could 
accomplish. The provisions of this section are, therefore, limited to the 
second situation. Here, neither probate nor administration is possible 
because the five-year limitation provided in § 83 operates as a bar. 
Moreover, under § I 3 5 (d) all creditors' claims would be barred as 
no administration is commenced within five years after the decedent's 
death. 
The sole purpose of this section is to determine the title to the 
property of the estate or to a designated part of it. Only after the ex­
piration of the five-year period is this possible, since otherwise the rights 
of creditors must be determined, and the proceeding for the determi-
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nation of heirship does not deal with creditors' rights. If a determi­
nation of heirship is desired prior to the expiration of the five-year period 
of limitation, a proceeding to administer the estate or to probate the will 
should be initiated ;  or, if it has already been initiated and closed, it 
should be reopened. 
PART IV. GuARDIANSHIP 
INTRODUCTORY COMMENT 
Few fields of the law have been as much neglected in recent decades 
as that of guardianship. Even the recent probate codes, while they 
have advanced the statutory law of administration of decedents' estates, 
have apparently considered the law of guardianship as a relatively un­
important appendage. Recent decisions on the subject are seldom of a 
distinguished character. Little periodical literature exists and there 
has not been a standard American text exclusively devoted to the 
field since Woerner's American Law of Guardianship appeared in 
1 897· . 
Like Topsy, the law of guardianship just grew, and it grew in a 
very illogical fashion. At common law the father and on his death 
the ,mother was the natural guardian of minor children without judicial 
appointment, and, as such, entitled to their custody. Ferguson v. 
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 84 Vt. 350, 79 A. 997 ( 1 9 1 0 ) .  By 
statute in many states the father and mother are entitled to joint 
custody, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1 94 1 )  § 1 97 .  Parents, of 
course, have the duty to support their minor children, but as parents 
they have no control over the property of the children except the right 
to the children's earnings. These phases of the law are parts of the 
law of parent and child, which this Code assumes but with which it 
does not specifically deal. See, however, § 224 (b) . 
The cases sometimes speak of one ·who wrongfully takes possession 
of an incompetent's property or assumes to act as his guardian without 
authority, as a de facto guardian or guardian de son tort. Kies v. 
Brown, 222  Iowa 54, 268 N. W. 9 1 0  ( 1936) .  However, this 
office is a mere fiction-Burch v. State, 4 Gill & J. ( Md. ) 444 ( I 8 3 2)  
-and the remedy of  the lawful guardian or of  the incompetent upon 
becoming competent proceeds upon ordinary principles of the law of 
torts or restitution. 
Guardianship in chivalry, or the right of the lord to take charge of 
. the infant's person and property, was abolished by 1 2  Car. II, c. 24 
and never prevailed in this country. Guardianship by socage arose outo 
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of land held in socage tenure. It devolved upon the nearest of kin 
who could not inherit the property and terminated when the minor 
became fourteen years of age. N. Y. Dom. Rei. Law, § So, provides 
for guardianship of property with the rights, powers and duties of a 
guardian in socage. However, the common law peculiarities of this 
form of guardianship no longer exist in New York and the term is 
of little significance there. Matter of De Saulles, I o I Misc. 44 7, I 6 7 
N. Y. S. 445 ( 1 9 I 7 ) ; Woerner, Guardianship ( I 897) § §  I 4, 23. 
By virtue of an English statute, I 2 Car. II, c. 24, § 8, a father 
by his will could appoint a guardian of the person and of the estate 
of his children during their minority. This testamentary guardianship 
sprang from the will and required no judicial confirmation. In the 
United States the testamentary guardianship is common. Some statutes 
make no requirement of judicial confirmation but the tendency has 
been to require the guardian so nominated to qualify and give bond 
just as any other guardian. Woerner, Guardianship ( I 897) § § I S ,  
2 o ;  Madden, Domestic Relations ( I 9 3 I )  § I 4 7 .  This Code does not 
recognize the office of testamentary guardian as such. It requires 
judicial appointment in all cases, though under § 203 the court is 
directed to give due regard to the parent's testamentary request for the 
appointment of a designated person as guardian. 
At an early date the English Court of Chancery assumed juris­
diction to appoint guardians (at least of the estate) of minors. This 
was a general guardianship, quite distinct from the office of guardian 
ad litem. \Voerner, Guardianship ( 1 897)  § 1 6. This phase of 
equity power has been recognized in some of the states of this country, 
resulting in concurrent jurisdiction to appoint guardians in equity and 
probate courts. Matter of De Saulles, I O I  Misc. 447, 1 6 7  N. Y. S. 
445 ( I 9 I 7 ) ; In re Sail, 59  Wash. 539, I IO P. 32, 626 ( 19 I0) . 
More generally perhaps, the jurisdiction over guardianships given by 
state constitutions and statutes to courts of probate has been deemed 
to be exclusive and to prevent courts of equity from exercising such 
power. Denton v. James, 107  Kan. 729, 1 93 P. 307, 1 2  A. L. R. 
I I 46 ( 1 920) ; Leclerc v. Leclerc, 8 5  N. H. 1 2 1 , 1 5 5  A. 249, 74 
A. L.  R.  I 348 ( I 93 I ) .  As  to the distinction between appointment 
of a guardian of the person and the award of custody in a divorce 
case, compare the last cited case with Stafford v. Stafford, 299 Ill. 
438, 1 32 N. E. 432 ( I 92 I ) ,  where the court of equity had general 
jurisdiction over guardianships. The wording of § I 99 of this Code, 
of course, precludes the possibility of a chancery guardian. 
Failure on the part of some members of the profession to realize the 
precise legal status of the estate under guardianship has been the 
source of much difficulty. This matter is well considered in an opinion 
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of Chief Justice Shaw in Conant v. Kendall, 2 1  Pick. (38 Mass.) 
36, 38 ( 1 838) : 
"There is considerable difficulty in treating the estate of a ward, 
in the custody and under the control of a guardian, as an estate held 
in trust by the guardian. He is appointed to take charge of the prop­
erty and manage it for the benefit of the ward ; but apparently the 
property remains vested in the ward, so that upon the death or resig­
nation of the guardian there is no change of property. There is a 
manifold distinction in this respect, between the case of a guardian 
and that of an executor or administrator. The original owner being 
dead, the personal property must vest in some one ; and by operation 
of law it vests in the executor or administrator, and is deemed so 
vested by relation, from the decease of the owner." 
There is no reason why this rule and the concomitant principles that 
the guardian acts in his own name, incurs personal liability for his acts 
and is sued in his own name with reference to such acts, securing 
reimbursement in proper cases from the estate, may not be changed by 
statute. However, the Model Probate Code proceeds in the main 
UJOn orthodox principles. See § §  2 2 7, 228 .  There is no special 
nonclaim statute relative to claims, as there is in some states. Title 
to the property is in the ward, § 2 2 1 .  
The Code does depart from common law in certain important 
respects. Thus, one having a claim of any nature against the ward 
or the guardian may procure its allowance by filing a claim with the 
court. § 227 . Again, all actions which seek to benefit or charge the 
estate are brought by or against the guardian as such. § 228 .  These 
provisions do not alter the substantive common-law principle of per­
sonal liability of the guardian for his own transactions ; they are 
merely procedural short-cuts which enable one to reach the assets of 
the estate directly instead of requiring him to pursue the guardian 
persona11y and forcing the latter to secure reimbursement from the 
estate assets. 
A frequent source of difficulty is that the term guardian is used both 
for the custodian of the person and for the custodian of the estate. 
Statutes frequently leave in doubt whether the term is used to mean 
guardian of the person, or guardian of the estate, or both. The fact 
that the same person is often both adds to the confusion. The rights 
and duties connected with the two offices are quite different. The 
situation is much the same as if the law of parent and child purported 
to state the legal relations when the father was a trustee for the benefit 
of the son. The applicable principles are distinct and harm may 
' ·result from considering the matters in the same code, particularly 
when there is confusion of legal nomenclature. Furthermore, many 
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of the problems of guardianship of the person lie outside of legal pro­
cedure and come within the realm of social work. 
The Model Probate Code is primarily a property code, The major 
part of it deals with decedents' estates wherein are included only prop­
erty rights and procedural rules to bring these rights into effect. 
Nevertheless, again in accordance with tradition, the Code deals with 
guardianships of the person as well as of the estate. There is not only 
an awareness of the problems of custody of the person but specific 
and distinct provisions therefor. See § §  200, 202, 203, 2 1 2, 2 1 3, 
2 1 6, 2 1 9 (a ) ,  220, 223,  234 (a) ( 2 ) .  However, there are limits 
beyond which the Code could not go in this regard. It does not pur­
port to codify the law of parent and child, nor to indicate methods of 
dealing with juvem1e delinquency, nor to provide for the commit­
ment of insane persons. Some or all of these are proper subjects for 
study and for legislative enactment based on that study, but they lie 
outside of the undertaking of the Code. Finally, on account of the 
recent dearth of legislative and scholarly development of the subject 
of guardianship the Model Probate Code is necessarily a more nearly 
pioneer undertaking with regard to guardianships than with regard 
to decedents' estates. 
It will be noted that the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act is 
contained as a separate portion of Part IV. There is every reason 
why the various states should pass this act even if they are not prepared 
to follow the other provisions of the Model Probate Code. Not only 
does this act take care of the peculiar problems of incompetent veterans 
and their dependents but under the statutes and regulations of the 
Federal government there must be compliance with many of the pro­
visions of the act in order to secure Federal compensation. Hence, it 
is desirable to have the act on the statute books as a guide for guardians 
of veterans and for the state courts having guardianship jurisdiction. 
Some of the provisions of Part IV A are modeled after the uniform 
act. See § §  225, 226. However, the uniform act does not fit the 
needs of a general guardianship code-first, because the act pre­
supposes and leans on a general guardianship code in some particulars ; 
second, because some of the safeguards of the uniform act are designed 
to prevent veterans' guardianships from becoming a racket and the 
provisions would be too onerous for guardianships generally. Of course 
in veterans' guardianship cases the provisions of the uniform act take 
precedence under the Model Probate Code. Where that act makes no 
provision the general law of guardianship will be applied .  § 1 97· 
The analogy between procedure in guardianships and in decedents' 
estates is apparent and has been recognized in many existing codes. I 
In some of them this is accomplished by the enactment of subdivisions 
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dealing with fiduciaries in general. See, for example, the Michigan 
Probate Code, which includes a chapter on "General Provisions Con­
cerning Fiduciaries," and chapters on "Claims" and "Sale, Mortgage 
or Lease of Property," covering guardianships as well as decedents' 
estates.• Other states have made use of the analogy of decedents' 
estates law by a sweeping provision which adopts in general terms for 
guardianships all the decedents' estate provisions which are applicable 
and which are not contrary to the specific provisions on guardianship. 
The latter method of introducing this analogy is believed to be pref­
erable for there are many particulars in which the law as to the 
various kinds of fiduciaries must necessarily differ. This method 
avoids the introduction of an artificial uniformity into the law of 
fiduciaries. 
However, the Model Probate Code is much more certain as to 
exactly what provisions regarding decedents' estates apply to guardian­
ships, for various sections in Part IV specifically adopt by reference 
particular sections in Part III, except in case of contrary provisions in 
Part IV. This is true of § 202 as to qualifications of guardians, § 2 I 3 
as to bonds, § 2 I 6 as to removal of guardians, § 2 I 8 as to inventory 
and appraisement, § 222 as to continuation of business, § 227  as to 
claims (in this section it is also provided that the remaining sections 
regarding claims in decedents' estates do not apply) ,  § 230 as to sales 
and other transfers by the guardian and § 233 as to accounting. 
Between these instances of incorporation by reference and the specific 
provisions of Part IV, there is almost complete coverage of all guardian­
ship matters which require a statutory solution. However, to provide 
for the unusual case, § I 98 adopts generally other applicable portions 
of Part III by analogy. 
Moreover, a careful analysis of the law of guardianship discloses 
that, at some points, it resembles more nearly the law of trusts than that 
of decedents' estates. Thus, the administration of the estate of a 
decedent ordinarily involves a more or less immediate distribution. 
There will ordinarily be no more debts nor assets ; and the primary 
object is to preserve the estate for a short time and then distribute 
it with fairness to creditors, heirs and devisees. But, like the trust 
estate, the guardianships may involve a continuous administration 
over a considerable period of time ; new assets may come in and new 
creditors may arise ; throughout it all there is a beneficiary to be main­
tained. Some statutes recognize the applicability of trust law. For 
example, § 5 8  82 of the Montana Revised Code ( 1 9  3 5 )  is as follows : 
"The relation of a guardian and ward is confidential, and is subject 
to the provisions of this code relative to trusts." The applicability of 
the law of trusts is recognized specifically in § 225 of the Model Code 
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as to investments of guardians of the estate, and in general, in § 2 1 9  (b) . 
A good example of the application of trust law to the law of guardian­
ship is found in the rule that a trustee must use reasonable care and 
skill to make the trust property productive. See Restatement, Trusts 
( 1 9  3 5 )  § 1 8 1. This same rule should be applied to determine the 
duties of a guardian, although the duty of a personal representative 
may be different. See § 1 33 of the Model Probate Code. 
In some statutory schemes, guardianships of minors and of mentally 
incompetent persons are treated in more or less separate divisions of 
the guardianship statutes. Indeed some states also have separate 
provisions as to spendthrifts, drunkards and the like. The Model 
Probate Code does not follow this plan of organization of subject 
matter. For the sake of brevity and of the unification of matters 
which do not require diverse treatment, the Code as a whole applies 
to all incompetents, though of course some provisions expressly or im­
plicitly relate only to one class. Of course, provisions as to commit­
ments of insane persons have no application to appointment of a 
guardian for a minor. The Code does not set forth the procedure 
for commitments though even this can be inserted in a unified compi­
lation of guardianship matters. See the recently enacted Florida 
Guardianship Law ( I 945 ) § 744.3 I ,  which refers to the commit­
ment procedure found elsewhere in the statutes. 
Somewhat relative to this problem is the question of permissibility 
of classifying both minors and insane persons as "incompetents." The 
definition of the latter term in § I 96 (c) adopts this scheme, which is 
followed throughout Part IV B. Clearly a minor is incompetent for . 
the legal purposes having to do with guardianship. With reference to 
guardianship of the estate, particularly, the same law and procedure 
is appropriate to both classes. The layman's idea that a stigma is at­
tached to the word "incompetent" can be avoided by using the word 
"minor" instead of "incompetent" in the entitling of petitions, orders 
and other documents in estates of minors. 
In this connection, it will be noted that the term "mental illness" 
is included in § I 96 (c)-( 2 )  as to the form of mental incapacity which 
warrants the appointment of a guardian. This is not intended to 
enlarge or change the sort of incapacity which is necessary for guardian­
ship, viz., that which renders the person incapable of managing his 
property or caring for himself. "Mental illness" is included in this 
section because of the sensitiveness of many persons who would. be 
loath to file a petition declaring that a relative was "insane," while 
they would readily and truthfully declare that he was "unable to 
care for himself or his property by reason of mental illness." Indeed 
the term "insanity" has no definite meaning except in connection with 
a particular purpose f<ilr which the mental state is to be determined. 
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The features of Part IV can be seen from examination of the 
various sections. Few, if any, are entirely untried. Of course, the 
rna jor emphasis is upon the protection of the ward's interest. Of this 
nature are provisions permitting the agency or institution having super­
vision of the ward to act as his guardian ( § 202 ) ; requiring__adequate 
notice of the petition and subsequent proceedings to be served on the 
incompetent and others who will likely protect his interest ( § § 206, 
207, 208, 209) ; defining the duties of guardians ( §  2 1 9) ; permitting 
periodic allowances for support ( § 2 2 3 )  ; requiring strict court super­
vision of investments ( §  225) ; permitting purchase of a home for the 
incompetent ( § 2 2 6) ; proVIding for compromise of claims under court 
order ( §  229) ; providing for annual accounts which may disclose 
defaults of the guardians without making the accountings binding on 
the ward ( § 2 33 ) .  In a number of these and in some other sections 
the ward is protected by court supervision of the administration with 
regard to matters which have not been so supervised at common law 
or under typical statutory systems. Court appointment is required for 
all guardians and the power to appoint is vested solely in the court 
having probate jurisdiction. § 1 99· Some of the provisions inure to 
the benefit of the guardian though they are not to the disadvantage of 
the ward. In addition to those already mentioned in this category are 
the provisions relative to court allowance of claims ( § 22 7 )  and the 
approval of expenditures in advance ( §  233) .  Finally several pro­
visions expedite or simplify the administration, or dispense with it 
entirely. See in this connection § §  205, 229, 235 and 237, 
As in the parts dealing with decedents' estates, the statutes of various 
states have sometimes been used as models. None has been used 
more frequently than the Florida Guardianship Law, just enacted, to 
which reference is made in various comments. InCleed, it has been 
somewhat suggestive as to certain sections where no reference was 
made to it. The draft of the act was prepared by a committee of the 
Florida State Bar Association of which D. H. Redfearn was chairman. 
See 1 9  Fla. L.J. 75 (March, 1 945) .  
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
§ 196. Definitions and use of terms. When used in 
Part IV A, unless otherwise apparent from the context : 
(a) A "guardian" is one appointed by a court to have the 
care and custody of the person or of the estate, or of 
both, of an incompetent. 
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(b) A "guardian ad litem" is one appointed by a court, 
in which particular litigation is pending, to represent 
a ward or an unborn person in that particular litigation. 
(c) An "incompetent" is any person who is 
( I ) Under the age of majority, 
( 2)  Incapable by reason of insanity, mental illness, 
imbecility, idiocy, senility, habitual drunken­
ness, excessive use of drugs, or other incapacity, 
of either managing his property or caring for 
himself or both. 
(d) A uward" is an incompetent for whom a guardian has 
been appointed. 
Comment. In large measure this section follows the Florida 
Guardianship Law ( 1 945)  § 744.03. As to "mental illness," see 
Introductory Comment to Part IV. Except for minors, an incom­
petent as defined in this section is one whose incapacity is mental. No 
matter how far a person may be incapacitated physically, he can man­
age his property and care for himself by an agent or servant if his 
mind is unimpaired. If so, he does not need a guardian. However, 
if his mind is such that he is incapable of managing his property or caring 
for himself, he is an incompetent, even though the mental condition 
was caused. by physical disabilities. Statutes providing for guardianship 
for incompetents are commonly regarded as referring to the kind of 
incompetence herein stated. See Matter of Coburn, 1 65 Cal. 202, 
1 3 1  P. 352 ( 1 9 1 3 ) .  But in one case a statute was held to provide 
for guardianship for a person whose incompetence was purely physical 
and for that reason was held to be unconstitutional in that it con­
stituted a deprivation of the right of "enjoying and defending life and 
liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property." Shafer v. 
Haller, 1 08 Ohio St. 322, Lf.O N.E. 5 I 7, 30 A.L.R. I 3 7 8  ( 1 923) .  
In general as to the constitutionality of statutes providing for guardian­
ship of persons under physical disability, see 3 7 Harv. L. Rev. 1 5  I 
( 1 923 ) ; 30 A.L.R. 1 3 8 1 .  
§ 197. Relation of Part IV A to Part IV B.  The pro­
visions of Part IV A hereof shall extend to the persons specifi­
cally provided for under the terms of Part IV B, known as the 
Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act. The provisions of 
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Part IV A shall be cumulative to the provisions of Part IV B ;  
but any conflict arising between Part IV B and the other sec­
tions of Part IV shall be resolved by giving effect to the law as 
stated in Part IV B, in cases to which the latter applies. 
Comment. This section follows closely the form of a section in 
the Florida Guardianship Law ( 1 945 ) § 744.05 . , 
It should be noted that, if Part IV A and Part IV B should, after 
enactment, be amended or revised by the legislature, they would be 
regarded as still having the same relation to each other as is indicated 
in § I 97, unless the legislature should otherwise provide. 
§ 198. Application of other parts of Code. The pro­
visions of Part I hereof, unless therein restricted to decedents' 
estates, apply to guardianships. \Vhere sections in Part III 
are specifically incorporated by reference by any section of 
Part IV they shall be applied as if "decedent" read "ward," 
"personal representative" read "guardian" and the like, as 
the case may be, as far as applicable to guardianships and not 
inconsistent with the provisions of Part IV. In other cases, 
where no rule is set forth for guardianships in Part IV, the rule 
regarding decedents' estates in this Code shall likewise apply 
to guardianships when applicable thereto and not inconsistent 
with the provisions of Part IV, unless a contrary rule of court 
is promulgated or declared as provided by section ro hereof. 
Comment. Statutes regarding guardianships abound with specific 
references adopting the procedure in decedents' estates. For examples 
of more sweeping provisions adopting the decedents' estates law when 
applicable and whe·n there is no specific provision as to guardianship 
procedure, see Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § I 6o6 ; Tex. 
Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 940) art. 4 I o8. 
Of course, when the guardian administers the estate of his deceased 
ward under § 235 hereof, any of the provisions of Part III might be 
applied .to the administration proceedings contemplated by that section, 
provided that such provisions of Part Ill are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of § 235 ·  This application would not be extensive, however, 
due to the relative simplicity of most estates which would be ad­
ministered under § 235· 
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Only a few sections of Part III could possibly come under the pro­
vision of the last sentence of § I 98. In this category are such sections 
as § § 10 1 ,  102, 1 2 1 ,  1 23, 132 (a), I J<f.· 
§ 199. Jurisdiction; non-statutory guardianships abol­
ished. The jurisdiction of the [ ] court over all 
matters of guardianship, other than guardianships ad litem, 
shall be exclusive, subject to the right of appeal. All forms of 
guardianship not expressly provided for in this Code, other 
than guardianships ad litem, are abolished. 
Comment. Chancery and testamentary guardians are abolished 
by this section. See Introductory Comment to Part IV. For original 
and appellate jurisdiction in general, see § § 6,  20 of this Code. 
§ 200. Who may be under guardianship. A guardian 
of the estate may be appointed for any incompetent. A 
guardian of the person may be appointed for any incompetent 
except a married minor who is incompetent solely by reason of 
his minority. 
Comment. The reason why the married minor, who is otherwise 
competent, is not subject to guardianship of the person is that the 
control of such a guardian might interfere with the relationship of 
the married pair and might disrupt the marriage. If a person is 
legally qualified to marry, it should not be necessary to entrust the 
custody of his person to a guardian. Statutes to this effect are com­
mon. See, for example, Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) 
§§ 1433, 1500. On the other hand, in some states, it is provided by 
statute that the guardianship of a female minor terminates on marriage. 
See Ala. Code ( 1 940) t: 2 1 , § 1 34, and Del. Rev. Code ( 1 93 5 )  
§ 4422.  This doubtless proceeds upon the theory that, on marriage, 
the estate, and perhaps also the person, of the female minor comes 
under the control of her husband and this control is inconsistent with 
a guardianship. But in view of modern statutes which largely emanci­
pate the married woman this theory would seem to be obsolete. The 
more logical rule, in view of the position of the married woman in 
modern law, refuses to recognize any guardianship of the person of 
any married minor who is otherwise competent. There is po reason, 
however, why there should not be a guardianship of the estate of a 
married minor, whether male or female, as this does not interfere in 
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any way with the marriage relation. See, for example, Kan. Gen. 
Stat, (Supp. 1 943) § 59-1 8 1 2. See § 234-(a) (2 )  hereof. 
§ 201 .  Venue. 
(a) Proper county. The venue for the appointment of a 
guardian shall be :  
( r ) In the county in this state where the incom­
petent resides ; 
( 2) If the incompetent does not reside in this state, 
then in any county wherein there is any prop­
erty of the incompetent. 
(b) Proceedings in more than one county. If proceed­
ings are commenced in more than one county, they shall be 
stayed except in the county where first commenced until final 
determination of venue in the county where first commenced. 
If the proper venue is finally determined to be in another 
county, the court shall transmit the original file to the proper 
, county. The proceeding shall be deemed commenced by the 
filing of a petition ; and the proceeding first legally commenced 
to appoint a guardian of the estate, or of the person and the 
estate, shall extend to all of the property of the incompetent 
in this state. 
(c) Transfer of proceed�ng. , If it appears to the court 
at any time before the termination of the guardianship that the • 
proceeding was commenced in the wrong county, or that the 
residence of the ward has been changed to another county, or in 
case of guardianship of the estate that it would be for the best 
interest of the ward and his estate, the court, in its discretion, 
may order the proceeding with all papers, files and a certified 
copy of all orders therein transferred to another [ ] 
court which other court shall thereupon proceed to complete 
the proceeding as if originally commenced therein. 
Comment. By this section venue for guardianship depends. on 
actual residence of the ward rather than on his technical domicile. 
Cf. § 6 I as to venue in decedents' estates. In most instances it will 
MODEL PROBATE CODE 
promote the best interests of the ward if the proceeding takes place 
in the county of the state where he actually lives. 
unless he is also the parent, a guardian appointed by the court can­
not change the domicile of his ward to another state. Restatement, 
Conflict of Laws ( I 934) § § 37, 40(e) ; I Beale, Conflict of Laws 
( I 935 )  § §  37 · I, 40·3· 
§ 202. Qualifications of guardian. A parent shall not 
be denied appointment as guardian of the person of a minor 
ward by reason of such parent being under the age of twenty­
one. The [State Welfare Department] or any other public 
department, bureau or agency of this state or any political sub­
division thereof, or any charitable organization of this state, 
which may be charged with the supervision, control or custody 
of the incompetent, may be appointed guardian of the person 
or of the estate or both. With these exceptions no one is quali­
fied to serve as guardian of the person or of the estate who does 
not have the qualifications of a personal representative under 
section 96(b) hereof. No one shall be appointed guardian 
of the person unless he is qualified to have the care and custody, 
and in case of a minor ward to provide for the training and 
education of the ward, and, except as provided in this section, 
unless he is a natural person. 
Comment. See § 2 I o. Most of the states have provisions some­
what similar to the second sentence above, though few are as broad. 
In some states the guardianship by the agency or institution is confined 
to guardianship of the person ; frequently the statutes are silent as to 
whether there may also be guardianship of the estate by the agency or 
institution. Under § § 96 (b) and 203 an official or director of the 
agency or institution may qualify as guardian. Minnesota permits 
the director of social welfare to take possession of the estate if it be 
personal property not exceeding $ I  ,ooo in value. Minn. Stat. ( I  94 I )  
§ 256.93 (amended Laws I 943, c. 6 I 2 ) .  This matter and the 
question of what agencies and institutions are permitted to act as 
guardian may be largely matters of local policy and it may be necessary 
to alter the wording of the second sentence accordingly. Of course, 
if any of the agencies, institutions or their officers are appointed as 
guardian they must comply with the provisions of the Code generally, 
as in case of other appointees, including the provisions as to a bond. 
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In this section the expressions "supervision, control or custody" and 
"care and custody" both appear. One or both of them also appear 
in § §  I 96,  204, 206 J;o 209, 223 and 229. See also § 233  which 
refers to § 207. "Care and custody" indicate the full powers and 
duties of a guardian of the person. See § § I 96, 2 I 9, 220. In ad­
dition, others, including particularly a parent of a minor, may have 
"care and custody" of an incompetent although not appointed guardian. 
In particular cases, the State Welfare Department, or other agency 
or organization may, under the law, have more limited "supervision, 
control or custody" of an incompetent. Of course one who has "care 
and custody" of an incompetent would always have "supervision, con­
trol or custody," but the reverse would not necessarily be true. The 
words "which may be charged with" immediately preceding "the super­
vision, control or custody" in § 202 indicate agencies and organizations 
which, under the law, are directed or authorized to act with reference 
to the incompetent, regardless of whether the agency or organization 
has or has not so acted as to the incompetent. See § §  207, 208, 209. 
Cf. §§ 204, 2o6, 223, 229. 
§ 203. Preference in granting letters. The parents of 
an unmarried minor, or either of them, if qualified, shall be 
preferred over all others for appointment as guardian of the 
person. Subject to this rule, the court shall appoint as guard­
ian of an incompetent the one most suitable who is willing to 
serve, having due regard to : (a) any request for the appoint­
ment contained in a will or other written instrument executed 
by the parent for the appointment as gl,lardian of his minor 
child ; (b) any request made by a minor of the age of fourteen 
years or over for the appointment as his guardiazi ; (c) any re­
quest for the appointment made by the spouse of an incom­
petent ; (d) the relationship by blood or marriage to the 
person for whom guardianship is sought. 
Comment. In many states the statutes provide that a surviving 
parent may nominate a guardian for his minor child by will, or by 
will or deed. See Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 937 )  § 1 0507-13. See 
§ I 99 and Introductory Comment to Part IV as to testamentary 
guardians. Another type of statute, which is almost universal, permits 
a ininor over the age of fourteen years to nominate his own guardian 
subject to the approval of the court. See, for example, .Ariz. Code 
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( 1 939) § 42-102 .  Some. statutes indicate an order of preference 
to be followed by the court in appointing a guardian. Thus, it is 
sometimes provided that parents are to be pre�rred. See Cal. Prob. 
Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § I 407· Or a preference has been ac­
corded to the person of nearest relationship. See Ala. Code ( I  940) 
t. 2 I ,  §§ 6, 23· 
Under the first sentence of § 203 the court should appoint the 
parent as guardian of the person if he is qualified and application is 
made for his appointment. See § § 202, 2 I o. In all other cases, the 
welfare of the ward is the sole consideration. This section does not 
require the appointment of the person named in the parent's will nor 
does it establish any other order of preference. The four factors named 
in (a) to (d) should be considered by the court, but they are not to 
be considered in any particular order of priority, nor to the exclusion 
of other factors, such as the religious faith and race of the proposed 
guardian of the person and the incompetent. While, if the incom­
petent's estate is small the court probably will endeavor to select one 
person to act as both guardian of the person and of the estate, some 
factors may be of greater weight in the selection of a guardian of the 
person than in the selection of a guardian of the estate or vice versa. 
See generally, comment, 33 Cal. L. Rev. 306 ( I 945 ) ·  
§ 204. Petition for appointment of guardian. Any 
interested person may file a petition for the appointment of 
himself or some other qualified person as guardian of an incom­
petent. Such petition shall state : 
(a) The name, age, residence, and post office address of 
the incompetent; 
(b) The nature of his incapacity in accordance with the 
classification set forth in section 1 9 6 (c) hereof; 
(c) The approximate value and description of his prop­
erty, including any compensation, pension, insurance 
or allowance to which he may be entitled ; 
(d) Whether there is, in any state, a guardian for the per­
son or estate of the incompetent ; 
(e) The residence and post office address of the person 
whom petitioner asks to be appointed guardian; 
(f) The names and addresses, so far as known or can rea­
sonably be ascertained, of the persons most closely re- · 
lated by blood or marriage to the incompetent ; 
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(g) The name and address of the person or institution 
having the care and custody of the incompetent ; 
(h) The names and addresses of wards for whom any 
natural person whose appointment is sought is already 
guardian; 
(i) The reasons why the appointment of a guardian is 
sought and the interest of the petitioner in the appoint­
ment. 
Comment. This section is patterned to some extent after the 
Florida Guardianship Law ( 1 945 ) § 744.30. As to the manner of 
entitling the petition and subsequent papers and of designating the 
nature of the incapacity, see Introductory Comment to Part IV. 
§ 205. Single guardianship for two or more incom­
petents. When application is made for the appointment of a 
guardian for two or more incompetents who are children of a 
common parent, or are parent and child, or are husband and 
wife, it shall not be necessary that a �eparate petition, bond or 
other paper be filed for each incompetent and the guardianship 
of all may be considered as one proceeding except that there 
shall be a separate final accounting when the guardianship 
terminates as to one ward but not as to the others. 
Comment. This section is based on S. D.-Code ( 1 939) § 35 . 1 802. 
Cf. Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. (Deering, 'I 944) § If40. 
§ 206. Participation by [State Welfare Department.] 
The [ State Welfare Department] of this state may petition 
the court for the appointment or removal of any guardian of 
the person or of the estate, and may appear as a party in any 
hearing involving a guardianship. It may a.t any time investi­
gate and report to the court concerning the care and custody of 
a ward and the fitness and conduct of his guardian, and shall 
make such investigation and report whenever ordered to do so 
by the court. 
Comment. Cf. Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 259.02 as to notification 
of the director of social welfare as a step in the adoption of minors . 
. As stated in the comment to § 202, local policy may demand some 
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alteration of the details concerning notice to, and participation by, 
social agencies. 
§ 207. Notice of hearing on petition for guardianship. 
Before appointing a guardian other than a temporary guardian, 
notice of hearing shall be served upon the following unless 
they have signed the petition for appointment of the guardian 
or have waived notice of the hearing: 
(a) The incompetent, if over fourteen years of age; 
(b) The parents if the incompetent is a minor, and the 
spouse of the incompetent, if any; 
(c) Any other person who has been appvinted guardian, 
or the person having the care and custody of the incom­
petent, if any; 
(d) At least one of the closest adult relatives of the incom­
petent by blood or marriage; 
(e) If directed by the court, 
( 1 ) Any department, bureau or agency of the 
United States or of this state or any political 
subdivision thereof, which makes or awards 
compensation, pension, insurance or other al­
lowance for the benefit of the ward's estate; 
( 2) Any department, bureau or agency of this state 
or any political subdivision thereof or any 
charitable organization of this state, which may 
be charged with the supervision, control or cus­
tody of the incompetent ; 
(3) Any interested person. 
If the incompetent is over fourteen years of age, there shall be 
p�rs.Qn�b�tvice upon him if personal service can be had. Serv­
ic(i'l.-9n others may be had in accordance with section 14 hereof. 
The court for good cause shown may reduce the number of days 
of notice, but in every case at least three days' notice shall be 
given. It shall not be necessary that the person for whom 
guardianship is sought shall be represented by a guardian ad 
litem in the proceedings. 
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Comment. Cf. Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § §  144 1 ,  
146 1 ;  Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .55 ; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 937)  
§ 1 0507-4· Under this section the court may require notice to the 
State Welfare Department. See § § 206, 208, 209. Service on the 
parent or the spouse, and in many cases on the person having care 
and custody of the incompetent, would obviate compliance with service 
· in accordance with (d) above. Of course, under (e) (3)  the court 
could always order service on any particular person. 
§ 208. What perso�s to receive notice of other hearings. 
Whenever notice of a hearing in a guardianship proceeding is 
required, notice of hearing shall be served upon the following 
who do not appear or waive notice of the hearing: 
(a) The guardian of the person ; 
(b) The guardian of the estate ; 
(c) If directed by the court, 
( 1 ) Any department, bureau or agency of the 
United States or of this state or any political 
subdivision thereof, which makes or awards 
compensation, pension, insurance or other al­
lowance for the benefit of the ward's estate ; 
( 2)  Any department, bureau or agency of this state 
or any political subdivision thereof or any 
charitable organization of this state, which may 
be charged with the supervision, control or cus­
tody of the incompetent. 
( 3 )  Any interested person. 
Comment. Sections 207 and 233 provide specially for service of 
notice of hearing on petition for guardianship and notice of hearing upon 
accounts. Otherwise § 1 4  applies as to manner of service. 
§ 209. Request for special notice of hearings. At any 
time after the issuance of letters of guardianship, 
(a) Any department, bureau or agency of the United 
States or of this state or any political subdivision there­
of, which makes or awards compensation, pension, in­
surance or other allowance for the benefit of the ward's 
estate, or 
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(b) Any department, bureau or agency of this state or any 
political subdivision thereof or any charita,ble organi­
zation of this state, which may be charged with the 
supervision, control or custody of the incompetent, or 
(c) Any interested person 
may, in person or by attorney, serve upon the guardian or upon 
his attorney, and file with the clerk of the court where the pro­
ceedings are pending, with a written admission or proof of 
service, a written request stating that he desires written notice 
of all hearings on petitions for the settlement of accounts, for 
the sale, mortgage, lease or exchange of any property of the 
estate, for allowances of any nature payable from the ward's 
estate, for the investment of funds of the estate, or for the 
removal, suspension, or discharge of the guardian or final ter­
mination of the guardianship. The applicant for such notice 
must include in his written request his post office address or 
that of his attorney. Unless the court otherwise directs, upon 
filing the request, the person shall be entitled to notice of all 
such hearings or of such of them as he designates in his request. 
Comment. This is analogous to § 67  hereof. It is based .on 
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § r6oo. 
§ 210. Proof required for appointment of guardian. 
Before appointing a guardian the court must be satisfied : 
(a) That the person for whom a guardian is prayed is 
either a minor or otherwise incompetent ; 
(b) That a guardianship is desirable to protect the interests 
of the incompetent ; 
(c) That the person to be appointed guardian is qualified 
and is the person most suitable to act as such under 
this Code. 
Comment. As to who is qualified and most suitable to act as 
guardian, see § § 202, 203. 
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§ 2 1 1. Determination of incompetency. No guardian 
of the person or of the estate, or of both, of .any person other 
than a minor, can be appointed until such person has been aq­
judicated to be incompetent upon sufficient competent evi\lence 
in a proceeding instituted for that purpose as provided by law. 
Comment. This section assumes that there will be separate pro­
visions for adjudication of incompetency and for commitment to in­
stitutions. See Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § §  525 .75 to 525 .7 9  (amended 
Laws 1 943, c. 6 1 2 ;  Laws 1 945, c. 425, 490, 567 ) ; 1 3th Ann. Rep. 
Jud. Council of Mich. ( 1 943) 5 7 ;  14th id. ( 1 944) 5 ;  also the pro­
vision of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act ( § 2 5 5  of this 
Code) .  While probate or similar courts are commonly given such 
jurisdiction, it involves matters quite distinct froni the appointment of 
a guardian. Thus, a person may well be committed to an institution 
because of minor mental derangements, and yet it may not be desirable 
either to put him under guardianship or to adjudicate him to be insane. 
Likewise, statutes should provide specifically for his release from such 
an institution ; but those provisions should be distin·� from general . 
guardianship provisions, although they may be included in the same 
probate code. 
§ 212. Order appointing guardian. If on the hearing 
the court is satisfied that the requirements for the appointment 
of a guardian as set forth in this Code are proved, the court shall 
appoint one or two guardians of the person or of the estate or 
both ; but not more than one guardian of the person shall be 
appointed unless they be husband and wife. The order shall 
specify the amount of the bond to be given. 
Comment. The copy of the order furnished to the guardian could 
include the provisions of § 2 I 9 so that the guardian may be informed 
in a general way of his duties. This practice might be established by 
rule of court. 
§ 213. Bond of guardian. If the guardianship be of the 
person only, the amount of the bond·shall not exceed $ r ,ooo, 
or the court may dispense with the bond altogether. At every 
accounting the court shall inquire into the sufficiency of the 
202 MODEL PROBATE CODE 
bond and of the sureties, and if either or both are found insuf­
ficient the guardian shall be ordered to file a new bond. If by 
the terms of a will the testator expresses the wish that no bond 
be required of the person whom he requests to be ·appointed 
guardian, that person may be relieved of giving a guardian's 
bond so far as it applies to property given by the will to the in­
competent subject to the conditions specified in section I07 (a) 
hereof. Sections ro6 to I I 8 inclusive hereof with respect to 
the bonds of personal representatives shall be applicable to the 
bonds of guardians. 
Comment. The bond is for the protection of the ward and his 
creditors, and also the ward's distribatees if the guardian administers 
his deceased ward's estate under § 235 .  Under the last sentence the 
amount of the bond is determined in the same manner as the bond of 
a personal representative. As to the testamentary request that no bond 
shall be required, d. Ala. Code ( I 940) t. 2 I ,  § §  2 9, 30. As to time 
limitations in actions upon the guardian's bond, see § 236 of this Code 
with which compare § I I 9· 
§ 214. When letters to be issued. When a duly ap­
pointed guardian has given such bond as may be required and 
the bond has been approved by the court, letters under the 
seal of the court shall be issued to him. 
§ 215. Temporary guardian. If the court finds that the 
welfare of an incompetent requires the immediate appoint­
ment of a guardian of his person or of his estate, or of both, it 
may, with or without notice, appoint a temporary guardian for 
the incompetent for a specified period not to exceed sixty days, 
and remove or discharge him or terminate the trust. The ap­
·pointment may be to perform duties respecting specific prop:-: 
erty or to perform particular acts, as stated in the order of 
appointment. The temporary guardian shall make such re­
ports as the court shall direct, and shall account to the court 
upon termination of his authority. In other respects the pro­
visions of this Code concerning guardians shall apply to tempo-
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rary guardians and an appeal may be taken from the order of 
appointment of a temporary guardian. 
Comment. It will be noted that under § 2 o (b) no appeal is 
allowed from the order appointing a special administrator, while an 
appeal is specifically permitted by the terms of § 2 I 5 from the order 
appointing a temporary guardian. The reasons for preventing an 
improper person from acting as the temporary guardian of the person 
and estate are more cogent than in the decedent's estate situation where 
the delay caused by appeals overrides the considerations as to whether 
the special administrator selected was a proper on\!. In this regard 
§ 2o (b) does not apply to temporary guardianships under § I 98 and 
by their terms § §  20(c) and 2o(d) do not apply in any way to 
guardianships. So far as may be, other provisions of § 20 apply to 
appeals in all guardianship matters under § I 98. 
The above section is suggested by Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. I 944) 
c. 20 I ,  § I 4, but differs in important particulars. A number of states 
have no provision for special or temporary guardians. Doubtless this 
is due to the fact that the guardian ad litem often se:rves the purpose 
of a temporary guardian. In ·California and the states whose legis­
lation usually follows California guardians are classified as general 
or special, the former referring to the general guardian of the estate 
or of the person or both, the latter to all other guardians. Cal. Prob. 
Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § I 40 r .  Michigan allows appointment 
of a special guardian pending any application for appointment of gen­
eral guardian or litigation with reference thereto. Mich. Stat. Ann. 
( I  94 3) § 2 7 .  3 I 7 8 ( 2 I I ) .  Minnesota allows a special guardian to be 
appointed with or without notice "upon a showing of necessity or 
expediency." Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 525 .5 9 1 .  In Texas either a 
receiver of any incompetent or a temporary guardian of a minor may 
be appointed until a regular guardian qualifies. Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
( I 94o) art. 4 1 29, 4 I 34· See § I o5 of the Model Probate Code 
as to special administrators. While there is doubtless less need for a 
temporary guardian than for a special administrator, there are some 
occasions where there should be a temporary guardian. 
§ 216. When guardian may be removed. When a 
minor ward has attained the age of fourteen years, the guard- . 
ian of his person may be removed on petition of the ward to 
have another person appointed guardian if it is for the best in­
terests of the ward that such other persons be appointed. A 
guardian may also be removed on the same grounds and in the 
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same manner as is provided in section 98 hereof for the re­
moval of a personal representative. 
§ 217. Appointment of successor guardian. When a 
guardian dies, is removed by order of the court, or resigns and 
such resignation is accepted by the court, the court may appoint 
another guardian in his place in the same manner and subject 
to the same requirements as are herein provided for an original 
appointment of a guardian. · 
Comment. Sections 2 I 6 and 2 I 7 correspond to § § 98  and 99· 
Section 2 I 6 adds the additional provision as to the minor fourteen 
years of age who wants a different guardian. 
§ 218. Inventory and appraisement. When a guardian 
of the estate has been appointed, an inventory and appraise­
ment of the ward's estate shall be made in the same manner and 
subject to the same requirements as are provided in section 1 20 
hereof for the inventory and appraisement of a decedent's 
estate. 
§ 219. General duties of guardian. 
(a) Guardian of the person. . It is the duty of the guard­
ian of the person to care for and maintain the ward and, if he is 
a minor, to see that he is properly trained and educated and 
that he has the opportunity to learn a trade, occupation or pro­
fession. The guardian of the pefson may be required to report 
the condition of his ward to the court, at regular intervals or 
otherwise as the court may direct. 
(b) Guardian of the estate. It is the duty of the guard­
ian of the estate to protect and preserve it, to invest it pru­
dently, to apply it as provided in this Code, to account for it 
faithfully, to perform all other duties required by him by law, 
and, at the termination of the guardianship, to deliver the assets 
of the ward to the persons entitled thereto. Except as other­
wise provided in Part IV hereof, the law of trusts shall apply as 
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far as may be in determining the duties of a guardian of the 
estate. 
Comment. Except for the last sentence, this section is based upon 
the Florida Guardianship taw ( I945 ) § §  744.48 and 744.5 1 .  For 
other types of statutes stating duties of guardians, see Minn. Stat. 
( I  94 I )  § 5 2  5 .  56  and Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § I 5 oo 
and following. As to the last sentence of subsection (b) ,  see Intro­
ductory Comment to Part IV. Contrasting with the trustee, how­
ever, the guardian does not have title to the ward's property. See 
§ 22 I and comment thereto. 
Under subsection (a) , the guardian of the person must see that 
the child is maintained from the guardian's personal funds if necessary. 
If the guardian of the person is the parent, or stands in loco parentis, 
the ward's estate cannot be used for maintenance except as directed 
by the court under § 224 (b) . If the guardian of the person is neither 
the parent, nor a person standing in loco parentis, the ward's property 
may be used for his maintenance under § 224(a) ; see also § 223. · 
Of course, under subsection (a) and § 220 when a guardian of , 
the person of a minor is appointed, other than the parent, the parent's 
right of custody ceases. However, the guardian of the estate, as such, 
has no rights or duties relative to the custody of the ward. See § 22 1 .  
§ 220. Powe:�;s of guardian of the person; custody. 
The guardian of the person shall be entitled to the custody of 
the ward, but shall not have power to bind the ward or his 
property. 
Comment. This is modeled after Florida Guardianship L;tw 
( I 945)  § 744·49· 
§ 221 .  Title and possession of estate. The guardian of 
the estate shall take possession of all of the ward's real and 
personal property, and of rents, income, issues and profits 
therefrom, whether accruing before or after his appointment, 
and of the proceeds arising from the sale, mortgage, lease or 
exchange thereof. Subject to such possession, the title to all 
such estate, and to the increment and proceeds thereof, shall 
be in the ward and not in the guardian. 
Comment. The first sentence follows the Florida Guardianship 
Law ( 1945) § 744.52. The second sentence states the common-law 
206 MODEL PROBATE CODE 
rule as to title. Woerner, Guardianship ( 1 897 )  § 53· See Intro­
ductory Comment to Part IV. Cf. § §  84, 1 24 of this Code. As to 
actions, see § 228 .  
§ 222. Continuation of business. In all cases where 
the cou�t deems it advantageous to continue the business of a 
ward, such business may be continued by the guardian of the 
estate on order of the court and according to the rules specified ' 
in section I 3 I hereof for the continuation of the business of a 
decedent by a personal representative when no testamentary 
provisions are involved. 
§ 223. Order for periodic allowance. The guardian of 
the estate, or the person, department, bureau, agency or chari­
table organization having the care and custody of a ward may 
apply to the court for an order directing the guardian of the 
estate to pay to the person, department, bureau, agency or 
charitable organization, having the care and custody of the 
ward, or if the guardian of the estate has the care and custody 
of the ward, directing the guardian of the <!state to apply, an 
amount weekly, monthly, quarterly, semi-annually or an­
nually, as the court may direct, to be expended in the care, 
maintenance and education of the ward and of his dependents. 
In proper cases the court may order payment of amounts di­
rectly to the ward for his maintenance or incidental expenses. 
The amounts authorized under this section may be decreased 
or increased from time to time by direction of the court. If 
payments are made to another under such order of the court, 
the guardian of the estate is not bound to see to the application 
thereof. 
Comment. This section is largely based on the Florida Guardian­
ship Law ( 1 945 ) § 744·50· Under § 6 of the Model Probate Code 
the court may require any person to whom an allowance is paid to 
account therefor. If the guardian of the estate applies the allowance, 
his regular accounting will cover this matter. See § 233 hereof. 
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§ 224. Application of income and principal for benefit 
of ward. 
(a) Income and principal; or�er of court. So far as is 
necessary for the purpose except as provided in subsection (b) 
hereof, the income of the ward's estate shall be first applied to 
his care, maintenance and education. On order of the court, 
any surplus of the income may be applied to the care, mainte­
nance and education of the dependents of the ward. If the in­
come is not sufficient to care for, maintain and educate the ward 
and his dependents, the court may order the expenditure of 
such portion of the principal as it deems necessary from time 
to time for such purposes. 
(b) When parents able to care for ward. If the ward 
is a minor, and his parents or those standing in loco parentis 
are able to care for, maintain and educate him, neither the in­
.come nor the principal shall be expended for any purpose ex­
cept as ordered by the court. 
Comment. This section is based to some extent upon § 7 44.64 
of the Florida Guardianship Law ( I  94 5 ) .  In cases coming under 
subsection (b) the compensation and necessary expenses of the guardian 
will of course be ordered by the court. See § 232 hereof. 
To the effect that a guardian who stands in loco parentis must 
ordinarily support the ward though the ward has property of his own, 
see Horton's Appeal, 94 Pa. St. 62 ( I  88o) ; annotation, 64 A.L.R. 
692, 694. As to when the guardian is deemed to stand in loco parentis, 
see also Shuey's Estate, I Pa. Super. 405 ( I  896) ; cf. State ex rei. 
Hickey v. Freeman, 146 Tenn. 304, 24 I  S.W. 98 ( 1 92 1 ) .  
§ 225. Investments. The guardian of the estate shall 
invest the property of the ward in accordance with the rules ap­
plicable to investments of trust estates by trustees, except that: 
(a) No investment shall be made without prior order of 
the court in any property other than unconditional 
interest-bearing obligations of this state or of the 
United States and in obligations the interest and 
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principal of which are unconditionally guaranteed by 
the United States; 
(b) In all cases the guardian must report in writing his 
purchase or sale of any trust investment on the date 
thereof; 
(c) If it is for the best interests of the ward that his specific 
property be used by the ward rather than sold and the 
proceeds invested, the court may so order. 
Comment. Practically all states have permissive or restrictive pro­
visions regarding trust investments and, in a majority of states, the 
lists go into considerable detail. 3 Bogert, Trusts ( 1 935)  § §  6 u-
663. Dependent on the judicial interpretation of the language of the 
statute, the list may be exclusive, or the trustee may be authorized to 
invest in other securities if he uses ordinary skill and prudence. 
3 Bogert, Trusts ( 1 935) § 6 14. See Restatement, Trusts ( 1 935) 
§ 22 7 for a statement of  the trust investment rule in absence of  statute. 
The above § 225  of this Code would apply the law of trust invest­
ments in the particular state, whether common law, statutory or both, 
,to investments by guardians, subject, however, to the three exceptions 
expressed in § 225 .  See Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act (§  250 
of this Code) . In accord with this general principle, some states have 
statutes in which the rule as to trustees applies equally to guardians. 
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1 944) § 10506-41 .  In other states 
there are special provisions relative to guardians' investments. III. 
Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 ) c. 3, § 4 1 3 ;  Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
(Vernon, 1 940 and Supp. 1 944) art. 41 80-4 1 82.  · 
§ 226. Purchase of home. The court may authorize the 
purchase of real property in which the guardian has no interest, 
but such purchase can be made only for a home for the ward, or 
to protect the home of the ward or his interest, or, if he is 
• �at a minor, as a home for his depende]lt family. Such pur­
' chlse of real property shall not be made except upon order of 
the court after notice in accordance with section 14 hereof. 
Comment. This is similar to the Florida Guardianship Law 
( 1 945 ) § 745.03. Compare, also, the Uniform Veterans' Guardian­
ship Act ( §  252  of this Code ) .  
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§ 227. Claims. 
(a) Duty of guardian to pay. A guardian of the estate 
Is under a duty to pay from the estate all just claims against the 
estate of his ward, whether they constitute liabilities of the 
ward which arose prior to the guardianship or liabilities prop­
erly incurred by the guardian for the benefit of the w'ard or his 
estate and whether arising in contract or in tort or otherwise, 
upon allowance of the claim by the court or upon approval of 
the court in a settlement of the guardian's accounts. The duty 
of the guardian to pay from the estate shall not prec1ude his 
personal liability for his own contracts and acts made and per­
formed on behalf of the estate as it exists according to the 
common law. If it appears that the estate is likely to be ex.:. 
hausted before all existing claims are paid, preference shall be 
given to prior claims for the care, maintenance and education 
of the ward and of his dependents and existing claims for ex­
penses of administration over dther claims. 
(b) Claims may be presented. Any person having a 
claim against the estate of a ward, or against the guardian of his 
estate as such, may file it with the court for determination at 
any time before it is barred by the statute of limitations, and, 
upon proof thereof, procure an order for its allowance and 
payment from the estate. Any action against the guardian of 
the estate as such shall be deemed a claim duly filed. 
(c) When decedents' estate law applicable. The pro­
visions of sections I 3 7, I 44 and I 46 hereof as to claims against 
decedents' estates shall be applicable to claims against estates 
under guardianship, but other provisions regarding claims 
against -decedents' estates shall not apply to estates under 
- guardianship. 
Comment. Under this section a guardian may pay a claim with­
out allowance but he does so at his peril. If he has doubt as to whether 
the court will allow the claim he should withhold payment until the 
creditor procures allowance of the claim or until the guardian's next 
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accounting. See § 2 33 (a) hereof. The allowance of_..a claim is 
binding upon all persons except that, as between guardian and ward, 
the latter is permitted to question these as well as other items of the 
account at any time within two years after the guardian's discharge. 
See § 233 (b) . 
In some states claims against an estate under guardianship are 
handled in much the same way as claims against the estate of a decedent. 
There is a publication of notice to creditors ; creditors are requireq to 
tile their claims ; and there is a short nonclaim period after which 
claims which have not been filed are barred. See Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) 
§ 3 I 9.4 1 .  Such provisions are believed to be undesirable. In the case 
of the detedent's estate, presumably there will be no more creditors 
and no more assets. It is a matter of distributing immediately once 
and for all as fairly as possible the assets of the dead man. The estate 
under guardianship is a continuing thing, and more creditors or more 
assets may come in from time to time. Moreover, if the estate under 
guardianship is insolvent, the bankruptcy laws apply to secure a fair 
distribution to creditors. Glenn, Liquidation ( 1 935 )  § §  36, 38 .  In 
the case of the insolvent decedent's estate, the rules for the administra­
tion of decedents' estates commonly provide the only method of insur­
ing fair treatment to all creditors. Glenn, Liquidation ( I  9 35) § I 4 3 ;  
cf. Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 932) c. 2 1 6, § 30. Thus, there is no oc­
casion for a nonclaim statute for an estate under guardianship. In 
general, creditors of the estate under guardianship stand in the same 
position as creditors of a living person who is not under guardianship. 
However, they may file their claims if they so desire ; they cannot 
reach the estate by levy, attachment or garnishment and they should 
sue the guardian as such. See § 228 hereof. In accord with the law 
in some states, in case of insolvency of a ward of unsound minJ the 
law recognizes a preference for claims even for future maintenance 
and support of the ward and his family, as against other general 
creditors. Adams v. Thomas, 8 1  N.C. 296 ( I 879) ; cf. Matter of 
Application of Otis, I O I  N.Y. s 8o, 5 N.E. 5 7 1  ( z 886) .  No 
precedent is found for imposing liability upon the guardian in bank­
ruptcy proceedings on account of following such direction as is laid 
down in the last sentence of subsection (a) . Indeed, some guardian­
ship statutes indicate that the law of decedents' estates applies as to 
priority in payment of debts. Colo. Stat. ( 1 935 )  c. I 76, § I 96. See 
generally Comment, 24 Va. L. Rev. 643 ( I 938 ) .  
§ 228. Actions. 
(a) Guardian to sue and be sued. When there is a 
grtardian of the estate, all actions between the ward or the 
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guardian and third persons in which it is sought to charge or 
benefit the estate of the ward shall be prosecuted by or against 
the guardian of the estate as such. He shall represent the in­
terests of the ward in the action and all process shall be served 
on him. 
(b) Joinder, amendment and substitution. When the 
guardian of the estate is under personal liability for his own 
contracts and acts made and performed on behalf of the estate 
he may be sued both as guardian and in his personal capacity 
in the same action. Misnomer or the bringing of the action 
by or against the ward shall not be ground for dismissal of the 
action and leave to amend or substitute shall be freely granted. 
If an action was commenced by or against the incompetent be­
fore the appointment of a guardian of his estate, svch guardian 
when appointed may be substituted as a party for the incom­
petent. If the appointment o� the guardian of the estate is 
terminated, his successor may be substituted; if the ward dies, 
his personal representative may be substituted; if the ward be­
comes competent, he may be substituted. 
(c) Garnishment, attachment and execution. When 
there is a guardian of the estate, the property and rights of ac­
tion of the ward shall not be subject to garnishment or attach­
ment, and execution shall not issue to obtain satisfaction of any 
judgment against the ward or the guardian of his estate as 
such. 
Comment. As to subsection (a) cf. Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deer­
ing, 1 94-4) § 1 208 ; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 93 7 )  § I 05Q]-I 8 ;  
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 1 7 . There has been much confusion 
in the various states as to the proper party to sue or be sued in case 
of guardianship. Woerner, Guardianship ( 1 897) § § 5 8, 5 9· From 
the practical standpoint it makes little difference whether the guardian 
or the ward or both are formally named as parties. Any definite rule 
would be practically as desirable as any other. The Code selects the 
guardian because he should, in any event, represent the ward's interest 
in the actioh. 
Subsection (a) applies regardless of whether the action arises out 
of transactions involving the ward directly or transactions by the 
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guardian. However, under § 227 a guardian may be sued personally 
as to the latter, and a creditor may sue the guardian in both capacities 
in a single action under subsection (b) above. 
If there is no guardian of the estate the usual rule is that actions 
for the incompetent are brought in the infant's name by next friend and 
actions against him are managed by a guardian ad litem selected by 
the court in which the action is commenced. These persons are in no 
sense guardians of the estate and are not entitled to receive the pro­
ceeds of the judgment. Their authority terminates when the judgment 
becomes final. Woerner, Guardianship ( I 8 9 7 )  § 2 2. The Code does 
not disturb the local practice in this regard. 
The authorities are divided as to whether garnishment, attachment 
or execution may be employed in an action against an estate under 
guardianship. Most of the decisions deny the right on the basis that 
the estate is in custodia legis. Annotation, 92 A.L.R. 9 I 9· Creditors' 
rights are adequately protected by action on the guardian's bond or 
probate court order for allowance and payment of claims. See § § 2 I 3, 
227 (b) . Cf. § I 45 ·  When the guardian incurs personal liability 
as the result of his own transactions relative to the ward's estate and 
judgment is obtained against him in his personal capacity, the creditor 
may obtain execution from the personal assets of the guardian. See 
§ 227 and comment. 
§ 229. Compromise. 
(a) By guardian. Whenever it is proposed to com­
promise or settle any claim by or against the ward or the guard­
ian as such, whether arising as a result of personal injury or 
otherwise, and whether arising before or after appointment of 
a guardian, the court on petition of the guardian of the estate, 
if satisfied that such compromise or settlement will be for the 
best interests of the ward, may enter an order authorizing the 
settlet;nent or compromise to be made. 
(b) By parent. Whenever a minor has a disputed claim, 
whether arising as a result of personal injury or otherwise, 
and no guardian of his estate has been appointed, his father, 
or if his father is dead or the parents of the minor are living 
separate or apart and his mother then has the care and custody 
of the minor, then his mother shall have the right to com­
promi�e or settle such claim, but before the compromise or set-
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dement is  valid, i t  must be approved by the court upon the 
filing of a petition. If the court approves the compromise or 
settlement, it may direct that the money be paid over in ac­
cordance with th� provisions of section 237 hereof, or may re­
quire that a guardian of the estate be appointed and that the 
money be delivered to such guardian. 
· 
Comment. See Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 937 )  § 1 0507-19 
for a similar provision. In this section "court, refers to the court 
having probate jurisdiction regardless of whether or not litigation on 
the claim is pending in another court. When litigation is pending in 
another court there are provisions in some states that small claims of 
a minor for whose estate no guardian has been appointed may be 
compromised and paid over for the minor's benefit by order of the 
court in which the litigation is pending. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, § 980-a; 
N.Y. Rules Civ. Prac., Rule 294· Pa. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 2039 
in 332 Pa. lxxxviii. Such provisions seem desirable but they belong 
in the code of civil procedure rather than in a probate code. See § 237 
and comment. 
§ 230. Sales, mortgages, leases and exchanges. 
(a) When permitted. The real or personal property of 
the ward, or any part thereof, may be sold, mortgaged, leased 
or exchanged by the guardian of the estate upon such terms as 
the court may order for the purpose of paying the ward's debts, 
providing for his care, maintenance and education and the care, 
maintenance and education of his dependents, investing the 
proceeds or in any other case where it is for the best interests 
of the ward. 
(b) Guardian forbidden to purchase. No guardian 
shall purchase property of the ward, unless sold at public sale 
with the approval of the court, and then only if the guardian 
is a spouse, parent, child, brother or sister of the ward and is a 
cotenant with the ward in the property. 
(c) What decedents' estate law applicable. In other 
respects, the provisions of sections 1 54, 1 56 to 1 67 inclusive, 
I 70 and r. 7 r hereof, relative to decedents' estates apply to 
sales, mortgages, leases and exchanges of property of the ward. 
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Comment. Subsection (b) is taken from the Florida Guardian­
ship Law ( 1 945 ) § 745 . 1 4 ;  cf. § 1 5 5  of this Code. 
§ 231 .  Sale of ward's property not an ademption. In 
case of the guardian's sale or other transfer of any real or per­
sonal property specifically devised by the ward, who was com­
petent at the time when he made the will but was incompetent 
at the time of the sale or transfer and never regained com­
petency, so that the devised property is not contained in the 
estate at the time of the ward's death, the devisee may at his 
option take the value of the. property at the time of the ward's 
death with the incidents of a general devise, or the proceeds 
thereof with the incidents of a specific devise. 
Comment. Cf. 5 3  & 54 Viet., c. 5, § 1 23 ( 1 ) ; N.Y. Civ. Prac. 
Act, § 1 402 ; Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) § 394.360. The Kentucky 
statute purports to give the value of any adeemed devise to the devisee 
if he is an heir of the testator. The Model Probate Code does not 
deal with this more general proposition but proceeds upon the theory 
that the remedy for the usual ademption situation lies in greater liber­
ality by the courts in holding that devises are general or demonstrative 
rather than specific. See Introduction to this Code under "Omitted 
Matters." When the testator becomes incompetent, however, it seems 
unfair that acts of his guardian should work an ademption when the 
incompetent has no opportunity to remedy the situation by making a 
fresh will. The option given to the devisee in the above situation will 
prevent him �rom being totally disappointed in most cases where there 
are assets payable to devisees. If he chooses to take the value of the 
property the devise will abate as a general devise ; if he can trace the 
proceeds and chooses to do so the devise will abate as a specific devise. 
As to abatement generally, see § 1 84. 
§ 232. Compensation of guardian and attorney. A 
guardian shall be allowed such compensation for his services 
as guardian, as the court shall deem just and reasonable. Ad­
ditional compensation may be allowed for his necessary services 
as attorney and for other necessary services not required 
of a guardian. He may also be allowed compensation for 
necessary expenses in the administration of . his trust)· 
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including reasonable attorney's fees if the employment of an 
attorney for the particular purpose is necessary. In all cases, 
compensation of the guardian and his expenses including at­
torney's fees shall be fixed by the court and may be allowed at · 
any annual or final accounting; but at any time during the ad­
mini?tration of the estate, the guardian or his attorney may 
apply to the court for an allowance upon the compensation or 
necessary expenses of the �ardian and for attorney's fees for 
services already performed. If the court finds that the guard­
ian has failed to discharge his duties as such in any respect, it 
may deny him any compensation whatsoever or may reduce the 
compensation which would otherwise be allowed. 
Comment. If it were desired to limit the guardian's ordinary 
compensation to a definite percentage of the income of the estate, the 
provisions of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act ( § 249 of 
this Code) are suggestive. The limitations there provided might be 
enacted by rule of court. Compare § 1 03 as to compensation of the 
personal representative and his attorney. No attempt has been made 
in § 232 to permit a testator to limit the compensation of a guardian. 
The situations in a decedent's estate and an incompetent's estate are 
not analogous in this regard. It would seem to be against public policy 
in all cases to permit a testator to restrict a guardian's fees, as the selec­
tion of the guardian should be determined by the best interests of the 
living ward and in order to secure a proper guardian the court should 
not be limited by any fixed amount in the allowance of reasonable 
compensation to the guardian. The same considerations seem to in­
dicate the desirability of not fixing any definite statutory limitation as 
to amount of the guardian's compensation. 
§ 233. Accounting. 
(a) Guardian to account. Unless otherwise directed by 
the court, every guardian of the estate shall file with the court 
annually within thirty days after the anniversary date of his 
appointment, and also within thirty days after termination of 
his appointment, a written verified account of his administra­
tion. Notice of hearing of every accounting shall be given to 
the same persons and in the same manner as is required by sec-:-
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tion 207 hereof for notice of the petition for the appointment 
of a guardian. The account shall show with respect to each 
item for which credit is claimed whether or not the amount has 
been paid, and in either event the court m.ay allow any item or 
disallow it in whole or in part except to the extent that it has 
been approved in advance. 
(b) Effect of settlement. When notice has been given as 
provided in subsection (a), the settlement by the court of any 
account, subject to the right of appeal and to the power of the 
court to vacate its final orders, is binding upon all persons ex­
cept the ward, or, if he shall die after the settlement, his per­
sonal representative. The ward, or, if he shall die after the 
settlement, his personal representative, may question any item 
of any settlement within two years after the date of the dis­
charge of the guardian but not afterward. 
(c) When decedents' estate law applicable. The pro­
visions of sections 1 72, 1 74 to I 78 inclusive, 1 80 and I 8 I  
hereof as to accounting in decedents' estates shall apply to 
guardianship estates. 
Comment. Of particular importance under subsection {c) is the 
provision of § I 7 5 that the court may provide for inspection of the 
balance of assets on hand. This device is more important in guardian­
ship estates than in decedents' estates since the former normally con­
tinue over a longer period. See in this connection the provision of the 
Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act ( §  247 of this Code) which 
requires inspection at each accounting. 
In only a few states do the statutes provide specifically as to the con­
clusiveness of the annual or intermediate accounts of guardians. Some 
statutes provide for approval of such accounts which may be had ex 
parte and for judicial settlement of the final account. Statutes of this 
type and most other legislation on the subject are generally construed 
to permit re-examination of intermediate accounts upon the final ac­
count though the case law is more evenly divided as to whether the 
guardian may later question items of his intermediate accounts. An­
notation, 99 A.L.R. 996. In the above section the position is taken 
that while notice to other interested persons is required in the case of 
annual accountings so as to bind them, the approval is not binding 
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on the ward until he becomes sui juris. See Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 
1 930) t. 50, § 962 ; Wash. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 1 5 75-1 .  
Indeed, not even the settlement of the final account is binding on the 
ward until two years after the' guardian's discharge. 
§ 234. Termination of guardianship. 
(a) Termination without court order. A guardianship 
is terminated 
( I ) If the guardianship was solely because of the 
ward's minority, by the ward attaining his ma­
jority; 
( 2) If the guardianship of the person was solely 
because of the ward's minority, by the marriage 
of the ward; 
(3)  By an adjudication of competency of the ward; 
( 4) By the death of the ward. 
(b) Termination on court order. A guardianship may 
be terminated by court order after such notice as the court may 
reqmre 
( I )  I f  the guardianship is of the estate and the estate 
is exhausted; 
( 2) If the guardianship is no longer necessary for 
any other reason. 
(c) Effect of termination. When a guardianship ter­
minates otherwise than by the death of the ward, the powers 
of the guardian cease, except that a guardian of the estate may 
make disbursements for claims that are or may be allowed by 
the court, for liabilities already properly incurred for the 
estate or for the ward, and for expenses of administration. 
When a guardianship terminates by death of the ward, the 
guardian of the estate may proceed under section 23 5  hereof 
but the rights of all creditors against the ward's estate shall be 
determined by the law of decedents' estates. 
Comment. The particular appointment also terminates when the 
guardian is removed under § 2 1 6, or his resignation is accepted under 
§ 2 1 7, though it will usually be necessary to appoint a new guardian. 
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§ 235. Administration of deceased ward's estate. Upon 
the death of a ward intestate the guardian of his estate has 
power under the letters issued to him and subject to the direc­
tion of the court to administer the estate as the estate of the 
deceased ward without further letters unless within thirty 
days after death of the ward a petition is filed for letters of 
administration or for letters testamentary and the petition is 
granted. Notice to creditors and other persons interested in 
the estate shall be published and may be co
.
mbined with the 
notice of the guardian's final account. This notice shall be 
published in accordance with section I 4(b) ( 2) hereof, and all 
claims which are not filed within sixty days after first publica­
tion shall be barred against the estate. Upon the hearing, the 
account may be allowed and the balance distributed to the per­
sons entitled thereto, after the payment of such claims as may 
be allowed. Liability on the guardian's bond shall continue 
and shall apply to the complete administration of the estate of 
the deceased ward. If letters of administratibn or letters testa­
mentary are granted upon petition filed within thirty days after 
the death of the ward, the administrator or executor shall su­
persede the guardian in the administration of the estate and 
the provisions of Part III of this Code shall apply to all pro­
ceedings in the administration, including the publication of . 
notice to creditors and other interested persons and the barring 
of creditors' claims. 
Comment. Cf. Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § 476 ; 
Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 9  3 3 )  § 8-13  5 ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 
1 944) t. 20, § 872 .  Upon death of a ward the rights of his creditors 
are determined according to the law of decedents' estates. See the last 
sentence of § 2 34 (c) hereof. The shortening of the nonclaim period 
under § 235 is justified inasmuch as the guardian's personal liability 
remains for obligations incurred by him, and in normal cases other 
debts of the ward would probably have been already satisfied. It 
should not be necessary under this section that there be a separate hear­
ing or notice of hearing on the final account of the guardian as to the 
post-mortem affairs of the ward. This section contemplates that 
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ordinarily all matters will be closed upon a single hearing, winding up 
both the guardianship and also the estate of the deceased ward as a 
decedent's estate. As to the application of the provisions of Part II-I in 
proceedings under § 235, see § I 98 and second paragraph of comment 
thereto. 
· 
§ 236. Discharge of guardian. When a guardian of the 
estate shall file with the court proper receipts or other evidence 
satisfactory to the court, showing that he has delivered to the 
persons entitled thereto all the property for which he is ac­
countable as guardian, the court shall enter an order of dis­
charge. The discharge so obtained shall operate as a release 
from the duties of his office which have not theretofore ter­
minated, and shall operate as a bar to any suit against the 
guardian and his sureties unless such suit be commenced with­
in two years from the date of the discharge. 
Comment. This section is designed to correspond to § 1 93 on 
discharge of personal representative. 
As in case of personal representatives the discharge of the fiduciary 
terminates his powers and duties as to future acts. It does not, how­
ever, relieve him or his sureties from liability for past acts. 
§ 237. Dispensing with guardianship. 
(a) Estate of minor of a value not exceeding five hun­
dred dollars. When the whole estate of a minor does not 
exceed the value of $ soo, the court may, in its discretion, with­
out the appointment of a guardian or the giving of bond, 
authorize: 
( 1 ) The deposit thereof in a depository authorized 
to receive fiduciary funds, payable to the guard­
ian of the estate when appointed or to the minor 
upon his attaining the age of majority; or, 
(2) If the assets do not consist of money, the de­
livery thereof to a suitable person designated 
by the court, deliverable to the guardian of the 
estate when appointed or to the minor upon his 
attaining the age of majority; or, 
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(3)  The payment or delivery thereof to the parent 
of the minor, or to the person having the care 
or custody of the minor or to the minor himself. 
The person receiving such money or other assets shall hold and 
dispose of the same in such manner as the court shall direct. 
(b) Estate of adult incompetent of a value not exceed· 
ing five hundred dollars. When the whole estate of a person 
over the age of twenty-one who has been adjudicated incom­
petent does not exceed the value of $soo, the court may, in its 
discretion, without the appointment of a guardian or the giv­
ing of bond, authorize the deposit thereof in a depository 
authorized to receive fiduciary funds in the name of a suitable 
person designated by the court, or if the assets do not consist 
of money, authorize the delivery thereof to a suitable person 
designated by the court. The person receiving such money or 
other assets shall hold and dispose of the same in such manner 
as the court shall direct. 
(c) Deposit of funds subject to order of court. If the 
estate of an incompetent consists in money in an amount 
greater than $ soo, and it is for the best interests of the incom- ' 
petent that no guardian of the estate be appointed, and that 
such estate be deposited in a depository authorized to receive 
fiduciary funds, the court may, on reasonable notice to all per­
sons who would be entitled to receive notice of a hearing on a 
petition to appoint a guardian, so order. The person receiving 
such money shall hold and dispose of the same in such manner 
as the court shall direct. 
Comment. Subsections (a) and (b) are based on Ohio Gen. Code 
(Page, Supp. I 944) § I0507-5· If an incompetent's claim is pend­
ing in a court of ordinary trial jurisdiction, the legislation described 
in the comment to § 229 provides another means of dispensing with 
guardianship. 
B .  UNIFORM VETERANS' GUARDIANSHIP ACT 
Comment to Part IV B. Sections 238 to 2 5 5  inclusive are § §  I to 
. I 8 inclusive of the I 942 Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, which 
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was a revision o f  a prior act promulgated by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws under the same title in I 928.  
The Commissioners' comments to the various sections have been 
omitted here. Almost two-thirds of the states have enacted the sub­
stance of either the I 928 or I 942 acts. As to the relation of Part 
IV B to Part IV A of this Code, see § I 97 hereof and Introductory 
Comment to Part IV. Sections I9  to 24 of the uniform law are un­
necessary if the uniform law is enacted as part of this Code. See § §  2, 
I97  of this Code. In the first line of § 238  below, the words italicized 
should be substituted fQr the bracketed words, which were contained in 
the uniform act. Attention is called to the definitions contained in 
§ 238, being § I of the uniform act, and in particular to the definition 
of "administrator." 
§ 238. Definitions. As used in [this Act : ]  Part IV B :  
"Person" means an individual, a partnership, corporation or 
an association. 
"Veterans Administration" means the Veterans Administra­
tion, its predecessors or successors. 
"Income" means moneys received from the Veterans Ad­
ministration and revenue or profit from any property wholly 
or partially acquired therewith. 
"Estate" means income on hand and assets acquired partially 
. or wholly with "income." 
"Benefits" means all moneys paid or payable by the United 
States through the Veterans Administration. 
"Administrator" means the Administrator of Veterans Af­
fairs of the United States or his successor. 
"Ward" means a beneficiary of the Veterans Administration. 
"Guardian" means any fiduciary for the person or estate of 
a ward. 
§ 239. Administrator as party in interest. The Admin­
istrator shall be a party in interest in any proceeding for the 
appointment or removal of a guardian or for the removal of 
the disability of minority or mental incapacity of a ward, and 
in any suit or other proceeding affecting in any manner the ad-
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ministration by the guardian of the estate of any present or 
former ward whose estate includes assets derived in whole or 
in part from benefits heretofore or hereafter paid by the 
Veterans Administration. Not less than 1 5 days prior to hear­
ing in such matter notice in writing of the time and place 
thereof shall be given by mail (unless waived in writing) to the 
office of the Veterans Administration having jurisdiction over 
the area in which any such suit or any such proceeding is 
pending. 
§ 240. Application. Whenever, pursuant to any law 
of the United States or regulation of the Veterans Administra­
tion, it is necessary, prior to payment of benefits, that a guard­
ian be appointed, the appointment may be made in the manner 
hereinafter provided. 
§ 241 .  Limitation on number of wards. No person 
other than a bank or trust company shall be guardian of more 
than five wards at one time, unless all the wards are members 
of one family. Upon presentation of a petition by an attorney 
of the Veterans Administration or other interested person, al­
leging that a guardian is acting in a fiduciary capacity for more 
than five wards as . herein provided and requesting his dis­
charge for that reason, the court, upon proof substantiating the 
petition, shall require a final accounting forthwith from such 
guardian and shall discharge him from guardianships in excess 
of five and forthwith appoint a successor. 
§ 242. Appointment of guardians. 
(a) A petition for the appointment of a guardian may be 
filed by any relative or friend of the ward or by any person who 
is authorized by law to file such a petition. If there is no per­
son so authorized or if the person so authorized refuses or fails 
to file such a petition within thirty days after mailing of notice 
by the Veterans Administration to the last known address of 
the person, if any, indicating the necessity for the same, a peti-
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tion for appointment may be filed by any resident of this state. 
(b) The petition for appointment shall set forth the name, 
age, place of residence of the ward, the name and place of 
residence of the nearest relative, if known, and the fact that 
the ward is entitled to receive benefits payable by or through 
the Veterans Administration and shall set forth the amount of 
moneys then due and the amount of probable future payments. 
(c) The petition shall also set forth the name and address 
of the person or institution, if any, having actual custody of 
the ward and the name, age, relationship, if any, occupation 
and address of the proposed guardian and if the nominee is a 
natural person, the number of wards for whom the nominee is 
presently acting as guardian. Notwithstanding any law as to 
priority of persons entitled to appointment, or the nomination 
in the petition, the court may appoint some other individual 
or a bank or trust company as guardian, if the court determines 
it is for the best interest of the ward. 
(d) In the case of a mentally incompetent ward the peti­
tion shall show that such ward has been rated incompetent by 
the Veterans Administration on examination in accordance with 
the laws and regulations governing the Veterans Administra­
tion. 
§ 243. Evidence of necessity for guardian of infant. 
Where a petition is filed for the appointment of a guardian for 
a minor, a certificate of the Administrator or his authorized 
representative, setting forth the age of such minor as shown 
by the records of the Veterans Administration and the fact that 
the appointment of a guardian is a condition precedent to the 
payment of any moneys due the minor by the Veterans Ad­
ministration shall be prima facie evidence of the necessity for 
such appointment. 
§ 244. Evidence of necessity for guardian for incom­
petent. Where a petition is filed for the appointment of a 
guardian for a mentally incompetent ward, a certificate of the 
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Administrator or his duly authorized representative, that such 
person has been rated incompetent by the Veterans Admin­
istration on examination in accordance with the laws and 
regulations governing such Veterans Administration and that 
the appointment of a guardian is a condition precedent to the 
payment of any moneys due such ward by the Veterans Admin­
istration, shall be prima facie evidence of the necessity for such 
appointment. 
§ 245. Notice. Upon the filing of a petition for the ap­
pointment of a guardian under this Act, notice shall be given 
to the ward, to such other persons, and in such manner as is 
provided by the general law of this state, and also to the Vet­
erans Administration as provided by this Act. 
§ 246. Bond. 
(a) Upon the appointment of a guardian, he shall execute 
and file a bond to be approved by the court in an amount not 
less than the estimated value of the personal estate and antic­
ipated income of the ward during the ensuing year. The bond 
shall be in the form and be conditioned as required of guard­
ians appointed under the general guardianship laws of this 
state. The court may from time to time require the guardian 
to file an additional bond. 
(b) Where a bond is tendered by a guardian with personal 
sureties, there shall be at least two such sureties and they shall 
file with the court a certificate under oath which shall describe 
the property owned, both real and personal, and shall state 
that each is worth the sum named in the bond as the penalty 
therieof over and above all his debts and liabilities and the 
aggregate of other bonds on which he is principal or surety 
and exclusive of property exempt from execution. The court 
may require additional security or may require a corporate 
surety bond, the premium thereon to be paid from the ward's 
estate. 
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§ 247. Petitions and accounts, notices and hearings. 
(a) Every guardian, who has received or shall receive on 
account of his ward any moneys or other thing of value from 
th� Veterans Administration shall file with the court annually, 
on the anniversary da:te of the appointment, in addition to such 
other accounts as may be required by the court, a full, true, and 
accurate account under oath of all moneys or other things of 
value so received by him, all earnings, interest or profits 
derived therefrom and all property acquired therewith and of 
all disbursements therefrom, arrd showing the balance thereof 
in his hands at the date of the account and how invested. 
(b) The guardian, at the time of filing any account, shall 
exhibit all securities or investments held by him to an officer of 
the bank or other depository wherein said securities or invest­
ments are held for safekeeping or to an authorized representa­
tive of the corporation which is surety on his bond, or to the 
judge or clerk of a court of record in this state, or, upon request 
of the guardian or other interested party, to any other reputa­
ble person designated by the court, who shall certify in writing 
that he has examined the securities or investments and iden­
tified them with those described in the account, and shall note 
any omissions or discrepancies. If the depository is the guard­
ian, the certifying officer shall not be the officer verifying the 
account. The guardian may exhibit the securities or invest­
ments to the judge of the court, who shall endorse on the 
account and copy thereof a certificate that the securities or 
investments shown therein as held by the guardian were each 
in fact exhibited to· him and that those exhibited to him were 
the same as those shown in the account, and noting any omission 
or discrepancy. That certificate and the certificate of an of­
ficial of the bank in which are deposited any funds for which 
the guardian is accountable, showing the amount on deposit, 
shall be prepared and signed in duplicate and one of each shall 
be filed. by the guardian with his account. 
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(c) At the time of filing in the court any account, a certified 
copy thereof and a signed duplicate of each certificate filed 
with the court shall be sent by the guardian to the office of the 
Veterans Administration having jurisdiction over the area in 
which the court is located. A signed duplicate or a certified 
copy of any petition, motion or other pleading, pertaining to 
an account, or to any matter other than an account, and which · 
is filed in the guardianship proceedings or in any proceeding 
for the purpose of removing the disability of minority or men­
tal incapacity, shall be furnished by the person filing the same 
to the proper office of the Veterans Administration. Unless 
hearing be waived in writing by the attorney of the Veteran.s 
Administration, and by all other persons, if any, entitled to 
notice, the court shall fix a time and place for the hearing on 
the account, petition, motion or other pleading not less than 
fifteen days nor more than thirty days from the date same is 
filed, unless a different available date be stipulated in writing. 
Unless waived in writing, written notice of the time and place 
of hearing shall be given the Veterans Administration office 
concerned and the guardian and any others entitled to notice 
not less than I 5 days prior to the date fixed for the hearing. 
The notice may be given by mail in which event it shall be de­
posited in the mails not less than I 5 days prior to said date. 
The court, or clerk thereof, shall mail to said Veterans Admin­
istration office a copy of each order entered in any guardianship 
proceeding wherein the Administrator is an interested party. 
(d) If the guardian is accountable for property derived 
from sources other than the Veterans Administration, he shall 
be accountable as is or may be required under the applicable law 
of this state pertaining to the property of minors or persons of 
1,1nsound mind who are not beneficiaries of the Veterans Ad­
ministration, and as to such other property shall be entitled to 
the compensation provided by such law. The account for other 
property may be combined with the account filed in accordance 
with this section. · 
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§ 247. Petitions and accounts, notices and hearings 
(alternative section) .  
(a) Every guardian, who has received or shall receive on 
account of his ward any money or other thing of value from 
the Veterans Administration, at the expiration of one year from 
date of his appointment, and every three years thereafter on 
the anniversary date of his appointment, or as much oftener 
as the court may require, shall file with the court a full true 
and accurate account under oath of all moneys or other thing 
of value received by him, all earnings, interest or profits de­
rived therefrom, and all property acquired therewith and of 
all disbursements therefrom; and showing the balance thereof 
in his hands at the date of the account and how invested. Each 
year when not required to file an account with the court, the 
guardian shall file an account with the proper office of the Vet­
erans Administra:tion. If the interim account be not filed with 
the Veterans Administration, or, if filed, shall be unsatis­
factory, the court shall upon receipt of notice thereof from the 
Veterans Administration require the guardian forthwith to · 
file an account which shall be subject in all respects to the next 
succeeding paragraphs. Any account filed with the Veterans 
Administration and approved by the Chief Attorney thereof 
may be filed with the court and be approved by the court with­
out hearing, unless a hearing thereon be requested by some 
party in interest. 
(b) The guardian, at the time of filing any account with 
the court or Veterans Administration shall exhibit all securi­
ties or investments held by him to an officer of the bank or other 
depository wherein said securities or investments are held for 
safekeeping or to an authorized representative of the corpora­
tion which is surety on his bond, or to the judge or clerk of a 
court of record in this state, or upon request of the guardian 
or other interested party, to any other reputable person desig­
nated by the court, who shall certify in writing that he has 
examined the securities or investments and identified them 
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with those described in the account and shall note any omission 
or discrepancies. If the depository is the guardian, the certify­
ing officer shall not be the officer verifying the account. The 
guardian may exhibit the securities or investments to the judge 
of the court, who shall endorse on the account and copy thereof, 
a certificate that the securities or investments shown therein 
as held by the guardian were each in fact exhibited to him and 
that those exhibited to him were the same as those in the ac­
count and noting any omission or discrepancy. The certificate, 
and the certificate of an official of the bank in which are de­
posited any funds for which the guardian is accountable, show­
ing the amount on deposit, shall be prepared and signed in 
duplicate and one of each shall be filed by the guardian with 
his account. 
(c) At the time of filing in the court any account, a certified 
copy thereof and a signed duplicate of each certificate filed 
with the court shall be sent by the guardian to the office of the 
Veterans Administration having jurisdiction over the area in 
which such court is located. A duplicate signed copy or a 
certified copy of any petition, motion or other pleading per­
taining to an account, or to any matter other than an account, 
and which is filed in the guardianship proceedings or in any 
proceedings for the purpose of removing the disability of mi­
nority or mental incapacity, shall be furnished by the persons 
filing the same to the proper office of the Veterans Administra­
tion. Unless hearing be waived in writing by the attorney of 
the Veterans Administration and by all other persons, if any, 
entitled to notice, the court shall fix a time and place for the 
hearing on the account, petition, motion or other pleading, not 
less than fifteen days nor more than thirty days from the date 
same is filed, unless a different available date be stipulated in 
writing. Unless waived in writing, written notice of the time 
and place of hearing shall be given the Veterans Administra­
tion office concerned and to the guardian and any others entitled 
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to notice, not less than fifteen days prior_ to the date fixed for 
the hearing. The notice may be given by mail, in which event 
it shall be deposited in the mails not less than fifteen days prior 
to said date. The court or clerk thereof, shall mail to said 
Veterans Administration office a copy of each order entered in 
any guardianship proceeding wherein the Administrator is 
an interested party. 
(d) If the guardian is accountable for property derived 
from sources other' than the Veterans Administration, he shall 
be accountable as is or may be required under the applicable 
law of this state pertaining to the property of minors or per­
sons of unsound mind who are not beneficiaries of the Veterans 
Administration, and as to such other property shall be entitled 
to the compensation provided by such law. The account for 
other property may be combined with the account filed in ac­
cordance with this section. 
§ 248. Penalty for failure to account. If any guardian 
shall fail to file with the court any account as required by this 
Act, or by an order of the court, when any account is due or 
within thirty days after citation issues as provided by law, or 
shall fail to furnish the Veterans Administration a true copy 
of any account, petition or pleading as required by this Act, 
such failure may in the discretion of the court be g�ound for 
his removal. 
§ 249. Compensation of guardians. Compensation 
payable to guardians shall be based upon services rendered and 
shall not exceed s %  of the amount of moneys received during 
the period covered by the account. · In the event of extraordi­
nary services by any guardian, the court, upon petition and 
hearing thereon may· authorize reasonable additional com­
pensation therefor. A copy of the petition and notice of hear­
ing thereon shall be given the proper office of the Veterans 
Admini�tration in the manner orovided in the case of hearine: 
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on a guardian's account or other pleading. No commission 
or compensation shall be allowed on the moneys or other 
assets received from a prior guardian nor upon the amount 
received from liquidation of loans or other investments. 
§ 250. Investments. Every guardian shall invest the 
surplus funds of his ward's estate in such securities or property 
as authorized under the laws of this state but only upon prior 
order of the court ; except that the funds may be invested, 
without prior court authorization, in direct unconditional in­
terest-bearing obligations of this state or of the United States 
and in ob.iigations the interest and ·principal of which are un­
conditionally guaranteed by the United States. A signed 
duplicate or certified copy of the petition for authority to in­
vest shall be furnished the proper office of the Veterans Ad­
ministration, and notice of hearing thereon shall be given said 
office as provided in the case of hearing on a guardian's account. 
§ 251 .  Maintenance and support. A guardian shall not 
apply any portion of the income or the estate for the support 
or maintenance of any person other than the ward, the spouse 
and the minor children of the ward, except upon petition to 
and prior order of the court after a hearing. A signed dupli­
cate or certified copy of said petition shall be furnished the 
proper office of the Veterans Administration and notice of hear­
ing thereon shall be given said office as provided in the case of 
hearing on il guardian's account or other pleading. 
§ 252. Purchase of home for ward. 
(a) The court may authorize the purchase of the entire 
fee simple title to real estate in this state in which the guardian 
has no interest, but only as a home for the ward, or to protect 
his interest, or (if he is not a minor) as a home for his depend­
ent family. Such purchase of real estate shall not be made 
except upon the entry of an order of the court after .hearing 
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upon verified petition. A copy of the petition shall be fur­
nished the proper office of the Veterans Administration and 
notice of hearing thereon shall be given said office as provided 
in the case of hearing on a guardian's account. 
(b) Before authorizing such investment the court shall 
require written evidence of value and of title and of the advis­
ability of acquiring such real estate. Title shall be taken in 
the ward's name. This section does not limit the right of the 
guardian on behalf of his ward to bid and to become the pur­
chaser of real estate at a sale thereof pursuant to decree of fore­
closure of lien held by or for the ward, or at a trustee's sale, to 
protect the ward's right in the property so foreclosed or spld ; 
nor does it limit the right of the guardian, if such be necessary 
to protect the ward's interest and upon prior order of the court 
in which the guardianship is pending, to agree with co-tenants 
of the ward for a partition in kind, or to purchase from co-ten­
ants the entire undivided interests held by them, or to bid and 
purchase the same at a sale under a partition decree, or to com­
promise adverse claims of title to the ward's realty. 
§ 253. Copies of public records to be furnished. When 
a copy of any public record is required by the Veterans Admin­
istration to be used in determining the eligibility of any person 
to participate in benefits made available by the Veterans Ad­
ministration, the official custodian of such public record shall 
without charge provide the applicant for such benefits or any 
person acting on his behalf or the authorized representative 
of the Veterans Administration with a certified copy of such 
record. 
· 
§ 254. Discharge of guardian and release of sureties. 
In addition to any other provisions of law relating to judicial 
restoration and dischilrge of guardian, a certificate bY. the Vet­
erans Administration showing that a minor ward has attained 
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majority, or that an incompetent ward has been rated compe-
tent by the Veterans Administration upon examination in ac­
cordance with law shall be prima facie evidence that the ward 
has attained majority, or has recovered his competency. Upon 
hearing after notice as provided by this Act and the determina­
tion by the court that the ward has attained majority or has 
recovered his competency, an order shall be entered to that 
effect, and the guardian shall file a final account. Upon hear­
ing after notice to the former ward and to the Veterans Admin­
istration as in case of other accounts, upon approval of the final 
account, and upon delivery to the ward of the assets due him 
from the guardian, the guardian shall be discharged and his 
sureties released. 
§ 255. Commitment to Veterans Administration or 
other agency of United States Government. 
(a) Whenever, in any proceeding under the laws of this 
state for the commitment of a person alleged to be of unsound 
mind or otherwise in need of confinement in a hospital or other 
institution for his proper care, it is determined after such ad­
judication of the status of such person as may be required by 
law that commitment to a hospital for mental disease or other 
institution is necessary for safekeeping or treatment and it ap­
pears that such person is eligible for care or treatment by the 
Veterans Administration or other agency of the United States 
Government, the court, upon receipt of a certificate from the 
Veterans Administration or such other agency showing that 
facilities are available and that 'such person is eligible for care 
or treatment therein, may commit such person to said Veterans 
Administration or other agency. The person whose commit­
ment is sought shall be personally served with notice of the 
pending commitment proceeding in the manner as provided by 
the law o.f this state ; and nothing in this Act shall affect his 
right. to appear and be heard in the proceedings. Upon com­
mitment, such person, when admitted to any facility operated 
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by any such agency within or without this state shall be subject 
to the rules and regulations of the Veterans Administration or 
other agency. The Chief Officer ·of any facility of the Veterans 
Administration or institution operated by any other agency of 
the United States to which the person is so committed shall 
with respect to such person be vested with the same powers as 
superintendents of state hospitals for mental diseases within 
this state with respect to retention of custody, transfer, parole 
or discharge. Jurisdiction is retained in the committing or other 
appropriate court of this state at any time to inquire into the 
mental condition of the person so committed, and to determine 
the necessity for continuance of his restraint, and all commit­
ments pursuant to this Act are so conditioned. 
(b) The judgment or order of commitment by a court 
of competent jurisdiction of another state or of the District of 
Columbia, committing a person to the Veterans Administra­
tion, or other agency of the United States Government for 
care or treatment shall have the same force and effect as to the 
committed person while in this state as in the jurisdiction in 
which is situated the court entering the judgment or making 
the order; (and the courts of the committing state, or of the 
District of Columbia, shall be deemed to have retained ju­
risdiction of the person so committed for the purpose of inquir­
ing into the mental condition of such person, and of determin­
ing the necessity for continuance of his restraint ; as is provided 
in subsection (a) of this section with respect to persons com­
mitted by the courts of this state. Consent is hereby given to 
the application of the law of the committing state or District in 
respect to the authority of the chief officer of any facility of the 
Veterans Administration, or of any institution operated in this 
state by any other agency of the United States to retain custody, 
or transfer, parole or discharge the committed person.) 
(c) Upon �eceipt of a certiticate of the Veterans Admin­
istration or such other agency of the United States that facili­
ties are available for the care or treatment of any person here:.. 
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tofore committed to any hospital for the insane or other 
institution for the care or treatment of persons similarly af­
flicted and that such person is eligible for care or treatment, the 
superintendent of the institution may cause the transfer of such 
person to the Veterans Administration or other agency of the 
United States for care or treatment. Upon effecting any such 
transfer, the committing court or proper officer thereof shall 
be notified thereof by the transferring agency. No person 
shall be transferred to the Veterans Administration or other 
agency of the United States if he be confined pursuant to con­
viction of any felony or misdemeanor or if he has been acquitted 
of the charge solely on the ground of insanity, unless prior to 
transfer the court or other authority originally committing 
such person shall enter an order for such transfer after ap­
propriate motion and hearing. 
Any person transferred as provided in this section shall be 
deemed to be committed to the Veterans Administration or 
other agency of the United States pursuant to the original 
commitment. 
PART v. ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION 
INTRODUCTORY COMMENT 
This part of the Code consists of acts promulgated or to be pro­
mulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws. Sections 256 to 260 inclusive are sections I to 5 of the 
Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act, promulgated in 
I 944· The remaining sections of this uniform act are merely formal 
and are unnecessary when the act is incorporated into a probate code. 
The Commissio,ners' notes are omitted. The basic philosophy of the 
uniform act is that if the domicile of the decedent or ward is in an­
other jurisdiction the domiciliary personal representative or guardian 
is given the full · powers of a local personal representative or guardian 
if there is no administration granted in the local jurisdiction. Various 
drafts of the act, together with the Commissioners' notes and other 
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materials are found in the Handbooks of the National Conference com­
mencing in I 940. In the first line of § 2 56  below, the words italicized 
should be substituted for the bracketed words, which were contained 
in the uniform act. It should be noted that in § § 256 to 260 the term 
"representative" includes guardians and testamentary trustees and 
should be distinguished from the term "personal representative" as 
used in Parts I to IV of this Code. "Representative," as used in the 
act and this part of the Model Probate Code, has the same meaning as 
"fiduciary" elsewhere in the Code. See § 3 ( i) hereof. 
The companion act, the Uniform Ancillary Administration of 
Estates Act, has not yet been promulgated by the National Confer­
ence. The latest draft was considered by the Conference in 1 944. 
Earlier drafts are contained in the Handbooks of the Conference for 
I 94 1  to 1 943. This act will provide for the situations where the local 
jurisdiction grants ancillary administration. The basic philosophy is 
to unify the domiciliary and ancillary administrations in so far as it is 
possible to do so. Thus, the drafts contemplate that the domiciliary 
personal representative or guardian may act as ancillary representative 
and preference is given for his appointment. After setting up the 
procedure peculiar to ancillary administration, § 1 5 of the 1 944 draft 
declares that the general law relative to administration applies to 
ancillary administration. Cf. § 1 98 of this Code. In the drafts of 
the Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates Act, § 1 ,  the defini­
tional section, is identical ·with § I of the Uniform Powers of Foreign 
Representatives Act. Hence § 256 below can be declared to apply 
also to the sections which are taken from the Uniform Ancillary 
Administration of Estates Act when the latter is promulgated. 
In 1 9 1  5 the National Conference promulgated the Uniform Wills 
Act, Foreign Probated which has been enacted in five states. How­
ever, this act was withdrawn by the Conference in 1 943. Un­
doubtedly this action was due in part to the fact that the act required 
proof of execution of the will and did not accept the foreign probate 
as proof of that fact. As to this general problem, see Hopkins, "The 
Extraterritorial Effect of Probate Decrees," 53  Yale L. J. 22 1 
( 1 944) ; Carey, "A Suggested Fundamental Basis of Jurisdiction with 
Special Emphasis on Judicial Proceedings Affecting Decedents' 
Estates," 24 Ill. L. Rev. 44, 1 70 ( 1 929) .  I t  is expected that the 
National Conference will undertake the preparation of a new uniform 
act on this subject. When this has been done, the three uniform acts 
will complete the matters upon ancillary probate and administration 
necessary for inclusion in a probate code. Among the better existing 
statutes on the subject of probate of foreign wills are : Cal. Prob. Code 
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Ann. (Deering, I 944) §§ 360 to 362 ; Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932) c. 
I 92, § § 9 to I I ;  Minn. Stat. ( I 94 1 )  § §  5 25 .27  to 5 25 .273 ; Ohio 
Gen. Code (Page, 1 937 )  § §  I OS I I-5 to 1 05 I I-9. 
UNIFORM POWERS OF FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES ACT 
§ 256. Definitions. As used in [this Act : ]  sections 2 55 to 
26o : 
(a) "Representative" means an executor, administrator, 
testamentary trustee, guardian or other fiduciary of 
the estate of a decedent or a ward, duly appointed by 
a court and qualified. It includes any corporation so 
appointed, regardless of whether the corporation is 
eligible to act under the law of this state. This Act 
does not change the powers or duties of a testamentary 
trustee under the non-statutory law or under the terms 
of a trust. 
(b) "Foreign representative" means any representative 
who has been appoined by the court of another ju­
risdiction in which the decedent was domiciled at the 
time of his death, or in which the ward is domiciled, 
and who has not also been appointed by a court of this 
state. 
(c) "Local representative" means any representative ap­
pointed as ancillary representative by a court of this 
state who has not been appointed by the domiciliary 
court. 
(d) "Local and foreign representative" means any repre­
sentative appointed by both the domiciliary court and 
by a court of this state. 
§ 257. Powers of foreign representatives in general. 
When there is no administration or application therefor pend­
ing in this state, a foreign representative may exercise all 
powers which would exist in favor of a local representative, 
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and may maintain actions and proceedings in this state subject 
to the conditions imposed upon non-resident suitors generally. 
§ 258. .Proof of authority in court proceedings; bond. 
Upon commencing any action or proceeding in any court of this 
state, the foreign representative shall file with the court au­
thenticated copies of his appointment, and of his official bond 
if he has given a bond: ·· --If the court believes that the security 
furnished by him in the domiciliary administration is insuf­
ficient to cover the proceeds of the action or proceeding, it may 
at any time order the action or proceeding stayed until suffi­
cient security is furnished in the do�iciliary administration. 
§ 259. Proceedings to bar creditors' claims. Upon 
application by a foreign representative to the [probate] court 
of the county in which property of the decedent or of the ward 
is located, the court shall cause notice of the appointment of 
the foreign representative to be published once in each of 
[ three] consecutive weeks in some newspaper of general cir­
culation in the county. The claims of all creditors of the 
decedent or of the ward, unless filed with the court within 
[ ] after date of the first publication are barred as a lien 
upon all property of the decedent or of the ward in this state, to 
the extent that claims are barred by a local administration. If 
before the expiration of such period any claims have been filed 
and remain unpaid after reasonable notice thereof to the for­
eign representative, ancillary administration may be had. 
§ 260. Effect of local proceedings. The powers granted 
by this Act shall be exercised only when there is no administra­
tion or application therefor pending in this stat_e, except to the 
extent that the court granting local letters may order other­
wise, but no person who, before receiving actual notice of local 
administration or application therefor, has changed his posi­
tion by relying on �he powers granted by this Act shall be prej-
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udiced by reason of the application for, or grant of, local 
administration. The local representative or the local and 
foreign representative shall be subject to all burdens which 
have accrued by virtue of the exercise of the powers, or other­
wise, under this Act and may be substituted for the foreign 
representative in any action or proceeding in this state. 
UNIFORM ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES ACT 
(To be promulgated by the National Conference of Com­
missioners on Uniform State Laws. See Introdu�orr 
Comment to Part V.) 
UNIFORM WILLS ACT, FOREIGN PROBATED 
(To be prepared by the National Conference of Commis­
sioners on Uniform State Laws. The Act of I 9 I 5 promulgated 
under this title has been withdrawn by the National Confer­
ence. See Introductory Comment to Part V.) 
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APPENDIX A 
Statutory Notes on Various Sections of the 
Model Probate Code 
I
N connection with the preparation of the Model Probate 
Code, many memoranda on particular topics were pre­
pared for the use of the draftsmen. In some instances 
the substance of them was embodied in comments which appear 
in connection with the pertinent sections of the Code. Some­
times, however, either by reason of their length or their subject 
matter, they were not sui table for comments ; and were, there­
fore, preserved in this Appendix. These notes are primarily 
statutory, though in some instances they include citations of 
case law. They were prepared as a part of the research work 
of the University of Michigan Law School under the super­
vision of Professor Lewis M. Simes. Most of them were 
written by Miss Elizabeth Durfee, research assistant of the 
University of Michigan Law School. While not a part of 
the report of the Committee on Model Probate Code, they 
throw much light on portions of that report. 
§ 20. APPEALS 
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO DECEDENTs' EsTATES 
Though all the states have statutory provisions for appeals, there 
is considerable variation in the details of these statutes. Some permit 
appeals from any decision of the probate court, while others list 
specific appealable orders. In some states the appeal is a trial de 
novo, in others it is in the nature of a law appeal, and in still others 
it is like an equity appeal. Perhaps the point of greatest difference 
in the various states is in the time for appeal. All of these matters 
will be discussed in this note. In general, see 2 Woerner, Ad­
ministration ( 3d ed., 1 923) § §  542-55 0. 
24-I 
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I .  What orders may be appealed. In most states an appeal is 
permitted in general terms from all final orders, or from "any 
order" or "any decision" or by similar terms it is indicated that most 
orders are appealable. The statutory language varies somewhat, 
and will be set out for each state. Seven of the states in this group 
-Georgia, Indiana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North 
Carolina and Tennessee-also provide specifically for appeals from 
certain orders, but inasmuch as these orders would seem to be in­
cluded in the general provisions it has not seemed necessary to set 
out the special ones here. In two states, Maine and Michigan, the 
statement that any order is appealable is followed by a list of specific 
exceptions. In fourteen other states the statute is of a different type, 
_ and lists specifically the decrees and orders which may be appealed, 
either in one comprehensive section or in scattered provisions through­
·out_ the probate statutes. The following list indicates what orders 
and decisions may be appealed in each jurisdiction. 
Ala. Code ( I  940) t. 7, § 7 7  5 .  "From any final decree of the 
court of probate, or from any final judgment, order or decree of the 
judge of probate." 
Ariz. Code ( I 939) § 2 I-J702, subd. 3· Appealable orders are 
listed specifically. 
Ark. Laws I 939, act I 64, p. 388 (appears also in Dig. Stat. 
(Pope, Supp. I 944) p. 678)  "Any final order or judgment." 
Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § I 240. Appealable 
orders are listed specifically. 
Colo. Stat. ( I 935)  c. I 76, § 243· "Any and all final judgments, 
decrees or orders . . . entered upon any question of law or fact, 
or both." 
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 930) § 4990. "Any order, denial or decree" 
unless otherwise provided by law. 
Del. Rev. Code ( I 935) § §  3827,  3835, 3843, 3866, 3894. Ap­
pealable orders are listed specifically. 
D. C. Code ( 1940) § 1 7-1 0 1 .  "Any final order, judgment or 
decree." 
: Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 I )  § 732. 1 5 .  "All orders, judgments and 
decrees of the county judge finally determining rights of any party." 
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Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) § 6-20 1 .  "Any decision . .  · .  except 
an order appointing a special .administrator." 
Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § I 1-40 1 .  Appealable orders are 
listed specifically. 
III. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § § 483, 484. "A final 
order or decree . . . in a proceeding for the sale of real estate" ;. 
"any other order, judgment or decree." 
Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 933) § 6-200 1 .  "Any decision." 
Iowa Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 33 I ,  in Laws 1 945, p. 340. "All 
final judgments and decisions and any final adjudication 
. . . involving the merits or materially affecting the final decision" ; 
interlocutory orders under certain circumstances. 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 5 9-2401 .  Appealable orders are 
listed specifically. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) § §  23.030, 394.240, 395 .440. Appeal­
able orders are listed specifically. 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( I  944) c. I 40, § 32 .  "Any order, sentence, decree 
or denial . . . except the appointment of a special administrator, or 
any ord!'!r or decree requiring any administrator, guardian, or trustee 
to give an additional or new official bond, or any order or decree under 
the provisions of section 53 of chapter I 4 I, [appointment of an ex­
ecutor instead of a special administrato� pending an app�al from 
probate of a will ] ,  or any order or decree removing a guardian from 
office." 
Md. Code ( I  939) art. 5, § 64-. "All decrees, orders, decisions 
and judgments." 
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. 2 I 5 , § 9· "An order, decree or 
denial." 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) §§ 27 .3 I 78 (36) ,  27 .3 I 78 (3 7 ) .  "Any 
order, sentence, decree or denial" ; "no appeal shall lie from any 
order of the probate court removing any fiduciary for failure to give 
such new bond or render such account as may be required by order 
of such probate court in pursuance of law, nor from the appointment 
of special administrators or special guardians, nor from an order grant­
ing a rehearing, nor by any person, except the widow or children af­
fected thereby, from an order granting an allowance to the widow 
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or children of a decedent pending settlement of the estate, nor from 
an order granting permission to sue on a fiduciary's bond." 
Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525.7 1 .  Appealable orders are listed 
specifically. 
Miss. Code ( 1 942) § §  1 147, 1 1 48. "Any final decree" ; also 
any interlocutory decree in the discretion of the chancellor, when 
such decree orders money to be paid or the possession of property 
changed, or on demurrer, or in exceptional cases to avoid expense 
and delay. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) § 283. Appealable orders are listed 
specifically. 
Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 935) § 9731  (amended Laws 1 94 1 ,  c. 4 1 ) .  
Appealable orders are listed specifically. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 943) § 30-160 1 .  "Any final order, judgment 
or decree." 
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 1 )  § 9882.293. Appealable orders 
are listed specifically. 
N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c. 365, § I . "A decree, order, appoint­
ment, grant or denial . . . which may conclude his interest and 
which is not strictly interlocutory." 
N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 937)  §§ 2 : 3 1-90, 2 : 3 1-92, 2 : 3 1-93, 3 : 2-
52 .  Orders respecting probate of wills, inventory or grant of letters 
of administration or guardianship may be appealed from surrogate to 
orphans court;· all other proceedings of a surrogate are appealable to 
the prerogative court ; "order or decree" of orphans court is appeal­
able to prerogative tourt. 
N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 1 6-4 1 8. "Any decision." 
N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 288. "A decree of a surrogate's court, or 
from an order affecting a substantial right . . . in a special pro­
ceeding, or from an order of the supreme or a county court . . . 
granting or denying a motion for a new trial after a trial of con­
troverted issues of fact pursuant to an order of the surrogate directing 
specified questions of fact to be so tried." 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) § §  1-272, 7-66. "All matters of law 
or legal inference" ; "all issues of law or fact." 
N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943) § 30-260 1 .  "A decree or any order 
affecting a substantial right." 
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Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1 944) § 1 050 1-56. "Any order, 
decision or judgment." 
Okla. Stat. ( I  94 I )  t. 5 8, § 7 2 1 .  Appealable orders are listed 
spe cifi call y. 
Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) § I o-8ol. "A judgment or decree 
. . . an order affecting a substantial right." 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 930) t. 20, § §  2253, 260 1 :  "Orders 
or decrees" of the register ; "the definitive sentence or decree" of the 
orphans court. 
R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 938)  c. 5 73, § §  1 ,  1 9. "An order or decree" ; 
no appeal from an order giving advice and direction. 
S. C. Code ( 1942) § 230. "Any final order, sentence or decree." 
S. D. Code ( 1 939) § 35 .2 1 0 1 .  Appealable orders are listed 
specifically. 
Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 938) § 9028 .  "The sentence, judgment, 
or decree." 
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939) art. 3698. "Any decision, 
order, decree or judgment." 
Utah Code ( 1 943) § 20-2-2. "All final orders and decrees." 
Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 933) § §  300 1 ,  3005 . "An order, sentence, 
decree or denial." 
Va. Code (Michie, 1 942 and Supp. 1 944) § §  5429, 6336. Ap-: 
pealable orders are listed specifically. 
Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 932) § 1 5 9 1 .  "Any 'final order, judgment 
or decree." 
W. Va. Code ( 1 943) §§ 4067, 4088, 4 1 65,  4 1 80, 5 76 1 .  Ap-
pealable orders are listed specifically. 
Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 324.0 1 .  "Any order or judgment." 
Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 1 )  § 88-9 1 1 .  "Any final order." 
It is noteworthy that four of the fourteen states whose statutes list 
appealable orders specifically (Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma and South 
Dakota) conclude their list with a catch-all permitting appeal from 
any other final decision not listed. In view of this broad provision it 
would seem useless to list certain appealable orders in detail. In the 
absence of such a catch-all clause, the type of statute which specifies 
�ppealable orders presents certain problems, the most obvious of which 
is the unintentionai omission. Thus, the Idaho statute formerly pro-
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vided for an appeal (inter alia) from an order "granting, refusing or 
revoking" letters of a personal representative, and "against or in favor 
of the validity of a will, or revoking the probate thereof." It was 
found necessary to amend these provisions so as to include orders re­
fusing to revoke letters of probate. Moreover, in sev�ral states the 
section listing appealable orders is not complete, so that it is necessary 
to· search other parts of the statute book in order to discover whether 
an appeal may be had in particular cases. Thus in Oklahoma, there 
are separate sections providing for an appeal in escheat proceedings and 
proceedings for determination of heirship, and in West Virginia there 
are four isolated sections covering particular appeals in addition to the 
general section on appeals. While this objection is one of incon­
venience only, it may be avoided by the use of the more common type 
of statute providing for appeals from all final orders. 
A few states provide explicitly that no appeal will lie from the ap­
pointment of a special administrator. These are Ariz. Code ( I  939) 
§ 38-602 ; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 46 I ;  Ga. Code 
Ann. ( I 936) § §  6-20 I ,  I I 3-I 207 ; Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) 
§ I 5-354 ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-240 I ;  Me. Rev. Stat. 
( I 944) c. I 40, § 32 ; Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 27 .3 I 78 (37) ; 
Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 525 .30 ; Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943 ) § 30-3 I 7 ;  
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  § 9882.84 ; Okla Stat. ( I 94 I )  t. 
5 8, § 2 I 3 ;  S. D. Code ( I 939) § 35 .o6o3 ; Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 933) 
§ 2 796 ; Wis. Stat. ( I  94 3)  § 3 I 1 .06 ; and Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I  93 I )  
§ 88-I 803. It should be noticed also that the other states which list 
specifically the appealable orders do not include the appointment of 
the special administrator ;  in those states, therefore, such an order is 
not appealable unless it falls within the provision for appeal from �p­
pointment of the personal representative. In this connection it �ay 
be mentioned that a few states specifically permit an appeal from 
the appointment of a special administrator, and provide that such appeal 
shall not prevent his continuing in the discharge of his duties. Iowa 
Code ( I 939) § u 885 ; Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. I 93• § I O ;  
N. H. Rev. Laws ( I 942) c. 352,  § 24 ; but to the effect that the 
order appointing a special administrator is not a final judgmerif and 
therefore not appealable, see In ·re Jones' Estate,· :S 6 Utah 29 I ,' i ¢ 
p, 783 ;(l920) .-· · '  ' ' - ·  - - - - - . .. .. . 
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Beyond the prohibitiqns already listed, there are no express denials 
of the right of appeal, though it is limited in some instances, as for 
example in Alabama, where an order removing a personal repre­
sentative may not be appealed unless he gives bond. Ala. Code ( I  940) 
t. 7> § 7 79· 
2 .  Nature of appeal. In twenty-six states tl)e appeal is a trial 
de novo. See Simes and Basye, "The Organization of the Probate 
Court in America," 42 Mich. L. Rev. 965 at 995 ( 1 944), for a list 
of these states. In the other states the appeal is a true appeal. In 
some it is treated like a law appeal, so that the appellate court does not 
weigh the evidence but affirms the decision of the lower court if . there 
is substantial evidence to support the findings of fact. In other states 
the appellate court weighs the evidence and makes its own-findings 'of 
fact, in the nature of an equity appeal. In a few states it is expressly 
provided that the appellate court may hear testimony if it so desires, 
e.g., Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1 94 1 )  § 956a. In many states 
it has been impossible to ascertain whether the appeal is in the nature 
of a law appeal or an equity appeal ; the following list indicates its 
nature so far as it could be determined. 
States in which the appeal is a law appeal : 
Alabama. Rogers v. McLeskey, 225 Ala. 148, 1 42 So. 526 
( 1 932) ; Patterson v .  Murphy, ·9 So. ( 2d) 754 ( 1 942) .  
Florida. In re Thompson's Estate, 1 45 Fla. 42, 1 99 So. 352 
( 1 940) . 
0 
Iowa. Murphy v. Calbn, 1 99 Iowa 2 I 6, 1 99 N.W. 98 1 ( 1 925 ) ; 
In re Will of Fish, 220 Iow_a 1 247, 2 64 N.W. 1 23  ( 1 935 ) ; In re 
Estate of Conkling, 2 2 1  Iowa 1 332, 268 N.W. 67  ( 1 936) .  
Ohio. In re  Roeser's Estate (Ohio App., 1 942) 47  N.E. (2d) 
4 1 0. 
Pennsylvania. Catalano's Estate, 309 Pa. 249, 1 63 A. 5 2 7  
( 1 932) ; Pusey's Estate, 3 2 I  Pa. 248, I 84 A .  844 ( 1 936) . (But 
apparently equity appeals are reviewed in the same way as law appeals. 
Naulty v. S.titeler, 34 1 Pa. 234, 1 9  A. (2d) I 4 I  ( I 94 1 ) ;  Lochinger 
v. Hanlon, 348 Pa. 29, 33 A. (2d) I ( 1 943) .) . . .  
�outh Carolina (probably) . Ex parte Blizzard, I 8 5 S.C. I 3 I,  
��-9$ .. 8·�'- 633 ( I:937 ) · .· .  
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States in which the appeal is an equity app.eal : 
Arkansas. Constitution, Amendment 24 ;  Campbell v. Hammond, 
203 Ark. 1 30, 1 56 S.W. (2d) 7 5  ( 1 94 1 ) .  
California. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1 94 1 )  § 956a. 
Massachusetts. Ann. Laws ( 1 932)  c. 2 I 5 , § 9 ;  Tuells v. Flint, 
283 Mass. 1 06, 1 86 N.E. 222 ( 1 933) (but court indicates that the 
findings of the trial judge should be revised only if plainly wrong, and 
that they should be rarely reversed if they rest on open testimony) . 
Bowles v. Comstock, 286 Mass. I 59, I 89 N.E. 7 85 ( 1 934) .  
Mississippi. Chancery court deals with probate matters. 
New Jersey. Prerogative Court Rules ( 1 94 1 Revision) Rules 
82, 1 00. 
· New York. Surr. Ct. Act § 309 ; Matter of McMillan, 2 1 8  
N.Y. 64, 1 1 2 N.E. 5 73  ( I 9 1 6) ; In re Baldwin's Will, 2 16 App. 
Div. 1 1 1 , 2 1 5  N.Y.S. 1 49 ( 1 926) ,  affirmed without opinion 243 
N.Y. 646, 1 54 N.E. 64 1 .  
3· Time for appeal. The time for appeal varies from four days 
in Georgia to twelve months in Delaware. Several states give six 
months, while the majority have a shorter period, often thirty days 
or sixty days. A few states grant extensions in case of disabilities. The 
period for appeal in each jurisdiction is as follows: 
Ala. Code ( I  940) t. 7, § 7 76.  Varies from five days to six months 
depending on the decree which is appealed. 
Ariz. Code ( I 939) § 2 I- I 80 I .  Sixty days. 
Ark. Laws I 939, act 1 64, p. 388. Six months. 
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1 94 1 ) § 939· Sixty days. 
Colo. Stat. ( 1 935)  c. 46, § I 66. Ten days. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( 1 930) § 499 I .  One month ; or twelve months 
if the person had no notice and was not present ; but appeal on pay­
ment of claims in insolvent estates, and those based on disqualification 
of the judge, must be within one month ; period may be extended in 
case of disabilities. 
Del. Rev. Code ( 1 935 ) § 44 1 9. One year for appeal from 
orphans court to superior court, with one year after removal of dis­
abilities. 
D.C. Rules of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, in 1 I U.S. S. Ct. Digest (Supp. I 945)  Rule 1 0 (a) .  Three 
months. 
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Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 194 I )  § 732. I 6. Thirty days. 
Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) § 6-202. Four days. 
Idaho Laws Ann. ( I  94 3)  § I I -404. Sixty days. 
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Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § 484. Twenty days ; 
may be extended not to exceed sixty days. · 
Ind. Supreme Court Rule 2-2 in I Ind. Stat. (Burns, Supp. I 943) ·  
Ninety days ; ninety days after removal of disability. 
Iowa Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 335, in Laws I 943, c. 278. Thirty 
days. 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 5 9-2404 (amended Laws I 945, 
c. 237) .  Thirty days ; nine months from an order admitting, or 
refusing to admit a will to probate. 
Ky. Civ. Code ( I 938) § 729. Sixty days. Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) 
§ 394.240 gives five years for appeal from probate or denial of probate. 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. I 40, § 32 .  Twenty days ; if a person 
is beyond sea or out of the United States and without an attorney 
within the state, twenty days from his return or appointment of an at-
torney. 
Md. Code ( I  939) art. 5 ,  § 66. Thirty days. 
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. 2 I 5 ,  § 9. Twenty days. 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § 27 .3 I 7 8 (36) .  Twenty days; may 
be extended not to exceed forty days beyond the twenty days .. 
Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .7 I 2 . Thirty days ; or six months if · 
there is no notice of the order, judgment or decree appealed from. 
Miss. Code ( 1 942) § I I48.  Thirty days for interlocutory orders ; 
nothing found on final orders. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) § 285 .  During the term at which 
the decision is made, or within ten days thereafter ; nonresident of the 
county has twenty days. 
Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 935 )  § 9732. Sixty days. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 943) § 3o-l6o2. Thirty days. 
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  § 9385 .60. Six months. 
N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c. 365, § 2. Sixty days. 
N. ]. Rev. Stat. ( I 937 and Supp. I 940) § § 2 : 3 1-90, 3 : 2-52, 
2: 3 1-94. Twenty days for appeal from surrogate to orphans court 
from an order in proving an inventory or granting letters of administra­
tion or guardianship ; three months for appeal from surrogate to 
orphans court re probate of a will, but six months for an appellant who 
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resided out of the state at the time of decedent's death ; thirty days for 
appeals from orphans court to prerogative court. 
N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 1 6-4 1 8. Ninety days. 
N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 293· Thirty days. 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) § §  1-272, 28-70, 28-162 .  Five days 
for appeal re discovery of assets ; otherwise ten days. 
N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943) § 3o-2603. Thirty days. 
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1 945)  § I 2223-7· Twenty days 
for an appeal to the supreme court or court of appeals ; otherwise ten 
days; may be extended for twenty days in case of death or insanity of 
a party. 
Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 I )  t. 58, § 724. Ten days; or thirty days for a 
party who was not present. 
Ore. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 943) § I 0-803. Sixty days to supreme 
court ; thirty days to circuit court. 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t. 20, § 260 1 .  Six months for ap-
peal from orphans court. Nothing found on appeal from register. 
R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 938)  c. 5 73, § I . Forty days. 
S. C. Code ( I 942) § 230. Fifteen days. 
S. D. Code ( 1 939) § 35 .2 1 03. Thirty days. 
Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 938) § 9030. Next term if more than five 
days intervene ; if less than five days, then the next succeeding term. 
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 942) art. 932 ; Rules Civ. Proc. 
(Franki, I 942) Rule 332. Appeal bond is to be filed in fifteen days; 
certiorari lies within two years, with two years after removal of dis­
abilities. 
Utah Code ( I 943) § 104-4 1-2. Ninety days. 
Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 933) § 3005. Twenty days. 
Va. Code ( I 942) § 6337 .  Four months. 
Wash. Supreme Court Rule V ( I ) , in I Wash. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 
I 940) . Thirty days. 
W. Va. Code ( I 943) § 5 764. Four months. 
Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § §  324.0 I ,  324.04, 324.05. Sixty days; .may 
be extended to one year if person aggrieved fails to appeal without 
fault on his part. 
Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 I )  § 89-4902. Ten days. 
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4· One appeal to bring up all errors. The normal procedure in 
decedents' estate proceedings requires an appeal from each "final" order 
made, with the result that there may · be many appeals during the 
settlement of a single estate. There may, for instance, be an appeal 
from the probate of the will, the appointment of the personal repre­
sentative, decisions on claims, accountings, the decree of final distribu­
tion, and perhaps other matters. The Model Probate Code formulates 
a method analogous to appeals in civil a<;rions, so that errors saved by 
proper objections may be brought up together on appeal from the 
decree of final distribution. Although there are obvious differences 
between a probate proceeding and a civil action, they are not so es­
sentially different that the same methods of appeal cannot be used in 
both types of proceeding. There are, however, certain decisions in 
the course of administration of an estate which are so fundamental to 
the whole proceeding that it is necessary to permit an appeal from them 
before continuing with the administration. The decision on the probate 
of the will and the appointment of the personal representative clearly 
form the basis upon which all other steps in the administration may 
depend, and therefore appeals on these matters should not be delayed. 
Other matters, however, will not so materially affect succeeding steps 
in the administration that a review of them is essential before the estate 
is fully administered. 
An approach to this method of appeal is found in Alabama, where it 
is provided that either party to an appeal in probate matters may by a 
bill o� exceptions reserve "any charge, opinion, ruling or decision . . . 
which would not otherwise appear of record." Ala. Code ( 1 940) t .. 
7, § 7 83. And in New York each intermediate order which neces­
sarily affects the decree appealed from may be included in the appeal. 
N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 295 · In addition, in two states whose probate 
business is handled by the court of general jurisdiction, the code of 
civil procedure governs probate appeals, and the rules permitting review 
of intermediate orders on appeal from final orders must ,necessarily 
apply to probate appeals as well as to appeals in civil actions. See Wash. 
Rev. Code ( 1 932) § §  1 5 9 1 ,  1 736 ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 1 )  § 88-
9 1 1 .  It is not clear how far these .rules bring about a s4bstaptial 
variation from the probate practi�e::�H�wed in most state_s.;: ·. · · · 
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§ 2 I .  RECORDS 
Provisions regarding the making and keeping of records in the 
probate court are found in all the states. While these provisions are 
commonly grouped together, in some states the pertinent sections are 
scattered throughout the probate statutes. In Missouri, for example, 
there are some ten or twelve scattered sections covering the subject. 
In general, it may be said that the purpose of making records is the 
preservation of documents and information. The filing of the various 
papers is sufficient preservation in some cases, but the danger of loss 
or intentional removal of such important documents as wills and bonds 
warrants their duplication by copying them into the court records. 
Without attempting to list all the substantive provisions for record­
ing found in the various states, a few of the more common require­
ments may be noted. All except two or three states require recording 
of probated wills, and almost as many require recording of letters and 
bonds. A less common requirement is the recording of the inventory 
and appraisal. Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941  and Supp. 1 944) 
c. 3, §§ 323, 327 ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) § 7 1 . Recording of 
claims is a requirement in Kan. Gen. Stat. ( Supp. 1 943) § 59-2 1 2, 
and in Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .03.  It is commonly required that 
orders, decrees and judgments be recorded. Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 
1 943) § 5 9-2 1 2 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § 27 .3 1 7 8 (28) ; Minn. 
Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .03. 
A given state may have few·or many of these provisions. In Cali­
fornia, for example, the only records required are records of probated 
wills and of orders and decrees. Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 
1 944) §§ 332,  1 2 2 1 .  In Florida, a record must be made of probated 
wills, letters, bonds, orders and judgments, and all other writings re­
quired to be recorded. A progress docket is also required, noting each 
pleading or document filed. An instrument settling an account of 
the personal representative may also be recorded. Fla. Stat. Ann. 
( 1 94 1 )  § §  732.07,  733.48. The Kansas statute provides for a 
record of probated wills, elections filed, letters issued, certificates of 
appointment, bonds, orders, judgments and decrees, and such other 
documents as the court may determine. In addition, there is an ap­
pearance docket listing ail documents filed, a claims docket, and various 
indexes. Kan. Gen. Stat. ( Supp. I94J) § 59-2 1 2. · In Michigan 
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records must be kept o f  orders, sentences, decrees, and all other official 
acts of the judge, and probated wills, letters and all other things proper 
to be recorded. Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § 27 .3 1 78 ( 28 ) .  
§ 29  . . ADVANCEMENTS 
In general on advancements, see Atkinson, Wills ( I 9 3 7 )  § 2 3 9 ;  
3 Woerner, Administration ( 3d ed., 1 923) 1 8 79-1 898;  annota­
tions in 26 A.L.R. 1 1 78  and 76 A.L.R. 1420. Every state except 
New M�xico has legislation on the subject. In some states it is little 
more than an enunciation of the rule in general terms, while in other 
states the statute is detailed. There is one group of fourteen states 
whose statutes are almost identical, or include almost identical sections; 
This group consists of Alabama, California, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South 
Dakota, Utah and Washington. The Wisconsin code also contains 
a few of the sections which appear in this group. There is also a close 
similarity between Virginia and West Virginia and between Mary­
land and the District of Columbia. J'here is some similarity, though 
less marked, between Colorado and Wyoming ; between Arkansas 
and Indiana ; and between Arizona, Mississippi, Missouri and Texas. 
Otherwise, there is little similarity as to form, but nearly all the statutes 
are alike as to substance. 
1 .  What donees are covered? The statutes usually cover gifts to 
children ; or to children and their issue ; or to children and other lineal 
descendants. A few statutes refer ·simply to heirs, and in Florida the 
statute applies to gifts to "any person." In Nevada, one section speaks 
of "any donee" but the succeeding sections refer to "heirs." Twenty­
six states provide that the representative of a deceased advancee will 
be treated as if the advancement were made to him, but two juris­
dictions (District of Columbia and Maryland) provide the opposite. 
The other states are silent on this point. Eight states provide that 
bringing in the advancement does not increase the share of· the surviv­
ing spouse, and perhaps North Carolina also provides thus. Georgia, 
on the other hand, stipulates that the spouse's share is thereby increased. 
2. Must the advancement he in writing? California, Illinois, 
Maine, Nevada, and Oregon so provide. In addition, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island and Vermont n;quire a writing unless the gift w:as made 
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before two witnesses "who were requested to take notice thereof." 
(In New Hampshire also a deed expressed to be made for love or 
affection may be an advancement.) In several other states there is a 
statute which seems to require a writing, by a provision identical or 
nearly identical with the following Michigan statute : "All gifts and 
grants shall be deemed to have been made in advancement, if they 
are expressed in the gift or grant to be so made, or if charged in writing 
by the intestate as an advancement, or acknowledged in writing as such 
by the child or other descendant." Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I  94 3) 
§ 2 7 .  3 I 7 8 ( I  6o) . Similar language appears in Georgia, Idaho, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Okla­
homa, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. This form 
of statute has been held to require a writing in Olney v. Brown, I 63 
Mich. 1 25 ,  I 28  N.W. 241  ( 1 9 1 0) ;  Stark v. Stark, 1 2 8  Neb. 524, 
259  N.W. 523 ( 1 935) ; Arthur v. Arthur, I43 Wis. 1 26, I 26 N.W. 
5 50  ( I9 IO) ; see also Estate of Yates, 88 Okla. 259, 2 1 3  P. 8 7  
( I 923 ) .  Contra, Bransford v .  Crawford, 5 1  Ga. 20 ( I 874) ; see 
also Hornstra v. Avon State Bank, 55 S.D. 5 1 3, 226 N.W. 740 
( I 929) · 
3· How is the gift valued? It is commonly provided that if the 
value is stated in the writing accompanying the gift then that value is 
controlling ; but if not so stated, then the value at the time the gift was 
made governs. The following exceptions should be noted:  In Con­
necticut, the statute perhaps means that the value at the time of final 
distribution controls ; in South Carolina the value at the time of de­
cedent's death controls ; and in Georgia the writing is not conclusive 
as to value "unless inserted as part of testator's will or referred to 
therein." 
4· Are both realty and personalty included? Thirty-seven states 
so provide, and in most of the others the language is "property," which 
presumably would include both kinds. In District of Columbia and 
Maryland,. however, the statute appears to cover only gifts of realty. 
It is not uncommon to have a provision to the effect that an advance­
ment of realty shall be taken out of the donee's distributive share of 
realty, and one of personalty taken out of the .distributive share of per­
sonalty, with any excess of one type made. up out of .the other type. 
The Vermont statute is of thi� type, butfurther provides- that the heirs 
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can agree to some different arrangement. In Indiana, however, ap­
parently all advancements, whether of realty or personalty, are taken 
out of the share of personalty. 
5 ·  Education of a child as an advancement. Some states provide 
that education or maintenance of a child shall not be deemed an ad­
vancement; this is usually limited to minor children. 
6. Do advancements apply in partial intestacy ? Most of the ' 
statutes throw no light on this point. But in Alabama the statute refers 
to the executor or administrator, and in Georgia the decedent's will is 
referred to. ( See quotation in part 3 supra. )  In Kansas, though the 
statute does not say anything about partial intestacy, it could apply in 
such a case. In Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia 
the statute clearly covers partial intestacy, since in all of these states a 
gift by will is considered as an advancement. In these four states, 
intent apparently is not a factor ; if one person has received more than 
others, an equalization must take place. 
The statutes on advancements are as follows: Ala. Code ( I  940) 
t. I 6, §§ I I, I4 to 24; Ariz. Code ( I 939) §§ 38-I5o8, 39-I07 ; 
Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 937)  § §  4353 to 4356 ;  Cal. Prob. Code Ann. 
(Deering, I 944) §§ 1 050 to I 054 ;  Colo. Stat. ( I 93 5 )  c. I 76, 
§ § 5 ,  6, 2 2 3 ;  Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 930)  § 4980 ;  Del. Rev. Code 
( I 935 )  § §  3 752 ,  385 I ;  D. C. Code ( I 940) § §  I 8-108,  I 8-7o 7 ;  
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 734.07 ;  Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) § §  I I 3-
I O I 3  to I I 3-I O I 7 ;  Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § §  I 4- I07  to I 4-
I I I ,  I 5- I323 ; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § I 66 ; Ind. 
Stat. (Burns, I 933) § §  6-I S03 to 6-I S04, 6-2354 to 6-2355 ; 
Iowa Code ( I 939) § I 2029 ; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943)  § 59-
5 I o ;  Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I  944) .§ 39 I .  I 40 ;  Me. Rev. Stat. ( I  944) c. 
I 5 6, § §  4 to 6 ;  Md. Code ( I 939) art. 93, § I 33 ; Mass. Ann. Laws 
· ( I 932)  c. I 96, § §  3 to 8 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) 
§§ 27 ·3 I 78 ( I  5 7 )  to 2 7 ·3  I 78  ( I 62) ; Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  §§ 525 ·53 ,  
. 525 .53 I ;  Minn. Laws I 943, c .  322,  § I4 ;  Miss . .  Code ( I 942) 
§ 475 ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942) §§ 3 I I , 3 I 2, 5 2 7 ; Mont. Rev. 
Code ( I 935)  § §  7082 to 7 086, �0345 ; Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943) 
§ § 3o-I I 2  to 30-1 1 7 ;  Nev: Comp. Laws ( I 929)  § 992 I ;  Nev. 
Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  § §  9882.267 ,  9882 .30 I to 9882.305 ; 
N. H. Rev. Laws ( I942) c. 360, § §  I 3  to I 6 ;  N. J. Rev. Stat. 
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( 1 937 )  § §  3 : 3-3, 3 :  5-2 ; N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, § §  85,  86 ; N. C. 
Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) §§ 28-150, 28-1 5 1 ,  29-1 ( 2 ) ; N. D. Rev. Code 
( 1 943) § §  30-2 1 1 2 to 30-2 1 1 7 ;  Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 93 7 )  
§ §  1 0503-1 9  to 1 0503-2 2 ;  Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t .  58, § 66x ; t .  84, 
§ §  223 to 227 ; Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) § §  x 6- 103, 1 6-30 1 to 
1 6-306 ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 930) t. 20, § 135 ; R. I. Gen. 
Laws ( 1 938)  c. 567,  § §  22, 2 3 ;  S. C. Code ( 1 942) § 8909 ; S. D. 
Code ( 1 939) § § 35 · 1 706, 56 .0 1 1 4  to 56 .o u 8 ;  Tenn. Code 
(Michie, 1 938) § §  8402 to 8405 ; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 
1 942) art. 2576 ; Utah Code ( 1 943)  § §  I O I-4-1 8 to 1 0 1-4-22, 
1 02-1 2-9 ; Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 933)  §§ 2981 to 2986 ; Va. Code 
( 1 942 ) § 5 2 78 ;  Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 932) § §  1 348 to 1 353, 1 5 5 7 ;  
W. Va. Code ( 1 943) §4094 ; Wis. Stat. ( 1 943)  § §  3 1 5 .05, 3 1 8.24 
to 3 1 8 .29 ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 1 )  §§ 88-3705 to 88-3707 .  
§ 3 1 .  ABOLITION oF DowER 
The following analysis of statutes on the abolition of dower proceeds 
on the theory that the essential attribute of common-law dower is the 
inchoate interest which the wife holds in all lands of which the husband 
is seized during coverture. If this inchoate interest is retained in the 
statute law of a state, it may fairly be said that dower is not abolished 
in that state. It should be pointed out that the community property 
states are not considered here, since dower forms no part of their 
scheme of succession. Those states are Arizona, California, Idaho, 
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington. 
According to the express language of the statutes in twelve states, 
the estates of dower and curtesy are abolished ; but in four of these 
an inchoate interest is in fact retained, so that the abolition of dower 
and curtesy is negatived. In the other eight states of this group the 
inchoate interest is actually abolished, the interest of the surviving 
spouse in the decedent's real estate being limited to that owned by him 
at the time of his death. The twelve states in which dower and · 
curtesy are expressly abolished are as follows : 
(a) Abolished in fact as well as by express language : Colo. Stat. 
( 1 935 )  c. 1 76, § I ; Conn. Gen. Stat. ( 1 930) § §  5 1 54, 5 1 56 ; 
Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 453 ;  N. Y. Real Property Law, § 1 90 ;  N. D. 
Rev. Code ( 1 943) § 56-o xo2 ; Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t. 84, § 2 1 4 ;  
S. D. Code ( 1 939) § 56.o xo3 ;  Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 1 )  § 88-4001. 
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(b) Abolished by express language but not abolished in fact : 
Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 933) § 6-2353 ( §  6-2325 shows retention of 
inchoate interest) ; Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. I 5 6, § 8 (c. I 56, § I , 
shows retention of inchoate interest) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943) § 30-
I 04 ( §  30-I O I  shows retention of inchoate inte.rest) ; Utah Code 
( I 943) § I O I-4-9 ( §' I O I-4-3 shows retention of inchoate interest) .  
I n  three other states, although it is not specifically stated that dower 
is abolished, the statutes have this effect, for the sutviving spouse's 
interest in real estate is limited to that owned at death. Although two 
of these states retain the word "dower" in their statutes, it is clear that 
there is no inchoate interest. These states are as follows: Ga. Code 
Ann. ( I 936) § 3 I-IO I ; Tenn. Code (Michie, I 938)  § 835 I ;  Vt. 
Pub. Laws ( I 933) § 295 1 .  
Four other states have achieved a partial abolition of dower. One 
of these states cuts off the inchoate interest in lands conveyed more 
than seven years befor.e claim of dower is made, while another state 
cuts it off as to lands conveyed before a certain date. The other two 
states take an opposite course, cutting off the inchoate interest as to 
lands which the decedent owned at death, but retaining it as to lands 
which he conveyed without the consent of the surviving spouse. The 
four states of this group are as follows : 
Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 937 )  § 44 I4. The inchoate right of dower 
is barred when the husband "has been barred of his title, or of any 
interest in said property for seven years or more, and also in real prop­
erty or interest therein conveyed by the husband but not signed by 
his wife when such conveyance is made or has been made for a period 
of seven years or more." 
Minn. Stat. ( I  94 I )  § 5 I 9.09. "All inchoate estates in dower and 
curtesy, and all inchoate estates or statutory interests in lieu of dower 
and curtesy, are hereby abolished in all lands in this state which have 
been conveyed prior to January I ,  I 920, by the husband or wife of 
· the one entitled to such inchoate dower or curtesy, or statutory interest, 
· by a conveyance in writing." (To the effect that the inchoate interest 
is otherwise retained, see § 5 2.5 . I 6, subd. 2.) 
Ohio Gen. Code ( I 937)  § 1 0502- 1 .  "Such dower interest shall 
· terminate and be barred upon the death of the consort except : 
" (a) ·To the extent that any such real property at any time during 
the marriage was conveyed by the deceased consort, the surviving 
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spouse not having relinquished <>fl. been barred of dower therein ; and 
" (b) To the extent that any such real property at any time during 
the marriage was encumbered by the deceased consort by mortgage, 
judgment, lien (except tax lien) , or otherwise, or aliened during the 
marriage by judicial or other involuntary sale, the surviving spouse not 
having relinquished or been barred of dower therein. . • ." 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t. 20, § 3 1 .  The intestate share 
of the widow "shall be in lieu and full satisfaction of her dower at 
common law, so far as relates to land of which the husband died seized ; 
and her share in lands aliened by the husband in his lifetime, without 
her joining in the conveyance, shall be the same as her share in lands 
of which the husband died seized." 
In all other states, except those having community property legis­
lation, an inchoate interest is retained. No analysis will be made here 
of these statutes but it may be pointed out that in many states the com­
mon-law life estate is changed to a fee ; and not infrequently the surviv­
ing spouse takes one-half rather than one-third. In some states a 
nonresident spouse has no inchoate interest, and in some the inchoate 
interest does not attach to lands sold on judicial sale. See 3 Vernier, 
American Family Law ( I 935) § 1 89. 
§ 32.  AMOUNT DISSENTING SPOUSE MAY OBTAIN 
This note deals with the amount which a surviving spouse may 
take in case of an election against the will. There is great variation 
in this amount. In some states the surviving husband apparently has 
no election, in others he may elect but takes less than the widow, while 
in still other states the two spouses are treated alike. Sometimes the 
dissenting husband or wife is given both realty and personalty against 
the will, sometimes realty only. A number of states retain common­
law dower and curtesy or a closely analogous estate ; while in some 
stales the dissenting spouse takes as in intestacy. In a few states the 
spouse may choose between dower and an intestate share. The intestate 
share is, of course, subject to the decedent's debts unless otherwise 
provided, but dower and cu;tesy are free of debi:s. 
It is common for the share of the surviving spouse to vary according 
to the number of heirs or the size of the estate. Thus in a state where 
the dissenting spouse takes a:n intestate share, he may be able to ,take the 
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whole estate if there are no  close heirs, o r  he  may get as little as one­
fourth if there are several close heirs, e.g. Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 943) 
§ 30-10 1 .  Indeed, in states where a surviving spouse takes "a child's 
share," the proportion taken may obviously be even less than one­
fourth. Sometimes the statute fixes a maximum limit on the amount 
which the dissenting spouse may take, as in New York where he can­
not take more than half the net estate in any case. N. Y. Dec. Est . .  
Law, § I 8. As an example of the share varying with the size of the 
estate, Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. I 9 I ,  § I 5 ,  provides that if the 
intestate share which the spouse elects against the will exceeds $ 1 0,000 
he may take only the income of the excess over that amount. And 
in New Hampshire the dissenting spouse may take the first $5000 
and half of the excess if no issue survive. N. H.  Rev. Laws (I 942) 
c. 359, § §  I O  to I 3. 
In twenty-three jurisdictions it is possible for the dissenting spouse 
to take one-half or more of the estate. These jurisdictions are 
Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia (as to personalty) , Illinois, 
Kansas, Kentucky (as to personalty) , Maine, Maryland, Massa­
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Okla­
homa, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Wyoming. In the remaining 
states the dissenting spouse takes either a fee in less than half the estate, 
or a life estate in a half or a third. 
Some statutes provide that debts are to be paid before computing 
the share of the dissenting spouse, Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 930) § 5 I 56.  
Two states provide that one-third of the realty goes to the surviving 
spouse free from debts, but where there is a possibility of his or her 
taking more, the statutes give creditors a priority as to the excess. See 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. I 56, § I  and Va. Code ( I 942) § §  5 I I 7  
and 5 I 39a. Arkansas is analogous but applies to both realty and per­
sonalty. Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I  937 )  § 442 1 .  Although the Mississippi 
statute does not disclose whether or not dower or the intestate share 
i� �omputed on the basis of the gross or the net estate, Gordon v. James, 
86 Miss, 7 I 9> 39 So. I 8, I L.R.A. (N.S.) 46I  ( I 905 ) ,  holds that the 
net estate controls. In a large number of the states neither the statutes 
nor the decisions decide this issue. 
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It is impossible to describe, within the limits of this note, all the 
conditions under which the dissenting spouse may take a given share 
of the estate. Therefore, only the largest possible amount which he 
may take under any circumstances will be noted, it being understood 
that this amount may depend on the number of heirs or the size of the 
estate or other factors. Th� community property states are not listed 
here, since that system of law proceeds on a different basis ; nor are 
North and South Dakota listed, as there is apparently no election in 
those states. 
Ala. Code ( I  940) t. 34, § 4 I .  Widow's dower may be a life 
estate in half the lands owned during the marriage. Under t. 6 I ,  
§ I 8 and t. I 6 ,  § I o, she may also take an intestate share in the per­
sonalty, which may be the entire estate up to $5o,ooo. 
Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 937)  § 442 1 .  Widow's dower may be half the 
realty in fee simple and half of the personalty absolutely ; as against 
creditors she may take only one-third of the realty and personalty. 
Colo. Stat. ( I 935 ) c. I 7 6, § 37· Neither spouse may will away 
from the other more than half the estate. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( 1930) § 5 I s6. Either spouse may take one­
third of the realty and personalty, after payment of debts. 
Del. Rev. Code ( I 93 5 )  § 3767 .  Widow's dower is one-third of 
the lands owned during the marriage. 
D. C. Code ( I 940) § I 8-20 I .  Widow's dower is one-third of 
the lands owned during the marriage. By § I 8-2 I 5 ,  husband has 
right of curtesy; amount not set out. Under § I 8-2 I I ,  either spouse 
may also take an intestate share of personalty ; under § I 8-702, this 
may be the whole estate. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I  94 I )  § 7 3 I .  34· Widow's dower is one-third in 
fee of 'all lands owned during the marriage, and one-third absolutely 
in personalty owned at death. These shares are ratably liable for estate 
and inheritance taxes and costs of administration. 
Ga. Code Ann. ( I 9 3 6) § 3 I-I o 1 .  Widow's dower is a life 
estate in one-third of the lands owned at death. 
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § I68 .  Either spouse 
may take half the realty and personalty owned at death, subject to 
debts. 
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•• · Ind. Stat. ' (Burns, 1933) § 6-2325 .  Widow may take as heir 
one-third of all land owned during the marriage. By § 6-2 3 I 3, this 
is free from creditors except that if the realty exceeds $ I O,ooo in 
value she takes only one-fourth as against creditors, and only one-fifth 
if it exceeds $2o,ooo. By § 6-232 I ,  husband may take as heir one­
third of the wife's realty subject to her debts contracted before mar­
nage. 
Iowa Code ( I 939) § I I 990. Either spouse may take dower, a 
fee simple in one-third of the land owned during the marriage. 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 5 9-602. Neither spouse may 
will away from the other more than half his property. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I  944) § 392 .020. Either spouse may hav� dower, 
a life estate in one-third of the land owned during the marriage, and 
an absolute estate in half the surplus personalty. 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. I 56, § I4 .  Either spouse may take 
an intestate share. Under c. I 56, § § I and 20, this may be all the 
realty and personalty ; one-third of �he realty goes free from debts. To 
the effect that the share of personalty is taken from the net estate, see 
Fogg's Estate, I 05 Me. 480, 74 A. I I 33 ( I 909) ; In re Appeal of 
Smith, I 07 Me. 247, 78  A. 97 ( I 9 I O ) .  
Md. Code (Supp. I 943) art. 93, § 3 I 4. Either spouse may take 
$2000 or its equivalent in property and half the resi�ue of the land 
as heir and half the surplus personalty. 
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. I 9 I ,  § I 5 .  Either spouse may take an 
intestate share ; if this exceeds $ I  o,ooo he takes only the income of 
the excess over this amount ; and if there are no kindred the spouse is 
limited to the interest he would take if there were kindred but no 
issue. By c. I 90, § I ,  this intestate share may be all the realty and 
personalty, subject to debts. 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 27 .3 I 78 ( I 39 ) .  Widow may elect 
intestate share, up to $5000 of the personalty and half of the remainder 
pf her intestate share ; if her intestate share of realty is all the realty, 
she takes half absolutely, and half subject to the provisions of the will. 
Minn. Stat. ( I  94 I )  § 52  5 .  I 6. Either spouse may take as heir half 
of the realty owned during the marriage and half of the personalty. 
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Miss. Code ( 1 942)  § 668. Either spouse may take an intestate 
share, but not more than half the realty and personalty. This share 
is taken from the net estate ; Gordon v. James, 86  Miss. 7 1 9, 39 So. 
I S, I L.R.A. (N.S. ) 46 1 ( 1 905 ) .  
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942) § 3 2 3 .  Either spouse may take a 
child's share of the personalty. By § §  324 and 325 ,  either spouse 
may take half the realty and personalty absolutely, subject to debts ; 
the widow is also entitled to all the realty and personalty which came 
to the husband in right of the marriage, and to all his personalty which 
came to him with the written assent of the wife. 
Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 935 )  § 582 1 .  Widow may take absolutely 
half the realty owned _at death, subject to debts. 
Neb. Rev� Stat. ( 1 943) § 30-1 07 .  Either spouse may take an 
intestate share. By § 30-1 0 1 ,  this may be the whole net estate. 
N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1942 ) c. 3 59, § §  1 0  to 13 .  Either spouse may 
take $5000 in value and half the remainder of both realty and per­
sonalty, subject to debts. 
N. ]. Rev. Stat. ( 1 937 )  § 3 : 3 7-1 and 3 : 3 7-2. Dower and 
curtesy, a life estate in half the realty owned during the marriage. 
N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, § 1 8. Either spouse may take an intestate 
share, but not over half the net estate. 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) § 30-2 . Widow may take intestate 
share of realty and personalty. Under § §  28-1 49 and 29-1,  this 
may be the whole estate. Husband has curtesy under § 5 2-1 6. 
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1 944) § 1 0504-55 .  Either spouse 
may take intestate share, but not over half the net estate. 
Okla. Stat. ( I  941 ) t. 84, § 44. Neither spouse may will away 
from the other so much that the survivor takes less than his intestate 
share, except that he may will away half the property not acquired by 
joint industry during the marriage. By t. 84, § 2 1 3, the intestate 
share may be the whole estate. 
Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) § §  1 7- 10 1  (amended Laws 1 945, c. 
66) and 1 7-40 1 .  Dower and curtesy, a life estate in half of the 
land owned during the marriage. 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 930)  t. 20, § 26 1 .  Either spouse may 
take an intestate share of realty and personalty. By t. 20, § 1 1  I )  this 
may be the whole estate.• 
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R. I. Gen. Laws ( I 938) c. 566, § I 2 .  Husband has curtesy, 
amount not set out. Under c. 4 I 8, § I ,  widow's dower is one-third 
of all lands owned during the marriage. 
S. C. (Apparently has common-law dower.)  
Tenn. Code (Michie, I 938)  § §  835 I and 8353 .  Widow's dower, 
life estate in one-third of lands owned at death. By § 8359, husband 
has curtesy, and may also take one-third of the personalty. Under 
§ 8360, widow may have same share of personalty. 
Utah Code ( I 943) § I O I-4-3· Widow takes as heir a fee simple 
in one-third of all land owned during the marriage, free from debts 
except certain specified liens. 
Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 933) § §  295 I and 2964. Either spouse may 
take fee in half of all land owned at death. 
Va. Code ( I 942) § §  5 I I 7, 5 I 39a. Dower and curtesy, which 
may be all the realty ; one-third of all land owned during the mar­
riage is free from creditors' claims. 
W. Va. Code ( 1 943) § 4096. Either spouse may take dower, 
one-third of all land owned during the marriage. 
Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 233.0 1 .  Widow's dower, one-third of all 
lands owned during the marriage. 
Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 1 )  § 88-10 1 .  Either spouse may take half 
the real and personal estate, subject to debts. 
§ 32 .  SPousE's MiscoNDUCT As BARRING RIGHT OF ELECTION 
In general on this subject, see 3 Vernier, American Family Law 
( I 935 )  § 202. Twenty-four states are listed there as having statutes 
on the subject, but the Illinois statute was omitted in the recent probate 
code, bringing the number down to twenty-three. Of these twenty­
three states, five purport to bar dower only, and do not affect any other 
rights which the surviving spouse might have in the property of the 
decedent. The statutes of these five jurisdictions are Ark. Dig. Stat. 
( I 93 7 )  § § 4397,  4398 ; D. C. Code ( I 940) § 1 8-203 ; Ga. Code 
Ann. (Supp. I 943) § 3 I-I I O, subd. 5 ;  N. J. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 7 )  
§ §  3 : 39-2, 3 :  39-3 ; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 937 )  § I 0502-5. 
The significant language of the remaining 1 8  states is as follows: 
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Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I  930) § 5 I s6 .  Spouse forfeits statutory share 
"who, without sufficient cause, shall have abandoned the other and 
continued such abandonment to the time of the other's death." 
Del. Rev. Code ( I 935)  § 37 75 .  A wife who wilfully leaves her 
husband and goes with an adulterer forfeits dower "and all demands, 
as his widow, upon his real or personal estate, and any estate, charge, 
or benefit" settled on her in lieu of dower. 
Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 933)  § 6-2329. Wife who leaves her husband 
and is living in adultery at the time of his death takes "no part of the 
estate of her husband." Section 6-2330 has a similar provision for 
an adulterous husband, and § 6-233 I has a similar provision for a 
husband who abandons his wife without just cause and fa�1s to make 
suitable provision for her. 
Iowa Code ( I 939) § I 2032. No person who feloniously kills the 
decedent shall inherit or receive any interest as surviving spouse, or 
take any devise or legacy. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) § 392 .090. "If either spouse voluntarily 
leaves the other and lives in adultery, the offending party forfeits all 
right and interest in and to the property and estate of the other, unless 
they afterward become reconciled and live together as husband and 
wife." 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) c. I 53 ,  § 45 · If a wife deserts her husband 
without just cause, or if he is living apart from her for just cause, 
after one year the husband may petition the probate court for a decree 
permitting him to "convey his real property in the same manner as 
if he were sole, and no portion of his estate shall descend to his said 
wife at his decease, neither shall she be entitled to receive any distributive 
share thereof or to waive any will made by him in her favor." C.  
I 53 ,  § 44,  has a similar provision in favor of the wife. 
Md. Code ( I 939) art. 27 ,  § I 9. Upon conviction for bigamy a 
husband forfeits all claim or title as tenant by curtesy, and all his 
claim or title to any estate, real, personal or mixed which he may have 
in right of his first wife ; a wife who is convicted of bigamy forfeits 
dower and the distributive share of personalty which she would be 
entitled to if the husband had died intestate. 
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. 209, § §  35  and 36  are similar to the 
Maine statute described above. The defaulting spouse shall not be 
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entitled to waive the provisions of the will or claim such portion of his 
estate as he would take if the decedent died intestate, or to dower or 
curtesy. 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I  93 7 )  § 26. I I  8 1 .  No person who is living 
in bigamy at the time of the death of his lawful spouse "shall inherit 
or take any estate, right or interest whatever, by way of dower, al­
lowances, inheritance, distribution or otherwise, in the property or 
estate, real or personal, of the deceased." 
Minn. Stat. ( I  94 I )  § 5 I 9.07 is similar to the Maine statute 
described above. A person who is deserted by his spouse for one year, 
or who would be entitled to a divorce, or when the spouse has been 
insane for ten years, may apply to the district court for a decree per­
mitting him to convey his lands as if unmarried, and barring the de­
faulting spouse from "any right or estate by the curtesy or in dower, 
or otherwise" in his lands. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942) § 337 ·  A wife who voluntarily 
leaves her husband and goes away and continues with an adulterer, 
or abandons him without cause and continues to. live separate for one 
year next preceding his death, or after being ravished consents to the 
ravisher, forfeits dower, jointure, homestead and statutory allowances ; 
a husband guilty of similar offenses forfeits his inheritance, jointure, 
homestead, curtesy and statutory allowances in real and personal prop­
erty. 
N. H. Rev. Laws ( I 942) c. 359, § 1 8 .  "If a husband has will­
ingly abandoned his wife and has absented himself from her, or has 
willfully neglected to support her, or has not been heard from, in con­
sequence of his own neglect, for the term of three years next preced­
ing her death, he shall not be entitled to any interest or portion in her 
estate, real or personal, except such as she may have given to him in 
her will." C. 359, § 1 9  has similar penalties if the decedent was 
justifiably living apart from the surviving husband or wife because 
the survivor was guilty of conduct constituting cause for divorce. 
N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, § 1 8, subd. 4· "No husband who has neg­
lected or refused to provide for his wife, or has abandoned her, shall 
have the right of such an election." 
Subd. 5· "No wife who has abandoned her husband shall have the 
right of such an election." 
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N. C .  Gen. Stat. ( I 943) § 28-I o. Divorce a vinculo or felonious 
slaying of decedent bars rights to a distributive share of the personalty. 
Sections 2 8-I I and 28-I 2 have similar penalties against a spouse who 
elopes with an adulterer and is not living with the decedent at the time 
of his death. Sections 52-I9  and 52-20 have similar rules, and also 
bar the year's allowance and rights in realty under a settlement made 
in consideration of marriage. 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t. 20, § 4 1 .  A husband who for 
one year prior to the wife's death neglected or refused to provide for 
her, or deserted her, cannot claim any title or interest in her real or 
personal estate under the rules of intestate succession. Section 42 has 
similar penalties for a wife who for one year or more previous to the 
husband's death maliciously and wilfully deserted him. 
S. C. Code ( I  942) § 89 I 2 .  A wife who has forfeited dower also 
forfeits her distributive share of real estate under the rules of intestate 
succession. Sections 8 58  3 and 8 5 84 provide for forfeiture of dower 
by desertion without cause or elopement with an adulterer. 
Va. Code ( I 942) § 5 1 23 .  "If a wife wilfully deserts or abandons 
her husband and such desertion or abandonment continues until his 
death, she shall be barred of all interest in his estate as tenant by 
dower, distributee or otherwise." By § 5277 ,  an adulterous spouse 
is barred of an intestate share in the personal estate. 
W. Va. Code ( I 943) § 4093· A spovse who has forfeited dower 
also forfeits "any part of the estate of the other, unless the same be 
given him or her by will and then only so much as is so given." Sec­
tion 4 I I 4 provides for forfeiture of dower by adultery or desertion 
without cause. 
Many of these statutes have very limited application. Thus, the 
Michigan statute applies only in case of a bigamous marriage, which is 
probably relatively uncommon. The statutes which provide a for­
feiture in case of mere desertion without cause have a wider applica­
tion, and certainly there is as much reason to bar the right of election 
in case of desertion as in case of adultery or bigamy. But such a statute 
may lead to much. litigation. The type of statute found in Maine, 
Massachusetts and Minnesota, providing for a decree that the spouse 
has forfeited his or her rights, has the merit that any litigation will take 
place during the lifetime of both spouses, and is likely to take place 
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within a relatively short period after the desertion. But what if they 
effect a reconciliation ? Will the decree automatically be voiqed, or 
must' the parties go into court and have the decree set aside ? No cases 
have been found on this question. 
It is noteworthy that Kansas, which enacted a probate code recently, 
has no statute barring the right of election, and the Illinois statute was 
omitted from tl;le recent probate code of that state. 
This note does not include statutes which deal generally with the 
effect ·of murder of an ancestor by an heir, although such statutes 
may well include the case of the murder of a spouse by a surviving 
spouse. However, the Iowa and North Carolina statutes which deal 
expressly with this type of misconduct by a surviving spouse have been 
referred to above. 
§ 63.  LIABILITY OF CusTODIAN OF WILL 
All the states have statutes requiring the custodian of th� will to 
produce it. Such statutes are not new. See, for example, 2 N. Y. 
Rev. Stat. ( r 829) 6o, § 2 5 ;  3 Cal. Rev. Laws, Code Civ. Proc. 
( I 8 7 I )  § I 298. Most legislative provisions today treat the refusal to 
produce the will as a contempt, giving the court power to imprison the 
custodian until he produces the will. Six ·jurisdictions, however, pro­
vide only a criminal sentence, in the form of a fine or imprisonment 
for a definite period, or both. These six are Connecticut, District of 
Columbia, Maryland, South Carolina, Tennessee and Washington. 
A few states provide for enforcement both by criminal sentence and 
imprisonment for contempt. No criminal penalties have been set up 
in the 'Model Probate Code, since it is felt that such provisions right­
fully belong in the penal code rather than in the probate code. 
It is common to provide for restitution to persons damaged by with­
holding of the will, either by making the custodian liable in damages to 
all persons injured, or by a penalty of a stated sum per day or per 
month, to be recovered for the · benefit of the estate. Thus in 
Michigan the custodian is given thirty days to produce the will, and 
after that time he may be forced to pay $ 1 o per day for the benefit of 
the estate. Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94-3) § 2 7 .3 1 78 (8 8 ) .  In Illinois 
the amount is $20 per month after the lapse of thirty days. Ill. Ann. 
Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94- 1 )  c. 3, § 2 1 2 .  This type of statute, embody-
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ing a blanket penalty, has the merit that the damages may be recovered 
in a single suit, but this advantage is outweighed by two other con­
siderations. The sum recoverable bears no relation to the actual 
damages sustained ; it may be larger or smaller than the actual 
damages. Moreover, the benefits presumably enure to the various dis­
tributees in proportion to their shares in the estate, although possibly 
they have not been damaged in this proportion. For example, a 
legatee who is bequeathed the same amount which he would take in 
case of intestacy is not damaged by withholding of the will, while one 
who would take nothing by intestacy is damaged to the full extent of 
his legacy. For these reasons the Model Probate Code does not con­
tain this type of provision, but provides instead for liability to all per­
sons damaged. A similar statute is found in twenty-three states, as 
follows : Ala. Code ( I 940) t. 6 I ,  § 3 7 ;  Ariz. Code ( I 939) § 38-
20I ; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 320 ;  Colo. Stat. 
( I 935 ) c. I 76, § 46 ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 732 .2 2 ;  Ind. Stat. 
(Burns, I 933) § 7-405 ;  Iowa Code ( I 939) § 1 1 862 ; Kan. Gen. 
Stat. ( Supp. I 943) § 5 9-62I ; Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. I 4 I ,  § 4 ;  
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I  932) c. I 9  I , § I 3 ;  Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I  943) § 30-
2 I 5 ;  Nev. Comp. Laws .(Supp. I 94 I )  § 9882 .04 ; N. M. Stat. 
( I 94 I )  § 32-20 I ; N. D. Rev. Code ( I 943) § 30-0502 ; Ohio Gen. 
Code (Page, I 93 7 )  § 1 05 04- I3 ;  Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  t. 58, § 2 I ;  
Ore. Comp. Laws ( I 940) § I 9-20I ; S. D. Code ( I 939) § 35 .020 I ;  
Utah Code ( I 943) § I 02-3-I ; Wash. Rev. Stat. ( I 932)  § I 3 7 9 ;  
W. Va. Code ( I943) § 406 I ; Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 3 I 0.02 ; Wyo. 
Rev. Stat. ( I 93 I )  § 88-209. 
A further penalty, in addition to liabi1ity for damages, is imposed 
in Kansas, where a person who knowingly withholds a will for more 
than a year from the date of testator's death is barred from all rights 
under the will. Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 5 9-6 I 8. In Ohio 
the custodian is barred of all rights both testate and intestate if he 
withholds the will for three years� Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 93 7 )  
§ I 0504-I4.  
One more feature of these statutes should be mentioned. It  is 
frequently .provided that the custodian must surrender the will within 
a specified time, usually thirty days after being informed of the 
testator's death, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 932)  c. 1 9 1 ,  § 1 3. No 
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time limit has been written into the Model Probate Code ; in the 
absence of any rule, a reasonable time is implied, and it is felt that this 
is sufficiently definite. 
§ 68.  REQUIREMENT OF NoncE FOR PROBATE OF WILL 
OR GRANT OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION * 
To lawyers and judges in states which require notice for the initi­
ation of probate or administration, it may "ome as a shock to discover 
that there are many jurisdictions in which these proceedings can be 
had without any notice whatever. It is the purpose of this note to 
investigate the situation in the various states, in order to show that in 
nearly half of them notice is not considered essential. The sole ques­
tion to be considered is notice or no notice ; this note is not concerned 
with the kind of notice required, nor with the possibility of waiver of 
notice by interested parties. Nor does it deal with probate of 
nuncupative wills, for which the requirements may be entirely dif­
ferent from those for probate of ordinary wills. 
A few words should be said regarding the old English rule as to 
notice. As far as wills were concerned, probate could be in either com­
mon or solemn form, in the former of which no notice was given. 
Notice was required for probate in solemn form, and interested 
persons could demand such a probate following probate in common 
form . . Atkinson, Wills ( I 937)  428 .  The picture is less clear in the 
case of intestate estates. In 2 Burn, Ecclesiastical Law ( I 763)  637, 
the only mention of notice seems to be in connection with the grant 
of letters to creditors ; it is there said that "the practice is usually for the 
ordinary first to issue a citation for the next of kin in special, and all 
others in general, to accept or refuse letters of administration, or shew 
cause why the same should not be granted to 4 creditor." The same 
statement appears in 4 Burn, Ecclesiastical Law (9th ,ed., I 842) 366, following which the editor of this edition interpolates the following 
statement : "The practice indeed is most correctly stated by Dr. Burn, 
for it has become an unfailing maxim of the courts of probate, that 
where a party, whether executor, residuary legatee, or next of kin, 
has a prior title to a grant of administration, he or they must be cited 
* This note is substantially the same as a comment by Elizabeth Durfee, 
published in' 43 Mich. L. Rev. 1 1 53 ( 1 945) . 
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before it is granted to any other person. And where there are two 
persons equally entitled, e.g., two universal legatees, the court will 
grant administration to one after a decree with intimation has issued to 
the other." Conset, The Practice of the Spiritual or Ecclesiastical 
Courts ( I 7o8) I4 implies that no notice is necessary in case of grant 
of letters to the surviving spouse, but states that when the next of kin 
apply, citation is required "against all and singular next of kindred." 
In any case, there seems to have been no statutory requirement of 
notice. 
The rule today in England remains unchanged as to the probate 
of wills, and the terms common form and solemn form are still used. 
I4 Halsbury's Laws of England ( I 934) 205-235 .  In case of 
intestacy, notice is not required, but may be ordered by the court. 
Court rules provide that the registrars "may require proof" that notice 
of the application for letters of administration has been given to those 
equally entitled ; Rules for Non-Contentious Business, Rule 28 P. R. 
and 34 D. R., set out in Tristam and Coote, Probate Practice ( I  8th 
ed., I 940) 805 . These rules further require a person intending to 
oppose the grant of letters to enter a caveat or request for notice. 
�ule 5 9  P. R. and 7 2  D. R., id. at 8 I 2 . I 4  Halsbury's Laws of 
England ( I  934) § 3 I o states that before a citation is signed by the 
registrar a caveat must be entered against a grant being made, and 
states further, at § 429, that "the court usually requires citation of the 
parties having a claim to the grant" before it issues letters under its dis­
cretionary power to one not entitled, "but it will in special circum­
stances make the grant without citation." 
In the United States, notice is required for probate of a will in 
twenty-eight jurisdictions. These are Ala. Code ( I  940) t. 6 I, § § 48, 
s o ;  Ariz. Code ( I939) § §  38-2o6, 38-207 ; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. 
(Deering, I 944) § 327 ; Colo. Stat. ( I 935)  c. I 76, § § 50, S I ;  
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I  930) § 4884 (but court may dispense with 
notice for cause shown) ; D. C. Code ( I  940) § I 9-30 I ;  Idaho 
Laws Ann. ( I 943) § §  I S-206, I 5-207 ; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith­
Hurd, I 94 I )  c,. 3, § 2 I 6 ;  Iowa Code ( I 939) § 1 1 865 ; Kan. Gen. 
Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 5 9-222 2 ;  Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. I 4 I ,  § 5 ;  
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943 ) § 27 .3 I 7 8 (99) ; Minn. Stat. ( I 94 1 )  
§ 525 .24 ;  Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 935)  § §  1 0025,  1 0026 ; Neb. Rev. 
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Stat. ( 1 943) § 30-2 1 7 ;  Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp • .  1 94 1 )  § 9882 . 1 1 ;  
N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § §  32-204, 32-206 ; N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, 
§ 1 4 0 ;  N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943) § §  30-0508, 3�0509 ;  Ohio 
Gen. Code (Page, Supp. I 945 ) § 1 0504-I 7 ;  Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  t. 
58 , § 2 5 ; R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 938)  c. 5 7 1 , § 3 ;  S. D. Code ( 1 939) 
§ 35 .o2o6 (amended Laws I 945, c. I 5o) ; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
(Vernon, I 939)  art. 333 3 ;  Utah Code ( I 943) § I 02-3-5 ; Vt. 
Pub. Laws ( I 933)  § 2 763 ; Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 3 1 0.04 ; Wyo. Rev. 
Stat. ( I 93 I  and Supp. I 940) § §  88-2 I4, 88-2 I 5 .  
In sixteen states, on the other hand, the practic� as embodied in the 
statutes is based on the English system of probate in common and 
solemn form, with or without modifications, so that probate can be had 
without notice. These sixtecrn states are Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I  937)  
§ §  I 4540 and I 4544 ; Del. Rev. Code ( I 935)  § 3 799 ; Fla. Stat. 
Ann. ( 1 94 I )  § §  732.23,  732.28,  732 .2 9 ;  Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) 
§ §  I I 3-60 I ,  I 1 3-602, 1 I 3- 607 ; Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) 
§§ 394. 1 70, 394.1 80, 394.220 ;  Md. Code ( 1 939) art. 93, § 360 ; 
Miss. Code ( 1 942) § §  502 to 504 ;  Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) 
§ § I and 5 2  9 (the Missouri statute is ambiguous, but see State ex rei. 
Mitchell v. Gideon, 2 I 5  Mo. App. 46, 237 S. W. 220  ( I 92 1 ) ) ;  
N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c. 349, § 2, and c. 35 1 ,  § §  6 and 7 ;  N. J. 
Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7 )  § §  3 :2-2 1 and 3 :2-2 2 ;  N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943) 
§ 3 1-32 ; Ore. Comp. Laws ( I 940) § I 9-204 ; S. C. Code ( I 942) 
§ 8932 ; Va. Code ( 1 942) §§ 5253 ,  5 254, 5259 ; Wash. Rev. Stat . 
.( 1 932) § 1 380 ;  W. Va. Code, ( I 943)  § §  4065 and 4070. 
In four states the statutes are silent: Massachusetts, Indiana, 
Pennsylvania and Tennessee. Notice seems to be required in 
Massachusetts even without a statute, but apparently is not necessary 
in the other three states. Newhall, Settlement of Estates and 
Fiduciary Law in Massachusetts (3rd ed., I 93 7 )  § 2 8 ;  I Henry, 
Probate Law and Practice of Indiana ( I  93 I )  760 ; 2 Hunter, 
Pennsylvania Orphans' Court Commonplace Book ( I 939)  1 1 22 .  
No authority was found for Tennessee, but a local probate expert has 
advised that notice is not required in that state. 
In the case of intestate estates, statutes require notice in all cases in 
nineteen jurisdictions. Ariz. Code ( 1 9  3 9) § 3 8-406 ; Cal. Pro b. 
Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 44 1 ;  Conn. Gen. Stat. ( 1 930) 
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§ 4904 (but court may dispense with notice for cause shown) ; D. C. 
Code ( 1 940) § 20-2 1 7  ( "such notice . . .  as the rules of the court 
may require") ; Ga. Code Ann. ( I  936) § I I 3-I 2 I 2 ;  Idaho Laws 
Ann. ( 1 943)  § I 5-32o ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-2222 ; 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § 2 7 .3 1 78 ( 1 26) ; Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  
§ 5 25 .282 ; Mont. Rev. Code ( I 935 )  § 1 0076 ; Neb. Rev. Stat. 
( I 943) § 30-33 1 ;  Nev. Camp. Laws (Supp. I 94 1 )  § 9882 .56 ; 
N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943) § 30-0206 ; R. I.  Gen. Laws ( 1 938) c. 
5 7 1 , § 3 ;  S. C. Code ( 1 942) § 8972 ; S. D. Code ( 1 939) 
§ 35 .0506 ; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 939) art. 3333 ; Utah 
Code ( I 943) § 1 02-4-8 ; Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 3 1 1 .03. 
In thirteen other states notice is not required except under certain 
circumstances. Thus in one group of s.tates notice is required only to 
persons preferred over the petitioner to be administrator. In Florida 
notice must be given "to all known persons qualified to act as 
administrator and entitled to preference over the person applying." 
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § 732.43. The Illinois statute requires notice 
to one "entitled either to administer or to nominate a person to 
administer in preference to the petitioner." Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith­
Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § 2 5 1 .  But see c. 3, § 2 52, requiring notice in all 
cases when letters are sought on presumption of death. In New Jersey 
all next of kin or parties by law entitled to administer, both residents 
and nonresidents, must be notified if the petitioner does not have 
preference or when application is made after forty days from decedent's 
death. N. J. Prerog. Ct. R�les ( I  94 I Revision) Rules 4 and 7 ;  
Orphans' Ct. Rules ( I  94 I Revision) Rules 2 and 5 ·  In New York, 
notice must be given to competent residents of the state who have a 
right to administration prior or equal to that of the petitioner, and if 
the petitioner is not entitled to share in the distribution of the estate 
notice must also be given to "all resident infants and ad judged incom­
petents who are so entitled." N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § I 20. The 
Oklahoma statute provides that no notice shall be given "if the petition 
asks for the appointment of some person entitled under the law to 
appointment, and there shall accompany such petition a waiver of all 
persons having a prior right to appointment." Okla. Stat. ( I  94 I )  t. 
5 8, § 1 28. If there 1s no one with a prior right to appointment, 
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the petitioner may presumably be appointed without even the formality 
of a waiver of notice. 
New Hampshire also belongs in this group, for its statute provides 
that the judge may at discretion proceed without notice "in the ap­
pointment of the person entitled to such trust, or of the person by him 
nominated, as administrator." N. H.  Rev. Laws ( I  942) c. 349, § 2 .  
Since the surviving spouse, next of  kin and suitable persons are equally 
entitled to administration under c. 352, § 2, it is clear that notice is 
not necessary in the normal case in New Hampshire. 
In Washington notice is not required if the application for letters 
"be presented by or on behalf of the surviving husband or wife." 
Wash. Rev. Stat. ( I 932)  § I 433· Similarly in Kentucky, notice is 
required only "if there be no surviving spouse, or if such · spouse waives 
the right of appointment or is not qualified to act and does not nominate 
a suitable administrator and there are more than one resident heir at 
law entitled. to appointment . . . .  Notice of said hearing shall be given 
to the surviving spouse and all known heirs of the deceased residing in 
the state." Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) § 395 .0 I 5 .  The court may in 
its discretion dispense with notice altogether in any estate where the 
gross amount involved is less than $ I ,ooo. Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) 
§ 395-0 16 .  
In  another group of  states the only statutory requirement for notice 
is that the preferred persons be notified if they fail to apply for letters 
for thirty days and it is sought to appoint a stranger or a creditor. In 
Maine, any suitable person may be appointed if the preferred persons 
are unsuitable, "or being residents in the county, they after due notice 
neglect or refuse for thirty days from the death of the intestate to take 
' . out letters of administration." Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. I 4 I ,  § I 8. 
And in Massachusetts a creditor may be appointed "after public notice 
· upon the petition" if the preferred persons renounce or fail for thirty 
days after the death of the intestate. Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932) c. 
193, § 1 .  Similarly in North Carolina, any suitable person may be 
appointed if those entitled to preference fail for thirty days, after 
citation to such persons ; furthermore, "if no person entitled to ad­
minister applies for letters of administration on the estate of a decedent 
within six months from his death, then the clerk may, in his discretion, 
274 MODEL PROBATE CODE : APPENDICES 
deem all prior rights renounced." N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943) 
§ 28-I5 .  No notice is necessary after the six months have elapsed. 
Withrow v. DePriest, I I 9 N. C. 54 I ,  26 S. E. I I O ( I 896) . 
The remaining two states of the thirteen which require notice only 
under certain circumstances are Maryland and Ohio. In Maryland 
"it shall not be necessary to give notice to a party entitled to adminis­
tration if he be out of thff State, nor shall it be necessary to summon or 
notify collateral relations more remote than brothers and sisters of the 
intestate, in order to exclude them from the administration." Md. 
Code ( I  939) art. 93, § 33· The only requirement in Ohio is for 
notice to "the person or persons resident of the county entitled to ad­
minister the estate." Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 937 )  § 1 0509-4. 
In addition to the thirteen states just described, there are three more 
whose statutes provide for notice at the option of the court. In 
Arkansas and Missouri notice "may" be given to the preferred persons 
if they fail to apply for thirty days, while in Oregon the court "in its 
discretion may, if they reside within the county," order notice to such 
persons. Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 937) § 8 ;  Mo .. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942 ) 
§ 8 ;  Ore. Comp. Laws ( I  940) § I 9-2 I I .  The wording of the 
Oregon statute makes it clear that notice is not required, and the same 
would seem to be true of Arkansas and Missouri. Indeed, this as­
sumption is borne out as to Arkansas by correspondence with a local 
probate expert, who states that notice is not required there. 
In the remaining thirteen states the statutes are silent as to any 
requirement of notice, creating a presumption that administration may 
be had without any prior notice. These states are Alabama, Colorado, 
Delaware, Indiana,. Iowa, Mississippi, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming. No 
case law oh the subject has been found, but probate experts in eight of 
these states-Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Vermont and West Virginia-have advised that notice is 
not required in those states, although in some of them it is the local 
practice to give at least some sort of notice. It should be remembered 
that every state, except Massachusetts and Virginia, requires a pub­
lished notice to creditors to file their claims, and this notice may to 
some extent serve as a substitute for notice before appointment, since 
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it gives public notoriety to the fact that an administration has been 
commenced. 
There seems to be no correlation between requirements of notice in 
testate and in intestate estates. Some states require notice in both cases, 
some in neither; some states require notice for one and not for the 
other. 
The box-score thus stands as follows: 
Testate estates: 
Notice required in 29 states. 
Notice not required in 19 states. 
Intestate estates: 
Notice required in 19 states. 
Notice required only under certain circumstances in 1 3 states. 
Notice never required in 16 states. 
§ 73· LIMITATIONS ON PROBATE OF LATER WILL 
This note deals with the narrow question of whether a later will 
may be probated after the period for contesting or appealing the pro­
bate of an earlier will has expired. There is direct authority on this 
question in about half the states, and in several others there is some 
indication of how the question will be answered when it arises. 
Though the problem has been but little affected by statute, legisla­
tion on the question is found in a few jurisdictions. In California and 
Nevada it is expressly provided that failure to contest does not bar 
probate of a later will, and in Ohio the statute gives the court the same 
authority to admit a later will that it would have if no earlier one had 
been probated. In Kentucky a later will may be probated within 
twenty-five years after testator's death. In North Dakota, Oklahoma 
and South Dakota, on the other hand, presentation of the late1" will 
is one of the statutory grounds of contest after probate, and such 
proceedings are governed by the contest statute. There are in addi­
tion a few states whose statutes contemplate probate of a later will, 
but these statutes are silent on the question of a time limit. This group 
of statutes seems to assume that the later will will be presented before 
the close of administration, but it may be questioned whether this would 
prevent probate at a later time. In this group are Kansas, New York, 
276 MODEL PROBATE CODE: APPENDICES 
North Carolina and a few other states. In connection with this 
problem, statutes which place an absolute limit on probate of any will 
necessarily apply to the two-will situation ; but some limitation statutes 
apply only to the will introduced in the original administration. 
Where there is no statute settling the question, the cases take two 
general lines. In the states having contest after probate the issue is 
whether probate of the later will constitutes a contest of the earlier one. 
About half the courts which have passed upon the issue have held that 
it is a contest, and hence within the period of limitations for such 
contest ; others have held that it is not a contest and that the limitation 
statute does not apply. In the states which have no contest after pro­
bate, the question has not been whether the period for appealing the 
first probate constitutes a bar, but rather whether the probate court 
has the power to set aside its prior decree. Most of these courts have 
found such a power. 
In the states which hold that probate of the later will is a contest of 
the earlier one, fraud in the suppression of the second will is usually 
deemed immaterial. If the statute of limitations for contest contains 
no saving clause for cases of fraud, the courts refuse to read in any 
such exception. On the other hand, in several of the states which 
permit the later probate at any time the proponent is required to explain 
his delay in presenting the second will, and fraud may therefore be­
come an essential fact to be proved. In Illinois, for example, the later 
will may be probated only if it can be shown that it was fraudulently 
concealed or that its existence was unknown. In Massachusetts also, 
the trend seems to be toward a strict requirement of fraud or mistake. 
It must be remembered that there may be other remedies in addi­
tion to probate of the later will. Thus in Florida, where the statute 
permits probate of the later will only while administration remains un­
completed, another statute provides for impressing a constructive trust 
on the assets in the hands of heirs, legatees or distributees; this remedy, 
however, is available for only three years after discharge of the repre­
sentative, and can reach only those assets which remain in their original 
form or can be traced. Even without such a statute, constructive 
trust or damages in tort may be available, e.g., Dulin v. Bailey, I 72  
N. C. 6o8, 90 S. E. 689  ( 1 9 16  ) .  See Evans, "Torts to Expectancies 
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in Decedents' Estates," 93 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 8 7  ( 1 944) ; annotations 
in 52  A. L. R. 7 79  and 65 A. L. R. I I  1 9. 
In general on the subject of probate of the later will, see annotation 
in 1 0 7  A. L. R. 249· 
Alabama. A later will cannot be probated after the period to con­
test has expired. 
Hardy v. Hardy's Heirs, 26 Ala. 5 24 ( 1 855 ) was a petition for 
probate of a later will nine years after probate of the earlier one. The 
reasons for delay are not given. Probate was denied. Held, the later 
instrument revokes the first one pro tanto, and impeaches its validity; 
but this can only be done in the manner and within the time provided 
for by the statute governing contest of wills after probate. 
\Vatson v. Turner, 89 Ala. 220, 8 So. 20  ( 1 889) . The probate 
court had admitted to probate a codicil over twenty years after probate 
of the will. This is a bill to contest the codicil. Held, the codicil can­
not be probated after the period to contest the will has run. 
See, also, Caverno v. Webb, 239 Ala. 6 7 1 ,  1 96 So. 7 23 ( 1 940) , 
citing the two above cases with approval. But see Jordan v. Tharp, 
223 Ala. 6 1 9, I 3 7  So. 667 ( I 93 I ) , involving mistake. 
California. By statute, probate of a later will is not within the 
limitation period for contest. 
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 385 .  "Failure to con­
test a will does not preclude the subsequent probate of another will of 
the decedent." 
Colorado. The statutes on probate of a later will fail to set out any 
time limit for such proceedings, and on the contrary indicate that they 
may be brought at any time. Therefore they are not within the period 
of limitations fo� contests, which is one year. 
Colo. St�t. ( I  935 ) c. I 76, § § 66 to 7 0  inclusive, provide for the 
probate of a later will after an earlier one has already been probated. 
There is no time limit made for such proceedings, except as to cutting 
off the title of bona fide purchasers from a devisee or legatee under 
the earlier will, and to reimburse the heir, devisee or legatee who 
made improvements. 
Under c. I 7 6, § 6 5, the period to contest probate of a will is one 
year. The sections discussed above indicate that probate of a later will 
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is not within the contest statute, since there seems to be no time limit 
for such proceedings. 
Connecticut. By statute, a later will may be admitted pending 
proceedings for the settlement of the estate. But it is held that after 
the estate has been settled, and after the time for appeal from probate 
has passed, the probate court has no power to set aside the first probate 
and admit a later will to probate. However, equity can grant relief 
in case of fraudulent probate of a will, and presumably could act also 
in the two-will situation. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 930) § 4898. "When it shall appear to any 
court of probate, pending proceedings before it for the settlement of 
the estate of a deceased person as a testate estate, that the will under 
which such proceedings were commenced . . . had b,een revoked by 
the testator by a subsequent will, . . .  such court shall have power to 
revoke . . . any order or decree proving or approving the will so re­
voked and any other order or decree made and passed by such court 
in the settlement of such estate under such will. Such court shall have 
power thereafter to proceed with the settlement of such estate under 
a subsequent will. . . ." 
Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 4 I 2, 56  A. 88 I  ( I 904) .  The 
first will was probated in I 899, and the second was offered for probate 
in I 903, after the period to appeal from the first probate had passed. 
Defendant's demurrer was sustained. Held, since the second will 
expressly revoked the first one, its approval would necessarily revoke 
the decree approving the first one, and the probate court has no power 
to set aside its decrees ; by statute and decision, the decrees may be 
set aside only on appeal ; otherwise a decree could be set aside long 
after the period to appeal has expired. (Appeal to United States 
Supreme Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction, I 99 U .  S. 6o2, 26 
S. Ct. 748.) 
Folwell v.  Howell, I I 7 Conn. s6s, I 69 A. I 99 ( I933)  did t:J.Ot 
involve two wills, but is important in connection with the Delehanty 
case. It was an action for damages and equitable relief for fraud 
in securing probate of a will. The time for appeal from probate had 
passed, and plaintiff showed lack of laches. Defendant's demurrer 
was overruled. Held, equity has power to relieve against fraud, but 
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the probate court could not give relief under the ruling of Delehanty 
v. Pitkin. 
The Delehanty case has been cited many times for the proposition 
that the probate court cannot set aside its decrees, and .is apparently 
still good authority. 
Florida. By statute, a later will may be offered for probate pend­
ing probate proc�edings. This presumably coincides with the period 
for contest (termed revocation of probate in the statute) ,  which may 
be made at any time before final dischrge of the representative. In 
case of a will discovered after the termination of administration, a 
trust may be impressed on the property, but only to the extent that it 
remains in its original form or may be traced, and proceedings for this 
purpose must be brought within three years after the discharge of the 
personal representative. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § 732.3 2. "Upon the discovery, pending 
probate proceedings, of a later will or codicil expressly revoking the 
probated will or impliedly revoking the same in whole or in part, any 
person interested may by petition offer same for probate. The pro­
ceedings shall be, as nearly as practicable, similar to those for revoca­
tion of probate generally." (Under § 732.30, proceedings for rev­
ocation of probate may be brought at any time before final discharge 
of the personal representative. )  
§ 732 ·33 ·  "Upon the discovery, after the termination of  adminis­
tration or probate proceedings and the discharge of the personal 
representative, of an unknown will or a later will or codicil expressly 
revoking the probated will or impliedly revoking the same in whole 
or in part, any one or more persons interested may, by bill in chancery 
impress a trust upon the funds or property received by an heir, ]ega tee 
or distributee in the administration or probate proceedings recently 
terminated which, because of the newly discovered will, such recipient 
is not justly entitled to retain. . . . Nor shall any such proceeding be 
brought after three years after the discharge of the personal representa­
tive." 
Georgia. By statute, probate in common form becomes con­
clusive after seven years, and it has been held that this bars probate of 
a later will after seven years have elapsed. As for probate in solemn 
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form, it is provided by statute that proceedings to set aside judgments 
or decrees must be commenced within three years. It has been held 
that the three-year limitation applies to a proceeding to set aside a 
probate in solemn form for fraud, and probably it would also be held 
to prevent probate of a later will after three years from probate of 
the earlier one in solemn form. 
Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) § 1 1 3-605. "Probate in common form 
shall become conclusive upon all parties at interest after the expiration 
of seven years from the time of such probate, except minor heirs at 
law who require proof in solemn form and interpose a caveat within 
four years after arrival at age. • • ." 
§ 3-702.  "All proceedings of every kind in any court of this State 
to set aside judgments or decrees of the courts, shall be made within 
three· years from the rendering of said judgments or decrees." 
Skinner v. Phillips, I42  Ga. 405, 83 S. E. I 2 I  ( I 9 I 4 ) .  The first 
will was probated in common form in I 889, and the second will was 
offered in I 9 I 2, together with an application to revoke the first probate. 
The proponent attained his rna jority within four years before this pro­
ceeding, but was not an heir of testator. Held, proponent is not 
'within the saving clause of the statute, for that clause is limited to 
minor heirs; therefore the proceeding is barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
Speer v. Speer, 7 4 Ga. I 79 ( I  88 5 )  does not involve a later will, 
but holds that an action to set aside probate in solemn form for fraud 
must be started within three years, under § 3-702. But see Walden 
v. Mahnks, I 78 Ga. 825,  I 74 S. E. 538  ( I 934) , which holds that 
§ 3-702 does not prevent probate of a will ten years after an adminis­
trator was appointed on the supposition that the estate was intestate. 
Illinois. A later will can be probated after expiration of the period 
to contest on a showing that its existence was not known or was con­
cealed. 
Conzet v. Hibben, 2 7 2  Ill. 5 08; I I 2 N. E. 305 ( I 9 I 6) was an 
attempt to have the later will probated two and one-half years after 
probate of the first will. Proponents gave no reasons for the delay, 
nor did they make any claim of fraud or mistake. Contestants in their 
pleading argued the statute of limitations for contest of the first will, but 
the court does not decide this point. Held, probate is denied because 
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proponents were parties to and assented to probate of the first will; 
they are estopped unless they can show fraud or mistake, and they 
have not done this. 
Abdill v. Abdill, 295 III. 40, 128 N. E. 741 (1920) involved a 
codicil which was offered for probate over two years after probate of 
the will. The proponent alleged in his petition that he did not know 
of its existence earlier, and testified fully as to the circumstances of 
finding it. He also alleged that if the other heirs knew of its existence 
they were guilty of fraud against him. Held, the codicil is admitted 
to probate; in view of the positive proof of his ignorance of its existence 
he is entitled to probate; if everyone was ignorant, the will was 
probated by mistake, and if others knew of it, there was fraud; it is 
immaterial that the time for contesting the will has expired. 
Oliver v. Oliver, 3I3 III. 6I2, I45 N. E. I23 (1924-). The first 
will was probated in I908, but was of no effect as to the land in ques­
tion since the devisee of the land was a subscribing witness. In I 9 I o 
there was litigation in equity between the various heirs to have deeds 
to this land, made by decedent, set aside. It was so decreed and an 
intestacy declared. Now, in I92I, a later will was offered with 
full explanations of ignorance of its existence. Holding that the will 
should be admitted to probate, the court concluded that the require­
ments of Conzet v. Hibben had been met; the litigation in the chan­
cery court is no bar, for probate is not an attack on that decree; a will 
may be probated at any time, regardless of probate of a prior will or 
of intestate administration. (The latter will was contested after this 
decision, and set aside as a forgery. Oliver v. Oliver, 340 Ill. 445, 
I/2 N. E. 9I7 (I93o).) 
Austin v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 343 Ill. 406, 175 N. E. 554 
( I 9 3 I ) . In this case a codicil was offered five years after the will, 
with allegations that it was not offered sooner because the proponent 
had thought he could claim under it as a gift causa mortis. The main 
issue in the case involves the question of election of remedies and . 
whether the instrument is a codicil; it is also held, however, that the 
proponent is not barred by lapse of time, the court saying that there is 
no time limit on the probate of a codicil to a will. 
See, also, In re Estate of King, 310 Ill. 90, 141 N. E. 416 (1923). 
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Indiana. A later will cannot be probated after the period for 
contest has expired. 
Bartlett v. Manor, I 46 Ind. 6 2 I ,  45 N. E. 1 060 ( I 897 ) .  A 
later will was offered for probate thirty years after probate of the 
earlier one, the reason for delay being fraudulent concealment by the 
devisee under the earlier wilL- Held, probate is denied ; an essential 
part of the case is the overthrow of the first will, and therefore it is a 
contest of the first will, and must be brought within the time provided 
by statute for contest after probate. 
Kansas. A statute sets out the procedure for probate of a later 
will but makes no mention of the time element. However, the section 
probably means that a later will may be probated after the period to 
appeal has expired. But no will may be offered for probate after one 
year from decedent's death, except in cases of fraud, when the limita­
tion is five years from decedent's death. 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-2226. "If, after a will 
has been admitted to probate, a later instrument in writing purporting 
to be the last will or codicil shall be presented, proceedings shall be 
had for the probate thereof. . . ." 
§ 59-6 I 7 .  "No will of a testator who died while a resident of this 
state shall be effectual to pass property unless an application is made 
for the probate of such will within one year after the death of the 
testator, except as hereinafter provided." (See also § 59-803, pro­
tecting bona fide purchasers from heirs of a nonresident unless a will 
is offered within one year from testator's death.) 
§ 59-6 I 8 .  " . . . [A will which has been knowingly withheld] 
may be admitted to probate as to any innocent beneficiary on the 
application by him for such probate, if such application is made within 
ninet:g days after he has knowledge of such will and access thereto and 
within five years after the death of the testator. • . ." 
As to the time limitation of § 5 9-6 I 7, In re Colyer's Will, I 5 7  
Kan. 34 7 ,  I 3 9  P. (2d) 4 I  I ( I  943 ) held, on an appeal from a denial 
of probate, that this section is not subject to exceptions, and that the 
court cannot admit a will which is not offered within one year from 
death. 
In general, see 2 Bartlett, Kansas Probate Law and Practice ( I  939) 
§ I 078 .  
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Kentucky. By statute, a later will may be offered within twenty­
five years after testator's death. 
Ky. Civ. Code ( 1 938)  § 5 1 8 . "The court in which a judgment 
has been rendered shall have power, after the expiration of the term, 
to vac�te or modify it- . . . 
"9· When any paper purporting to be the last will of any person 
has been, or may be hereafter admitted to probate, and a later will 
has been discovered. A judgment on this ground, however, shall not 
be vacated or modified, unless proceedings to that end shall be instituted 
within twenty-five years after the death of the testator. . . ." 
The cases under this statute concern the proper procedure, and 
do not involve any question of passage of time. See Rubarts v. Rubarts, 
255  Ky. 695, 7 5  S. W. (2d) 353 ( 1 934) ; Anderson's Adm'x v. 
Bourbon Bank, 265 Ky. 1 5 7 , 96 S. W. (2d) 257  ( 1 936) ; Vaughan's 
Admr. v. Vaughan, 2 7 1  Ky. 387 ,  I I I  S. W. (2d) 1 037  ( 1 937 ) ; 
Polley v. Cline's Exr., 272  Ky. 147 ,  I 1 3  S. W. (2d) I 1 3 3  ( 1 938 ) .  
A case prior to the above statute is Couchman v. Couchman, 1 04 
Ky. 68o,  47 S. W. 858,  44 L. R. A. 1 36 ( 1 898) ,  in which a codicil 
was probated shortly after the will was probated, and on,appeal from 
probate of the codicil it was held that it could not be probated because 
it revoked the will, and the probate court has no power to set aside 
its decrees. The proper procedure was said to be an appeal to the 
circuit court from the probate of the will, as provided by statute, within 
five years after probate. 
Maine. Probate courts have jurisdiction to set aside probate of 
an earlier will and admit a later one, but no case has presented the 
question of what showing must be made. 
Cousens v. Advent Church, 93 Me. 292, 45 A. 43 ( 1 899) . Bill 
in equity against the recipient of benefits under the first will, by a 
beneficiary under the later will, to obtain payment of his legacy. Plain­
tiff alleged that he learned of the later will too late to bring a writ 
of error from the probate of the first will. The theory of the bill 
is that there is no authority in the probate court to correct its decrees. 
Defendant's demurrer was held properly sustained. \Vilis do not 
become operative until proved, and the probate cou:t is the only 
court which can probate wills ; probate courts have inherent power 
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to set aside their decrees if the will is found to be a forgery or a 
later will is discovered, or testator proves to be alive. 
See, also, Tripp v. Clapp, 1 26 Me. 5 34, 140  A. 1 99 ( 1 928) which 
reaches the same conclusion. 
Maryland. There have been no cases on the question whether a 
later will may be probated, but a dictum in one case indicates that the 
statute of limitations for a caveat or other objection to a probated will 
is applicable to any proceeding affecting the validity of a will. 
Md. Code ( 1 939)  art. 93, § 3 5 7 ·  "No will, testament, codicil or 
other testamentary paper shall be subject to caveat or other objection 
to its validity after the expiration of one year from its probate." 
Garrison v. Hill, 8 I  Md. 55 I; 32 A. I 9 I  ( 1 895)  holds that this 
statute has no retroactive effect, but the court assumes that it would 
otherwise bar proceedings to revoke a probate. The case did not 
involve two wills. 
Clagett v. Hawkins, I I Md. 38 I ( I  8 5 7 ) ,  decided before the enact­
ment of the above statute, has sometimes been cited in discussions of 
the problem, but it does not involve two wills. It holds that probate 
may be revoked in an independent action after the period to appeal 
from the probate has expired, where it is shown that the will was 
never executed and that the testator did not intend it to be his will. 
In view of the above statute, this case is of doubtful value as authority. 
Massachusetts. A later will may be probated after the period for 
appeal has expired, but probably only on a showing of fraud or mistake 
which would permit reopening of an ordinary judgment. 
The only case directly in point is Waters v. Stickney, I 2 Allen ( 94 
Mass.) I, 90 Am. Dec. I 2 2 ( I  866) . In this case a codicil was 
written on the back of the paper containing the will, but it was over­
looked when the will was probated. It was apparently an oversight 
of the court, since the letters testamentary referred to both will and 
codicil. The codicil was presented for probate some fourteen years 
later. Held, the codicil may be probated although the time for appeal 
from the probate of the will has passed, for the probate court has 
inherent power to set aside its judgments for fraud or mistake. The 
court is mainly concerned with the power to set aside judgments, and 
assumes that tpe statute of limitations does not affect the case. This 
case is often cited in Massachusetts for the proposition that a probate 
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court may revoke its decrees for fraud or mistake, the most recent 
being O'Sullivan v. Palmer, 3 I 2  Mass. 240, 44 N. E. ( 2d) 958  
( I  942) ,  but none of  these cases involves the two-will situation. 
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. I 92, § 3, provides that a probate 
decree is conclusive after one year as to bona fide purchasers, executors, 
etc., but provides further for certain liabilities in case a subsequent 
decree reverses or qualifies the original decree. This seems to indicate 
that the court is still deemed to have the power to set aside its decrees, 
and \Vaters v. Stickney is therefore still in force. But Newhall, 
Settlement of Estates and Fiduciary Law in Massachusetts (3d ed., 
I 937) § 20, discussing the power to set aside probate court judgments, 
states that there is "a very marked stiffening in the attitude of the 
court since I 89 I, when the probate courts were mad(j courts of superior 
jurisdiction," citing McLaughlin v. Fe erick, 2 76 Mass. I So, I 76 N. 
E. 7 i 9  ( I 93 I ) .  This case sets out three bases for revoking probate 
decrees : error, fraud going to the jurisdiction of the court, and fraud 
which deprives an interested party of his day in court. 
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. I 93,  § §  4 and 5, which place a 
limitation of twenty years from death of a testate or intestate decedent 
on the original grant of administration, do not affect the two-will 
situation, since by their terms they apply to original administration. 
Michigan. The probate court has no power to set aside its decrees, 
and therefore lacks jurisdiction to probate a later will which would 
annul the first probate. 
In re Butts' Estate, I 73 Mich. 504, I 39  N. W. 244 ( I 9 I3 )  in­
volved a petition to probate the later will over thirty years after probate 
of the earlier one, with allegations that the first will had been probated 
under a mistaken impression that it was the later one. The estate was 
still in process of administration. Held, in tliis state the probate court 
has no power to vacate its orders and decrees, and since probate of the 
second will would necessarily revoke the first probate, the probate 
court cannot entertain the petition ; chancery has jurisdiction in cases 
of fraud, accident and mistake, and petitioner's only forum, if any, is 
in chancery. The passage of time is not mentioned. 
Mississippi. No authority found on issue of passage of time ; but 
see Mims v. Johnson, 1 29 Miss. 403, 92 So. 5 7 7  ( I 922) . 
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Missouri. By statute, no will may be offered for probate more: 
than one year from the first publication of notice of granting letters 
testamentary or of administration. In most cases this will coincide 
with the period for contest, which is one year from date of probate. 
It has been held that the period cannot be extended for fraud. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942 ) § 5 3  2. " . No proof shall 
be taken of any will nor any certificate of probate thereof issued, unless 
such will shall have been presented to a probate court . . . within 
one year from the date of the first publication of the notice of grant­
ing letters testamentary or of administration that may have been 
granted by any probate court in the state of Missouri, on the estate of 
the testator or named in such will so presented." 
(Under § 53 8 ( Supp. I 944) the period to contest probate is one 
year from the date of probate. )  
Breeding v. Pack (Mo., I 942) I 64 S. W. ( 2d) 929,  holds that 
suit may not be brought in the circuit court to revoke probate of 
an earlier will and establish a later one. The proper procedure is to 
offer the later will for probate in the probate court. 
State ex rel. Bier v. Bigger, 352  Mo. 502, I 7 8  S. W. (2d) 347 
( I  944) was a mandamus proceeding to force the probate judge to 
hear a petition for probate of a will. Letters of administration on the 
estate had been issued Dec. 26, I 94 I ,  notice being published Jan. 9, 
I 942 . The will was not offered for probate until Sept. I S , I 943, and 
allegations were made that the will had been fraudulently suppressed 
by the administrator. Petitioner claimed § 532  did not apply in cases 
of fraud. The petition was dismissed. Held, where a statute of 
limitations is a special one, not included in the general chapter on 
limitations, the running of it cannot be tolled for any reason not set 
out in the statute ; § 532  i§ such a special statute, and does not authorize 
the time to be extended for any reason. 
Nebraska. A codicil was admitted to probate after the time for 
appeal -in one case, but the time element was not an issue in the case. 
In re Estate of Bremer, I 4 I  Neb. 25 I ,  3 N. W. ( 2d) 4 I I ( I 942 ) .  
A codicil, which was written on the back of the will, was presented 
for probate some eleven months after probate of the will. The issue 
was whether the codiCJ1 could be admitted to probate without first 
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vacating the probate of the will. Held, it may �e admitted without 
first vacating the prior decree, "in consideration of the jurisdiction 
vested in the county court, coupled with the facts, that there. was no 
fraud shown nor want of diligence, and the mistake • was 
inadvertently made, . . . . and the codicil was presented for probate 
within the time when no statutory provision would bar it." (The 
statute then in force, Comp. Stat. ( I  929) § 30-I 602, provided a 
thirty-day period for appeal, but the court does not refer to this statute.) 
Cf. Williams v. Miles, 63 Neb. 859, 89 N. W. 45 1 ( 1 902) .  
Nevada. By statute, probate of a later will is not within the limita­
tion period for contests. 
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 9· P )  § 9882.2 7. "Failure to contest 
a will does not preclude the subsequent probate of a will executed 
later in point of time than the one heretofore admitted to probate." 
New York. By statute, a later will may be probated after probate 
of an earlier one, and the former letters must be revoked by the decree 
granting probate. There seems to be no litigation involving a time· • 
limit for such proceedings. 
N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § I 54· "Where, after letters of administra­
tion, on the ground of intestacy, have been granted1 a will is admitted 
to probate, and letters are issued thereupon ; or where a subsequent 
will is admitted to probate and letters are issued thereupon ; the decree 
granting probate must revoke the former letters." 
The leading case on probate of a later will is Campbell v. Logan, 
2 Brad£. Surr. 90 ( I 85 2 ) ,  which holds that the probate of the first 
will may be set aside, and is not conclusive against probate ofa later 
one. The second will was offered one week after probate of the . 
first one. 
In re Lyman's 'Vill, 14 Misc. 352,  36 N.Y.S. I I 7  ( 1 895)  in­
volved a will offered eighteen years after probate of the first one. 
Probate was denied on the basis of estoppel because of acceptance of 
benefits under the earlier will with knowledge of the existence of the 
later one, and also for lack of due execution. There was no discussion 
of the lapse of time, and it apparently did not concern the court. 
A later will was admitted nearly a year after the earlier one in 
In re Shaver's Estate, 1 3 3  Misc. 1 1 2, 2 3 1  N. Y. S. 5 96 ( 1 928)  
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(affirmed without opinion in 227  App. Div. 646, 235 N. Y. S. 882) .  
The court did not question its power to  admit the later will ; the sole 
issue was forgery. 
In re Snediker's \Vill, I 74 Misc. 209, 20 N. Y. S. ( 2d) 223 
( I  940) involved a petition for probate of a second will, filed the day 
after probate of the first one. A motion to dismiss on the ground that 
the probate decree was a bar, was denied. Held, Campbell v. Logan, 
2 Brad£. Surr. 90, decided the point, and is still the law ; there would 
be no advantage in disturbing the decree until a decision is made on 
the second will, and if the second one is probated the former letters 
will ,be revoked, under Surr. Ct. Act, § I  54· 
North Carolina. By statute, a later will • may be proved and the 
original letters testamentary revoked. This statute indicates that a 
later will may be probated at least while administration is pending. 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I  94 3 )  § 2 8-3 I .  "If, after the letters of ad­
ministration are issued, a will is subsequently proved and letters testa­
mentary are issued thereon ; or if, after letters testamentary are issued, 
a revocation of the will or a subsequent testamentary paper ' revoking 
the appointment of executors is proved and letters are issued thereon, 
the clerk of the superior court must thereupon revoke the letters first 
issued. " 
North Dakota. By statute, discovery of a later will is one of the 
grounds for a contest after probate, and proceedings are governed 
by the contest statute. 
N. D. Rev. Code ( I 943)  § 30-0608. "When a will has been 
admitted to probate, any person 'interested therein, at any time within 
one year after such probate, may contest the same. • . . For that 
purpose he must file in the court in which the will was proved a sworn 
petition in writing containing his allegations that evidence discovered 
since the probate of the will . . . · shows : 
" I .  That a will of the decedent, of later date than the one proved, 
revoking or changing the former will, has been discovered and is 
offered. . . ." 
Ohio. By statute, a later will may be probated in the same manner 
as if no earlier will had been probated. The cases indicate that probate 
of the later will i;; not limited by' the period for contest of the earlier 
one. 
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Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 93 7 )  § 1 0504-27.  "When a will 
has been admitted to probate or to record, and a will of later 
date . is presented to the same court for probate or record, 
it shall have the same authority to admit the later copy to 
probate or to ., record that it would possess if no earlier will . . . 
had been so admitted. In such case, the proceedings shall be the same 
as if no other will of the party ever had been proved or recorded." 
Stafford v. Todd, I 7  Ohio App. I I4 ( I 92 I )  was an action to 
enjoin proceedings for probate of the later will after the period to 
contest had expired. Defendant's demurrer was sustained, the court 
saying that the above statute gave authority for such proceedings in 
spite of lapse of time. 
Oklahoma. By statute, discovery of a later will is one of the 
grounds for a contest after probate, and proceedings are governed by 
the contest statute. 
0 kla. Stat. ( I  94 I )  t. 58 ,  § 6 I .  "When a will has been admitted 
to probate, any person interested therein may at arty time within one 
year after such probate, contest the same. . . . For that purpose he 
must file in the court in which the will was proved a sworn petition 
in writing containing his allegations, that evidence discovered since the 
probate of the will . . . shows: 
" I .  That a will of a later date than the one proved by the decedent, 
revoking or changing the former will, has been discovered, and is 
offered. • • ." 
Oregon. In one case probate was revoked because of the existence 
of a later will, though this will was not offered for probate. Lapse 
of time was not at issue in this case. See Melhase v. Melhase, 8 7  Ore. 
5 90, I 7 I  P. 2 I 6  ( I 9 I 8) .  
Pennsylvania. It would seem that a later will must be presented 
within the time to appeal from probate of the first wi�l, unless a recent 
lower court decision represents a new trend in its holding that probate 
of the earlier will is like forgery, which may be proved after the period 
to appeal from probate has elapsed. 
Cochran v. Young, 1 04, Pa. St. 333  ( I 883) . Ejectment, by a 
devisee under a codicil against the purchaser of a devisee under the 
will. The will was probated in I 862, and the . codicil was probated 
in 1 88 1 .  The present action was brought in I 882.  Judgment was 
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for the defendant. Held, by statute, a probate is conclusive unless 
those interested to controvert it should contest it within five years ; 
this is not merely a statute of limitations, but is a provision for greater 
certainty of title, and lays down a rule of evidence ; the probate of the 
will becomes conclusive after five years, and the codicil cannot now 
be used to upset the validity of the will ; even if there was fraud in with-
- holding the codicil, it is unavailing against the defendant, a bona fide 
purchaser. 
Baker's Estate, 244 Pa. 350, 90 A. 655 ( 1 9 14 )  is not directly 
in point. The first will was probated, and the time for appeal had 
passed. A codicil was probated at the same time, and this is an appeal 
from probate of the codicil. The evidence shows that there was a 
will •later than the one probated, and that the codicil was intended 
as a codicil to this later will. Held, the codicil cannot be probated 
because it related to another will than the one which was probated, 
and since the probate of the will has not been appealed from during the 
statutory period, it could not be superseded by the later will. 
Sebik's Estate, 300 Pa. 45, 1 5 0  A. r 6 r  ( 1 930) . A later will was 
offered for probate two and one-half years after probate of the first 
will. Probate· was denied by the register, and the case is affirmed on 
appeal. Held, the probate of the first will can only be set aside on 
appeal, and if on such appeal it is decided that the later will is in fact 
the last will, an appropriate �rder will be made to the register to admit 
it to probate ; the proper procedure is appeal from probate of the first 
will ; the statute providing that a last will may be offered for probate 
at any time does not apply, since there is an adjudication that the earlier 
instrument is the last will. 
See, also, Crawford v. Schooley, 2 1 7  Pa. 429, 66 A. 743 ( 1 907) .  
But see Hetzel's Estate, 37 D. & C. 440 ( 1 939) . The second 
will was offered for probate but the petition was dismissed, under 
procedure as outlined in Sebik's Estate. An appeal was filed two 
years and two months after probate of the first will. Held, appeal 
is proper ; the purpose of the statute of limitations is to protect titles of 
bona fide purchasers, and not to prohibit the probate of a last will 
offered after the expiration of a time limit. "The present case raises 
no question of title in the hands of an innocent purchaser. Only the 
rights of legatees are involved. There has been no ad-
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vertisement of letters, no inventory filed, no administration conducted, 
no transfers of property, nor any account filed. . . '. Every will 
probated which is not the last will is as much a fraud upon the register 
as the forgery was in Culbertson's Estate, 301  Pa. 438 ." 
Culbertson's Estate, 30 1 Pa. 438, 1 5 2  A. 540 ( 1 930) involved a ,  
forged will, and the court set aside its probate twelve years after 
p�obate, on the twofold ground that there was extrinsic fraud, and 
that the will was void and the order admitting it to probate was equally 
void. See, also, Lowry's Estate, 26 D. & C. 200 ( 1 936) ,  holding 
that it is in the discretion of the court to allow an appeal after the 
statutory period has elapsed where fraud is claimed. See, also, Roberts' 
Estate, 309 Pa. 389, 1 64 A.  5 7  ( 1 932 ) ,  which denies relief from 
probate of a forged will twenty years after probate, on the ground of 
laches. 
See, also, Wall v. Wall, 1 23 Pa. 545, 1 6  A. 5 98, 1 0  Am. St. Rep. 
54-9  ( 1 8$9) , where plaintiff in an ejectment action was able to set 
aside the probate after more than thirty years had elapsed, because the 
will was never executed. The court says this goes to the jurisdiction 
of the court ; the register cannot make a will out of something which 
is not a will. But see Broe v. Boyle, 1 08 Pa. St. 76 ( 1 884) , holding 
that after the period to appeal has expired, a will cannot be set aside 
on the ground that it was revoked by marriage of the testatrix, al­
though by statute marriage of a woman revoked her will. 
Rhode Island. A later will may be admitted to probate after the 
time for appeal from the first probate has passed. 
Bowen v. Johnson, 5 R. I. 1 1 2, 73 Am. Dec. 4-9 ( 1 858 ) .  The 
first will was probated in Rhode Island in 1 854. A later will was 
probated in New York the same year, and its decision was affirmed 
by the New York supreme court in 1 85 7 .  A duly authenticated copy 
of the later will and the New York decree were presented in Rhode 
Island, and probate denied. On motion for a new trial, held, a new 
trial must be granted. After first deciding that the full faith and 
credit clause does not require recognition of the New York decree, 
the court holds that the later WJ11 can be probated without first revok­
ing the first probate ; the probate courts have power to rev.oke their 
decrees ; "else, if probate of a will be granted, and the time of appeal 
be passed, inasmuch as their jurisdiction is exclusive, there would · be 
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no mode in which a later will of the testator, subsequently found, could 
be proved, without the inconvenience of having out, at the same time, 
conflicting authorities, issuing from the same source, and with regard 
to the settlement of the same estate." 
Merrill v. Boal, 47 R. I. 2 74, I 32 A. 7 2 I ,  45 A .L.R. B3o ( 1 926) .  
This was a petition for probate o f  an  instrument in the form of  a trust 
deed ; the petition was filed after the time for appeal from probate of 
the will had passed ; the will referred to the trust deed. Held, citing 
the Bowen case, the court has power to probate a supplemental instru­
ment which should have been probated with the will. 
South Carolina. It has been held that equity has no jurisdiction to 
admit a later will. There is no authority on the power of the probate 
court to do so. 
Myers v. O'Hanlon, I 2 Rich. Eq. I 96 ( I  86 I ) .  Bill in equity 
twenty-two years after probate of the first will, to set aside the probate 
and to set up a later will. The bill was dismissed. Held, equity has 
no such jurisdiction. 
South Dakota. By statute, discovery of . a later will is one of the 
grounds for a contest after probate, and proceedings are governed by 
the contest statute. 
S. D. Code ( I  939) § 35 .0306. "When a will has been admitted 
to probate, any person interested therein may, at any time within one 
year after such probate, contest the same. . . • For that purpose 
he must file in the court in which the will was proved a sworn petition 
in writing alleging that evidence, discovered since the probate of the 
will . . . shows : 
" I .  That a will o f  a later date than the one probated, revoking or 
changing the former will, has been discovered and is offered. . . ." 
Tennessee. There are no cases in which the passage of time was 
an issue, and the very absence of such an issue indicates that the later 
will may be offered at any time. It has been held that probate of 
the later will is not a collateral attack on the first probate, and in one 
case the second will was probated twenty-three years after probate of 
the first will. 
Murrell v. Rich, I 3 I  Tenn. 3 78, I 75 S.W. 420 ( I 9 14 )  came 
up on a contest of the later will ; it is not clear how much time had 
passed after p�obate of the first one. One of the 1grounds of contest of 
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the second will is that its probate constitutes a collateral attack on the 
probate of the first will, and that the first probate must be revoked 
before the second can be probated. Held, the first probate need not be 
revoked, for the second probate is not a collateral attack. Even if the 
effect of the second will is to annul the first one, there is no objection. 
In Fransioli v. Podesta, I 7 5  Tenn. 340, I 34 S.W. (2d) I 62  
( I 9 3 9) the first will was pr.obated in  I 9 3 3, and the second one was 
offered in I 936. The second one was holographic, and probate was 
denied because it was not found among decedent's valuable papers, as 
required by statute ; the present proceeding was begun in I 9 3 8 to 
have it probated as a codicil. The sole issue is whether the I 936 pro­
ceeding constitutes res judicata. Held, it does not, and the will may 
be probated. The time element is not mentioned. 
In Hudson v. Hudson, 2 Tenn. App. 535 ( I 926) the later will 
was offered two years after probate of the first one. It was admitted, 
and again no mention was made .of the passage of time. The main 
issue was estoppel. 
Seilaz v. Seilaz, 24 Tenn. App. 6 1 1 , 148 S.W. ( 2d) 23  ( I 940) 
was a case for construction of the second will, and is important here 
only because the statement of facts indicates that the second will was 
probated twenty-three years after the first one. 
Texas. There is no direct authority on the question of lapse of 
time, but probably a later will may be offered at any time. 
Vance v. Upson, 64 Tex. 266 ( I 885 ) .  The second will was 
offered within ten months after probate of the first one. The limita­
tion period for conteSt: is not stated, although one statement in the 
opinion indicates that it is one year. On defendant's demurrer on the 
ground that the later will cannot be probated until the first probate is 
revoked, the demurrer was overruled. Held, the court has jurisdiction 
to admit the last will of the decedent, and it would be pointless to re­
quire revocation of the first probate before the second can be probated, 
and then perhaps discover that the second will does not operate to 
revoke the first. · 
Richardson v. Ames (Tex. Civ. App., I 928) ,  2 S.W. ( 2d) 5 I 7 ,  
was an  attempt to set aside a probate obtained in I 92 I on  the ground 
of revocation of the will by a later will. Apparently there is no effort 
to probate the later will. It was held that execution of the later will 
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was not proved, and hence could have no effect on the earlier one. 
The case is important only because of its assumption that proof of a 
later will could operate to revoke probate of the earlier one. 
Virginia. A later will may be probated after the period for im­
peaching the earlier will in equity has expired. 
Schultz v. Schultz, I O  Gratt. (5 I Va.) 358, 6o Am. Dec. 335 
( I 8 5 3) is  a leading case, and is often cited for the proposition that a 
later will may be offered after the period to contest has expired. The 
statute gave_ seven years to contest, providing that if not contested in 
that time the probate is forever binding ; there was a saving clause in 
favor of persons out of the state. The first will was probated in I 830, 
and the second was offered for probate in I 84 5 .  The proponent was 
within the saving clause of the statute. Probate was denied in I 845, 
whe�eupon the same proponent began proceedings in equity for rev­
ocation of the first probate. He was successful in this action, and 
then obtained probate of the second will. The present case is an ap­
peal from the decree revoking probate of the first will and from the 
probate of the second will. After deciding that the saving clause of 
the statute was applicable, the court held that the denial of probate in 
I 84 5 was a judgment on the merits, and that it was not necessary to 
revoke the first probate before the second will could be probated. 
That is, the probate court had jurisdiction over the probate of the 
second will, and its decision denying probate is forever binding because 
not contested within seven years. Therefore the later proceedings 
were void. 
(It would seem that this case does not hold that a later will may 
be admitted at any time. In view of the fact that the proponent was 
within the saving clause of the statute of limitations for contest, there 
could be no question of his right to present the second will. That is, 
the period to contest had not expired. It would seem �hat if the case 
holds anything beyond the holding that proponent was within the sav­
ing clause, it holds merely that the decision on the later will is binding 
even though the probate of the first will was not first revoked. ) 
In re Will of Bentley, I 75 Va. 456, 9 S.E. (zd) 308 ( I 940) . 
The second will was offered five years after probate of, the first one ; 
no reasons for the delay are given. The statute then in force (Code, 
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I 930, § 5259)  gave two years to bring a suit in equity to impeach the 
will. It was contended that the statute barred probate of the second 
will, but held, the later will may be admitted because it is not an attack 
on the judgment of probate of the earlier will ; the court relies on 
Schultz v. Schultz, saying that that case holds that a later will may 
be admitted at any time. There is a strong dissenting opinion, which 
points out that the only real holding of the Schultz case was that the 
limitation period did not apply because proponent was within the 
saving clause of the statute, and therefore all other questions in the case 
are moot and the rest of the opinion dictum. 
T¥ ashington. Probate of the later will is not a contest of the earlier 
one, and the probate court has inherent power to set aside its former 
decree, at least while the estate is still open. 
In re Elliott's Estate (Wash., I 945 ) I 56 P. ( 2d) 427 .  The 
second will was offered for probate after the period for contest of the 
first will had elapsed. Held, the second will is admitted to probate ; 
it does not constitute a contest of the prior will within the meaning of 
the contest statute, and a court of probate has inherent authority at any 
time, while an estate is still open, to set aside its decrees and to admit 
to probate a later will than that theretofore probated. 
§§  76-7 8. PRODUCTION OF WITNESSES FOR PROBATE 
The rule that attesting witnesses to a document must be called in 
preference to other witnesses is probably too well settled to require 
discussion here. See 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., I 940) § § I 2  8 7-
I 32 I .  A greater problem arises regarding the number of such wit­
nesses which must be called. Two witnesses were apparently neces­
sary to prove a will of personalty in solemn form in the English ec­
clesiastical courts, but a will of realty could be proved in the common 
law courts on the testimony of only one witness. Wigmore, Evidence 
(3d ed., I 940) §§  I 304, 2048, 2049· In view of the fact that 
ecclesiastical courts were not known in this country, the English 
common-law rule presumably applies in American courts unless it has 
been changed by statute. As to the necessity of producing all the sub­
scribing witnesses, see 2 Page, Wills (3d. ed., I 94 I )  § 7 44. Gen­
erally, see 2 Woerner, Administration (3d ed., I 923)  § §  2 1 6-2 I 8. 
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Many of the states have statutes on the subject ; these statutes will be 
discussed in this note. The word witness will be used to mean at­
testing witness. 
Perhaps the most common type of statute permits an uncontested 
will to be proved by only one witness if he testifies to the essential re­
quirements of execution, but requires all of the available witnesses to 
be produced and examined if the will is contested. Ariz. Code ( I  939) 
§§ 38-209, 38-2 I 2 ;  Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) §§ 329, 
372 ; Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § §  I 5-2 I I , I 5-2 I 6 ;  Minn. Stat. 
( I 94 I )  § 525 .24 ; Mont. Rev. Code ( I 935 )  § §  I 0030, I 003 5 ;  
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  § §  9882. I 7, 9882. I 9 ;  N. D. Rev. 
Code ( I 943) § §  30-o5 1 I , 3o-o6o4 ; Okla Stat. ( I 94 I )  t. 5 8, 
§ §  30, 43 ; S. D. Code (I 939) § §  35 .0209, 35 .0303 ; Tenn. Code 
(Michie, I 938)  § §  8 I o2, 8 1 08 ;  Utah Code ( I 943) § I 02-3-8 ; 
Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 I )  § §  88-2 I 8, 88-605.  A similar result is 
reached in Georgia and South Carolina, where proof in common form 
may be made by one witness, while all the witnesses are required for 
proof in solemn form. Ga. Code Ann. ( I  936) § § I I 3-60 I ,  I I 3-
602 ;  S. C. Code ( 1 942) § 8932. 
A few other states provide simply that an uncontested will may be 
proved by one attesting witness, but make no provision •for the case of 
the contested will. Ala. Code ( 1 940) t. 6 I ,  § 3 9 ;  Me. Rev. Stat. 
( I 944) c. I 4 I ,  § 7 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 27 .3 I 7 8 (92) ; Neb. 
Rev. Stat. ( I 943 ) § 30-2 I 8 ;  Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 933)  § 2 764 ; Wi�. 
Stat. ( 1 943) § 3 Io.o6. New Hampshire achieves the same result by 
providing that probate in common form may be had on the testimony 
of only one witness, but the statute is silent as to probate in solemn 
form. N. H. Rev. Laws ( I  942) c. 35 I ,  § 6. By implication, one 
witness would not suffice in these states if the will is contested, and 
cases in at least some of these jurisdictions have so held. See cases 
cited in 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., I 940) 607,  footnote 6. A 
few states require only one witness without reference to whether there 
is a contest. Ala. Code ( I  940) t. 6 I ,  § 39 ( "one or more of the sub­
scribing witnesses") (but the same section also provides explicitly that 
one witness suffices if there is no contest) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I  94 I )  
§ 732.24 ("any attesting witness") ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 933) § 7-
407 ( "one or more of the subscribing witnesses") ; Miss. Code ( I  942) 
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§ 498 ( "at least one of the subscribing witnesses") ;  Tex. Civ. Stat. 
Ann. (Vernon, Supp. I 94 5 )  art. 3344 ("one of the subscribing wit­
nesses") .  The Massachusetts 'statute, after providing that an un­
contested will may be proved by one witness, continues with a unique 
provision that "if the probate of such instrument is assented to in writ­
ing by the widow or husband of the deceased, if any, and by all the 
heirs at law and next of kin, it may be allowed without testimony." 
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. I 92, § 2 .  
Some states require the testimony of two witnesses or all the wit­
nesses regardless of whether or not there is a contest. Colo. Stat. 
( 1 935)  c. I 76 ,  § § 55 ,  56 ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ( Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3' 
§ 2 2 1 ;  Iowa Code ( 1 939)  § I I 866 ( "the subscribing witnesses") ;  
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 59-2224 ;  Md. Code ( I 939)  art. 
93, § 365 ; N. M. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 32-209 ("the attesting witnesses") ;  
N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 1 4 1 ; N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943)  § 3 I-I 8 ;  Ohio 
Gen. Code (Page, I 937 )  § 1 0504-I 8 ( "the witnesses") ;  Pa. Stat. 
Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t. 20, § 1 9 1 .  
It should be noticed that most statutes merely require that the 
specified number of witnesses be called and examined, and do not re­
quire that all of them be able to prove the execution of the will. See 
7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., I 940) § § 2048, 2049 for a discussion 
of the difference between these two rules. It is there stated that 
Pennsylvania is the only state requiring the proof of two witnesses. 
The Pennsylvania statute has been so interpreted in Hock v. Hock, 6 
Serge. & R. 47  ( I 82o) ; McClure v. Redman, 263 Pa. 405, 107  A. 
2 5 ( 1 9 I 9 ) .  Statutes in at least two other states, however, are suscepti­
ble of a similar interpretation. In Colorado, the will shall be allowed 
if it appears "by tjle testimony of two or more of the subscribing wit­
nesses" that it was properly executed. Colo. Stat. ( I  935 ) c. I 76, 
§ 56. And in Tennessee, a contested will "shall be proved by all the 
living witnesses." Tenn. Code (Michie, I 938)  § §  8 1 02, - 8 1 08. 
Most of the states provide for the use of depositions of absent wit­
nesses, and for the use of secondary evidence when the witnesses are 
unavailable. The only important point of divergence in this con­
nection concerns the territorial limits beyond which an attesting witness 
is excused from attending. In some states a witness who is not in 
the county need not appear, e.g., Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 
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Supp. I 945)  art. 3344, while in other states any witness within the 
state must be produced, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 2 7 ·3 I 78 ( 93 ) .  
A few states have indefinite language such as "without the reach of 
subpoena," Ore . Comp. Laws ( I  940) § I 9-204 ; or "parts un­
known," Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 7-32.24. A few states employ a 
limitation in terms of distance from the court. Thus, in Arkansas 
and Kentucky a deposition may be used if the witness resides more 
than fifty miles away. Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 937 )  § I4535 ; Ky. Rev. 
Stat. ( I 944) § 394.230. In Maine and Washington the distance is 
thirty miles. Me. Rev. Stat. ( I  944) c. I4 I ,  § 6 ;  Wash. Rev. Stat. 
( I 932 )  § I 38 1 .  In Nevada it is twenty-five miles, but in case of a 
contested will a witness within the county must be produced. Nev. 
Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  §§  9882. I 7, 9882. I 9. 
§ 77 ·  PROOF OF LosT AND DEsTROYED WILLS 
I. IN GENERAL 
In the absence of statute, the fact that a will is lost, or is destroyed 
without the consent of the testator, does not prevent its probate, pro­
vided its contents are proved. See Atkinson, Wills ( I 93 7 )  45 2 .  
While i t  has been said that the ecclesiastical courts in England required 
two witnesses to prove the contents of such a will (see 2 Page, Wills 
(3d ed., I 94 I )  § 708 and Swinburne, Wills ( 7th ed., I 793 ) 450) , 
it would seem that this is of little significance, since the rule of the 
ecclesiastical courts was that any fact must be proved by two witnesses. 
7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., I 940) § 2045 ; I Williams, Executors 
( Ist Am. ed., I 832 )  * I 96 (as to wills generally) . In the United 
States, in the absence of statute, the rules for the proof of the contents 
of a will are substantially the same whether the will is lost or not. It 
is true, a number of cases state that "clear and satisfactory" proof is 
required, or by similar language indicate that something more than a 
mere preponderance of the evidence may be necessary (see cases col­
lected in I 26 A. L. R. I I 39 at I I 4 I ) ,  yet it is held that the contents 
need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Skeggs v. Horton, 
82 Ala. 35 2, 2 So. I I o ( I  886) . Thus it may be said that the rule as 
to proof is the same as that applicable in the ordinary case, but the 
nature of the evidence is such, when the will is lost, that it must be 
received with caution. 
.. 
STATUTORY NOTES 299 
Attention should be called to a rule laid down in a few early cases 
to the effect that a lost or destroyed will may be established in equity. 
To that effect are Dower v. Seeds, 28 W. Va. I I 3, 5 7  Am. Rep. 646 
( I  886) ; Harris v. Tisereau, 52 Ga. I 53 ,  2 I Am. Rep. 242 ( I 874) ; 
Buchanan v. Matlock, 8 Humph. ( 2 7  Tenn.) 390, 47 Am. Dec. 
622 ( I 847) ; and see Hall v. Gilbert, 3 I  Wis. 6 9 I  ( I 873) . This 
doctrine apparently arose from the rule which once obtained in English ' 
chancery permitting an heir or devisee of land to establish his title in 
that tribunal where the remedy at law of trespass or ejectment was in­
adequate. See Boyse v. Rossborough, Kay Ch. 7 I  ( I 85 3 ) ,  3 DeGex 
MacN. & G. 8 I 7  ( I 854) ; Colclough v. Boyse, 6 H .  of L. Cases I 
( I  8 5 7 )  ; Fourth Report of English Real Property Commissioners 
( I 833)  34-3 7 ;  Adams, Equity ( 8th ed., I 89o) 248-250 .  A 
New York statute gives the supreme courts of that state a jurisdiction 
over lost and destroyed wills concurrent with the surrogate's court 
See N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, § § 200-204. In most of the states today, 
however, a lost or destroyed will is probated in the same tribunal as 
any other will. Wachter v. Davis, 2 I 5  Ala. 659, I I I  So. 9 I 7  
( I 927 ) ; Beatty v. Clegg, 2 I 4 Ill. 34, 73 N. E. 383 ( I 905 ) ;  Harrell 
v. Harrell, 284 Mo. 2 I 8, 223 S. W. 9 I 9  ( I 920) ; see, also, Atkin­
son, \Vilis ( I  937)  4 5 2 . Indeed, this is expressly indicated by a number 
of statutes which provide for the probate of all wills in the same court 
and begin with a statement to the effect that an interested person may 
petition for the probate of a will "whether the same be in writing or 
nuncupative, in his possession or not, lost or destroyed, or beyond the 
jurisdiction of the state ." See, for example, Cal. Prob. Code Ann. 
(Deering, I 944) § 323.  
In general, as to the proof of lost and destroyed wills, see Atkinson, 
Wills ( I 93 7 )  § I 86 ;  2 Page, Wills (3d ed., I 94 I ) §§  708-7 2 I ; 7 
Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., I 940) § §  2052, 2 1 06 ; annotations in 
34 A. L. R. I 304 and I 26 A. L. R. I I 39· 
II. STATUTES IMPOSING SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS 
In many states it has been felt that special requirements for the 
proof of missing wills should be established by legislation. In about 
half the states are found statutes on the subject, setting up more or 
!ess rigid requirements for the proof of such wills. For the most part 
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they make requirements as to the number of witnesses necessary to 
prove the contents, and many of them require proof of the time of 
destruction. The remainder of this note will be devoted to a discussion 
of the statutes. They are as follows: 
Ariz. Code ( 1 939) § §  38-222  to 38-224 ;  Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 93 7 )  
§ §  I4560-I4563 ; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § §  350-
3 5 2 ;  Colo. Stat. Ann. ( I 935)  c. I 76, § 5 7 ;  Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  
§ 732 .2 7 ;  Ga. Code Ann. ( 1 936) § I I 3-6 I I ;  Idaho Laws Ann. 
( 1 943) § § 1 5-230 to 1 5-233 ; I�d. Stat. (Burns, 1 933)  § § 7-601 
to 7-604 ; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-2228 ; Me. Rev. Stat. 
(1 944) c. 1 4 1 ,  § 9 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § §  2 7 .3 1 7 8 (95 ) ,  
2 7 .3 1 78 (96) ; Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § § 5 25 .26 to 525 .262 ; Mont. 
Rev. Code ( 1 935)  § § . 1 0049-10052 ;  Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp . 
. 1 94 1 )  § §  9882 .34 to 9882.3 6 ;  N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, § §  200-
204 ; N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 1 43 ;  N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943) 
§§ 30-05 1 7, 30-05 1 8 ;  Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 93 7 )  §§ 1 0504-
35 to 1 0504-40 ; Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t. 5 8, § §  8 1-84 ; S. D. Code 
( 1 939) § §  35 .02 1 I-35 .02 1 3 ;  Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939) 
art. 3330, 3335, 3345, 3349 ; Utah Code ( I 943) §§ 1 02-3-25 to 
102-3-2 7 ;  Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 932)  §§ 1 390-139 1 ;  Wis. Stat. 
( 1 943) § 3 10 . 1 0 ;  Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 1 )  § §  88-40 I to 88-404. 
See also Ore. Comp. Laws ( I  940) § I 9-202 ; S. C. Code ( I  942 )  
§ §  733,  8978 .  
Fourteen states require that the will be proved "to have been in 
existence at the time of the death of the testator, or . . . fraud:. 
ulently destroyed in his lifetime." These states are Ari�ona, Arkansas, 
California, Delaware, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, New York, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. 
This provision is undesirable. If the statute is literally construed and 
actual existence at the time of death is meant, it may prevent probate 
of an unrevoked will, since a lost or destroyed will which cannot be 
proved is in effect revoked, even though the revocation statute may 
not have been complied with. Again, if actual existence is meant, 
the · doctrine of dependent relative revocation is virtually precluded in 
so far as that doctrine applies to cases in which testator destroyed the 
will, for necessarily such a will is not in existence at the time of 
testator's death. In In re Kerckhof's Estate, I 3  Wash. ( 2d) 469, 
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I25 P. (2d) 2 84 ( I 942) (noted in 4I Mich. L. Rev. 358) ,  for 
example, testator destroyed his will under the mistaken impression 
that his sole legatee was also his sole heir, thinking that this legatee 
would take by intestacy. There 'Yere in fact several other heirs. The 
sole legatee sought to have the will probated, claiming that the re'voca­
tion was conditional and hence within the doctrine of dependent 
relative revocation, but the court denied probate, holding that it could 
not be admitted as a lost will because the statute required actual existence 
at the time of testator's death. 
In order to obviate these difficulties, some courts have ip.terpreted 
"fraudulently destroyed in his lifetime" as meaning any unlawful de­
struction, even though done in good faith, so that the will may be 
established even when actual existence cannot be shown, by proving 
that it was "fraudulently" destroyed. Rose v. Hunnicutt, I 66 Ark. 
I 34, 265  S. W. 65 I ( I 924) ; In re Breckwoldt's Will, I 70 Misc. 
883, I I N. Y. S. (2d) 486 ( I 939) .  Another method of avoiding 
the pitfalls of a literal construction of the statute is to interpret "exist­
ence" to mean existence in contemplati<;>n of law rather than actual 
physical existence. Under this interpretation the second clause of the 
statute-fraudulent destruction-becomes superfluous, for perforce 
the will continues in legal existence even though fraudulently destroyed. 
The Minnesota court adopted the legal existence construction in In 
re Estate of Havel, I 5 6  Minn. 253,  I 94 N. W. 633, 34 A. L. R. 
I300 ( I 923 ) .  Subsequently the Minnesota statute was amended to 
conform to this holding, so that it now requires only proof that the 
will remained unrevoked. Minn. Stat. ( I  94 I )  § 5 2  5 .26 I .  
Another approach to the problem is found in the Ohio statute. In 
that state a missing will may be probated if it was lost, spoliated or 
destroyed "subsequent to the death of such testator, or after he became 
incapable of making a will by reason of insanity, or before the death of 
such testator if testator's lack of knowledge of such loss, spoliation or 
destruction can be proved by clear and convincing testimony." Ohio 
Gen. Code (Page, I 937 )  § I 05 04-35 ·  The Georgia provision is 
similar, permitting probate of a will "destroyed without the consent of 
the testator, or . • . lost or destroyed subsequent to the death of 
the testator." Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) § I I 3-6 I I .  These statutes 
clearly make actual existence the �riterion, with the alternative of prov-
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ing that destruction before testator's death was without his knowledge. 
This form of statute has the virtue of avoiding the term "fraudulently 
destroyed," and for that reason probably does not present the same 
difficulties in proving a missing will which remains unrevoked, at least 
if testator did not know it was missing. But what of the case of 
dependent relative revocation ? Or the case where testator destroyed 
the will under undue influence ? The Ohio statu!e prevents probate 
in these and other cases in' which the will is destroyed with testator's 
knowledge but not revoked. At the same time, however, the statute 
has the advantage of making testator's ignorance of the mere loss of 
the will (as distinguished from intentional destruction) a necessary 
part of the proof. For reasons already discussed, this presumably carries 
out the intent of the average testator. 
As to proof of contents, the statutes require two credible witnesses 
in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, ·Michigan, 
Montana, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming ; Florida requires two 
disinterested witnesses. This mandate is, of course, for corroborative 
purposes ; but it may be questioned whether any definite number of 
witnesses should be required. The quality of evidence cannot be 
measured in terms of number of witnesses. In the final analysis it 
becomes a question of credibility of the witness, and credibility is neither 
aided nor defeated by a statutory requirement as to the number of 
witnesses. There may well be cases in which only one witness is avail­
able, yet this single witness may .be of such credibility that no further 
proof is necessary, and none should be required. This situation is 
cured in part by a proviso found in Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and 
N�w York to the effect that a correct copy of the will is equivalent to 
one of the two required witnesses. The purpose of this provision is 
doubtless to permit the attorney who drew the will and who retained 
a copy of it to produce the copy and prove that it is a correct copy. 
But it does not aid the single credible witness who does not possess a 
copy. If there is no requirement whatever as to the number of wit­
nesses, the attorney with his copy, or the single credible witness who 
has no copy, may secure probate. 
Evidence that the two-witness rule has not worked satisfactorily is 
found in such cases as Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425,  227  N. W. 8 1 7  
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( 1 929) ,  where a legatee under a lost will Wll;S unable to obtain his 
legacy because of inability to produce two witnesses. He then brought 
a tort action against the person who destroyed the will, and recovered 
damages for its malicious destruction. The court avoided the effect 
of the statute by saying that it applied only to probate proceedings, and 
thus in effect gave the plaintiff his legacy without forcing him to 
comply with the statute. In this connection see also Dulin v� Ba
.
iley, 
I 7 2  N. C. 6oS, 90 S. E. 6S9 ( 1 9 1 6) and Morton v. Pettit, 1 24  Ohio 
St. 24 1 ,  I 7 7  N. E. 5 9 1  ( 1 93 1 ) .  
The Texas statute requires the testimony "of a credible witness who 
has read it [the will] or heard it read." Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernnn, 
1 939)  art. 3349· 'While this may help to prevent fraud, it also 
prevents establishment of the contents by means of statements of the 
testator. Since this latter mode of proof is often the best and only 
method available, it should not be precluded by statute. One's position 
on this form of enactment is perhaps dependent upon his views on 
the desirability of permitting partial proof of the contents, for the 
entire will may be proved more easily by one who has read it or heard it 
read than by one who has not. If the policy of the legislature points 
to rejection of partial proof of the contents, the Texas provision may 
well be an aid to the effectuation of this policy. 
Michigan has a unique provision to the effect that no revoking clause 
or provision which is inconsistent with a prior will produced for probate 
shall affect the prior will unless the legal execution of the lost will and 
the revoking clause or inconsistent provisions are "established by at 
least 2 reputable witnesses, having knowledge thereof." Mich. Stat. 
Ann. ( 1 943)  § 27 .3 1 7 S (96 ) .  This provision was perhaps intended 
to obviate the situation exemplified in such cases as Estate of Johnston, 
I SS  Cal. 336, 206 P. 62S ( 1 922 ) ,  where a revoking clause of a lost 
will was admitted on the testimony of one witness, in spite of the statute 
requiring two witnesses for the proof of a lost will, with the result that 
a prior will which was offered for probate was held to be revoked by 
the lost will. 
Various other statutory requirements should be mentioned. In 
Texas the cause of non-production of the will must be shown. Tex. 
Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939)  art. 3330, 3349· Since this fact 
is part of the common-law best evidence rule and is therefore a neces-
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sary part of the proof, it is scarcely necessary to spell it out by statute. 
In Georgia, "the presumption is of revocation by the testator, and that 
presumption must be rebutted by proof." Ga. Code Ann. ( I  936) 
§ I I 3-6 I I .  This extends the common-law presumption to cases 
where the will was not in testator's custody, and may be an aid to the 
prevention of fraud. 
Ill California provision is made for the establishment of a will 
destroyed by public calamity in the lifetime of the testator without his 
knowledge, with the additional provision that knowledge of the destruc­
tion by public calamity shall not be imputed to a person committed to 
an insane hospital. Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 350. 
Maine includes "suppressed" along with "lost or destroyed." Me. 
Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. I 4 I ,  § 9· Moreover, the Maine statute applies 
not only to lost and destroyed wills, but also to wills which are filed 
in a foreign jurisdiction and which cannot be produced for that reason. 
This situation should be provided for in legislation on ancillary ad­
ministration rather than in the lost wills statute. 
Nothing has so far been said about the statutes of Kansas and 
Minnesota (which are nearly identical) and that of Wisconsin which 
is similar. These three states have a simple form of enactment : Kansas 
and Minnesota provide that no lost or destroyed will "shall be es­
tablished unless it is proved to have remained unrevoked, nor unless 
its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved," Kan. Gen. Stat. ( Supp. 
I 943)  § 5 9-2228 ; Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 525 .26 1 ;  while in Wis­
consin the county court "shall have power to take proof of the execution 
and validity" of a will "lost or destroyed by accident or design." Wis. 
Stat. ( 1 943) § 3 I O. I O. These statutes have the virtue of avoiding 
the pitfalls of the existence-at-death formula with its limitation on de­
pendent relative revocation ; they also eliminate the requirement of 
two witnesses. Probably none of them does more thai-I to give the 
common law the force of legislative approval. 
§ §  8 1 ,  85.  NEcEssiTY AND EFFEcT oF PRoBATE 
I. NECESSITY OF PROBATE 
Provisions are found in many states to the effect that probate is 
essential. These usually take the form that no will shall be effectual 
to pass real or personal property until probated. Fla. Stat. Ann; 
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( I 94- I )  § 732 .26 ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 94-3) § 5 9-6 I 6 ;  Me. 
Rev. Stat. ( I 94-4-) c. 1 55 ,  § I S ;  Mass. Ann. Laws ( I932) c. 1 9 1 , 
§ 7 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 94-3) § 27 .3 I 78 (9o) ; Minn. Stat. ( I 94- I )  
§ 525 .222 ; Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 94-3) § 30-220 ; N. H .  Rev. Laws 
( I 94-2)  c. 35 I ,  § I ; N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943) § 3 I-39 ;  Ohio 
Gen. Code (Page, 1 93 7 )  § 1 0504-29 ;  Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 933)  
§ 2 7 5 8 ;  Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 238. I 8. 
Arkansas, Kentucky and South Carolina provide that no will shall 
be received in evidence until probated, and in Iowa and North Dakota 
it is provided that a will shall not be carried into effect until probated. 
Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 937)  § I 4-53 I ;  Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) § 394-. 1 30 ;  
S .  C .  Code ( I 94-2) § 8964 ; Iowa Code ( 1 939) § n 882 ; N .  D. 
Rev. Code ( I  94 3)  § 30-0 5o 5. Both of these forms of statute clearly 
make probate essential. The Rhode Island statute states that "title 
to real or personal estate shall pass by will when such will has been 
finally proved," R. I. Gen. Laws ( I 938)  c. 566, § 4- 1 ; while in 
Illinois "every will when admitted to probate . . . is effective to 
transfer the real and personal property." Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith­
Hurd, 1 94- 1 )  c. 3, § 205. By implication, if not by express language, 
probate would seem to be essential in both of these states. _ 
In other jurisdictions the courts have held that probate of a will is 
necessary because of the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate courts 
over wills. See cases collected in Ann. Cas. 1 9 1 6 - A 887,  and 2 
Woerner, Administration (3d ed., I 923)  § 228 .  There is no dissent 
from this proposition as to wills of personal property. The same has 
been held with respect to wills involving real property. See, for 
example, Tompkins v. Tompkins, I Story 547,  Fed. Cas. No. 1409 I  
( 1 84- I ) ; Castro v. Richardson, I S  Cal. 4-78  ( I 86 I ) ; Johnes v. 
Jackson, 67 Conn. 8I at 90, 34- A. 709 ( I 895 ) .  While it is possible 
to probate a will involving land as well as one involving personalty in 
all jurisdictions, it would seem that, in a few states, one may prove 
a will involving land in an action in the nature of trespass or ejectment 
without first having it admitted to probate. See Bouton v. Fleharty, 
2 1 5  App. Div. 1 80, 2 1 3  N. Y. S. 4-55 ( I 926) ; Corley v. McElmeel, 
I4-9 N. Y. 228, 4-3 N. E. 628 ( 1896) ; Weatherhead v. Sewell, 9 
Humph. (28 Tenn.) 2 72  ( I 848) ; Bagwell v. Elliott, 2 Rand. (23  
Va.) I 90 ( 1 824-) ; but see Taylor v .  Taylor, 2 Humph. ( 2 I Tenn.) 
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597  ( I 84 I )  and Weaver v. Hughes, 26 Tenn. App. 436 at 443, I 73 
S.W. ( 2d) I 5 9  ( I 943) ; and see also Tenn. Code (Michie, I 938)  
§ 8 I 2 7 ,  which, in referring to  foreign wills, states that nothing in the 
sections on probat� of foreign wills "is to prevent the proving of such 
wills as at common law and without probate." 
II. EFFECT OF PROBATE 
It is common to provide for the effect of probate. In Alabama the 
judgment upon a contest in equity after probate is conclusive as to 
all matters which were litigated or which could have been litigated ; 
and in the District of Columbia a contested probate is res judicata as 
to all persons. Ala. Code ( I  940) t. 6 I ,  § 6 5 ;  D. C. Code ( I  940) 
§ I 9-3 I 2. Georgia makes probate in solemn form conclusive on all 
persons notified and on all legatees. Ga. Code Ann. ( I  936) § I I 3-
602. In Kentucky probate is conclusive except as to the jurisdiction 
of the court. Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I  944) § 394· I 30. In Washington, 
probate or rejection of the will is binding and final as to all the world 
if not c.ontested within six months. Wash. Rev. Stat. ( I 932)  § I 385 .  
In one group of  states (and this is largely composed of  the same 
states which provide that no will shall be effectual to pass real or per­
sonal property until probated) probate is made conclusive as to due 
execution of the will. Iowa Code ( I 939) § I  I 882 ; Me. Rev. Stat. 
( I 944) c. I 5 5 , § I 5 ;  Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. I 9 I ,  § 7 ;  Mich. 
Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 2 7 .3 I 7 8 (9o) ; Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 525 .222 ; 
Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943) § 3o-22o ; N. H. Rev. Stat. ( I 942) c. 35 I ,  
§ I ; R. I. Gen Laws ( I 938) c. 5 72, § 7 ;  Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 933) 
§ 2 7 5 8  ; Wis. Stat. ( I 94 3)  § 2 3 8 .  I 8. Florida belongs to this group, 
but provides in addition that probate shall be conclusive that the will 
is unrevoked. Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 732.26. 
Most of the other states have broad provisions to the effect that 
probate is conclusive ; or, in states permitting contest after probate, 
probate is made conclusive if not contested within the statutory period. 
States in this latter group usually have a saving clause in favor of per-
sons under disability. ' 
A few states provide that a probated will may be read in evidence 
without fu�ther proof. Ala. Code ( I  940) t. 6 I '  § 44 ; Ark. Dig. 
Stat. ( 1937) § I4532 ; Del. Rev. Code ( I 935 )  § 3 799 (record pf 
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probate is "sufficient evidence") ;  Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) § I I 3-
6 I 2 ;  Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 933) § 7-4 I 3 ;" Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
( I 942)  § 547 ; N. M. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 32-2 I 8 ;  Tenn. Code (Michie, 
1 938)  § 8 I 39 (probate is "sufficient evidence" of a devise of realty) . 
Most of these states have other statutes on the necessity and effect of 
probate, but Delaware, Indiana and Tennessee apparently have no 
other statutory provisions on the subject. 
§ 83. TIME LIMIT FOR PROBATE 
Statutes have been found in twelve states setting up an absolute 
time limit on the probate of wills or grant of administration or both� 
The period varies from one to twenty-one years. In some states ex-:­
ceptions are written into the statute, or the court is given discretio� 
to waive the limitation, but in other states no exceptions are made. 
The salient points of the various statutes are indicated in the excerpts 
which follow : 
Ala. Code ( I  940) t. 6 I ,  § 34· "Wills shall not be effective unless 
filed for probate within five years from the date of the death of the 
testator." 
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I  930) § 4909. "Administration of the estate 
of any person shall not be granted, nor shall the will of any person 
be admitted to probate, after ten years from his decease, unless the 
court of probate upon written petition and after public notice and 
hearing shall find that administration of said estate ought to.be granted, 
or that said will should be admitted to probate ; but when any minor 
is interested, one year shall be allowed after his arrival at .full age t() 
take out administration or to cause said will to be proved. In all 
cases where any person has died leaving estate which isnot known to 
those interested in the same within the time above limited, but is dis­
covered afterwards, administration may be granted within one year 
after its discovery." 
Iowa Code ( I  93 9) § I I  89 I. "Ad�inistration shall not be origi­
nally granted after five years from the death of the decedent, or from 
the time his death was known, in case he died out of the state." 
, § I I 8 9 2.  "\Vhen personal property belonging to the estate of 
decedent is discovered after the expiration of said five years, administra-
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tion may be granted after the five-year limit, for the purpose only of 
making proper disposition and distribution thereof." 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-6 1 7 . "No will of a testator 
who died while a resident of this state shall be effectual to pass property 
unless an application is made for the probate of such will within one 
year after the death of the testator, except as hereinafter provided." 
§ 5 9-6 I 8. When the will is withheld for over a year from the 
death of the testator, it "may be admitted to probate as to any innocent 
beneficiary . • . if such application is made within ninety days after 
he has knowledge of such will and access thereto and within five years 
after the death of the testator. " Bona fide purchasers are 
protected after one year from the death of the decedent. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) § 395.0 1 0. "Original administration shall 
not be granted after the expiration of twenty years from the death of 
the testator or intestate, and if made after that time it shall be void." 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) c. 1 4 1 ,  § I . " . . After 20 years 
from the death of any person, no probate of his last will or administra­
tion on his estate shall be originally granted except as provided in the 
following section, unless it appears that there are moneys due to said 
estate from this state or the United States. . . ." 
§ 2 .  "When administration has not been taken on the estate of 
an intestate within 20 years after the death of such intestate, and 
thereafter any property of at least $20 in value accrues to said estate., 
or belonging thereto, first comes to the knowledge of any person in­
terested in said estate, original administration may be granted on such 
property, at any time within 2 years next after it so accrued or first 
became known, but such administration shall affect no other property 
and shall not revive debts due to or by said intestate." 
Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 932) c. 1 93, § 4. "Administration shall not 
be originally granted after the expiration of twenty years from the 
death of the testator or intestate, except in cases expressly authorized 
by law." 
C. I 9 3, § 5. "If administration has not been taken on the estate 
of a testator or intestate within twenty years after his decease, and any 
property or claim or right thereto remains undistributed or thereafter 
accrues to such estate and remains to be administered, original ad-
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ministration may for cause be granted, but it shall affect no other prop­
erty. . . ." 
N. D. Rev. Code ( I 943) § 30-0506. "A proceeding for the 
probate of a will may be commenced : 
" I .  If a written will, within six years after the testator's death, or 
if the will is not made known within that time, then within one year 
after its discovery. . . ." 
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 93 7 )  § 1 0509-I 3. "Administration 
shall not be originally granted as of right after the expiration of twenty 
years from the death of the testator or intestate. But, within his 
county, each probate judge may grant letters of original administration 
upon the estate of a person deceased, after the expiration of twenty 
years, upon petition of the next of kin or other person or persons in­
terested, or their agent, and on good cause shown therefor. • . ." 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 930) t. 20, § 342. "No letters testa­
mentary or of administration shall in any case be originally granted 
upon the estate of any decedent after the expiration of twenty-one 
years from the day of his decease, except on the order of the orphans' 
court upon due cause shown." 
Tenn. Code (Michie, I 938)  § 8 I 67 .  "The time within which 
administration may be granted shall be as follows: 
" I .  Where a person dies entitled to a vested or contingent re­
mainder, not reduced to possession in his lifetime, ten years after the 
termination of the life or other particular estate on which the re­
mainder depends, letters shall be given to administer upon his estate 
in said remainder. 
"2. Administration may be granted at any time within twenty-two 
years from the death of the deceased to any person entitled to distribu­
tion who was an infant when the deceased died. 
"3. A special administration may be granted for the purpose of 
prosecuting any claim against the government of the United States, 
without any limitation of time. 
"4� In no other cases shall letters of administration be granted 
where the deceased died ten years before application made for the 
same ; and all such letters testamentary or of administration, granted 
after the said period, shall be utterly void and of no effect." 
' . 
3 I Q  MODEL PROBATE CODE : APPENDICES 
. Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 939)  art. 3325 .  "All applications 
for the grant of letters testamentary or of administration upon. an estate 
must be filed within four years after the death of the testator or 
intestate ; provided that this Article shall not apply in any case where 
administration is necessary in order to receive or recover funds or 
other property due the estate of the decedent." 
Art. 3326. "No will shall be admitted to probate after the lapse 
of four years from the death of the testator unless it be shown by proof 
that the party applying for such probate was not in default in failing 
to present the same for probate within the four years aforesaid ; and 
in no case shall letters testamentary be issued where a will is admitted 
to probate after the lapse of four years from the death of the testator." 
In addition to these statutes, there are provisions in several states 
to the effect that claims of creditors are barred if no administration is 
had within a certain time after the death of the decedent. These 
statutes are collected in the appendix note for § I 3 5 ,  infra. As to 
time limitations on probate of a will discovered after probate of an 
earlier one, see appendix note for § 7 3· 
§ 1 06. AMOUNT oF BoNn 
The statutes on the amount of the personal representative's bond 
fall into three general categories : ( I )  those leaving the amount· to 
the discretion of the court ; ( 2 )  those enunciating the traditional rule 
that the bond must be in a sum equal to double the value of the estate 
(usually including the personal estate and the annual income from 
real estate) ; and (3)  those stipulating a fixed ratio less than the 
traditional one. Within each group, of course, there are variations. 
Thus, a guide for the court is sometimes laid down in those states 
which leave the amount to the discretion of the court. In some states 
which lay down a fixed ratio, the value of the real estate and its income 
are not taken into consideration, and in a few which do include the 
income from realty, the period from which the amount of the bond. is 
computed is longer than a year. It is common to provide for a reduced 
amount of the bond if the surety is a corporation; and in some states a 
reduction is provided for in case the perso�?:l representative is the. 
residuary legatee, or if all. interested perSOJl:� .-:con�;nt to a reduced 
amount. In addition to these rules, many statutes take ·cognizance of 
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testamentary directions as to reduction · or total dispensation of the 
bond ; this note, however, does not purport to cover such statutes. 
Nor does it cover bonds for the sale of real property, whether given at 
the beginning of administration or at the time the sale is made. Also 
excluded are rules for deposit of assets of the estate with consequent 
reduction in the amount of the bond. 
While in ma'st cases it is not difficult to determine into which of the 
three general categories the various statutes fall, there is ambiguity in 
some statutes. Therefore no attempt is made here to group the various 
statutes. Rather, they will be listed alphabetically by states, with brief 
explanatory notes for each one. 
Ala. Code ( I  940) t. 6 I ,  § 96. Not less than double the value of 
the personal property, and double the value of the rents of real estate 
for a term of three years ; or, at the discretion of the judge, not less than 
double the value of the real and personal property. 
Ariz. Code (Supp. I 945)  § 38-502. Not less than the value of 
the personal property and annual rents of real property. The court 
may dispense with bond in estates of less than $2000 when the whole 
estate goes to the surviving spouse and such spouse is applying for 
letters in person. 
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Supp. I 944) § 22 .  Not less than double the 
£!mount of the estimated value of the estate ; but if executed by a 
surety company, then not more than the value of the estate. 
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 5 4 1 .  Not less than 
twice the value of the personal property and twice the value of the 
income of realty ; but if executed by a surety company, the court in its 
discretion may fix the amount at not less than the value of the per-
sonalty and annual rents of all property. 
' 
Colo. Stat. ( Supp. I 944) c. 1 7 6, § 9 5 .  At least equal to and not 
more than double the amount of the personal estate and rents of real 
estate. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 930) § 4787 .  An amount satisfactory to the 
court of probate. Cf. § 4887,  stating a specia1 rule for the case where 
the testator dispenses with bond or stipulates its amount. 
. 
Del. Rev. Code ( I 935)  § 38 I 3  (amended by Laws 1 939, c. 1 39) . 
Not less than the best estimate that can be made of the personal estate. 
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D. C. Code ( I 940) § 20-I 04. Except as provided in § §  20-203, 
20-302 and 20-303, an amount sufficient to secure the proper ap­
plication of all the personal estate. (Sections 20-203 and 20-303 
provide for the case where the executor or administrator is entitled 
to the residue of the estate ; § 20-302 provides for the case where the 
testator dispenses with bond.)  Cf. § 20-202 and 20:-30I ,  providing 
for a bond in such penalty as the court may require. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I  94 I )  § "7 32 .6 1 .  As the judge deems sufficient, 
respect being had to the value of the estate. 
Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) § I I 3-I 2 I 7 . Administrator's bond is 
equal to double the amount of the estate to be administered. Cf. 
§ I I 3-I 2 I 6, stating that no bond is required of an executor unless 
the court orders one. 
Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § I 5-333·  Not less than twice the 
value of the personal property and twice the value of the annual rents 
of real property ; but if executed by a surety company, then not less 
than the value of the personal property and the value of the annual 
rents of real property. 
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § 303. Not less than 
double the value of the personal estate ; but if executed by a surety 
company, then not less than one and one-half times the value of the 
personal estate ; in no case less than $5 oo. 
Ind. Stat. (Burns, Supp. I 943) § 6-50 1 .  Not less than double 
the value of the personal estate. 
Iowa Code ( I  9 3 9) § I I 8 8 7 .  As required by the court. 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-1 1 0 1 .  Not less than 1 25 %  
of the value of the personal property and the annual income from real 
property. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) § 395 . I 30. Bond of administrator, ad­
ministrator c.t.a. and curator must be sufficient to secure the value 
of the whole estate. No rule given for executors, except that the will 
may dispense with bond. 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. I4 I ,  § § I I , 22 .  As the judge orders. 
Under c. I 4 I ,  § 20, the court may grant letters of administration or 
administration c.t.a. to the spouse or next of kin without bond if all 
interested persons other than creditors assent. Under c. I 5 I ,  § 5, 
if executed by a surety company, the penal sum may be reduced. 
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Md. Code ( I  939) art. 93, § § 40, 44. As prescribed by the court 
or register ;  if executed by a surety company, then not exceeding the 
value of the property and assets of the estate. Note special rule in 
§ 44 for the case where the testator dispenses with bond. 
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. 205, § x .  As the court may order. 
See also c. 205, § 3, providing a special rule when the executor is 
residuary legatee. 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 27 .3 I 78 (253 ) .  As the judge may 
direct. 
Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 525 .32.  In such amount as the court 
directs. 
Miss. Code ( I  942) § 5 I 4· Executor's bond must be equal to the 
full value of the estate ; § 5 I 5, special rule when he is residuary legatee ; 
§ 5 2  7 ,  administrator's bond must be equal to the value of all the per­
sonal estate. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) § §  I 8, 20. Not less than double 
the amount of the personal estate. 
Mont. Rev. Code (Supp. I 939) § 1 0088. Not less than the value 
of the personal property and the annual rents ,of real property, nor 
more than twice the value of such personalty and rents of realty ; the 
court may in its discretion fix a smaller sum if all persons entitled to 
the estate assent. Under § I 0096, the court may dispense with bond 
if there are. no assets warranting the necessity of a bond, ot if the 
testator so requests. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943) § 30-1 5 0 1 .  As the judge shall direct. 
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 I )  § 9882.68. Not less than the 
value of the personal property, including rents and profits. 
N. H.  Rev. Stat. ( 1 942) c. 352,  § 1 3 .  As the judge shall direct .. 
N. J .  Rev:. Stat. ( I 937 )  § 3 : 8-x .  As the court shall direct, having 
due regard to the value of the estate and the extent of the represent­
ative's authority. 
N. M. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 33-I I 6. At least double the value of the 
personal estate ; but if executed by a surety company, then I O %  in 
excess of the value of the personal estate. 
N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § §  I 2 I ,  1 35 ·  Not less than the value of the 
personal property and the rents of real property for eighteen months, 
and of the probable amount to be recovered by reason of any right of 
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action ; the court may reduce or dispense with bond if all interested 
persons agree. 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943) § 28-34. At least double the value 
of all the personal property; but if executed by a surety company, 
then one and one-fourth times the value of all the personal property. 
N. D. Rev. Code ( I 943) § 30-1 1 07 .  Not less than twice the 
aggregate value of the personal property and the rents of real property 
for one year ; but if executed by a surety company, then 1 0% in 
excess of the value of the personal property and annual rents of real 
property. 
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 937 )  § 105 06-4. Not less than double 
the value of the personal estate and of the annual rents of real estate. 
Section 1 0506-I 8 (Supp. I 944) provides a special rule when personal 
representative is sole residuary distributee or legatee. 
Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  t. 58, § I 7 L  Not less than twice the value of 
the pe_rsonal property and twice the value of annual rents of realty. 
Ore. Comp. Laws ( I  940) § I 9-2 I 8. Not less than double the 
value of the personal property and double the value of the annual rents 
of real property ; but if executed by a . surety company, then not less 
than the value of the personal property and annual'rents of real prop­
erty. 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t. 20, § 403. Amount fixed by 
registrar, respect being had to the value of the estate. 
R. I. Gen. Laws ( I 938)  c. 5 76, § 1 .  As the court shall require. 
S. C. Code ( I 942)  § § 8958, 8975 .  Double the value of the 
personal property; but if executed by a surety company, then one and 
one-half times the value of the personal property. 
S. D. Code ( I 939) § 35 .0903. Not less than one and one-half 
times the value of the personal property and one and one-half times the 
value of the annual rents of real property ; if the value of the personalty 
and annual rents of realty exceeds $2000, the penalty of the bond shall 
be equal to the value of these items and such additional amount as the_ 
court directs. ' 
Tenn. Code (Michie, I 938) § 8 I 69. Double the value of the 
estate ; but it may be as low as the value of the estate if it is proved that 
the estate and all interested persons would. be fully protected by such 
smaller bond. 
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Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, Supp. I 945 ) art. 3386.  Equal 
to double the estimated value of the personal property, plus a reasonable 
amount to be fixed at the discretion of the judge to cover rents of real 
estate ; but if executed by a surety company, then equal to the value 
of the personalty plus a reasonable amount to be fixed at the discretion 
of the judge to cover rents of realty. 
Utah Code ( I 943) § I 02-5-2. Not less than twice the value of 
the personal property and twice the value of the annual rents of real 
property ; but if executed by a surety company, then not less than I o% 
in excess o f  the value o f  the personal property and the value o f  �e 
annual rents of real property. 
Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 933)  § 2 7 78 .  As the court directs. 
Va. Code ( I 942) § 53 70. At least equal to the full value of the 
personal estate. 
\Vash . Rev. Stat. (Supp. I 940) § I 437 ·  To be fixed by the court ; 
if petition for letters is made by or on request of the surviving spouse, 
and the court is satisfied that the value of the estate does not exceed the 
exemptions allowed to the spouse, the court may in its discretion dis­
pense with bond ;, if the value of the estate does not exceed $500 and 
rights of heirs and creditors will not be jeopardized, the court may 
dispense with bond. 
W. Va. Code ( I943 ) § 4 I 26. At least equal to the full value of 
the personal estate. 
Wis. Stat. ( I 943 ) § §  3 IO. I 4, 3 I  I .05 . As the judge may direct ; 
if it appears that no property will come into the hands of the adminis­
trator except proceeds of claims for the decedent's death or injuries, 
then no bond shall be required until proceeds are to be paid over to him. 
Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I  93 I )  § 88-2202. Not less than the value of 
the personal property and the value of the annual rents of real prop­
erty. 
§ 107 .  BoNn OF CoRPORATE FIDUCIARY -
Provisions were found in seventeen states either requiring or per­
mitting trust companies to deposit securities with the state treasurer or 
other state official. Except as noted in the following list, these states 
dispense with the� requirement of giving an execvtor's or adminis.:. 
trator's- bond·, ·the deposit being deemed sufficient security. Ala; Code 
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( I 940) t. 5, § §  I 9 I  and I 9 5  (bond is required if the company's 
aggregate liabilities exceed five times the par value of the deposited 
securities) ; Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, I 944) Act I 7 49, § 7 ;  Cal. 
Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 48 I ;  Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 
(Deering, I 94 I )  § 1 044 ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § §  655 . I O  and 
732.6 I ;  Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. I 944) c. 32 ,  § §  289 and 
292 ; Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943)  § §  23 . I O I I and 2 7 .3 I 78 ( 25 8 )  
(court has discretion to require bond) ; Minn. Stat. ( I  94  I )  § § 48.67 
and 48. 7 9 ;  Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942) § 8o68 ; N. J. Rev. Stat. 
( I 937)  § I 7 :4-4I ; N. M. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 50-505 ; N. Y. Banking 
Law, § §  95 and 1 00-a, subd. 5 (court has discretion to require a 
bond) ; N. D. Rev. Code ( I 943) § § 6-0504, 6-05 1 1 ;  Ohio Gen. 
Code (Page, I 937)  § §  7 I O-I 50  and 7 I O-I 6 I  (court has discretion 
to require a bond) ; Okla. Stat. ( I  94 I )  t. 6, § 33 I ; Ore. Comp. 
Laws ( I 940) § §  40-I 202 and 40-I 2 I 9 ;  R. I. Gen. Laws ( I 938)  
c .  I 33, § 4 ,  subd. f, and § 6 (bond is required, but no surety is neces­
sary unless the court requires it) ; S. D. Code ( I 939)  § §  6.050 I ,  
subd. 4, and 6.o 5 02 (court has discretion to require bond) ; Wis. Stat. 
( I 943) § § 223 .02 and 223.03, subd. 8 (court ha� discretion to re­
quire bond) .  
In addition to these states, there are nineteen others which dispense 
with bond in case of a corporate fiduciary, or dispense with the require­
ment of giving surety on the bond, although there is no provision for 
deposit of securities with the state. This group consists of the follow­
ing : Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 93 7 )  § 248 (requires bond only to extent that 
estate exceeds $5000) ; Colo. Stat. (Supp. I 944) c. I 76 ,  § 95 (but 
court may require security) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 939)  § I 203e 
(but court may require bond) ; Del. Rev. Code ( I 935 )  §§ 34 I 6, 
439 8 ;  D .  C. Code ( I 940) § §  26-333, 26-334 (but court may 
require bond) ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, I933) § I 8-I I I O  (but court may 
require bond) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. ( I  935 ) § I 7-2002, subd. 5 (but 
court may require bond) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) § 287 .220 (but 
court may require security) ; Me. Rev. Stat. ( I  944) c. 55 ,  § 86, subd. 
9 (but court may require security) ; Mass. Ann. Laws ( I  932)  c. I 72 ;  
§ § 55 ,  5 8 ;  c .  205 ,  § 6A (but court may require security) ; N.  M. 
Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 33-I 05 (as to  national banks) ; N; C. Gen. Stat. 
( I  943) § 58-1 1 3  (this section seems to apply only to 'insurance com-
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panies) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 939)  t. 7, § 8 I 9-I I o 6 ;  Tex. Civ. 
Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 940) art. 4982 ; Utah Code ( I 943) § 7-4-5 
(but court may require bond) ; V t. Pub. Laws ( I  933) § 68 I 2 
(amended Laws I 943, # I33, § 23) (requires bond not less than 
2 5 %  of the amount of the estate ; no bond required in estates under 
$2000) ; Va. Code ( I  942) § 4 I 49 ( 69) ,  subd. j (but bond is re­
quired when value of estate exceeds capital and surplus) ; W. Va. 
Code ( I  94 3 )  § 3 I 34 (but court may require security when value of 
estate exceeds capital and surplus) ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 I )  § I 0-
403, subd. I o (but court may require bond) . 
There seem to be only five states which explicitly require a corporate 
fiduciary to give bond. They are as follows : Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) 
§ I 09-409 (national banks required to give bond) ; Iowa Code 
( I939) § 929 I ; Miss. Code ( I 942) § 5 I 98 ; N. H. Rev. Laws 
( I 942)  c. 3 I 2 ,  § I 4 ;  S . C. Code ( I 942) § 7838 .  
In the other states there seems to  be no provision made for bonds of 
corporate fiduciaries ; hence the provisions for bonds of personal 
representatives probably apply to corporations, with the result that they 
must give bond to the same extent that individuals are required to do. 
§ I I 9. LIMITATION OF AcTION ON BoNn 
About half the states provide a special limitation period for actions 
on a representative's bond, and the period varies from one year in 
Florida to twenty years in Georgia and New Jersey. The following 
list indicates the limitation period for the various jurisdictions having 
a special statute : 
Ala. Code ( I  940) t. 7, § 2 I .  Six years from the act done. 
Ariz. Code ( I  939) § 29-205.  Four years after death, resignation, 
removal or discharge of representative. 
Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 937 )  § 8936. Eight years after cause of action 
accrues. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I  930) § 6oo8. Six years from final settlement 
of account of the principal and the acceptance of such account by the 
probate court ; does not apply to minor parties in interest. 
Del. Rev. Code' ( I 935 )  § 5 I 24. Six years from date of the bond ; 
the bond of an executor who during his life shall be entitled under the 
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will to the personal estate shall continue in force for three years after the 
executor's death. 
D. C. Code ( I 940) § I 2-20 I .  Five years after cause of action 
accrues. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 7 34.23.  One year from discharge of the 
representative. 
Ga. Code Ann. ( I  936) § 3-703. Twenty years after cause of 
action accrues. 
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 935)  c. 83,  § I ] . Ten years after 
cause of action accrues. 
Kan. Gen. Stat. ( I 935)  § 6o-3o6, subd. 5 ·  Five years after cause 
of actiop accrues. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I944) § 4 I 3 .090, subd. 3· Fifteen years after 
cause of action accrues. 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( I  944) c. I 5 I ,  § 9· Six years after representative 
has been cited to appear to settle his account ; if not so cited, six years 
from the time of breach of the bond ; if the breach is fraudulently con­
cealed, three years from the time the breach is discovered. 
Md. Code ( I 939) art. 57 ,  § 3· Twelve years after principal 
debtor and creditor are dead, or the debt or thing in action is above 
twelve years' standing ; infants and insane persons have six years after 
removal of disability. 
Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. I 943) § 2 7 .605, subd. 4· Four years 
after discharge of the representative. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942)  § 56 .  Seven years after revocation 
or surrender of letters, or death of the principal. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943) § 2 5-209. Ten years (probably means 
ten years after cause of action accrues) .  
N. J. Rev. Stat. ( I 937)  § 2 :24-I8 . Twenty years from date of 
bond ; period of infancy or insanity of persons entitled to the benefit of 
the bond is not computed as part of the twenty years. 
N. M. Stat. ( I  94 I )  § 2 ]-I07 .  Two years after the liability of the 
principal shall have been fully established or determined by a judgment 
of the court. 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943) § I-52,  s�bd. 6. :rhr�e years a_fter 
breach compliiined of. 
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Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 937 )  § I  I 226. Ten years after cause 
of action accrues. 
Okla. Stat. ( I 94 1 )  t. I 2, § 95, subd. 5 ·  Five years after cause of 
action accrues. 
Tenn. Code (Michie, I 938) § 86oo. Six years after cause of 
action accrues. 
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 94 1 )  art. 5 52 8. Four years after 
death, resignation, removal or discharge of the representative. 
Va. Code ( I  942) § § 5 8 1 0, 5 8  I I .  Ten years after cause of action 
accrues. 
\Vash. Rev. Stat. ( I 932)  § I 450.  Six years after revocation of 
letters of administration or death of the principal. 
\V. Va. Code ( 1 943) § §  5398, 5 399· Ten years after cause of 
action accrues. 
\Vis. Stat. ( I  943) § 32 1 .02 .  Four years from discharge of repre­
sentative ; four years after removal of disability of person entitled to 
bring action. 
Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 I )  § 89-4 I 3  . . Ten years after cause of ac­
tion accrues. 
Several states provide a limitation for actions on guardians' bonds, 
but apparently make no provision for bonds of executors and adminis­
trators. 
In those states which have no special statute for actions on bonds, 
resort must be had to the general statute of limitations for actions on 
instruments in writing. There is wide variation here. Cal. Code Civ. 
Proc. (Deering, I 94 I )  § 33 7 provides a four-year limitation, while 
Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 933) § 2-602 gives ten years. In some states 
the period is longer in the case of instruments under seal than for those 
not under seal, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. 260, § § I ,  2 .  
The limitation set out in the Model Probate Code i s  shorter than 
that in any of the states except Florida. But precedent is found in the 
Bankruptcy Act, which limits actions on a referee's bond to two years 
after the alleged breach of the bond, and actiohs on receivers' and 
trustees' bonds to two years after their discharge. Fed. Code Ann. 
( I 940) t. I I , § 78 (1) and (m) . Moreover, it is believed that the 
general trend is toward a shortening of limitation periods. 
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§ I 20. WHAT INVENTORY INCLUDES 
The statutes of all the states require the personal property, includ­
ing the debts due the estate, to be included in the inventory that the 
administrator or executor must file with the court. A few of the states, 
for example Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) c. J4. I ,  § 62, provide for the 
omission of clothes of the deceased and items of personal adornment up 
to a certain amount. For a unique provision relating to debts owed by 
the estate see Del. Rev. Code ( I 935 )  § 3830. 
The following statutes provide that real property be included in the 
inventory : Ariz. Code ( I 939)  § 38-803 ; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. 
(Deering, I 944) § 6oo ; Colo. Stat. ( I 935 )  c. I 76, § I 45 ;  Conn. 
Gen. Stat. ( I 930) § 49 1  I (except realty outside Connecticut) ; D. C.  
Code ( I  940) § I 8-40 I (included if  court so orders) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. 
( I 94 I )  §§ 733.0I ,  7 33.03; Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) §§ I I 3-140I ,  
I I 3-I402 (includes realty in  county where administration is had) ; 
Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § §  1 5-40 I ,  I 5-403 ; Ill. Ann. Stat. 
( Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § §  323, 324 ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 933) 
§ p-705 (realty included if devised to executor or directed in will to 
be sold) ; Iowa Code ( 1 939) § I I 9 I  3 ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. ( Supp. 1 943) 
§ 5 9-1 201 ; Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) c. I 4 I ,  § 5 7 ;  Md. Code (Supp. 
I 94 3 )  art. 93, § § 2 I 3, 2 1 4A (included if letters are granted in 
Montgomery County) ; Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. 1 95,  § 5 ;  Mich. 
Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § 27 .3 1 78 ( 382) ; Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .3 3 ;  
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942)  § 58 ;  Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 935)  
§ §  I 0 1 29, IO I 3 I ;  Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943) § 30-40 1 ;  Nev. Comp. 
Laws ( Supp. I 94 I )  § 9882. I OO ;  N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c. 353, 
§ I ;  N. M. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 33-302 ; N. C. Gen. Stat." ( I 943) § 28-
50 ;  N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943) § 30-I 50 1 ; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 
I937)  § 1 0509-4I ; Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 I )  t. 5 8, § 283 ; Ore. Comp. 
Laws ( I 940) § 1 9-40 1 ;  S. D. Code ( I 939) § 35 . 1 203 ; Tex. Civ. 
Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 939) art. 3408 ; Utah Code ( 1 943) § I 02-7-
3 ;  Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 933) § 2805 ; Va. Code ( I 942) § 5 403 ; Wash. 
Rev. Stat. ( I 932) § I 466 ; W. Va. Code ( I 943) § 4 I 82 ;  Wis. 
Stat. ( I 943) § 3 I 2 .0 I ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 I )  § 88-2303. 
In the following jurisdictions realty is not included in the inventory: 
Ala. Code ( I 940) t. 6 1 ,  § I 9 I ; Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1937 )  § 5 1 ;  Del. 
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Rev. Code ( I 935 )  § 3830 (amended Laws I 937 ,  c .  I 9 1 ) ;  D. C. 
Code ( I 935 )  § I 8-40I  (not included unless court so  orders) ; Ind. 
Stat. (Burns, 1 933)  § §  6-70 1 ,  6-705 (not included unless realty is 
devised to executors or directed in will to be sold) ; Md. Code (Supp. 
I 94 3 )  art. 9 3, § § 2 I 3, 2 I 4A (not included unless letters are granted 
in Montgomery County) ; Miss. Code ( I 942) § 548 ; N. J. Rev. 
Stat. ( 1 937)  § 3 :9-5 ; N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § §  I 95 ,  I 9 7 ; Pa. Stat. 
Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t. 20, § 442 ; R. I. Gen. Laws ( I 938)  c. 5 7 7, 
§ I ;  S. C. Code ( I 942) § 898 7 ;  Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 938)  
§ 8 I 89 .  Kentucky probably belongs in  this group also. 'See Ky. Rev. 
Stat. ( I 944) § 395 . I 8o. 
§ I 30· DISCLOSURE PROCEEDINGS 
Statutes setting up disclosure proceedings have been found in about 
three-fourths of the states. In the majority of these states the pro­
cedure is for discovery only-that is, its sole object is the gathering of 
information, and not the recovery of damages or possession. Statutes 
of this type are listed below : 
Ariz. Code ( I 939) § 38-8 1 2 ;  Cal. Prob. Code Ann (Deering, 
I 944) § 6 I 3 ;  Colo. Stat. ( I  935)  c. I 76, § 142 ; Conn. Gen. Stat. 
( I 930) § 495 9 ;  Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § I 5-4 I 3 ;  Ind. Stat. 
(Burns, I 933) § 6-9I I ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 5 9-2 2 I 6 ;  · 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( I  944) c. I 4 I ,  § 8 3 ;  Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 
I 944) c. 2 I 5 , § 44 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 2 7.3 I 7 8 (385) ; 
Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 525 .85 ; Mont. Rev. Code ( I 935 )  § I O I 4 I ; 
Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943) § 30-407 ;  N. H. Rev. Laws ( I 942) c. 
354, § I ;  N. D. Rev. Code ( I 943) § 30-I307 ; Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  
t .  58, § 293 ; Ore. Camp. Laws ( I 940) § I 9-303 ; R. I. Gen. Laws 
( I 938) c. 5 69, § I O ;  S. D. Code ( I 939) § 35 . I I 08 ;  Vt. Pub. Laws 
( I 933)  § 2 8 7 8 ;  Wash. Rev. Stat. ( I 932)  § I 47 2 ;  Wyo. Rev. 
Stat. ( I  93 I )  § 88-2402. 
, 
In some states, however, the statute purports to provide for final 
disposition of the property itself. In three states it is provided that a 
jury may be had to try questions of title, and in two others the case law 
so indicates. In other states the statute does not provide for jury 
trial, but provides that the court may order delivery of the property 
to the executor or administrator. In most of these states, however, 
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this power is limited by statute or decision to cases in which title is not 
in question. There are a few states in which no cases have been found, 
but the courts in th�se states will doubtless follow the same course of 
reasoning. 
Pertinent provisions of the statutes which purport to provide for 
final disposition of the property, together with any relevant cases, are 
as follows: 
Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1937 )  § 57 .  "If any such person shall be con­
victed of unlawfully detaining any such goods, chattels, moneys, 
effects, books, papers, or evidences of debt, the court may compel the 
delivery thereof to the executor or administrator entitled to receive the 
same by attachment." 
D. C. Code ( 1 940) § 20-503. " . . .  If satisfied, upon an exami­
nation of the whole case, that the party charged has concealed any part 
of the estate of the deceased, the court may order the delivery thereof 
to the executor, administrator or collector, and may enforce obedience 
to such order in the same manner in which orders of said court may 
be enforced." 
Ill. Ann. Stat. ( Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3 ,  § 337 ·  "The court . . .  
may determine all questions of title, claims of ad verse title, and the 
right of property, and may enter such orders and judgment as the 
. " case reqmres. . . . 
C. 3 ,  § 338 . "Upon the demand of any party to the proceeding 
questions of title, claims of adverse title, and the right of property shall 
be determined by a jury." 
Iowa Code ( 1 939) § 1 1 925 .  " . . .  If on such examination it 
appears that he has the wrongful possession of any such property, the 
court or judge may order the delivery thereof to the executor or 
administrator." 
In re,Estate of Brown, 2 1 2  Iowa 1 295,  235 N. W. 754  ( 193 1 ) .  
Held, a proceeding unde� this section is inquisitorial, and cannot be 
used where the defendant claims title, for it would deprive him of due 
process by virtue of lack of jury trial. 
Md. Code ( 1 939) art. 93, § 252 . " . . .  If satisfied upon an 
examination of the whole case that the party charged has concealed 
any part of the personal estate of the deceased, may order the delivery 
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thereof to the administrat9r, and may enforce obedience to such order 
by attachment, imprisonment or sequestration of property." 
Art. 93, § 254·  "If . . .  either party shall require it, the court shall 
cause an issue or issues to be· made up and sent to the circuit court for 
the county, or the superior court of Baltimore City, the court of com­
mon pleas, or the Baltimore City court, as the case may be, to be there 
tried and disposed of as other issues from the orphans' court. . . • " 
Hopper v. Hopkins, 162  Md. 448, 1 60  A. 166 ( 1 932)  holds that 
concealment-i. e., secrecy-is essential for a proceeding under § 252 ,  
and that the court has no jurisdiction where there is no concealment 
or where the defendant sets up title in himself. 
Forsythe v. Baker, 1 80 Md. 1 44, 23 A. ( 2d) 36  ( 1 94 1 )  indicates 
that a jury is used when issues are sent over for trial. 
Miss. Code ( 1942) § 545 .  " . . .  If on the hearing it shall appear 
that any person has property or assets of the estate to which there is no 
ad verse claim the court or chancellor may direct it to be delivered to 
the executor or administrator who shall forthwith account therefor in 
his inventory. But no decree shall be rendered in such proceeding 
concerning any adverse claim set up by any person to any of the 
assets. . ; ." 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I  942) § 66. "The issue upon the inter­
rogatories and answers thereto shall be tried by a jury, or if neither of 
the parties require a jury, by the court, in a summary manner, and 
judgment shall be rendered according to the finding and for costs, 
and if convicted, the court shall compel the delivery of the property 
detained by attachment of his person for contempt, and the court shall 
commit him to jail until he comply with the order of the court." 
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 1 )  § 9882 . 1 09. " . . .  The district 
court may make an order requiring such person to deliver any such 
property or effects to the executor or administrator . . . .  The order 
of the court for the delivery of such property shall be prima facie 
evidence of the right of the executor or administrator to such property 
in any aCtion that may be brought for the recovery thereof. . . ." 
·. N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7 )  § 3 : 1 3-9. " . . .  The court may, by 
Ol"der or decree, take such proceedings for the recovery of assets of the 
�ate so discovered as may be taken in like cases in the court of 
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chancery, and may compel obedience to such order or decree by the 
same process and in the same manner as orders or decrees of the 
court of chancery may be enforced." 
N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 206. " . . .  If it appears that the petitioner 
is entitled to the possession of the property, the decree shall direct 
delivery thereof to him, or if the estate property shall have been 
diverted or disposed of the decree may direct payment of the proceeds 
or value of such property or may impress a trust upon said proceeds 
or make any determination which a court of equity might decree in 
following trust property or funds. If such answer alleges title to or 
the right to possession of any property involved in the inquiry, the 
issue raised by such answer shall be heard and determined and a decree 
made accordingly." 
§ 68. "In any proceeding in which any controverted question of 
fact arises, or which any party has constitutional right of trial by jury 
. . . the surrogate must make an order directing the trial by jury of 
such controverted question of fact, if any party appearing in such pro­
ceeding demands the same . • . ." 
Matter of Wilson, 252 N. Y. 1 55 ,  1 69 N. E.  1 22 ( 1 929) .  Held, 
there is no deprivation of a constitutional right to jury in a proceeding 
for disclosure, as § 68 of the Surrogate Court Act gives the right to a 
jury trial in such a proceeding. The court can determine the rights 
of third persons in such a proceeding. 
N. C.  Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) § 28-69. If the defendant admits posses­
sion of "any property belonging solely to decedent and fails to show 
any satisfactory reason for retaining possession of said property, the 
clerk of the superior court shall issue an order requiring said person, 
firm or corporation forthwith to deliver said property to said executor 
or administrator, and may enforce compliance with said order by an 
attachment for contempt of court, and commit said person to jail unnl 
he shall deliver said property to said executor or administrator." 
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, i937)  § 1 0506-73 .  "By the verdict of 
a jury, if either party requires it, or without, if not required, the court 
shall determine whether the person or persons accused is or are guilty 
of having concealed, embezzled, conveyed away, or been in the posses­
sion of moneys, goods, chattels, things in action or effects oJ the trust 
STATUTORY NOTES 
estate, and if found guilty, the court shall assess the amount of damages 
to be recovered on account thereof ; or the court, in its discretion, may 
order the return of the specific thing or things concealed or embezzled, 
or may order restoration in kind. The court shall have authority to 
cite into court all persons who claim any interest in the assets alleged 
to have been concealed, embezzled, conveyed or held in possession, 
and at such hearing shall have authority to hear and determine ques­
tions of title relating to such assets. • . ." 
Utah Code ( 1 943) § 1 02-1 1-1 8. " . . .  If on such examination 
it appears that he has wrong.ful possession of any such property, not 
adversely claimed, the court may order the delivery of the same to the 
executor or administrator of the estate." 
Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 3 I 2.o6, subd. 2. The court "may make such 
order in relation to said matter as shall be just and proper." 
Estate of Schaefer, 1 89 Wis. 395, 207 N. W. 690 ( I 926) .  Held, 
the court cannot determine title or order delivery of the property in 
question, for this would be a deprivation of the right to jury trial. 
As to jurisdiction of the probate court to determine title which the 
personal representative claims in his own right, see annotation in 90 
A. L. R. I 34· Generally on disclosure proceedings in decedents' 
estates, see Atkinson, Wills ( 1 937 )  596, 6oS ; 2 Woerner, Adminis­
tration (3d ed., I 923) § 325 .  
§ I 3 5 ·  NoNCLAIM STATUTEs 
Nonclaim statutes exist in every state, although in a few states the 
legislation on the subject is meager. The statutes are of three general 
types, each of which will be discussed separately. The first type, which 
is the most common, bars creditors entirely unless their claims are filed 
within the statutory period, while the second type merely postpones 
payment in favor of those claims which were filed on time. The third 
type protects the personal representative who pays out the assets of the 
estate as against claimants who failed to file their claims within the non­
claim period. In addition to these three types of statute there is an­
other sort of nonclaim statute, which creates a bar against claims in 
cases where no administration is ha"d within a certain period after the 
death of the decedent. This group of statutes will be discussed last. 
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I .  ESTATES WHICH ARE ADMINISTERED 
1 .  Statutes creating an absolute bar. Thirty-five states have 
statutes of this type, of which twenty-seven provide an inflexible period 
for filing claims, three provide a variable period depending on the 
size of the estate, and five permit the court to set the time within 
specified statutory limits. In most states the period begins to run from 
the first publication of notice to creditors, while in some states it begins 
to run from the time of the grant of letters testamentary or of adminis­
tration. The period allowed varies widely from state to state. Thus 
ih Michigan and Utah the court may set a time as short as two months 
after the first publication of notice to creditors, while in Nebraska 
eighteen months may be allowed in the first instance, with a possible 
extension for another nine months. Between these outside limits, al­
most every conceivable period may be found, six months and twelve 
months being common. 
A number of the states in this group provide for extensions of the 
period under certain conditions. Thus in eight states a creditor who 
can show that he had no notice by reason of being out of the state 
may be permitted to file his claim at any time prior to the decree of 
fin,al distribution. Other states permit an extension for cause shown, 
or for circumstances entitling the claimant to equitable relief. Alabama 
is unique in its extension for claimants under disabilities, and Kansas 
stands alone in permitting the provisions of the will as to delayed pay­
ment to control. Some states provide an extension when proof of 
notice to creditors is not made, but these statutes are not listed here. 
It must be remembered that in some states the nonclaim statute does 
not bar all types of claims. No effort is made to indicate here the types 
of claims which are barred in the various states, but a few examples 
may be mentioned. Thus the Arizona statute applies to "all claims 
arising on contracts, whether due, not due or contingent," but does not 
refer to tort claims. Ariz. Code ( I  9 3 9) § 3 8-I oo 3. Many states 
expressly save obligations secured by mortgage to the extent of the 
lien. S. D. ,Code· ( I  939) § 35· I 404. In Maine there are special 
provisions for the filing of claims which accrue after the nonclaim 
period has expired. Me. Rev. Stat. �·1 944) c. 1 52, § §  1 8, 20. 
Statutes in many other states, however, are similar to the Model 
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Probate Code in barring all claims of whatever nature. See Ala. Code 
( 1 940) t. 6 1 , § 2 1 1 ;  Colo. Stat. (Supp. 1 944) c. 1 76, § 207 ; 
Del. Rev. Code ( 1 935)  § 3861  (amended Laws 1 939, c. 1 42) (as 
to personal estate) ;  Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § 733 . 1 6 ;  Iowa Code 
( 1 939) § 1 1 972 (amended Laws 1 94 1 ,  c. 30 1 ) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. 
(Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-2239;  N. M: Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 33-803 ; Wash. 
Rev. Stat. ( 1 932)  § 1484 ; Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) §§ 3 13 .08, 3 1 3 .22. 
In some states provision is made for reaching assets in the hands of 
distributees, but no attempt will be made here to list these statutes or to 
analyze their effect. In general, however, it may be said that they 
apply only to contingent claims. See Simes, Comment, 4 1  Mich. L. 
Rev. 920 ( 1 943) .  
The time limits provided in the thirty-five states in  this group are 
as follows : 
(a) Invariable time limit : 
Ala. Code ( 1 940) t. 6 1 ,  § §  2 1 0  to 2 1 2. Six months after grant 
of letters ; payment after that time is prohibited. Minors and persons 
of unsound mind have six months after appointment of guardians or 
removal of their disabilities. 
Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1 937)  § 93· One year after date of letters. See 
also description of this statute in group 2 below. 
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § §  700, 707 .  Six months 
after first publication of notice to creditors ; creditor who shows he did 
not receive notice by reason of being out of the state may file at any 
time before decree of distribution is rendered. 
Colo. Stat. (Supp. 1 944) c. 1 76, § 207 .  Six months from grant 
of letters. 
Del. Rev. Code ( 1 935)  § 386 1 (amended Laws 1 939, c. 1 42 ) .  
One year from grant of letters ; applies only to personal estate. See 
also description of this statute in group 3 below. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § §  733 . 1 6, 733 . 1 7 . Eight months from 
first publication of notice to creditors ; defective filing may be amended 
at any time before payment. 
' 
Idaho Laws Ann. ( 1 943) § §  1 5-602, 1 5-604. Four months 
from first publication of notice to creditors ; extension like California. 
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § 356 .  Nine months 
from issuance of letters ; but if an inventory is filed after the nine 
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months, listing estate not previously inventoried, the creditor may file 
a claim against such assets. 
Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 933) § 6-1 00 1 .  At least thirty days before 
final settlement of the estate ; and a claim not filed within six months 
of the notice to creditors must be prosecuted solely at the cost of the 
claimant. 
Iowa Code ( 1 93-9) § 1 1 972 (amended Laws 1 94 1 ,  c. 301 ) .  Six 
months from giving of notice to creditors, unless peculiar circumstances 
entitle the claimant to equitable relief. 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-2239.  Nine months from 
first publication of notice to creditors ; provisions of will requiring the 
payment of a demand exhibited later shall control. 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) c. 1 52 ,  § §  1 5 ,  1 8, 20, 22 .  Twelve months 
after qualification of personal representative ; a claim accruing after 
the period may be proceeded on within one year after it becomes due ; 
a creditor who failed to file in time may petition for relief in equity. 
Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 I ) § §  525 .4 1 ,  525 .4 I I .  Four months from date 
of filing order fixing the time ; - for cause shown the court may allow 
a claim presented before final settlement and allowance of the repre­
sentative's account and within one year after the date of the filing of 
the order to file claims. 
Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 566. Six months ; apparently this means six 
months from first publication of notice to creditors. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942 ) § 7 5 .  One year from grant of letters ; 
or if notice was not published within ten days from grant of letters, 
then one year from first publication of notice. See also description of 
this statute in group 2 below. 
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 1 )  § 9882. 1 20. Three months 
from first publication of notice to creditors ; creditor who shows he had 
no notice may file at any time before the filing of the final account. 
N. H. Rev; Laws ( 1 942) c. 355 ,  § 3·  No action may be brought 
by a creditor unless the demand was exhibited within one year after 
the original grant of administration, exclusive of the time the adminis­
tration may have been suspended. See also c. 355 ,  §.§ 5 and 28, re­
quiring suits to be brought within two years after the original grant 
of administration, with a possible extension if the claimant is not charge­
able with culpable neglect in failing to bring suit in time. 
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N. M. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 33-803. Six months from first notice of 
appointment of personal representative. 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943 ) § 28-49. Six months after personal 
notice to creditor. See also·description of this statute in group 3 below. 
N. D. Rev. Code ( I 943) § §  30-I 802, 30-I 804. Six months 
after first publication of notice to creditors. 
Okla. Stat. ( I 94 1 )  t. 58,  § § 33 I ,  333·  Four months from first 
publication of notice to creditors ; extension like California. 
R. I. Gen. Laws ( I 938)  c. 5 78, § 3 (amended Laws I 94 I ,  c. 
· I 003 ) .  Six months from first publication of notice of appointment of 
personal representative ; creditor who by reason of accident, mistake 
or other cause has failed to file may petition the court for leave to file 
at any time before distribution of the estate. 
S. C. Code (Supp. I 944) § 8993. Eleven months after first 
publication of notice to creditors. 
S. D. Code ( I 939) § 35 . I 404. Six months after first publication 
of notice to creditors ; extension like California. 
Tenn. Code (Michie, Supp. I 939)  § 8 I 96 ( I ) .  One year from 
first publication of notice to creditors. 
Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 932)  § I 4 7 7 ·  Six months after first publica­
tion of notice to creditors. 
Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I93 I )  § 88-3 I O I (amended Laws I 9431 c. 
10  5 ) ,  § 88-3 I 03. Six months after first publication of notice to 
creditors ; extension like California. 
(b) Time limit depending on value of the estate : 
Ariz. Code ( I 939) § §  38- IOO I ,  38-I 003. Ten months after 
first publication of notice to creditors if estate exceeds $5 ooo ; or four 
months if it does not ; extension like California. 
Mont. Rev; Code ( I 935 )  § §  I O I 7 I ,  I O I 73 ·  Ten months after 
first publication of notice to creditors when the estate exceeds $ I  o,ooo ; 
or four months when it does not ; ext�nsion like Califor'nia. 
Utah Code ( I 943) § §  1 02-9-2, I 02-9-4. Four months from 
first publication of notice to creditors when estate exceeds $ I  o,ooo ; 
or two months when it does not ; extension like California. 
(c) Time limit as ordered by the court within statutory limits : 
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 930) § 49 I4 .  Not more than twelve months 
nor less than six months (apparently from the time the court makes 
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the order) ; cause of action which accrues after the time limited shall 
be exhibited within four months after it accrues ; for cause shown the 
court may extend the time, not exceeding the period which it might 
have originally limited ; if a creditor failed to file in time through no 
default of his own, the court may extend the time for such creditor, 
not more than thirty days beyond the period which it might have 
originally limited. Section 4925 has similar provisions for insolvent 
estates. 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § §  2 7 .3 1 7 8 ( 4 1 2 ) ,  27 .3 1 78 (428) . Not 
less than two nor more than four months from the date of first publica­
tion of order ; on application of a creditor who has failed to file, made 
within eighteen months of the time originally fixed and before the estate 
is closed, court may allow further time not exceeding one month ; after 
eighteen months after the time originally fixed, no claim shall be 
allowed unless court determines failure was not due to any fault of the 
creditor. . -
•' ' 
Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 943 ) § §  30-603 to 30-605, 30-609. Such 
time as the circumstances of the case require, not over eighteen months 
nor less than three months; may extend the time as ·circumstances 
require, but not so that the whole time shall exceed two years ; on ap­
plication of a creditor who has failed to file, if made within three 
months after the expiration of the time previously allowed, the court 
may for good cause shown allow further time not exceeding three 
months. 
· Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 933)  § §  2838, 2839, 2842. Such time as the 
circumstances of the case require, not more than eighteen months nor 
less than six months ; court may extend the time as circumstances 
require, but not so that the whole time exceeds two years ; a creditor 
who failed to file through fraud, accident or mistake, or without fault 
on his part, m�y petition within two years from the appointment of 
commissioners and before final order of distribution has been made and 
before the estate has been fully distributed, and the court may then 
allow a further time not exceeding three months, but property which 
has been actually distributed at the time of such petition shall not be 
liable. 
Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § §  3 1 3 .03, 3 1 3.08. Not less than four months 
nor more than one year from the date of the order ; may be extended 
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but not beyond two years from the date o f  the letters upon application 
· of a claimant filed not later than sixty days after the expiration of the 
time limited . 
. 2 .  Statutes postponing payment of claims not filed promptly . Eight 
states have statutes of this type ; two of these-Arkansas and Missouri 
-also bar creditors absolutely after a further lapse of time as indicated 
in part I above. In these two states, and ·also in New Jersey, Ohio, 
Oregon and Texas, payment to the non-filing claimant is postponed 
until all claims filed on time are paid ; in Georgia, however, the non­
filing creditor loses his right to participate with those of equal dignity, 
but presumably still comes ahead of creditors of a lower priority even 
if the latter have filed on time. In Pennsylvania the statute does not 
make clear whether the dilatory creditor may come in at a later ac­
counting, but a dictum in one case indicates that he may. See Ray's 
Estate, 345 Pa. 2 1 0  at 2 1 6, 25 A. ( 2d) 803 ( 1 942) .  In all the 
other states of this group the non-filing claimant can come in at any 
time before final distribution and reach any undistributed assets. The 
statutes are as follows : 
Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1 937)  § 93· .Creditors who fail to file within six 
months after the date of letters "may be precluded from any benefit 
in the estate" ; absolute bar after one year from date of letters. 
Ga. Code Ann. ( 1 936) § I I 3-1505 .  Creditors who fail to file 
within twelve months from date of qualification of personal representa­
tive "lose all rights to an equal participation with creditors of equal 
dignity to whom distribution is made before notice of such claims is 
brought to the administrator ; nor can they 'hold the administrator 
liable for a misappropriation of the fund ; if, however, there are assets 
in the hands of the administrator sufficient to pay such debts, and no 
claims of higher dignity are unpaid, the assets shall be thus appropriated, 
notwithstanding the failure to give notice." 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942)  § 7 5 ·  Creditors who fail to file 
within six months after the date of letters "may be precluded from any 
benefit of such estate" ; absolute bar after one year from date of letters. 
N. ]. Rev. Stat. ( 1937)  § § 3 : 25-3, 3 : 2 5-9, 3 : 2 5- 10. Claims 
are barred after six months from date of order to present claims ; but 
creditor may reach any estate he finds unaccounted for after the 
settlement of the final account of the personal representative. 
' 
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Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. I 945)  § 1 0509-I 2 1 .  Preferred 
claims are paid first, then claims which were presented within four 
months after appointment of personal representative ; then all other 
claims which were presented after four months from the appointment 
of the personal representative. 
Ore. Comp. Laws ( I 940) § I 9-702. A claim not presented 
within six months after first publication of notice to creditors cannot be 
paid until claims presented within that time are paid ; until adminis­
tration is completed a claim may be presented, allowed and paid out 
of any assets then in the hands of the personal representative and not 
otherwise appropriated or liable. 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t. 20, § 864. No creditor who 
fails to present his claim at the audit of the account of the personal 
representative, held not less than six months after the grant of letters, 
_of which notice has been given, or at an audit held after actual notice 
to such creditor, shall be entitled to receive any share of the assets dis­
tributed in pursuance of such audit. 
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 939) art. 3509, 35 I o. Claims 
shall be presented within one year after grant of letters, or payment 
shall be postponed until the claims which were presented within one 
year are entirely paid. 
3· Statutes protecting personal representative. There are ten 
jurisdictions in this group, three of which also appear in other groups. 
Thus Georgia also appears in group 2 above ; North Carolina creates 
an absolute bar as to creditors receiving personal notice, while Delaware 
-protects the representative after six months and also creates an absolute 
bar after twelve months. (It should be noticed, however, that these 
Delaware statutes appear in the Revised Code in the chapter dealing 
with settlement of personal estates.) In the District of Columbia and 
Maryland the protection of the representative is dependent on his hav­
ing given notice six months before paying out the assets, but in the 
other states there is no such prerequisite set out in the statute. Pre­
sumably the dilatory creditor in all of these states could reach any left­
over assets, though the statutes do not so provide except in Kentucky, 
where such a creditor may proceed against the heirs and distributees. 
The statutes in this group are as follows: 
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Del. Rev. Code ( I935 ) § 3838. If a representative, after six 
months fro� the grant of letters, without notice of a demand of higher 
grade, pays a demand of lower grade, such payment shall be allowed 
him. See also description of this statute in group I (a) above. 
D. C. Code ( I  940) § 1 8-526.  No representative who, after one 
year from the date of his letters, pays any claims shall be answerable 
for any claim which was not properly presented, provided that at least 
six months before he makes distribution he shall have given notice to 
creditors. 
Ga. Code Ann. ( 1 936) § I 1 3-1505.  See description of this statute 
in part 2 above. 
Ky. Civ. Code ( 1 938) § §  433, 434· No time is stated ; but 
creditors failing to file withi!;,t the time specified by court order "shall 
have no claim against the executor or administrator who has actually 
paid out ." ; but a non-filing creditor may proceed against 
legatees and distributees. 
Md. Code ( 1 939) art. 93, § I I 6. No administrator who shall 
pay claims shall be answerable for any claim of which he had no notice, 
provided that at least six months before making distribution he gives 
notice to creditors. 
Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 1 944) c. 1 97 ,  § 2 .  Representative may 
pay claims after six months after the approval of his bond, and shall 
not be personally liable to any creditor of whose claim he did not have 
notice. 
N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § §  207,  208. Claim day is to be at least six 
months from date of first publication of notice to creditors ; if a claim 
is not presented within the time limited, or, if no notice is published, 
within seven months from date of issue of letters, the representa­
tive shall not be chargeable for any assets he has paid out for claims 
or for distribution to next of kin. 
N. C.  Gen. Stat. ( 1943) § §  2 8-47 ,  28- I I 3. Claim date is twelve 
months from first publication of notice to creditors ; in an action 
brought on a claim which was not presented within the twelve months, 
the representative "shall not be chargeable for any assets that he may 
have paid" for claims, legacies or distributive shares before the com-
• 
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mencement of such action. See also description of this statute under 
group I above. 
Va. Code ( I 942) § §  5 39 1 ,  5392 .  "A personal representative 
who, after twelve months from his qualification, pays a debt of the 
decedent, shall not thereby be personally liable for any debt or demand 
against the decedent of equal or superior dignity, whether it be of 
record or not, unless before such payment he shall have notice of such 
debt or demand." Liens are not affected by this provision. 
W. Va. Code ( I 943) § § 4 1 48, 4 I 69. Claim date is not less than 
six months from the date of the first publication of notice to creditors, 
nor more than eight months from the qualification of the personal 
representative ; "if any personal representative after one year from 
the qualification of the first executor or. administrator, and after the 
report of claims • . . shall pay any legacy . . . or distribute any of 
the estate . • . such personal representative shall not, on account of 
what is so paid or distributed, be personally liable for any debt or 
demand . . . unless, within the time fixed • . . such demand was 
duly presented." 
II. ESTATES WHICH ARE NOT ADMINISTERED 
It is not uncommon to bar claims if no administration is had upon 
the estate within a certain period after the death of the decedent. 
Coupled with such legislation is a provision to the effect that creditors 
can initiate administration. Although these statutes usually apply to 
both testate and intestate estates, the Rhode Island statute applies only 
to the latter. A few statutes merely save the decedent's real estate from 
the claims of creditors after the period has run, but most bar the claim 
entirely. Statutes protecting a bona fide purchaser after a certain 
period are not included here ; nor are statutes which bar claimants in 
ancillary administration proceedings. In some states an absolute bar 
is created for the initiation of administration, and these statutes may 
bar creditors after this time ; these statutes are collected in the appendix 
note for § 8 3· The various statutes under consideration here' are as 
follows : 
Colo. Stat. ( I  935)  c. 1 76, § § 7 5, 76 .  If letters testamentary or of 
administration are not issued wit�in two years of decedent's death, "all 
claims of creditors shall be ftlrever barred . . . shall not affect the lien 
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upon the encumbered property of any claim secured by valid recorded 
mortgage or deed of trust or by valid pledge accompanied by delivery 
of possession." 
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § 7 34.29. "After three years from the 
death of any person, his estate shall not be liable for any obligation or 
upon any cause of action unless letters testamentary or of administra­
tion shall have been taken out within said three years ; provided, how­
ever, that the lien of any duly recorded mortgage and the lien of any 
person in possession of any personal property and the right to fore­
close and enforce such mortgage or lien shall not be impaired or af­
fected by the limitation imposed hereby, but the same shall bar the 
right to enforce any personal liability against the estate of the de­
cedent . . . •  "
Idaho Laws Ann. ( 1 943) § §  1 5-140 1 to 1 5-1404. These sec­
tions provide for determination of heirship after two years have elapsed 
from the date of death of the decedent; administration of the estate 
is not contemplated. Creditors may file claims, but if none are filed 
the finding of heirship shall bar all claims, due or to become due, 
absolute or contingent. Liens are not affected by this provision. 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-2239. "No creditor shall 
have any claim against or lien upon the property of a decedent other 
than liens existing at the date of his death, unless an executor or 
administrator of his estate has been appointed within one year after the 
death of the decedent and such creditor shall have exhibited his de­
mand in the manner and within the time herein prescribed." 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1943) § 2 7 .3 1 7 8 (430) .  "All debts and obliga­
tions of any person shall be barred after 6 years from the date of his 
death unless presented to the probate court as provided by law or unless 
sooner barred by law, notwithstanding that no proceedings shall have 
been taken to probate such estate." 
Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 5 2  5 .4 3 1 .  · "Except as provided in section 
525 .4 1 1 with reference to contingent claims, no claim against a 
decedent shall be a charge upon his estate unless filed in the probate 
court within five years after his death and within the time limited under 
section 525 �4 1  or extended under section 525.4 1 1 .  Nothing in this 
section shall be construed as preventing an action to enforce a lien 
existing at the date of decedent's death nor as affecting the rights of a 
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creditor to recover from the next of kin, legatees, or devisees to the 
extent of the assets received, upon any claim not required to be filed 
by section 5 25 .4I  I ,  or upon any contingent claim arising upon con­
tract which did not become absolute and capable of liquidation until 
after the time limited under section 5 2  5 .4 I or extended under section 
5 25 .4 I  I or until five years after the death of the decedent." 
Miss. Code ( I 942) § 539· If no administration is commenced 
within three years after death, no creditor is "entitled to a lien or any 
claim whatsoever on any real property of the decedent, or the proceeds 
therefrom, against purchasers or encumbrancers for value of the heirs 
of the decedent, unless such creditor shall within three years and six 
months ftom the date of the death of the decedent file on the lis pendens 
docket in the office of the clerk of the chancery court of the county in 
which said land is located notice of his claim. . . . But the provisions 
of this Act requiring the filing of notice shall not apply to any secured 
creditor having a recorded lien on said property." 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I  942) § I 79· "When no administration 
shall be had on the estate of a person who shall die owning land in this 
state, such land shall not be taken or sold for any claims or debts against 
such person or estate after ten years from the death of such person, but 
shall be free and clear therefrom." 
Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943) § 30-609. If a claimant fails for two 
years from the death of the decedent to apply for or take out letters 
of administration, "then such claim or demand shall likewise be for­
ever barred. This section shall not be construed to limit or affect the 
time within which a person may enforce any lien against property, real 
or personal, of such deceased person, nor shall it be construed to affect 
actions pending against the deceased at the time of his death." But 
see § § 30-I 70 I to 3D-I 708, containing provisions similar to Idaho, 
described above. 
Nev. Comp. Laws ( I 929) § 8534. "No real estate of a deceased 
person shall be liable for his debts other than recorded incumbrances, 
unless letters testamentary or of administration be granted within three 
years from the date of the death of such decedent." 
N . H .  Rev. Laws ( I 942) c. 355 ,  § 29. "If no administration 
shall have been granted upon the estate of a deceased person within two 
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years from the date of death, no creditor of the deceased shall there­
after be entitled to maintain any action or proceeding in any court to 
appropriate the real estate or interests therein of which the deceased 
died seized, to the payment ot satisfaction in whole or in part of his 
claim against the estate." 
·N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 I )  § 33-804. "If any person shall die seized or 
possessed of any real estate in this state, and no letters of administration 
or letters testamentary shall issue on the estate of the decedent within 
�ix [ 6 ]  years from the date of such death, all claims of creditors shall 
be forever barred . . . except in the cas.e of judgment liens or liens 
secured by mortgage deed or deed of trust which shall in no wise be 
affected by this act." 
R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 938 )  c. 5 79, § 30. "Any creditor or creditors 
of any deceased person who shall have died intestate being seized at 
the time of his or her death of real estate within the state of Rhode 
Island, and upon whose estate no letters of administration shall have 
been taken, shall be forever barred from collecting their claim or claims 
against the estate of such deceased person, unless they shall, within the 
period of 6 years of the death of such person, petition . . .  for letters ; 
. . . nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the right of any 
such creditor to satisfy his said claim from any security held by him." 
Wash. Rev. Stat. (1 932 )  § 1 368. "No real estate of a deceased 
person shall be liable for his debts unless letters testamentary or of ad­
ministration be granted within six years from the date of the death of 
such decedent: Provided, however, That this section shall not affect 
the lien of any mortgage, upon specific real property, existing and 
recorded as required by law at the date of the death of such decedent." 
Wis. Stat. ( 1 943 ) § 3 1 6.or ,  subd. 2. "No debt of or claim 
against any deceased person, which was not a lien upon his real estate 
before his death, shall be a lien upon or valid claim against any such 
real estate for the payment of which it can be sold by an executor or 
administrator after three years from the death of such decedent, except 
in the following cases : 
" (a) When such claim is created or charged upon such real estate 
by a will. 
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"(b) When letters testamentary upon the will or of administration 
of the estate of such decedent issued in this state within such three 
years and such claim is duly presented to the county court which issued 
such letters. 
" (c) When delay in issuing letters is caused by an appeal from 
the county court which suspends the proceedings therein, the time Qf 
such delay shall not be counted as any part of said three years." 
Wyo. Laws 194S,  c. 69. If letters testamentary or of adminis'tra­
tion are not applied for within two years after the death of the decedent, 
"all claims of creditors shall be forever barred . . . provided that 
this Act shall not affect the lien upon encumbered property secured by 
valid mortgage or deed of trust in the case of real property, or by valid 
pledge accompanied by delivery of possession or by chattel mortgage 
or by conditional sale in case of personal property." 
§ §  I 7 2-I 8 I .  AccouNTING IN DEcEDENTs' EsTATES 
I .  Liability of personal representative. Provisions are found in 
many states defining the accountability of the personal representative ; 
these statutes commonly contain provisions similar to § I 7 2 of the 
Model Probate Code. Since these statutes are more or less similar, and 
since they do not present any controversial matters, it has no� been 
deemed necessary to list them completely ; examples of such statutes 
are Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 920 ;  Idaho Laws Ann. 
( I 943 ) § § I S-I 102  to I S-I I 04 ;  Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 933)  § 6-
1 403 ; Iowa Code ( 1 939) § §  1 2046, 1 2048 ; Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) 
c. 1 4 1 ,  § §  6s, 70, 7 I ;  Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 932 )  c. 206, § §  s, 6 ;  
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1937 )  § §  I OS09- I 7 2  to I OS09-I 74· 
2.  Duty to close estate. A few states require the final account to 
be filed within a given time, as follows : 
Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I  937 )  § 209. Within eighteen months from date 
of letters, but the court may grant an extension for good cause shown. 
Del. Rev. Code ( I 93S )  § 38s2 .  One year from date of letters. 
Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 933)  § 6-140 1 .  At end of one year from 
date of letters unless excused for cause by the court. See also § 6-14  I S· 
Iowa Code ( 1 939) § 1 2044. Within three years unless otherwise 
ordered by court. 
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Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 94-3 ) § 59-15 0 1 .  One year from date of 
appointment; may be extended by court, not to exceed one year at a 
time. 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94-3)  § 2 7 .3 1 7 8 (286) . As promptly as pos­
sible unless for good cause shown the court extends the time, not 
exceeding ten years. 
Minn. Stat. ( I 94- I )  § 525 .4-7 ·  One year from date of appoint­
ment ; may be extended by court, not to exceed one year at a time. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I  94-2 ) § 229. At first regular term of 
court after the expiration of one year from the date of granting the 
first letters on the estate, unless further time is given by the court. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943) § 30-I409. At expiration of the year 
from the time of granting letters, unless otherwise expressly permitted 
by law ; if by reason of a suit pending by reason of which full settlement 
cannot be had, settlement shall be had as fh as may be, and the ad­
ministration may be continued only to contest such suits to a full settle­
ment. 
N. C .  Gen. Stat. ( I 943) § 28-I 2 I .  A final account may be re­
quired any time after two years from the qualification of the personal 
representative. 
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 939) art. 3320. Within three 
years from the grant of letters unless extended by the court after a 
satisfactory showing. 
Wis. Stat. ( I 94-3) § 3 I 3 . I 3 . Within sixty days after entry of final 
order on claims filed, unless specified causes of delay exist. 
3· When personal representative must account. It is commonly 
provided that the personal representative must account when his author­
ity ceases or is revoked for any reason, e.g., Ariz. Code ( I  939) 
§ 3 8-I 307, or upon resignation, e.g:, Colo. Stat. ( I 935 ) c. I 76, § 92.  
It is also common to require an accounting upon a sale, e.g., Ala. Code 
( I  94-0) t. 6 I ' § 24 I ; Idaho Laws Ann. ( I  94 3 )  § I 5-7 4-.f.. These 
and other special rules will not be listed here ; rather, the following 
summary will mention only the normal times for accounting. 
Ala. Code ( I 940) t. 6 I ,  § §  I 97, 293, 294• Six months after ap­
pointment and any time thereafter when required by the court ; an­
nually, and at any time when necessary for the interests of the estate ; 
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final settlement may be any time after six months from the grant of 
letters. 
Ariz. Code ( I 939) § §  38-I30 I ,  38-I305,  38-I 306. Six months 
after appointment and thereafter when required by the court ; within 
thirty days after expiration of the nonclaim period ; annually. 
Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 937)  § I 82. At first term of court after one 
year from date of letters, and at corresponding term every year. 
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § §  92 I ,  922, 1 063. 
\Vhenever required by the court ; within thirty days after expiration 
of the nonclaim period ; annually. 
Colo. Stat. ( I  935)  c. I 76, § 2 I 7. At first term of court after 
expiration of six months from date of letters, and every six months 
thereafter, or oftener if required by the court. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 673g. Annually ; but not 
required if estate is less th1n $2000. 
Del. Rev. Code ( I 9 3 5) § 3 84 3. Every year ; register may extend 
the time, not exceeding six months, or dispense with the account if it 
appears that there are no transactions to report. 
D. C .  Code ( I 940) § §  2o-6oi ,  20-602, 20-203, 20-303. 
Within twelve months from date of letters, then from time to time 
under court rul,es. A personal representative who is entitled to the 
residue need not account. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I ) § 7 3 3.4 3. Annually, unless otherwise 
ordered by the cmirt. 
Ga. Code Ann. (Supp. I 943 ) § § I I 3-I 4 I 5  to I I 3-I 4 I 7 . Within 
sixty days after anniversary date of qualification, in each year ; an 
optionalintermediate final report may be filed every three years. 
Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § I 5-I I 08. When required by the 
court. 
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § 443. Within sixty 
days after nine months after issuance of letters, or within such further 
time as the court allows ; thereafter when required by the court. 
Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 933) § §  6-1 40I ,  6-1 4 1 5 . After six months 
from date of giving notice of appointment a final account may be filed 
if court consents ; after one year from notice of appointment, .court 
may order further accounting. 
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Iowa Code ( 1 939) § §  1 2042, 1 2043· On  expiration o f  six 
and within seven months from first publication of notice of appoint­
ment, and sooner if required by the court ; also from time to time as 
required by the court. 
· Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § §  5 9-1 50 1 ,  5 9-1502 .  Within 
one year from date of appointment, and at such other times as the 
court may require. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) § 25 . 1 75 ·  One year after appointment 
and annually thereafter unless otherwise provided by law; and at any 
other time on order of the court. 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) c. I 4 I ,  § § I I , 2 2 ;  c. 144, § 2 1 . Within 
one year and at any other time when required by the court ; if account 
is not settled within six months after the report on claims, or within 
such further time as the court allows, it is a breach of the bond. 
Md. Code ( 1939) art. 93, § § 1 to 3· Within twelve months from 
date of letters ; within every six months thereafter, and within six 
months after discovery or receipt of assets ; the court may allow further 
time, not exceeding six months. 
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I  932) c. 206, § I .  At least once a year and at 
such other time as required by the court ; court may excuse an account 
in any year if satisfied that it is not necessary or expedient. 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § §  2 7 .3 1 7 8 ( 286) ,  2 7 .3 1 78 ( 2 89) . 
Court may require an accounting at any time ; at least once a year, 
or oftener if the court directs. 
Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .48. Within one year from date of 
appointment, and at such other times as the court may require. 
Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 6 3 I .  At least once a year, or oftener if 
required by the court; the court may extend the time. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I  942) § 2 1 3. At first term of court after 
end of six months from date of letters, and at first term after one 
year from date of letters, and at the corresponding term every year 
thereafter. 
Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 935)  § §  1 0288, 10294. Six months after ap­
pointment, and at any time when required by the court ; within ,thirty 
days after expiration of the nonclaim period. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 943) § §  30-1409, 3o-14 13 .  Within one 
year from receiving letters �nless the court permits a delay ; also from 
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time to time as required by the court ; personal representative may 
be cited to account any time after six months from the time of receiving 
letters. 
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 1 )  § §  9882.2 1 2, 9882.2 1 3. Within 
thirty days after the judge has acted on claims filed ; also whenever 
required by the court. 
N. H .  Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c. 352,  § 1 3 .  Within one year. 
N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7 )  § §  3 :  I O-I,  3 : 1 0-2, 3 : 1 0-5 . Within 
one year after appointment, or within thirty days after such year has 
expired, unless the court for good cause allows more time ; no account 
is necessary when executor or administrator is entitled to the residue, 
unless ordered to do so. 
N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 33-1 20 1 .  On expiration of six months and 
within seven months from date of appointment, and sooner if required 
by court ; and from time to time as may be convenient and.whenever 
required by the court. 
N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § §  257-a, 258,  26 1 .  Court may require ac­
counting after fifteen months after letters were issued ; also fifteen 
days after nonclaim period has expired, or seven months after letters 
were issued, or after one year has elapsed without an accounting. 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) § 28-1 1  7· Within twelve months from 
date of qualification, and annually. 
N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943) § 30-200 1 .  At expiration of six months 
after letters issue, at expiration of one year after letters issue, and 
at any time required by the court. 
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1 945)  § 1 0506-34· Within nine 
months after appointment, and at least once a year thereafter, and at 
any time on order of the court. 
Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t. 5 8, § §  234, 54 1 ,  547 ·  At least once each 
year ; at any time required by the court ; at expiration of one year 
from the time of appointment. 
Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) § 1 9-IOO I .  Within the first ten days 
of April and October each year. 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t. 20, § 83 1 .  At expiration of six 
months from time of administration granted, or when required by 
the court. 
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R. I. Gen. Laws ( I 938)  c. 5 8o, § 1. Within two years after 
qualification and thereafter at least once a year, and when required 
by the court. 
S. C. Code (Supp. I 944) § 90 I 2 . On the first day after expiration 
of eleven months from date of appointment, and every twelve months 
thereafter ; court may excuse delay, or extend the time. 
S. D. Code ( I 939) § §  35 . I 604, 3 5 . I 6o6. Within ninety days 
after appointment, and thereafter when required by the court ; at 
expiration of one year from appointment. 
Tenn. Code (Michie, I 938)  § 8244. After eighteen months 
from qualification, and once a year thereafter. 
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 939) art. 3320, 3537 ,  3542. 
Annually ; at first term of court after twelve months from original 
grant of letters ; at the third regular term after twelve months from 
the original grant of letters, or at any term thereafter, any interested 
person may compel an exhibit of the condition of the estate. 
Utah Code ( I 943) § I 02-I I-32 .  Six months after appointment, 
also within thirty days after expiration of nonclaim period, also when 
required by the court. 
Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 933)  § 2809. \Vithin one year from time of 
receiving letters unless the court extends the time ; also when required 
by the court. 
Va. Code ( I  942) § § 5408, 5409a. Annually, within six months 
after the end of each year ; with estates under $500, an account is 
required only every three years after the first year. 
Wash. Rev. Stat. ( I  932) § I 5 29. Within thirty days after ex­
piration of nonclaim period. 
W. V a. Code ( I  942 ) § 4 I 8 5 .  Annually, within four months after 
the end of each year. 
Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § §  3 I3 . I 3, 3 I 7.05. Within sixty days after 
entry of final order on claims filed, and from time to time as ordered 
by the court. 
Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 I )  § §  88-270 I  (amended Laws 1 943, c. 
1 05 ,  § 4 ) ,  88-2702.  Six months after appointment and at 'end of 
each year thereafter ; any interested person may petition for an ac-
counting any time after expiration of the nonclaim period. 
. 
344 MODEL PROBATE CODE : APPENDICES 
4· What accounts to contain. Statutes exhibit considerable vari­
ation in their directions as to the contents of accounts. Thus the 
· Delaware statute merely requires an account in Federal money, Del. 
Rev. Code ( I 935 )  § 3843, while at the other extreme the Maryland 
statute lists specifically the items which must appear in the account. 
Md. Code ( I 939) art. 93, § §  4, 5 ·  A common type of statute re­
quires a showing of all money received and <!Xpended, all claims pre­
sented and the names of the claimants, and all ��.iter matters necessary 
to show the condition of the estate's affair�. See Ariz. Code ( I  939) 
§ 38-I 3 0 1 .  In Florida the statute requires a full and correct account 
of receipts and expenditures, together with a statement of the assets 
of the estate. Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I  94 I )  § 7 33·44· A few states require 
a listing of investments and changes of investments, e.g., Mass. Ann. 
Laws ( I 932) c. 206, § 2 . 
5 ·  Conclusiveness of order settling account. Several states are 
silent as to the conclusive effect of the settlement of accounts ; no 
statutes were found in Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, 
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South 
Carolina, Texas, Vermont or Washington. !n all other states some 
provision exists. Thus in one group of states there is a statute similar 
to the following, which is Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) 
§ 9 3 I : "The order settling and allowing the account, when it 
becomes final, is conclusive against all persons interested in the estate, 
saving, however, to persons under legal disability, the right to move 
for cause to reopen and examine the account, or to proceed by action 
against the executor or administrator or his sureties, at any time 
before final distribution ; and in any such action such ·order is prima 
facie evidence of the correctness of the account." Other statutes of 
this type are Ariz. Code ( I  9 3 9) § 3 8-I 3 I 3 ; Idaho Laws Ann. 
( I  94 3) § I 5-I I 20 (but persons under disability may bring suit 
within two years after their disabilities cease) ; Mont. Rev. Code 
( I 935 )  § I0303 (but decree may be reopened or set aside within 
sixty days after its rendition in case of inadvertence, or within sixty 
days after discovery of facts constituting fraud) ;  Nev. Comp. Laws 
(Supp. I 94 I )  § 9882 .2 I 9 ;  N. D. Rev. Code ( I 943) § 30-2016  (see 
also § 30-2014, providing that any matter not concluded on the 
settlement of a former account or in any other proceeding may be 
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contested for cause shown) ; Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  t.  5 8, § 5 5 6 ;  S. D. 
Code ( I 939) § 35 . I6 I 6 ;  Utah Code ( I 943) § I 02-I I-3 7 ;  Wyo. 
Rev. Stat. ( I 93 I )  § 88-27 1 1 .  
In another group of states it is simply provided that the decree 
is evidence, or prima facie evidence. These are Del. Rev. Code 
( 1 935 )  § 3844 ; Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) § 25 .200 (between the 
parties interested) ;  N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943) § 28-1 I 7 ;  Ore. Comp. 
Laws ( I  940) § I 9-1 006 (applies only to final account) ; Tenn. Code 
(Michie, I 938)  § 8254 (in favor of the accounting party) ; Wis. 
Stat. ( I 943) § 287.26. And in Georgia also it is prima facie evidence, 
Ga. Code Ann. ( I 9 3 6) § I I 3-I 4 I I ,  but in addition it is provided 
that an intermediate final report-which is optional with the personal 
representative and which may be filed every three years-binds all 
parties in interest in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, Ga. Code 
Ann. (Supp. I 943) § I  I 3-I424;  and by § I  I 3-220I  a settlement 
at the instance of an interested party is conclusive on the administrator 
and on all distributees present at the hearing. 
In Alabama any item in a previous settlement may be re-examined on 
the final account, but its allowance on the previous settlement is pre­
sumptive evidence of its correctness ; in addition, an accounting upon 
notice is final and conclusive as to all items shown therein except that 
it may be reopened prior to the final settlement for fraud or mistake. 
Ala. Code ( I  940) t. 6 I ,  § § 3 I 4, 3 I 5 ·  , Other statutes permitting· a 
re-examination of prior accounts are Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 933) § 6-
I409 ; Miss. Code ( I 942) § 64 I ;  R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 938)  c. 580, 
§ 9 (to correct mistake or error apparent therein) ; W. Va. Code 
( I 943) § 4 I 89 .  
In a few other states an account may be reopened, as  follows : 
Iowa Code ( I 939) § §  I 2049, I 205 I (mistake may be corrected 
any time before discharge, or afterwards by equitable proceedings; and 
accounts settled without notice to a person adversely interested may be 
reopened within three months) ; Miss. Code ( I  942) § 646 (may be 
reopened within two years, with a similar time after removal of dis­
abilities for persons under disability) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 930) 
t. 20, § 843 (within five years after decree) ;  Va. Code (Supp. 1 944) 
§ 5429 (as to persons not parties to exceptions filed to the report) . 
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In several states the decree is conclusive in the absence of fraud or 
mistake. Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I  937) § I 89 (fraud) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. 
(Smith-Hurd, Supp. I 944) c. 3, § 444 (fraud, accident or mistake) ; 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 27 .3 I 78 (290) ( fraudulent concealment 
or misrepresentation) ; N. ]. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 7 )  § 3 :  I O-I 8 (fraud 
or mistake) . 
In Florida it is provided that no item previously approved on notice 
shall be subject to objection, Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 733 ·45, and 
in N ew York the judicial settlement of an account is conclusive evidence 
against all persons of whom jurisdiction was obtained and persons 
deriving title from them. N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 274.  In West 
Virginia it is binding on creditors and every beneficiary who had 
notice. W. Va. Code ( I 943)  § 420 1 .  In Kansas, Missouri and 
New Mexico the decree allowing the final account and ordering 
• distribution is conclusive. Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-2249 ; 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942) § 230 ;  N. M. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 33-I2 I 2 . 
§ I 82. PARTIAL DISTRIBUTION 
Provisions for distribution of specific property and for pro rata 
distribution of the whole estate are common. Some states provide 
for both types of distribution, while some provide for only one or the 
other. Usually distribution may be made only after a lapse of time, 
either a certain number of months after the issuance of letters testa­
mentary or after the nonclaim period has elapsed. In California, for 
example, specific property may be distributed after four months from' 
the issuance of letters, but pro rata distribution may be made when 
the nonclaim period has expired. This period is six months after 
publication of notice to creditors. Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 
I 944) § §  1 000, I 0 1 0. In Ohio a specific legacy may apparently 
be paid at any time, but partial distribution may be had only when six 
months have expired from the appointment of the representative and 
one month from the approval of the inventory. After nine months 
from the appointment of the executor or administrator, a legatee or 
distributee may petition for partial distribution. Ohio Gen. Code 
(Page, 1 937  and Supp. I 944) § §  1 05 09-I8o to 1 0509- 1 82.  Texas 
likewise "permits delivery of specific property at any time. The perti­
nent statute reads as' follows: "Any devisee or legatee may obtain 
STATUTORY NOTES 347 
from the county judge of the county where the will was proved an 
order for the executor or administrator to deliver to him the pr<;>perty 
devised or bequeathed, provided' that there will remain in the hands 
of such executor or administrator, after such delivery, a sufficient 
amount of the estate for the payment of all debts �gainst ,said estate. 
Such devisee shall first cause the executor or administrator, and the 
other devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs, if any, to be cited to 
appear and show cause why such order should not be made." Tex. 
Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939)  art. 3450. 
Frequently a showing must be made that claims have been paid 
or that there are sufficient assets on hand for that purpose. New York 
has an elaborate provision that the amount on hand must exceed "by 
at least one-third the amount of all known debts and claims against 
the estate, of all legacies which are entitled to priority over the peti­
tioner's claim, and of all legacies or distributive shares of the same 
class." N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 22 I .  A simpler provision is found in 
Nevada, where distribution of specific property may be made on a 
showing "that the estate is but little indebted and that the share . . • 
may be allowed, without injury to the creditors of the estate." Nev. 
Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 1 )  § 9882.238.  Kansas seems to have no 
provision for the protection of creditors on a partial distribution. 
Minnesota requires that the inheritance taxes on the property distrib­
uted shall have been paid. Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .482.  
In the majority of the states a bond must be filed by the distributee, 
though this is sometimes left to the discretion of the court. In Cali­
fornia the distributee of specific property must give bond unless the 
court dispenses with it, but there is apparently no such requirement 
for pro rata distribution. Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) 
§ I OO I .  
Most states are silent as to the conclusiveness o f  an order for partial 
distribution. In California the pro rata distribution "is a full discharge 
of the executor or administrator . . . and when the order becomes 
final it binds and concludes all parties in interest." Cal. Prob. Code 
( 1 94 1 )  § 1 0 1 2 .  (In Deering's Probate Code o f  1 94 1  and 1 944 the 
word "includes" is substituted for "concludes.") There is no pro­
vision for the finality of an order for distribution of specific property. 
In Florida the order is conclusive as to bona fide purchasers from the 
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distributees unless revoked or unless reversed on appeal. Fla. Stat. 
Ann. ( I  94 I )  § 7 34.03. Kansas provides that a decree for partial 
distribution made on notice "shall be final as to the persons entitled 
to such distribution and as to their respective proportions of the whole 
estate, unless such decree includes only specific legacies." Kan. Gen. 
Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-2246. The Minnesota provision is similar, 
but states that "such decree shall be final as to the persons entitled to 
such distribution and as to their proportions, and except where such 
decree includes only specific bequests or devises, as to the persons 
entitled to, and their proportions of the whole estate." Minn. Stat. 
( I 94 I )  § 525 -482. 
In Mississippi the only provision for partial distribution is for the 
maintenance and support of a minor legatee or distributee who has no 
guardian. Miss. Code ( I 9H) § 565 .  Likewise in New York, the 
petitioner must show that he is "in actual need" of the property for 
support and education of himself or of his family. N. Y. Surr. Ct. 
Act, § 2 2 1 . In Missouri, appropriations may be made for the support 
of minor children of decedent, but this is not a prerequisite to partial 
distribution. Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) § §  235 ,  236, 247.  
§ 1 8 3. FINAL DISTRIBUTION 
This discussion of statutes on final distribution will take up the 
following points : ( I )  conclusiveness of the decree ; ( 2) whether it 
includes real estate, and if so, whether it is to be recorded as a muniment 
of title ; ( 3 )  provisions for distribution to the assignee of a distributee, 
and to the heir of a deceased distributee ; ( 4) provisions for payment 
of inheritance taxes. 
I .  C onclwiveness of decree: Provisions regarding the conclusive­
ness of the decree of distribution are fairly common. Idaho provides 
that "such order or decree is conclusive as to the rights of heirs, 
legatees or devisees, subject only to be reversed, set aside or modified on 
appeal." Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § I 5-I307 .  Similar language 
is found in Ariz. Code ( I 939) § 3 8-I 505 ; Mont. Rev. Code ( I 935 )  
§ 10328 ; Okla . .  Stat. ( I 94 I )  t .  5 8, § 632 ; s .  D.  Code ( I 939)  
§ 35 . I 7o8 .  Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) , §  I02 I is similar 
except that it does not mention appeal. Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I  942) 
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§ 230 makes the decree "conclusive on all persons claiming thereunder, 
subject to the right of appeal as provided by law," and Utah Code 
( 1 943) § 1 02-1 2-9 states that the decree is "binding on all parties 
. interested in the �state," subject to appeal. N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  
§ 33-1 2 I 2 makes it "final and conclusive in the distribution of said 
estate and in regard to the title to all property of the estate of said 
decedent." Under the provisions of Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) 
§ 59-2249, the decree is "binding as to all the estate of the decedent, 
whether specifically described in the proceedings or not." -According 
to Wis. Stat. ( I  94 3 )  § 3 1 8 .o6, subd. 3, "any finding or determination 
as to heirship or assignment of real estate in any such judgment shall 
be presumptive evidence of any fact so found and of the right to the 
portion of any estate so assigned and shall be conclusive evidence thereof 
as to all persons to whom notice shall have been given as provided in 
section 324 . 1 8 ,  or who have appeared in any such proceeding and as 
to all persons claiming under them." Though there seems to be no 
provision for the conclusiveness of the decree in Minnesota, provision 
is made in Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 5 25 .48 1 for an interlocutory decree 
before the determination of inheritance taxes, .and such a decree "shall 
be final as to the persons entitled to distribution, and as to the part or 
portion of the estate each is entitled to receive, but it shall not have the 
effect of assigning the estate to such persons." 
2. Does the decree of distribution include real estate? The Oregon 
statute, Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) § 1 9-1 202, states explicitly that 
realty passes "without any order or decree therefor," and in several 
other states it is fairly clear from the wording of the statute that 
the decree of distribution does not include realty. In a number of 
states, on the other hand, the statutes either declare or necessarily 
imply that real estate is to be included in the decree. Thus in Kansas 
it is stipulated that "the court shall determine the heirs, devisees, and 
legatees entitled to the estate and assign the same to them by its decree. 
The decree shall name the heirs, devisees, and legatees, describe the 
property, and state the proportion or part thereof to which each is 
entitled." Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-2249. In Wisconsin 
the section dealing with final distribution "shall apply to all real estate 
described in any such judgment [of final distribution] whether or 
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not in the possession of the executor or administrator, and such judg­
ment shall describe the real estate to be assigned." Wis. Stat. ( I  943) 
§ 3 I 8.o6, subd. 4. 
Several states have statutes substantially like the following California 
provisions, taken from Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) : 
§ I 020. " The court must proceed to distribute the 
residue of the estate among the persons entitled thereto . . . ." 
§ I 02 I .  "In its decree, the court must name the persons and the 
proportions or parts to which each is entitled . . . ." 
§ I 222 .  "When an order is made . . . making distribution of 
real property, . . . a certified copy thereof must be recorded in 
the office of the county recorder of each county in which the land, 
or any part thereof, lies ; and from the time of filing the same for 
record, notice is imparted to all persons of the contents thereof." 
These three sections make it clear that the decree of distribution in­
cludes realty. Similar statutes are found in the following states; in 
each case the provision for recording is listed last. Ariz. Code ( I  939) 
§§ 38-I504, 38-I 505 ,  38-2oo8 ; Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) §§ I 5-
I 3o6, I 5-I 307,  I 5-I 5 I 5 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) 
§ 2 7 .3 I 78 ( I 65 ) ,  27 .3 I 78 ( I 66) ,  2 7 .3 I 78 ( 108) ; Minn. Stat. 
( I 94 I )  § §  5 2 5 .48 I ,  5 2 5 .48 3 ;  Mont. Rev. Code ( I 93 5 )  § §  I 0327 ,  
I 0328,  I 037 I ;  Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I943) § §  30-I 303, 30-I 302 ; 
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  § §  9882.243, 9882.244, 9882.233 ; 
N. D. Rev. Code ( I 943) § §  30-2 I I O, 30-2 I I I ;  Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  
t. 58, § §  63 I ,  632,  7 I I ;  S. D. Code ( I 939) § §  3 5 . I 705 ,  3 5 . I 7o8, 
35 .0 I  I 7 ;  Utah Code ( I 943) § § I 02-I 2-7, I 02-I 2-8, I 02-I 4-
I 6 ;  Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 933)  § §  2974, 3000 ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 I )  
§ §  88-360 I ,  88-3602, 88-90 1 .  
In addition to these states which follow the California pattern, pro­
visions for recording appear also in Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 930) § 4989 ; 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-2249 ; Wis. Stat. ( I 943) 
§§ 3 I 8 .o6, 3 I 8.o65 .  
3·  Distribution to  assignee or heir of distributee. Statutes in  a 
few states provide for distribution to the assignee of an heir or devisee. 
The former California Code provision declared that "partition or 
distribution of the real estate may be made as provided in this chapter, 
although some of the original heirs, legatees, or devisees may have 
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conveyed their shares to other persons, and such shares must be as­
signed to the person holding the same, in the same manner as they 
otherwise would have been to such heirs, legatees, or devisees." Cal. 
Code Civ. Proc. ( I 906) § I678. An early case asserted that the 
purpose of this provision was to put the alienee upon the same footing 
as the heir or devisee. Estate of De Castro v. Barry, I 8  Cal. 97 
(I  86 I ) .  The statute was copied in the states which usually follow 
the California pattern. Ariz. Code ( I  9 3 9) § 3 8-I 604 �· Idaho Laws 
Ann. ( I 943) § 1 5-1 3 1 5 ; Mont. Rev. Code ( I 935)  § 1 0337 ; 
N. D. Rev. Code ( I 943) § 30-2 I22  (also cov�rs persorwl property) ; 
Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  t. 5 8, § 644 ; S. D. Code ( I 939i § 35. 1 7 I6 ;  
Utah Code ( I 943) § I02-I 2-I 5 ;  Wyo. Rev. Code q 93 I )  § 88-
3804. Cf. Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  § §  9882.23'15, 9882.243. 
It is settled that under this type of statute the court of probate has 
no jurisdiction to try a disputed assignment in making distribution. 
Church v. Quiner, 3 I  Wyo. 222, 224 P. 1 073  ( I 924) and cases 
cited therein. It has also been held that this provision does not author­
ize the court of probate to distribute land to the assignee unless his 
interest was conveyed to him by instrument in form of a valid deed. 
Maconchy v. Delehanty, I I Ariz. 366, 95 P. I 09 ( 1 908) . As to 
the probate court's power to distribute to the judgment creditor of 
the heir or devisee, compare Martinovich v. Marsicano, I 37 Cal. 354, 
70 P. 459 ( I 902) with Snyder v. Murdock, 26 Utah 233, 73  P. 
22 (I 903 ) .  Even under distribution statutes which do not mention 
assignees it has been held proper to give effect in the probate court to 
agreements between the heirs as to division of the property. Myers v. 
Noble, I 4 1  Kan. 432, 4 1  P. (2d) I02 I ,  97 A. L. R. 463 ( 1 935) ; 
cf. Schaefer v. Thoeny, 199 Minn. 6 1 0  at 6 1 5 ,  273  N. W. 1 90 
( I  93 7 ) .  And see Hotchkiss' Appeal, 89 Conn. 420, 9 5 A. 26 ( I  9 I 5 )  
(unusual statute) .  The present California provisions permit the as­
signee to petition for distribution and also allow the court to pass on 
the validity of the agreement in the proceedings for distribution. Cal. 
Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § §  1 020, I 020. I .  Under the 
former New York statute authorizing the surrogate "to ascertain the 
title to any legacy or distributive share," it was held that the surrogate 
had jurisdiction to adjudge a disputed assignment. Hull v: Hull, 225 
N. Y. 342, 122 N. E.  252 ( 1 9 I9 ) .  The present New York law is 
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much more vague as to the existence of this power in the surrogate. 
N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § §  40, 267.  See generally 3 Woerner, Ad­
ministration ( 3d ed., I 923) § 563. 
In addition to the provision for assignment of a share, California 
also provides that in case of death of a distributee pending administra­
tion, his share shall be paid to his representative or his estate, "with 
the same effect as if it had been distributed to him while living." Cal. 
Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § I 023.  There is a similar pro­
vision in Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § I 5-I 3 I O. The group of states 
which has copied the Field Code provides for the case when a minor 
child of the decedent dies intestate and unmarried before the close of 
administration. The following provision is taken from Mont. Rev. 
Code ( I  935 ) § I 032 7, and is typical of this group : "If the decedent 
has left a surviving child and the issue of other children, and any of 
them, before the close of administration, have died while under age 
and not having been married, no administration on such deceased 
child's estate is necessary, but all the estate which such deceased child 
was entitled to by inheritance must, without administration, be dis­
tributed to the other heirs at law." A similar statute is found in Idaho 
Laws Ann. ( I 943) § I 5-I 306 ; N. D. Rev. Code ( I 943) § 30-
2 I o6 ; Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  t. 5 8, § 63 I ;  S. D. Code ( I 939) 
§ 3 5 . I 705 ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 I )  § 88-360 1 .  Ariz. Code 
( I 939)  § 38-I 504 and Utah Code ( I 943) § I 02-I 2-7 are similar 
except that the share goes to the child's heirs instead of "the other heirs." 
In most cases, of course, the heirs of the child will be the same as those 
of his parent, but there might conceivably be cases in which the 
variation of statutory language would become significant. 
4· Payment of inheritance taxes. Very ·few states make payment 
of inheritance taxes a prerequisite to final distribution. Kan. Gen. 
Stat. ( Supp. I 943) § 59-2249 provides that "no final decree shall 
be entered until after the determination and payment of inheritance 
taxes." Minn. Stat. ( I  94 I )  § 52  5 .48 I has a similar provision. See 
also Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § I 024 ; Fla. Stat. Ann. 
( 1 94 I )  § 734.04 ; Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943 ) § 1 5-1 3 1  I .  California 
and Idaho also require payment of personal property taxes. Several 
other states, though silent as to inheritance taxes, require the payment 
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of "state, county and municipal taxes on personal property" before 
di�tribution may be decreed. This group includes those states whose 
probate law is modeled on the Field Code. See Mont. Rev. Code 
( I 935)  § 1 033 I ; N. D. Rev. Code ( I 943) § 30-2 I09 ;  Okla. Stat. 
( I 94 I )  t. 5 8, § 635 ; s. D. Code ( I 939) § 3 5 · I ] I O ;  Utah Code 
. ( I 943) § I 02-I 2-I O. Arizona and Wyoming require the payment 
of such taxes "upon the property of the estate," and this language pre­
sumably refers to taxes on real as well as on personal property. Ariz. 
Code ( I 939) § 38-I 505 ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 I )  § 8 8-3603. 
It should be noted that an inheritance tax is considered as an excise 
tax and not a property tax; therefore provisions requiring the payment 
of property taxes do not apply to inheritance taxes. 
§ I 84. ABATEMENT 
I. IN GENERAL 
The common-law rule of abatement was tha:t personalty alone was 
liable for debts (with certain exceptions not material here) and that 
it abated in the following order: ( I )  intestate estate ; ( 2 )  residuary 
legacies; ( 3) general legacies ; ( 4) specific legacies. Probably realty 
is now liable in every state, either under statutory provision or by 
judicial decision, but in many states personalty remains primarily 
liable, and real estate may be resorted to only after the personal ·prop­
erty has been exhausted. In other states personalty precedes realty 
only within each class, and in still others there is no priority between 
the real and personal estate. As to abatement between devises of 
land and legacies, see annotation in 42 A. L. R. I 5 I 9· As to abate­
ment in case of spouse's election against the will, see annotation in 99 
A. L. R. I I 87 .  As to testator's intention regarding abatement as dis­
closed by various factors, see comment, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 297 ( I  93 7 ) ; 
annotations in 34 A. L. R. I 24], I O I  A. L. R. 704, I I ]  A. L. R. 
I 339· Generally see 4 Page, Wills (3d ed., I 94 I )  c. 42 ; 3 Woerner, 
Administration ( 3d ed ., I 923)  § 452.  
An investigation of the statutes on abatement reveals considerable 
variation regarding the order of abatement. Some have adopted the 
common-law rule without change ; some merely provide that intestate 
property shall be taken before testate property. Some set up a rule 
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that personalty shall be taken first, followed by undevised realty and 
lastly by devised realty. Some provide merely that specific devises 
and/or legacies shall be taken last. Some provide that a specific legacy 
or a pecuniary legacy shall be taken from the real estate when neces­
sary. In a few states there seem to be no statutory provisions what­
ever, and this presumably leaves the common-law rule in force. 
There are a few groups of states whose statutes are similar. Thus 
Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma and South Dakota provide that 
property shall be resorted to for the payment of debts in the following 
order : ( I )  property appropriated by the will ; ( 2)  property not dis­
posed of by will ; (3)  property devised or bequeathed to residuary 
legatees; ( 4) property not specifically devised or bequeathed ; ( 5 )  
all other property ratably ; as t o  resort for the payment o f  legacies, the 
order is ( I ) property appropriated by the will ; ( 2 )  property not dis­
posed of by will ; (3)  property devised or bequeathed to residuary 
legatees; ( 4) property not specifically devised or bequeathed. It is 
further provided in these states that there is no priority as between real 
and personal estate, and that legacies to a spouse or kindred of any 
class are chargeable only after legacies to persons not related to testator, 
and that abatement takes place in any class only as between legacies 
of that class unless the will indicates another intention. In Arizona 
and Idaho there is no provision that abatement takes place in any 
class only as between legacies of that class, nor does Arizona list the 
specific order of abatement, but otherwise these · two states belong to 
this group. Likewise California and Nevada, though diffe�ent in 
details, are substantially like the statutes of this group. 
In another group of jurisdictions the only provision is that realty 
may be sold to pay debts if there is not sufficient personalty. These 
jurisdictions are Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Iowa, 
Mississippi (also provides that realty may be sold in preference to per­
sonalty when it is for the best interest of the distributees or legatees) ,  
New Jersey, New Mexico, South Carolina �nd Tennessee. 
A few other states require personalty to be taken first, then un­
devised realty before devised realty. These states are Indiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Nebraska (also saves specific legacies and devises) , 
North Carolina (also saves specific devise of land) ,  Ohio (also saves 
specific devises and legacies) , Rhode Island and Vermont. 
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Beyond these groupings, the statutes exhibit great variation ; there­
fore the statutes not already discussed will be briefly summarized. 
The entire list of statutes is as follows: 
Ala. Code ( I 940) t. 6 I ,  § §  6, 243, 252, 2 7 7 . Lands may be 
sold to pay debts only on a showing that the personal estate is insufficient 
therefor. Land may be sold to pay pecuniary legacies which expressly 
or by necessary implication are a charge on such land. A residuary 
devise of land is a general, not a special devise. 
' 
Ariz. Code ( I 939) § §  38-I 20 I ,  38-1 228, 3 8-I 229. See dis­
cussion preceding this list of states. 
Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I  9 3 7 )  § I 49· Realty may be sold to pay debts 
if there is not sufficient personalty. 
Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § §  750  to 7 54· See dis­
cussion preceding this list of states. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 930) § 48 78 .  If the personal estate is in­
sufficient for the payment of pecuniary legacies, they are a charge 
on the real estate not specifically devised. Specific legacies are not 
taken for debts and charges when there is other estate, real or personal, 
sufficient and available therefor and not specifically devised or be­
queathed ;  but real estate may be sold in lieu thereof when necessary. 
Del. Rev. Code ( I 935) § 3877 . Realty may be sold to pay 
debts if there is not sufficient personalty. 
D. C. Code ( I  940) § I 8-607. Real estate may be sold to pay debts 
and legacies on a showing of a deficiency of personal assets. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I  94 I )  § § 7 34.0 5, 7 34.06. Sets out the common­
law order of abatement to pay debts and legacies; there is no priority 
as between real and personal property ; a gift to the widow in lieu of 
dower abates only after other gifts of the same class ; gifts for a valu­
able consideration abate with other gifts of the class only to the extent 
of the excess over the consideration.  
Ga: Code Ann. ( I 936) §§ I I 3-82 I ,  I I 3-I 509· Debts are paid 
out of the residuum ; if insufficient, then general legacies, then specific 
legacies. For the payment of debts, real and personal estate are alike 
liable. The property charged in the will is used first to pay debts ; 
then the residuum, or if there is no residuary clause, the undevised 
estate ; then general legacies ; then specific legacies. 
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Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § §  I 5-70 I ,  I 5-73 I ,  I 5-732, I 5-I 202 
to I 5-I 204. See discussion preceding this list of states. 
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I  and Supp. I 945)  c. 3, § §  3 79, 
44 7 .  When there is insufficient personal estate to pay expenses of 
administration, claims, or legacies expressly or impliedly charged on 
the real estate, then the real estate may be sold. When it is necessary 
to refund after distribution, specific legacies need not be refunded unless 
the residue is insufficient. 
Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 933) § 6-I I 36. When the personal estate is 
insufficient to pay debts, the undevised real estate is first chargeable 
with the debts in exoneration of the real estate which is devised. 
Iowa Code ( I  939) § I I 933· Realty may be sold to pay debts if 
there is not sufficient personalty. 
Kan. Gen. Stat. ( Supp. I 943) § 59-1405.  Property is resorted 
to for the payment of debts in the following order: ( I )  personalty 
not disposed of by will ; ( 2 )  realty not disposed of by will ; ( 3 )  
residuary personalty ; (4 )  residuary realty ; ( 5 )  property not specifi­
cally devised or bequeathed ; ( 6)  property specifically devised or be­
queathed. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) § 395.200. Personalty specifically be­
queathed and personalty exempted by the testator is not sold unless 
necessary to pay debts. 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. I 5 5 ,  § I 3 .  Similar to Indiana. 
Md. Code ( I 939)  art. 93, § §  292, 346. The court may order 
the sale of the whole estate · contained in the inventory when necessary 
to pay debts and claims. Real estate not specifically devised is charge­
able to pay pecuniary legacies when there is not sufficient personal 
estate. 
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. 202, § § I ,  4. Realty may be sold 
wh'en personalty is insufficient to pay debts, legacies and charges of ad­
ministration. Undevised realty is first chargeable in exoneration of 
devised realty. 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § §  27 .3 I 78 ( I o2 ) ,  2 7 .3 I 78 ( ro3) ,  
2 7 ·3 I 7 8  ( 462 ) .  If the provisions of the will for payment of debt$ 
are insufficient, then the real or personal estate not disposed of by the 
will is taken. Legacies and devises are paid in the following order : 
( I )  realty specifically devised ; ( 2) personalty specifically bequeathed ; 
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( 3 )  personalty passing by general or demonstrative bequests; ( 4) 
residuary realty ; ( 5 )  residuary personalty. Real estate may be sold 
when there is not sufficient personalty to pay debts and expenses of 
administration, or when it is for the best interest of the estate. 
Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § §  525 .63, 525 .64 1 .  Realty may be sold 
when there is not sufficient personalty to pay debts and expenses of 
administration, or when it is for the best interest of the estate. When 
real estate is sold to pay debts, bequests, or other items, it is sold in the . 
following order : ( I )  realty devised charged with the payment of 
such items ; ( 2) realty not specifically devised ; (3) realty specifically 
devised but not so charged. 
Miss. Code ( I 942) § §  5 86, 5 88. Realty may be sold to pay 
debts if there is not sufficient personalty. Realty may be sold in prefer­
ence to personalty where it is for the best interest of the distributees or 
legatees. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942) . § §  I I 2 ,  I 4 I ,  246. Specific legacies 
shall not be sold unless necessary for the payment of debts. Realty 
may be sold when personalty is insufficient to pay debts and legacies. 
When it is necessary to refund after distribution, specific legacies need 
not be refunded unless the residue is insufficient. 
Mont. Rev. Code ( I 935) § §  7052 to 7056, I O I 95• I 0234, 
I 02 3 5. See discussion preceding this list of states. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943) § §  30-232, 30-233, 30-405 ,  30-I  I O I .  
Personalty is first chargeable for debts, and realty may be sold if there 
is not sufficient personalty. If the property designated by will is in­
sufficient, undevised property shall be taken, and specific devises and 
legacies are exempt if necessary to effectuate testator's intent and there 
are sufficient other assets. 
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 1 )  § §  9882 . 1 35  to 9882 . 1 39. See 
discussion preceding this list of states. 
N. H.  Rev. Laws ( 1 942)  c. 353, § I ] ;  c. 360, § § I ], I 8. Realty 
may be sold when personalty is insufficient to pay debts and legacies. 
The real and personal estate not specifically devised and bequeathed 
is first liable for debts and legacies. , If this is insufficient, then property 
devised and bequeathed may be taken. 
N. ]. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 7 )  § 3 : 25-23. Realty may be sold to pay 
debts if there is not sufficient personalty. 
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N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 33-7 14. Real estate may be sold when the 
personal estate is insufficient to pay debts and legacies charged thereon. 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) § §  28-8 1 ,  2 8-94, 28-95 . Realty may 
be sold to pay debts if there is not sufficient personalty. Undevised 
realty is chargeable in exoneration of devised realty. When specifically 
devised land is sold, the devisee is entitled to contribution from the other 
devisees. 
N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943) § §  30-1825  to 30-1 828, 56-o2o7 ,  
56-o6o2 to 56-o6o4. See discussion preceding this list o f  states. 
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 937  and Supp. 1 944) § §  1 0504-74, 
1 0504-76, 1 05 1 0-2. Realty may be sold tq pay debts if there is not 
sufficient personalty. After the personal estate is exhausted, undevised 
real estate shall be taken before devised real estate. Specific devise_s 
and legacies are taken last. 
Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t. 5 8, § § 3 8 1 ,  463, 47 1 ; t. 84, § § 3 to 6. 
See discussion preceding this list of states. 
Ore. C�mp. Laws ( 1 940) § §  1 9-804, 1 9-805, 1 9-8 1 8, 1 9-1 r o r .  
Personal property specially bequeathed is exempt from sale as long 
as any property not specially devised or bequeathed remains unsold. 
When the personalty has been exhausted, realty may be sold, but the 
court may order it sold without regard to the personalty when it is 
for the best interests of the estate. Real estate specially devised is 
exempt in the same manner f!S personal property specially bequeathed. 
Realty may be sold to pay debts, funeral charges and expenses of ad­
ministration, when there is not sufficient personalty exclusive of special 
bequests of personalty or legacies. Specific devises and legacies are 
exempt if necessary to effectuate testator's intent and there are suf­
ficient other assets. 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 930) t. 20, § §  5 5 1 , 632.  Realty may 
be sold when the personalty and rents of realty are insufficient to pay 
debts and expenses of administration. If there is not sufficient to pay 
all pecuniary legacies, an abatement shall be made in proportion to the 
legacies so given. 
R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 938 )  c. 5 70, § §  r , 2 ;  c. 5 79, § 2 .  Personalty 
is first Subject for debts. Undevised realty is chargeable in exoneration 
of devised realty. 
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S .  C .  Code ( I  942) § 900 I .  Realty may be sold to pay debts if 
there is not sufficient personalty. 
S. D. Code ( I 939) § §  3 5 · I 5 0 I  (amended Laws I 943, c. I 34) ,  
35 · I 5 I 6, 3 5 . I 5 28, 56.0402 to 56 .o4o6. See discussion preceding 
this list of states. 
Tenn. Code (Michie, I 938)  § 8 2 I 3 . Realty may be sold to pay 
debts if there is not sufficient personalty. 
Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 933) § §  29 I 7  to 2 9 I 9· The personal estate is 
first chargeable. If the property designated in the will is insufficient, 
then real and personal estate not disposed of by will is taken. Specific 
de�ises and legacies are exempt if necessary to effectuate testator's 
intent and there are sufficient other assets. 
Va. Code ( I 942) § §  5382, 5395 ·  Goods and chattels may be sold 
as necessary to pay debts and legacies, having regard to the privilege 
of specific legacies. All intestate realty, or testate realty not charged 
with or devised subject to the debts, or which remains after satisfying 
the debts with which it is charged, is liable for debts, in the order in 
which personal estate is directed to be applied. 
Wash . Rev. Stat. ( I 932)  §§ I 505 to I 507 .  If the estate ap­
propriated by the will is insufficient to pay debts, the intestate estate 
shall be taken. Specific devises and legacies are exempt if necessary 
to effectuate testator's intent and there are sufficient other assets. 
Realty may be sold when a legacy is effectual to charge it, �nd the 
personalty is insufficient to pay such legacy. 
W. Va. Code ( I 943) § §  4 I 39, 4225 .  Similar to Virginia. 
Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § §  3 I 3.26 to 3 I 3 .28, 3 I6 .o i .  If provisions 
of will are insufficient for payment of debts, then real and personal 
estate not disposed of by will are taken. Then real and personal estate 
'given by will, but specific devises and legacies are · exempted if there 
is other sufficient estate and it shall appear necessary to effect the 
intention of the testator. Real estate may be sold when there is not 
sufficient personalty to pay debts and expenses of administration, or 
when it is for the best interest of the estate. Realty may be sold when 
a legacy is a charge thereon. 
Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 I )  § §  88-320 I ,  88-3236, 88-3237 .  There 
is no priority between real and personal estate. If provisions of will 
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are insufficient for payment of debts, then realty and personalty not 
disposed of by will shall be taken, then real and personal estate given 
by will, but specific devises and legacies shall be exempt if necessary 
to effectuate testator's intent and there is other sufficient estate. 
II. SPECIAL RULES IN CASE OF PRETERMITTED HEIR 
In three states-Connecticut, Georgia, and Indiana-the birth of 
a child entirely revokes a prior will, hence there is no such thing in 
those states as a pretermitted heir. In a few other states the birth of 
issue sometimes works a revocation, but in other circumstances the 
child takes an intestate share' ; these states have therefore been included 
in this study. In Kansas, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia 
no rules have been found for pretermitted heirs. 
In the following list of states divergences are noted between the 
rules of abatement to make up the share of a pretermitted heir and 
the rules of abatement in other cases (which will here be called "ordi­
nary abatement") .  In comparing these two sets of rules it must be 
borne in mind that many states have little or no statutory scheme 
for ordinary abatement. Presumably the common law rule applies in 
these states-viz., intestate property is taken first, then residuary 
legacies, then general legacies, and lastly specific legacies-and the 
remarks below are based on that assumption. Rules as to the relative 
priority of real and personal property are not considered in this study, 
since the intestate share of the pretermitted heir generally-if not 
always-includes both realty and personalty. 
I .  A single rule to cover both types of abatement. 
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I  94 I )  § 7 3 I .  I I .  "The share of the estate which 
is assigned to such pretermitted child shall be raised in accordance 
with the order of appropriation of assets set forth in this law." 
· 
§ 7 34.0 5 .  "The property of  the estate shall be used for such 
purposes and to raise the shares of pretermitted spouse and children, 
in the following order. . . ." 
Iowa Code ( I  9 3 9) § I I 8 5 8 .  Share of prete;mitted heir is "taken 
ratably from the interests of heirs, devisees, and legatees." 
§ I  I 859·  "All claims which it becomes necessary to satisfy, and 
all abJounts necessary to be paid from the estate of a testator in dis-
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regat'd of or in opposition to .the provisions of a will, shall be taken 
ratably from the interests of heirs, devisees, and legatees.'' 
Md. Code ( I 939) art. 93, § 338 states that pretermitted heir 
takes an intestate share, but no rules are given for raising the share ; 
therefore the rules for ordinary abatement would seem to apply. 
N.H. Rev. Stat. ( I 942) c. 350, § I  I .  "If the property not devised 
nor bequeathed shall be insufficient to satisfy the just share of such 
child . . • the same shall be made up in just proportion from the 
property devised or bequeathed to others.'' 
C. 360, § I 7 .  "The estate, real and personal, not specifically 
devised or bequeathed, shall be first liable to the payment of the legal 
charges against the estate and legacies given by the will, and to be 
applied to make up the share of any child born after the decease of 
the testator, or of any child or issue of any child omitted or not provided 
for in the will.'' 
C. 360, § I 8. "If the same is not sufficient, the property devised 
and bequeathed shall be liable therefor • in just proportion. 
" 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t. 20, § 2 73 ·  Same as Maryland. 
2. Separate statutes to cover each of the two situations, but rules 
are the same. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943) § 30-227.  Share of pretermitted heir is 
made up first of estate not disposed of by will ; then from all devises 
and legacies ratably, unless the obvious intention of the testator in rela­
tion to some specific devise or bequest or other provision in the will 
would thereby be defeated ; in such case the specific legacy or other 
provision may be exempted. By § §  30-2 3 I  and 30-232, in ordinary 
abatement, the estate not disposed of by will is taken first, then estate 
given by will, but specific devises and legacies are exempt if it appears 
to the court necessary to -carry into effect the intention of the testator 
and there is sufficient other estate. 
Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 933)  § §  2978, 2 9 I 8, 2 9 I 9. Like Nebraska 
statutes described above. 
Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § §  238. I 2, 3 I 3.27,  3 I 3.28. Like Nebraska 
statutes described above. 
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3· Separate statutes to cover each of the two situations, with 'rules 
differing. 
Ala. Code ( i 940) t. 6 I, § I I .  Rules for pretermitted heirs follow 
ordinary rules, with these exceptions: 
a. As to the intestate property, if widow or other children share in 
such property the share which the pretermitted child takes with 
such widow and other heirs must be applied to his portion. 
b. As to residuary legacies, those going to widow or any other 
children do not abate . 
c. Specific legacies are not mentioned. 
Ariz. Code ( I 939) § §  4 I-106, 4 I-I07 .  Share for pretermitted 
heir is taken proportionately from all devises and legacies; differs from 
ordinary abatement in that no provision is made for intestate property 
or for specific legacies. 
Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 937)  § §  14524, 1 45 2 5 . Share for pretermitted 
heir is taken proportionately from all devises and legacies ; differs from 
ordinary abatement in that no provision is made for intestate property 
or for residuary or specific legacies. 
Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 9 1 .  Share of pretermit­
ted heir is made up first of estate not disposed of by will ; then from all 
devises and legacies ratably, unless the obvious intention of the testator 
in relation to some specific devise or bequest or other provision in the 
will would thereby be defeated ; differs from ordinary abatement in 
that residuary legacies are not mentioned._ 
Colo. Stat. ( I 93 5 )  c. I 76, § 4 1 .  Like Arkansas, described above. 
Del. Rev. Code ( I  9 3 5 )  § 3 7 I 7 .  Share of pretermitted heir is 
taken first from intestate property, then proportionately from legacies 
and devises ; differs from ordinary abatement in that residuary and 
specific legacies are not mentioned. 
Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § I4-3 2 1 .  Same as California, de­
scribed above. 
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § I 99· Share of pre­
termitted heir is taken proportionately from all devises and4legacies ; 
differs from ordinary abatement in that intestate property and specific 
legacies are not mentioned. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I  944) § 394.460. Share of pretermitted heir is 
taken first from intestate property, then ratably from devises ; differs 
STATUTORY NOTES 
from ordinary abatement in that specific legacies are not mentioned. 
Neither statute mentions residuary legacies. 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. I 5 5 , § 8 .  Share of pretermitted heir is 
taken proportionately from all devises, unless by a specific devise or 
some other provision a different apportionment is necessary to give 
effect to the intention of the testator ; differs from ordinary abatement 
in that intestate property and residuary legacies are not mentioned. 
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932) c. I 9 I ,  § 20. Same as Maine, described 
above. 
Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 27 .3 I 7 8 (84) . Like California, de-
scribed above. 
Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 525 .202. Like California, described above. 
Miss. Code ( I 9.42) § §  658, 659.  Like Arkansas, described above. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I  942) § 526 .  Share of preteffnitted heir is 
taken proportionately from all heirs, devisees and legatees ; differs 
from ordinary abatement in that specific legacies are not mentioned. 
Neither statute mentions residuary legacies or intestate property. 
Mont. Rev. Code ( I 935 )  § 70 IO. Same as California, described 
above. 
Nev. Comp. Laws ( I  929) § 9920. Same as California, described 
above. 
N. ]. Rev. Stat. ( I 937)  § §  3 :2-I 6, 3 :3-I 1 .  Same as Arkansas, 
described above. 
N. M. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § §  3 I-I I 7, 32-I07 .  Share of pretermitted 
heir is taken proportionately from all heirs, devisees and legatees ; 
differs from ordinary abatement in · that intestate property, residuary 
and specific legacies are not mentioned. 
N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, § 26. Like Arkansas, described above. 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943) § §  28-I53  to 2 8-I5 5 · Share of pre­
termitted heir in realty is taken first from undevised realty, then 
proportionately from the devisees ; same rule for share in personalty ; 
any excess of intestate property of either type may be used to make up 
the share of the other type ; differs from ordinary abatement in that 
specific legacies are not mentioned. Neither statute mentions residuary 
legacies. 
N. D. Rev. Code ( I 943) § 56-041 8. Same as California, de­
scribed above. 
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Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 937 )  § 1 0504-49· Share of pretermit­
ted heir is taken proportionately from devises and legacies, "or in such 
other manner as may be found necessary to give effect to the intention 
of the testator as shown by the will" ; differs from ordinary abatement 
in that specific legacies are not mentioned, unless the quoted clause 
refers to such legacies. 
Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t. 84, § 1 33 .  Same as California, described 
above. 
Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) § 1 8-so i .  Like Missouri, described 
above. 
R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 938) c. 566, § 23 .  Like Maine, described 
above. 
S. C. Code ( 1 942)  § §  8924, 8925 .  Pretermitted heirs take an 
equal share of all realty and personalty given to other children under 
the will, who shall contribute to make up such share proportionately. 
Differs from ordinary abatement in that the other children are the 
• only ones required to con�ribute, and specific and residuary legacies are 
not mentioned. 
S. D. Code ( 1 939) § s6 .o23 1 .  Same as California, described 
above. 
Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 938)  § 8 1 32. Like New Mexico, de­
scribed above. 
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 94 1 )  art. 8291 ,  8292. Like 
Arkansas, described above. (Note that if the widow is the principal 
beneficiary, and the mother of all the children, and the will excludes 
the" children entirely' a pretermitted heir has no share in the estate.) 
Utah Code ( 1 943) § I O I-I-33·  Like California, described 
above. 
Va. Code ( 1 942)  § §  5242, 5243. Share of pretermitted heir is 
taken ratably from devises and legacies ; differs from ordinary abate­
ment in that specific legacies are not mentioned. Neither statute men­
tions residuary legacies. 
Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 932)  § 1402 .  Share of pretermitted heir 
is taken from other heirs, devisees and legatees proportionately ; differs 
from ordinary abatement in that intestate property and specific legacies 
are not mentioned. Neither statute mentions residuary legacies. 
W. Va. Code ( 1 943) § §  4059, 4060. Same as Virg_inia, described 
above. 
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As to remedies of the pretermitted child, see annotation in 1 23 
A.L.R. I073· Generally as to who must contribute to the child's 
intestate share, see Mathews, "Pretermitted Heirs: An Analysis of 
Statutes," 29 Col. L. Rev. 748 at 774 and 779  ( 1 929) ; I Page, Wills 
(3d ed., I 94 I )  § 532. 
§ I 93· DISCHARGE 
Most of the twenty states having statutes on discharge of the 
personal representative are indefinite as to the effect of the discharge. 
Nine states provide merely that the representative shall be discharged 
from all liability to be incurred thereafter, which presumably does not 
affect his liability for past acts. Ariz. Code ( I  9 39) § 3 8-I 5 I 7 ;  Cal. 
Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 1 066 ; Iqaho Laws Ann. § I 5-
I 33 I ; Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 935 )  § I 0332 ; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 
1 94 1 )  § 9882.2 74 ;  Okla. Stat. ( I941 ) t. 5 8, § 69 1 ;  S. D. Code 
( 1 939) § 35 . I 72 6 ;  Utah Code ( 1 943) § I 02-I 2-19 ;  Wyo. Rev. 
Stat. ( I 93 1 )  § 88-3604. 
Other states provide that the representative shall be discharged and 
his sureties released. It may be questioned whether this language 
refers only to future liability, or whether it bars a suit against the 
representative or surety for past acts. Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) 
§ 59-1 7 I 8 ;  Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 932)  c. 206, § 22 (the statute 
makes an exception when the representative's account is impeached 
for fraud or manifest error) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 3 )  § 2 7 .  3 I 7 8 
(307 ) ; Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 5 2 5 .504. 
In Alabama and Georgia it is provided that the representative shall 
be released from all liability ; Georgia has a saving clause for minors, 
and provides further that a discharge obtained by fraud is void. Ala. 
Code ( 1 940) t. 6 1 ,  § 362 ; Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) § § I 1 3-2302 and 
1 13-2303. It has been held in Georgia that the discharge bars an 
action for devastavit unless there is a showing of fraud in obtaining 
the discharge. Wessel-Duval Co. v. Ramsey, I 70 Ga. 675 ,  I 5 3  
S. E .  7 44 ( I  930) . It has also been held that the discharge bars an 
action by the assignee of a legatee to obtain his share. First National 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Hirschfeld, I 78  Ga. 5 8  I ,  I 7 3  s. E. 663 ( I 933) ·  
Some of  the states employ language similar to that used in the­
Model Probate Code, providing that the discharge shall release the 
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representative from his duties. In this group are Fla. Stat. Ann. 
( I  94 I )  § 7 34.2 3 (it is further provided that the discharge shall bar 
any suit against the representative and sureties unless brought within 
one year) ; Iowa Code ( I 939)  § I 205 2 ;  Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 
I 930) t. 20, § 9 I I ;  Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 94 I )  art. 3642, 
3643. In Wisconsin the discharge is presumptive evidence of the 
facts therein adjudicated. Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 3 I 8.o6. 
Although most of the statutes are indefinite as to the effect of the 
discharge, it may be pointed out that the final accounting will usually 
determine any liabilities up to that time, so that there is relatively little 
to be adjudicated on the discharge. To that effect see Ellis v. 
Stevens (D. C. Mass., I 94 I )  37 F. Supp. 488. As to conclusiveness 
of orders allowing accounts, see appendix note on accounting ( § § I 7 2-
I 8 I  ) . 
• 
§ I95 ·  DETERMINATION OF DISTRIBUTEES 
A wide variety of statutory provisions might properly be included 
under the general designation "determination of distributees." Thus, 
the statute found in a number of states requiring a specific designation 
of heirs and devisees in every final decree of distribution is, in a sense, a 
statute on this subject. A statute which p�.:ovides a procedure for the 
quieting of land titles may likewise afford a means of determining 
distributees judicially. Neither of these types of legislation, however, 
is within the scope of this note. What is referred to here is a type of 
statute, found in twenty-five states, which provides an optional pro­
cedure for the determination of distributees, or of some classes of dis­
tributees, of the estate of a decedent. Some of these statutes permit a 
determination only if no administration is had. Some provide a pro­
ceeding independent of the proceedings for administration, while others 
permit the proceeding as a part of administr�tion. Some apply only to 
intestate estates ; others include distributees under a will. A number 
of them apply to real property only. Very commonly the legislation 
is referred to in the codes as concerned with "the determination of 
heirship." 
Without doubt, the purpose o� these statutes differs from state 'to 
state. Some, such as the West Virginia statute, are designed primarily 
to provide a means of showing on the real estate record the devolution 
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of the title to heirs. . While a will may become a part of the public 
record and may become a link in the chain of paper title, the same is 
not true of a devolution of title to heirs unless there is a decree of dis­
tribution which makes specific reference to the interests acquired by 
them. In states where the decree of distribution is concerned qnly 
with personalty, a determination of heirship would be needed to com­
plete the record title. Even if there is a will, however, it may merely 
devise land to "the heirs of A" without specifying who those heirs are. 
In California, a statute provides for a determination of heirship in 
precisely that situation. It is difficult to perceive, however, why that 
could not be determined in the decree of distribution in all cases and 
why separate legislation is required. 
But even though the statute providing for the decree of final dis­
tribution requires that it be specific both as to real and as to personal 
property, an independent proceeding for the determination of distribu­
tees might be necessary in two situations :  first, where the time has 
elapsed within which a petition for the administration of the estate or 
for the probate of the will may be filed and no such petition has been 
filed ; and, second, where, by mistake or otherwise, a portion of the 
estate of the decedent has not been included in the decree of distribu­
tion and the administration of the estate is closed. The Minnesota 
statute applies only to the�e two situations. It would seem, however, 
that even the second of these two situations need not be the subject of a 
special statute on determination of distributees, since legislation could 
well provide for the reopening of the original administration for the 
purpose of distributing the estate overlooked. The Model Probate 
Code provides for such reopening in § I 94· 
Many statutes for the determination of distributees, particularly if 
they can be used only when no administration is had, could well be 
described as a means of dispensing with administration. Indeed, one 
of the Colorado statutes hereinafter referred to indicates that it was 
enacted expressly for that purpose. 
It is interesting to note that in these statutes providing for the de­
termination of distributees when no administration is had, a designated 
waiting period after the death of the decedent is usually required ; and 
this period coincides pretty generally with the period after which claims 
are barred if no administration is had. See appendix note for § I 35 as to 
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these statutes. The reason for this correlation of time periods is to 
obviate any conflict between creditors' rights and those of the dis­
tributees. If distribution is permitted before the period of limitations 
for claims, the creditors will have to proceed against the various dis­
tributees, with resulting inconvenience and the possibility of finding 
them uncollectible. The following table indicates the length of the , 
waiting period, together with the statute of limitations for creditors' 
claims in unadministered estates, in the various states where both limita­










WAITING PERIOD FOR 
DETERMINATION OF 
HEIRSHU' 
One year from death 
Two years from death 
One year from death 
Five years from death 
Two years from death 
Six years from death 
Six months from death 
Three years from death 
Two years from death 
TIME LIMIT FOR 
PRESENTATION OF 
CLAIMS 
Two years from death 
Same proceeding bars claims 
One year from death 
F)ve years from death 
Two years from death 
Six years from death 
Non-existence of debts is a 
prerequisite for determin-
• ation of distributees ; the 
proceeding also bars any 
unknown creditors. 
Three years from death 
Four years from death 
In Kansas, where the statute is limited to intestate estates, the limita­
tion is doubtless because the determination of heirship can be instituted 
only after one year after the decedent's death, and a will cannot be 
probated after this period. In other words, to permit a determination 
of devisees and legatees after the period for p"robate has passed would in 
effect be an exception to the limitation period for probate. For the 
same reason the Model Probate Code makes special provision only for 
the determination of heirs, but not of devisees and legatees. 
The statutes of the twenty-five states on the subject of .determina­
tion of distributees are listed herewith, together with a brief summary of 
the principal features of each. Emph,asis is placed upon the type of 
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estate covered (testate or intestate, real or personal) ,  the relation to 
administration proceedings, when the petition is to be filed, and the 
effect of the determination of distributees. 
Ar.iz. Code ( 1 939) § §  38-I 5 I 8  to 38-I,5 2 I  apply to both testate 
and intestate estates, and the proceeding is a �art of the administration. 
The petition may be filed any time after one year from the issuing of 
letters. The decree is final and conclusive in the distribution of the 
estate and of the title to the property of the estate. 
Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § § 1080 to 1 082 apply 
to a proceeding during administration, to determine distributees when 
the estate is not in a condition to be closed. The petition may be filed 
when the time to present claims has expired. When the decree be­
comes final it is conclusive on the matters determined during the re­
mainder of the administration and on any subsequent proceeding for 
distribution. Sections 1 1 90 to I 1 92 apply to a proceeding to establish 
the identity of persons who take other than by the laws of succession 
and who arc not identified beyond such words as "heirs" or "children." 
It applies to both realty and personalty in a testate estate. It is an in­
dependent proceeding, not connected with administration. The de­
cree is prima facie evidence of the facts determined, and is conclusive 
in favor of any person acting thereon in good faith without notice of 
any conflicting interest. 
Colo. Stat. ( I  935 ) c. I 76, § § I 3 to I 5 apply to a determination 
duri�g administration ; the petition may be filed any time before the 
order for notice of final settlement. It covers both realty and per­
sonalty. The statute is not clear as to whether it applies to testate or 
intestate estates, or to both. The decree is fully binding on all heirs 
and their grantees, and a distribution of personalty thereunder dis­
charges the personal representative ; but any claimant or his grantee 
by a deed recorded prior to the entry of the decree, who is not personally 
served with notice, .may move to reopen the decree in, so far as it 'applies 
to lands within two years after the entry thereof. Sections I 8 to 26  
apply to  intestate estates of  not over $2000 where no administration 
is had within one year from the last publication of notice to demand 
administration. The decree is conclusive and binding on all heirs 
and grantees, with a similar privilege of reopening the decree within 
one year. Sections 28  to 34 apply only to intestate lands, and the 
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proceeding may be brought either after one year from death if no ad­
ministration has been had, or after final settlement if administration 
has been had but the descent was not determined. The decree has the 
same effect as the decree described above in a proceeding during ad­
ministration. 
Fla. Stat. Ann ( I  94 I )  § 7 34.2 5 covers both testate and intestate 
estates, and may be brought during or after administration, or in the 
absence of administration. Any personal representative who makes 
distribution or takes any other action pursuant to the order is fully 
protected. 
Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § §  I 5-I40 1 to I 5-I 404 apply only 
when no administration has been had for two years after death. It 
covers both realty and personalty, but is limited to intestate estates� 
The decree is binding and conclusive on all persons, including creditors 
and heirs, and all claims are forever barred unless the creditor appears 
at the hearing and demands appointment of an administrator. Sec­
tions 1 5-I 70 I  to I 5-I 708 apply in administered estates, and estates 
heretofore administered and closed leaving realty the title to which 
has not been determined by a testament duly allowed and recorded, and 
in estates where no administration has been had. The proceeding ap­
plies to realty only, both testate and intestate. The petition may be 
filed after one year after the issuing of letters, or within one year of 
death in other cases. The decree is final and conclusive in the ad-
' 
ministration of the estate and the title to the property. 
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I ) c. 3, § § 2 09 to 2 I I cover pro­
ceedings had during administration or in the absence of administration. 
The petition may be filed any time during the administration or prior 
to the probate of a will. The decree is prima facie evidence of heir­
ship, but any other method of proving heirship may be had by any 
party. This proceeding may be had on affidavit, and is apparently 
not an adversary proceeding. 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § §  5 9-2250  to 5 9-2252 apply to 
intestate estates only. The proceeding may be brought after one year 
from death if no will has been admitted to probate nor administration 
had, or administration has been had without a determination of descent. 
A person served only by publication may have the decree reopened 
within one year, but a bona fide purchaser is protected after six months. 
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Mich. Stat. Ann ( 1 943) § §  2 7 .3 1 7 8 ( 145 )  to 27 .3 1 7 8 ( 149 )  ap­
ply only to realty, and the purpose of the proceeding is to determine 
who are the heirs under the laws of the state, or who are entitled to 
take under a conveyance or grant to the heirs of a deceased person. 
It may be an independent action, not connected with administration. 
The decree may be recorded in the deed records, and is conclusive 
evidence of the identity of the heirs if the determination is made in the 
course of administration or if fifteen years have elapsed since death ; 
in other cases it is prima facie only. 
Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § §  525 .3 1 to 5 25 .  3 1 2  apply to both testate 
and intestate estates, but only to realty. The proceeding may be 
brought after five years from death if no will has been admitted to pro­
bate nor administration had, or when realty has not been included in 
a final decree. The statute is silent as to the effect of the determina­
tion. 
Miss. Code ( 1 942) § §  1 2 70 to 1 2 7 2  apply to both realty and per­
sonalty, but only to intestate estates. The proceeding is apparently 
independent of administration. The decree may be recorded in the 
deed records, and is evidence in all courts of law and equity in the 
state, and may not be assailed collaterally except for fraud ; it is binding 
and conclusive on all persons cited to appear from the date of its rendi­
tion, and on all persons after two years, saving to minors and persons 
of unsound mind the right to reopen the decree within one year of 
removal of their disabilities. 
Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 935)  § §  1 0324 to 1 0326 cover both testate 
and intestate estates, and both realty and personalty. The proceeding 
takes place 'during administration, and may be had any time after the 
issuing of letters. The decree is final and conclusive in the administra­
tion and of the title to the property. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 94j ) § § 30-1 70 1  to 30-I 704 apply only to in­
testate realty. The proceeding may be had after two years from death 
if no administrator has been appointed, or if administration has been 
had and has been closed or dormant for more than two years and no 
decree of heirship has been entered. The decree is binding and con­
clusive on all persons, including creditors and heirs, and all claims are 
forever barred. The creditors may appear at the hearing. Sections 
30-1 705 to 30-1 708 apply to a proceeding to secure probate of a 
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will without administration. It applies to realty only. The petition 
may be filed after two years from death when no application has been 
made to admit the will ; but these sections do not apply when by the 
terms of the will property is directed to be sold. The decree admits 
the will to probate, but no executor is appointed. The decree is bind­
ing and conclusive on all persons, including creditors and heirs. The 
creditors may appear at the hearing. 
N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7 )  § § 3 : 4-1 to 3 : 4-3 apply only to in­
testate realty. Apparently- the proceeding is independent of adminis­
tration. The decree may be recorded in the deed records, and is 
presumptive evidence of the matters and facts therein contained. This 
proceeding may be had on affidavit, and apparently is not an adversary 
proceeding. 
N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 33-1206 provides for a proceeding during 
administration on the petition of the personal representative or of any­
one claiming to be an heir or devisee and not named as such in the 
petition for appointment of the personal representative. It applies to 
both testate and intestate estates, and to both realty and personalty. 
The petition may be filed any time during administration. The decree 
is final and conclusive in the distribution of the estate and in regard to 
the title to all property, subject to the rights of creditors of the estate. 
Sections 33-1 2 1 3  to 33-1 2 1 8  apply when no administration has been 
had· for six years after death. The proceeding applies to realt}r only, 
and probably to intestate estates only, since there is no provision for 
probating a will. The statute is silent as to the effect of the determina­
tion. 
N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § §  3 1  I to 3 13 apply only to intestate realty. 
The petition is filed in the surrogate's court which has acquired jurisdic­
tion of the estate or in the surrogate's court in the county where the 
la-nd is. Apparently it is independent of administration proceedings. 
A copy of the decree may be recorded as deeds are recorded, and from 
the time of recording the decree is conclusive evidence , of the facts 
established against all parties to the proceeding. 
N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943) § §  30-2201  to 30-2 2 1 3  apply only to 
intestate realty, when administration has not been had. The petition 
may be filed after six months fro1,11 death, if the expenses of the last 
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illness and funeral have been paid and there are no debts. The de­
tree may be recorded in the deed records, and is final and conclusive 
against all creditors, heirs and others and their successors or assigns, 
and on all parties named in the proceeding, including those proceeded 
against as unknown persons. 
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 937)  § §  10509-95 to 1 0509-101  apply 
to intestate estates, and testate estates when property passes under the 
will to beneficiaries not named in the will. The proceeding is part of the 
administration. The decree is prima facie evidence ; any fiduciary 
who makes a final distribution or takes other appropriate action respect­
ing a trust upon the determination is discharged from liability arising 
from the determined interest, and the title to any property purchased 
from the fiduciary is free from the determined interest. 
Okla. Stat. ( I  94 I )  t. 84, § § 2 5 I to 2 5 6  provide for a proceeding 
when the time limited for institution of administration has passed or 
there is no lawful ground for their institution. The decree is final 
and conclusive on all persons appearing or who were personally served ; 
it is also final as to persons served by publication unless they file a 
• petition to reopen the decree within twelve months. Sections 2 5 7  to 
• 
26 I provide for a determination as part of a proceeding involving land. 
It applies to intestate estates, and to testate estates where there is a 
devise in such terms as "heirs" or "family." It may be brought after 
three years from death if there has been no decree determining heirship. 
The decree is conclusive as to the rights of devisees, heirs or grantees, 
subject to reopening as in civil actions. 
Ore. Comp. Laws ( I940) § §  I 9-I30I  (amended Laws I 945, c. 
I 84) to I 9-I 3 o6 apply to both testate and intestate estates. The pro­
ceeding is part of the administration, and may be brought after six 
months from the issuance of letters. The decree is final and conclusive, 
but any claimant served by publication who had no actual knowledge 
prior to the entry of the decree may petition to reopen the decree within 
three years. 
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann (Vernon, I 939) art. 3590 to 3597a apply to 
both realty and personalty. In case no administration has been had, 
the proceeding applies only to intestate estates, but the proceeding also 
applies when there has been a will probated or administration had and 
/ 
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property has been omitted from the will or administration, or no final 
disposition has been made in the administration. The decree may be 
recorded in the deed records, and is conclusive as between parties per­
sonally served, and as to nonresident defendants and bona fide pur­
chasers ; as to all other persons it is prima facie ; but the judgment does 
not preclude a suit against the persons named therein based on the al- . 
legation that they have received more than their share. 
Utah Code ( 1 943) § §  102-1 2-34 to 1 02-1 2-35 apply when 
letters have not been applied for after three months from death. The 
decree is conclusive on the parties and their successors in interest. 
Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 933)  § §  2 9 1 3  to 2 9 1 6  apply to realty only, and 
probably to intestate estates only. The proceeding may be brought 
after seven years from death if the estate has not been administered 
and the interest of the heirs has not been conveyed or has been defec­
tively conveyed. If the court determines that the heirs are not entitled 
to possession it decrees that the land is not a part of the estate, and may 
appoint an administrator to convey record title to the persons ad judged 
to be legally entitled thereto. 
W. Va. Code ( 1 943) § 4088 applies only to intestate realty. The 
proceeding is apparently independent of administration, and must be 
brought-within twenty years after death. The decree may be recorded 
in the deed records, and is conclusive evidence against all parties to the 
proceeding from the time of recording. Any person under disability 
or proceeded against by publication and not appearing may have the 
matter reheard as in other cases. 
Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 237 .09 provides a non-adversary proceeding 
· to obtain a certificate of descent, and applies to realty only. It is in­
dependent of administration. The decree may be recorded in the 
deed records, and is prima facie evidence. Sections 3 1 5 .02 to 3 1 5 .06 
apply to intestate realty ; the proceeding may be had in an administered 
estate when there is no personal property which would be proper as­
sets for payment of debts after six month� from death, or in an unad­
ministered estate after three years from death. The decree may be re­
corded in the deed records, and is presumptive evidence in all courts 
and places, and conclusive evidence against the persons to whom notice 
was given. 
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Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 1 )  § §  88-370 1  (amended Laws 1 943, c. 
105,  § I O) to 88-3704 are for a determination �uring administration. 
It applies to both testate and intestate estates, and may be brought at 
any time after expiration of the time for filing claims. The decree 
is final and conclusive in the administration, and of the title to the 
property. Sections 88-4 1 0 1  to 88-4 1 03 (amended Laws 1 945, c. 
79) are for a determination where no administration has been had 
after two years from death. It applies to realty only. The statute 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































P A R T  T H R E E  
M O N O G R A P H S  · 
O N  
P R O B L E M S  I' N P R O B A T E  L A W  
The Organization of the Probate 
Court in America * 
Lewis M. Simes and Paul E.  Basye 
T
HIS is a study of contemporary American legislation 
concerning probate courts, with particular reference 
to their jurisdiction over the probate of wills and the 
administration of estates of deceased persons. 
By the term "probate courts" is meant all judicial tribunals 
which exercise such jurisdiction. As will subsequently ap­
pear, they are otherwise variously designated as surrogates' 
courts, orphans' courts, prerogative courts, courts of ordinary 
and county courts. In one state all the functions of probate 
and administration are exercised by courts of chancery. In 
other states, chancery has concurrent jurisdiction over many 
of these functions. Sometimes the register of probate exercises 
some of the functions of a probate court, while an orphans' 
or other court acts in other probate matters. Again, two 
separate courts may each exercise a part of the functions of a 
probate court. In one group of states, probate and administra­
tion is merely a separate function of the trial court of general 
jurisdiction or of its judge. But, regardless of its name, every 
tribunal which exercises jurisdiction over the probate of wills 
or the administration of decedents' estates, from its initiation 
to the time of final distribution, is within the scope of this 
study. 
· 
In view of the great influence of the English pattern in the 
formative period of American probate law, we shall begin with 
a brief survey of the English system of probating wills and 
administering the estates of deceased persons. This will be 
followed by a consideration of the types of American probate 
* Originally printed as an article in 4z Mich. L. Rev. 965 and 43 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1 1 3 ( 1 944) . 
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court organizations, the subject matter of their jurisdiction, 
and the personnel of these courts. 
The subject of appellate procedure, as such, is not within 
the scope of this discussion, but will be considered only as it 
tends to indicate the character of original jurisdiction. 
I. SoME SIGNIFICANT AsPECTS OF THE ENGLISH LAw OF 
DECEDENTs' EsTATES 
A. PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION IN ENGLAND IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 1 
It is n:ot the purpose of this brief discussion of certain aspects 
of the English law of decedents' estates to give a complete ac­
count of the entire course of its development. Rather its ob­
ject is merely to present enough of that development to explain 
the principal source from which American probate law was 
drawn. While doubtless there were borrowings at an earlier 
period,2 the English probate law of the eighteenth century 
is so typical of that which existed for a century before that a 
consideration of its significant aspects will furnish us with an 
adequate picture of the well from which much of our probate 
legislation was drawn. Moreover, since there were few im-
1 In general on this period see the following : Atkinson, "Brief History of 
English Testamentary Jvrisdiction," 8 Mo. L. REV. 107 ( 1 943 ) ; REPPY and 
TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS, 
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ( 192.8) ; REPORT 
BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO 'INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND Ju­
RISDICTION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1 832.) ; 
LANGDELL, BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION (zd ed. 1 908) 12.S-I9l j 
I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW ( 1 92.2.) 62.5-630 ; MAITLAND, 
EQUITY (Rev. ed� 1 936) 2.48-2.76 ;  WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS ( 1st Am. ed. 
1 8 32) ; STORY, EQUITY JuRISPRUDENCE ( ISt ed. 1 836) ; CoNSET, THE 
PRACTICE OF THE SPIRITUAL OR EccLESIASTICAL COURTS (3d ed. 1 708) ; 
TOLLER, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (zd Am. ed. 1 82.4) ; BURN'S Ec-
CLESIASTICAL LAW (9th ed. by Phillimore, I 842) 1 
. 
• See Atkinson, "The Development of the Massachusetts Probate System," 42 
MICH. L. REV. 425 ( 1943) .  
. 
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portant changes in that law up to the legislation of 1 857,3 it 
is assumed that sources which describe the English probate 
system of the early half of the ninteenth century are equally 
pertinent to our study. 
Matters pertaining to the administration of decedents' 
estates were dealt with in three kinds of tribunals, natp.ely, 
the ecclesiastical courts, the common-law courts and chancery: 
Our study of English probate law will discuss the functions of 
these courts in that order. -
r .  Jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts 
The jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts has b_een classified 
under three general heads : 4 pecuniary causes, arising from 
"withholding ecclesiastical dues, or the doing or neglecting 
some act relating to the church, whereby some damage accrues 
to the plaintiff" ; matrimonial causes ; and testamentary causes, 
including "the probate of wills, the granting of administrations, 
and the suing of legacies." 5 In matters relative to wills and 
administration, the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was 
limited to the disposition of personal property. As to the 
probate of wills and the granting of letters testamentary and 
letters of administration, their jurisdi�tion was exclusive. 
It would not be helpful in this connection to set forth in 
detail a description of the bewildering varieties of ecclesiastical 
courts 6 having jurisdiction, original or appellate, such as the 
diocesan courts, the prerogative courts, the court of arches, 
the court of peculiars and the court of delegates. Suffice it to 
say that the original jurisdiction as to decedents' estates was, 
in general, exercised by consistory courts of the dioceses and the 
• zo-: u Viet., c. 77 .(r 857 ) . 
' 3 BLACKST. COMM. *88, *89. 
• Id. *98. 
o,.r HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1922) 598. · 
. ,. ·. 
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prerogative courts of Canterbury and York.7 The judge of 
the consistory court was called the ordinary judge, or merely 
the ordinary.8 The deputy of the judge of an ecclesiastical 
court was sometimes called the surrogate.9 
The ecclesiastical courts were �ot courts of record.10 Jusf 
precisely what is meant by a court of record is none too clear.11 
Probably at the present time its most important characteristic 
is its power to fine and imprison. But, as Professor Holds­
worth says : "It is the infallibility of its formal record which 
is the earliest mark of a court of reco�d." 12 Thus the decrees 
of an ecclesiastical court did not import the same infallibility 
as the judgment of the King's Bench. Moreover (and this 
may have had something to do with the conclusion that it was 
not a court of record) it did not proceed .according to the 
common law. Rather, its procedures were evolved from the 
civil and canon law, as such strange terms as citation, libel or 
significavit might well indicate.13 , 
When a person died testate, his executor could either have 
the will probated in common form (sometimes caped noncon­
tentious form) or in solemn form. If he chose to prove it in 
common form, the procedure was simple, indeed. No notice 
or process was issued to anyone. Strictly speaking, no actual 
evidence of the due execution of the will was required. The 
will was admitted to probate on the oath of the executor, 
• 3 BLACKST. CoMM. *97· 
8 3 BuRN's EccLESIASTICAL LAW (9th ed. by Phillimore, 1 842.) 39· 
• 3 BURN's EccLESIASTICAL LAW (9th ed. by Phillimore, t S42.) 667 ; and 
see 3 STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY (zd ed. I 903)  I 996  quoting from 
Termes de la Ley as follows : Surrogate "is he who is appointed in the stead' of 
another, most commonly of a Bishop or his Chancellor." 
10 I BACON'S ABRIDGMENT (5th ed: 1 7 86) 5 5 8 ;  3 BLACKST. COMM. *67. 
u 5 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW ( 1")2.4) 1 5 7 ;  3 BLACKST. 
CoMM. *2.4 ; Stonex, "Courts of Record and Courts Not of Record," 3 I CENTRAL 
L. J. 86 ( I 89o) . 
. • 
10 5 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW ( I 92.4) 1 5 8. 
"' In general as to procedure in an ecclesiastical .court, see REPORT BY THE CoM­
MISSIONERS TO INQUIRE !liTO THE PRACTICE AND }URISDICTION OF THE EcCLE•. 
SIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES ( I 8J2.)  I4• 
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whkh ordinarily amounted. to nothing more than hearsay and 
opinion. According to Conset, 14 writing near th� end of the 
seventeenth century, the oath was as follows : / 
. 
"You shall swear, that you believe this to be the last will 
and testament of the deceased, and that you will pay all the 
debts and legacies of the deceased, so far as the goods will 
extend, and law shall bind you ; and that you will cause all 
the said goods to be apprized, and make a true and perfect 
inventory of the said goods, (at a day appointed by the judge, 
if none be then exhibited) and likewise a true and just accompt 
of the said goods, when you shall be thereto lawfully called. 
So help you God." 
The will then at once being admitted to probate, letters testa­
mentary were issued to the executor who proceeded to ad­
minister the personal estate of the testator. 
At any time within thirty years the executor or some other 
interested party could have the will proved in solemn form . 
• 
This was spoken of as the contentious procedure. Notice to 
interested parties was given by citation; 15 the attesting wit­
nesses were called and testified as to the due execution of the 
will. The order ad'mitting the will to probate was binding on 
all parties who appeared in the proceeding or who were cited. 
Proceedings to administer the goods of a person who had 
died intestate were similar in form. They might be either 
with or without notice to interested parties. But Conset tells 
us that "if there is no widow or relict of the deceased (to whom 
the administration of the goods of the intestate ought to belong 
of course) the·n the nearest of kindred, coming to obtain letters 
of administration, must first have a citation against all and 
singular next of kindred to the d�ceased." 16 On� method of 
14 CONSET, PRACTICE OF THE SPIRITUAL OR ECCLESIASTICAL COtrRTS (3d ed, 
I 708) r z. The first edition was dated r 68 r .  . 
"' See note I 3, supra. · 
18 CONSET, PRACTICE OF THE SPIRITUAL OR ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS (3d ed. 
1 708) 14o 
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requiring notice, which might be employed either in the case. 
of a testate or of an intestate estate, was for an interested party 
to file a paper known as a caveat. This required notice to be 
given to the caveator before any further'steps could be taken 
in the case. Thus the caveat might lead to the proof of the 
will in solemn form. It should also be noted that the caveat 
could be filed before any . other proceedings had been taken 
with respect to the estate of the deceased. 
After the issuance of letters, there might be little or nothing 
more in the way of judicial proceedings in the ecclesiastical 
court. It is true, a statute of the reign of Henry VIII 17 re­
quired the personal representative to render an inventory of 
the goods of the deceased. And the Statute of Distribution 18 
required the administrator to give a bond to render an in­
ventory and to account. But it appears that this was not always 
done.19 Certainly there was no order of distribution such as 
is common in American probate courts today. The personal 
representative merely paid the debts and then distributed the 
residue to the legatees or next of kin. 
It should be pointed out that, throughout its procedure, the 
ecclesiastic�! court conducted a case quite differently from a 
common-law court. Oral testimony was not heard at the trial 
but depositions were taken and were read by the judge 
previous to the hearing.20 Orders of the court would ordi­
narily be enforced by excommunication only, or, if this be in­
effective, chancery might be asked to issue an attachment so 
that the refractory party might be imprisoned until he obeyed 
the order of the court. Review of decisions of the ecclesiastical 
11 2 1  Henry 8 ,  c. 5, p. 1 67 ( 1 529) . 
18 2 2-23 Car. 2, c .  1 0, p. 347 ( 1 67o) . 
19 TOLLER, THE LAW OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (2d Am. ed. 
1 824) 249, '492 ;  2 WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS { 1 st Am. ed. 1 8p) 1 263-1 265. ' 
20 REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONERS TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND }U· 
RISDICT!ON OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES ( 1 8p) 
1 9· 
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court was by appeal, n9t by writ of  error, and the appellate 
court could re-examine questions of fact as well as of law and 
come to a decision de novo. 21 
One other feature of the procedure in the ecclesiastical 
courts with respect to decedents' estates should be noted. It 
appears that it was relatively easy to secure the revocation, in 
the ecclesiastical court of original jurisdiction, of an order ad­
mitting a will to probate or appointing an executor or ad­
ministrator.22 And even though the will had been proved in 
solemn form, this did not prevent a revocation of probate on 
a later hearing. 23 
2. Jurisdiction of the common-law courts 
As has already been indicated, the ecclesiastical court had 
no jurisdiction over devises of land. That was ordinarily a 
matter for the common-law courts.24 This does not mean that 
wills of land were probated in the common-law court, for they 
were not. But, with respect to the land devised by it, a will 
was operative without any probate whatever. Title passed 
to the devisee immediately on the death of the testator, just 
as title passes to the grantee in a deed immediately upon its 
delivery. If a will disposed of both personalty and realty, 
the action of the ecclesiastical court, in admitting it to probate 
or in refusing to do so, did not determine w,hether the will 
was a valid devise of real estate. And, if a will disposed of 
real estate only, the ecclesiastical court had no jurisdiction to 
admit it to probate.25 When an heir or devisee wished to test 
the validity of a devise of land, he brought some action to try 
title, such as ejectment or trespass. Even a judgment in such 
"' PoUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1 941 ) 67-70 . 
.. 1 WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS ( 1 St Am. ed. 1 8 3z )  347, 359 ·  
.. I WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS ( I st Am. ed. I 8 3z)  359· 
"' z  PAGE, WILLS (3d ed. 1 94I )  § 563 . 
.. In the Goods of John Bootie, L. R. 3 P. & D. I 77 ( 1 8 74) . 
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an action did not prevent further actions of ejectment or 
trespass in which the validity of the will might be adjudicated 
I anew. 
Contract actions which survived the death of the decedent 
could be brought in a court of common law, whether on behalf 
of or against the decedent. 26 The personal representative 
could sue and be sued in his representative capacity. Unless 
chancery interfered, a creditor of the decedent might recover 
judgment against the executor or administrator in a court of 
law which was enforceable only against the goods of the estate. 
Thus, the judgment would be "de bonis testatoris." 
In the case of a specific legacy/7 such as a collection of silver 
. plate or an oil painting, the executor must first "accept the 
legacy," that is perform some overt act indicating that the 
·chattel was set aside for the legatee. Then title vested in the 
legatee and he could bring an appropriate action at law, such 
as replevin or trover, to assert his rights in it. If, however, the 
legacy was general 28-that is a gift of a sum of money-there 
was apparently a difference of opinion as to whether an action 
of assumpsit at law was proper, but it was eventually deter­
mined that this could not be brought. The remedy was by 
action in the ecclesiastical court. And, if a legatee chose to 
file a bill to have the estate administered in chancery, he could 
secure a determination of his rights in that tribunal, regardless 
of the character of his legacy.29 
Before concluding with the discussion of the function of the 
court of law something should be said about the use of the writ 
of prohibition. If a party to a proceeding in the ecclesiastical 
26 Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction," 8 Mo. L. 
REV. 107  at I I 8, n 1  ( 1 943) ; LANGDELL, BRIEF SuRVEY OF EQUITY JuRis­
DICTiON (2d ed. 1 908) 1 66, 1 67. 
21 2 WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS ( 1 st Am. ed. 1 832)  843 ff. 
28 Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction," 8 Mo. L. 
REv. 1 07 at 1 1 9  ( 1 943 ) .  
29 LANGDELL, BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY }URISDICTION ( z d  ed. 1 908 )  1 54, 
I 57· 
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court thought that court had exceeded its jurisdiction, he might 
obtain a writ of prohibition in the common-law court.30 Since 
it was conceded (to use the language of an early case) that the 
ecclesiastical courts "had but a lame jurisdiction," 31 these 
writs must have been frequently issued. For example, the 
King's Bench had held.that, after an inventory was exhibited, 
the ecclesiastical court could entertain no objections to it by a 
creditor.32 
3 ·  Jurisdiction of chancery 
While the writs of prohibition crippled the jurisdiction of 
the ecclesiastical courts, the common-law courts from which 
they issued had no machinery adapted to the administration 
of estates. The net result was that chancery, with its more 
flexible procedure, tended more and more to take over matters 
of administration. Though the will would be admitted to 
probate and the personal representative appointed by the ec­
clesiastical court, a creditor or distributee might file his bill to 
have the estate administered in chancery. This j urisdiction 
might be sought for the purpose of discovering assets, because 
a trust was involved, or, though no actual trust was involved, 
because the estate was regarded as a kind of trust fund and 
the personal representative as a kind of trustee. 33 But, for 
whatever reason jurisdiction was assumed, chancery ordinarily 
continued with the administration until it was complete. 
Notices to creditors were published; actions by creditors in 
common-law courts were enjoined; assets were brought in 
and distributed to creditors and legatees or next of kin. 
80 Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testamentary JuJ:isdiction," 8 Mo. L. · 
REV. I07  at I I 7  ( I 943) .  
81 Matthews v. Newby, I Vern. I 3 3  at I 34 ( 1 68z)  • 
.. See z WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS ( I St Am. ed. I 8p) 644, 645 and cases cited 
therein. 
83 I STORY, EQUITY JURISPllUDENCE ( 1 st ed. I 8J6)  §§ 530 et seq. ; LANGDELL, 
BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JuRISDICTION (zd ed. I 9o8)  Arts. VI and VII ; 
MAITLAND, EQUITY (Rev. ed, I 936) 248-257· 
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And not only did chancery administer personalty of the 
decedent, but it might also take charge of some or all of his 
real estate. Thus, if a testator had devised his lands to his 
executor in trust for the payment of debts, or for the payment 
of debts and legacies, the court of equity would take charge 
of the land and administer it as directed by the testator.34 
Chancery never assumed jurisdiction to probate a will 
or to appoint an executor or administrator. But, as to all sub­
sequent steps in the process of administration, it might take 
jurisdiction if an interested party filed a bill asking for it. 
The concurrent jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts con­
tinued, -it is true ; but the chancery procedure was regarded 
as so much more satisfactory that administration in equity 
became a common practice. 
Moreover, the chancery court might find itself confronted 
with a question of the validity of a devise of land. The issue 
could arise merely incidentally in connection with some related 
matter. Or the parties might come into chancery solely for 
the purpose of establishing the will and having the heir en­
j oined from interfering with the enjoyment of the devisee. 
Story thus describes the procedure in these two situations : 35 
"If the wiU·is of real estate, and its validity is contested in 
the cause, the Court will, in like manner, direct its validity to 
be ascertained, either by directing an issue to be tried, or an 
action of ejectment to be brought at law; and will govern its 
own judgment by the final result. If the will is established 
in either case, a perpetual injunction may be decreed. 
"But, it is often the primary, though not the sole, opject of 
a suit in Equity, brought by devisees and others in interest, to 
establish the validity of a will of real estate. . . . In such cases 
the jurisdictio� exercised by Courts of Equity, is somewhat 
analogous to that exercised in cases of Bills of Peace. . . . 
In every case of this sort, the Court will, unless the heir waives 
.. Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testam;ntary Jurisdiction," 8 Mo.- L. 
REV. 1 0 7  at 1 1 9 ( 1 943) .  
85 z STORY, EQUITY JuRISPRUDENCE ( 1 st ed. 1 8 36) 6 7 1 .  
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it, direct an issue of devisavit vel non, (as it is technically, 
though, according to Mr. W oodeson, barbarously expressed,) 
to ascertain the validity of the will. . . . When, by this means 
upon a verdict the validity of the will is fully established, the 
Court will, by its decree, declare it to be well proved, and that 
it ought to be established, and will grant a perpetual injunc­
tion." 
B. STATUTORY REFORM IN ENGLISH PROBATE LAW AND 
ADMINISTRATlON 
In the first half of the nineteenth c�ntury there were various 
evidences of dissatisfaction with the existing system of probate 
as administered by the ecclesiastical courts. A commission 
appointed to inquire into the practice and jurisdiction of the 
ecclesiastical courts recommended a number of reforms in its · 
report in I 832.36 The Fourth Report of the Real Property 
Commissioners, filed in I 833,  recommended the complete 
abolition of the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts over 
testamentary matters. 37 In I 8 5 7  legislation was enacted 
which actually provided for this important change. A statute 
enacted in that year 38 established a court of probate presided 
over by a judge having "rank and precedence with the Puisne 
Judges of Her Majesty's superior courts of common law at 
Westminster." This court was designated as a·court of record, 
and was vested with the voluntary and contentious jurisdiction 
in relation to the granting or revoking probate of wills and 
letters of administration. If a will disposed. of both land and 
chattels, probate was made conclusive as to real estate j ust as 
it was with respect to chattels. It was provided, however, that 
the newly established court of probate should have no j uris­
diction as to suits for legacies or for the distribution of residues. 
36 REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRAC­
TICE AND }URISDICTION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES ( 1 832) , 
37 FOURTH REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONERS TO INQUIRE INTO THE LAW OF 
ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL,PROPERTY ( I S 3 2) 6 5 ,  
33 zo-z r Viet., c. 77,  § 8, p.  240 (x 8s7) .  
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By the first Judicature Act, 39 enacted in I 8 7 3 and effective in 
I 8 7 5, most of the various courts were consolidated to form a 
single unified court known as the Supreme Court of Judicature. 
This was composed of two parts, the High Court of Justice and 
the Court of AppeaL The jurisdiction of the High Court of 
Justice included jurisdiction formerly exercised by the Probate 
Court and the High Court of Chancery, as well as the juris­
diction of other courts. For administrative convenience, the 
High Court was divided into the following divisions : the 
Chancery Division ; the King's Bench Division ; the Common 
Pleas Division ; the Exchequer Division ; the Probate, Divorce 
and Admiralty Division. To the latter division was assigned 
the jurisdiction formerly belonging to the Probate Court. 
The Land Transfer Act of I 897 40 provided that "Probate 
and letters of administration may be granted in respect of real 
estate only, although there is no personal estate." It was 
further provided by the same enactment that the personal 
representative should hold title to and administer the real 
estate of the decedent. 
The Supreme Court of Judicature Act of I 92 5, as 
amended, 41 provides for a High Court of Justice of three 
divisions, namely, the Chancery Division, consisting of the 
Lord . Chancellor and six puisne judges ; the King's Bench 
Division, consisting of the Lord Chief Justice and nineteen 
puisne judges ; and the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty 
Division, consisting of a President and four puisne judges. 
A puisne judge of the High Court must be qualified by being 
a barrister of ten years' standing. He receives a salary of 
£5000; but the Lord Chancellor receives £Io,ooo and the 
•• 36-3 7 Viet., c. 66, p. I 9 I  ( 1 8 7 3 ) .  
'" 6o-6I Viet., c. 65, p .  I 84 ( I 8 9 7 ) .  · 
4J. I S- I6  Geo. s. c. 49. p. I I 9 7  ( I 9 ZS) ; zs Geo. s. c. :z, p. I S  ( I935) ; 
I-z Geo. 6, c. z., p. 4 (I 9 3 7 ) ; I-z Geo. 6, c. 67, p. 804 ( I 9 3 8 ) ; 4 HALSBURY, 
STATUTES OF ENGLAND I46, with amendments in z 8  id. 3 3, 30 id. I Z9 and 3 1  
id. 84. 
. .. 
ORGANIZATION OF PROBATE COURT 397 
Lord Chief Justice receives £8,ooo. Judges of the Court of 
Appeal receive the same salaries as the judges o£ the High 
Court. 
Jurisdiction in the matter of decedents' estates is distributed 
among the three divisions of the High Court in much the 
same fashion as it was divided among the ecclesiastical courts, 
the court of chancery and the common-law courts, prior to .the 
act of r 857. The Probate Division has exclusive jurisdiction 
of the probate of wills and the issuing of letters. Actions at 
law for or against the personal representative may be brought 
in the King's Bench Division. But administration may be had 
in chancery after letters are granted. In that case, actions at 
law against the personal representative would be stayed and 
creditors' rights would be settled in connection with the ad­
ministration in equity. Appeals in matters of decedents' estates 
are taken· from the High Court to the Court of Appeals just 
as in other matters. 
There is a concurrent jurisdiction to admit to probate and 
grant letters in the county courts in the case of small estates, 42 , 
but judicial statistics would seem to indicate that this has rarely 
been taken advantage of. 43 
It is, of course, inconceivable that five judges could handle, 
alone and unassisted, all the probate business for all the people 
of England. In fact, judicial statistics indicate .that the great 
bulk of proceedings to admit wills to probate and for letters 
take the form of noncontentious proceedings and are heard 
before probate registrars. 44 This is, obviously, an administra­
tive matter which does not require, in most case�, the actual 
personal supervision of the judge. But, of course, the judge 
"' ·24-�5 Geo. 5, c. 5 3, §§ 6o, 6 I ,  p. 5 3 I  ( I 9 34) . 
"' CIVIL JuDICIAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES, I 9 3 8  ( I 9 3 9 )  pp. 20, 
2 I. This report shows that in I 9 3 8 there were I 2 I contentious probate actions 
tried and 25 8 motions heard by a judge. In noncontentious proceedings, in 
I 9 3 8, in the registries there were the following grants : 94,944 probates and 
letters of administration with the will annexed ; 54, 8o8  letters of administration. 
" CIVIL jUDICIAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES, I 9 3 8  ( I 9 39 )  p. 43• 
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and the registrar are both a part of the unified judicial system, 
and some judicial supervision is always possible where it is 
needed. 
There are four probate registrars 45 assisted by a staff of 
clerks. In addition, there are sixteen groups of district 
registrars, with a chief registry in each group and certain sub­
registrars. To qualify as a probate registrar, one must be a 
practicing barrister or solicitor , of ten years' standing, or a 
district probate registrar of five years' standing, or have served 
ten years as a clerk in the principal probate registry. 
In considering the English system as a whole, one cannot 
fail to note the extensive changes that have taken place within 
the last hundred years. All matters of decedents' estates are 
now handled by one court. There is no possibility of conflict­
ing rulings by different courts on questions of jurisdiction de­
priving a litigant of relief. This court is not an inferior court 
as was the ecclesiastical court, but is a court of general juris­
diction, whose judges receive a salary comparable to that of 
justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. The 
English system, however, distinguishes sharply between con­
tentious and noncontentious business of the court. The latter 
being largely of an administrative character, is handled by 
probate registrars and their assistants. But if a contentious 
proceeding is necessary, either in the Chancery or the King's 
Bench Division, it may be heard by judges of the one great 
trial court of general jurisdiction of England. 
The separation of jurisdiction between the Probate Division 
and the Chancery Division would seem still to be a mark of in­
efficiency. Indeed, in recent years there was an unsuccessful 
movement to transfer the probate of wills and granting of 
letters to the Chancery Division.46 Nevertheless, since mat­
ters may be freely transferred from one division of the High 
"' 8  HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND, "Courts," (zd ed. 1 93 3 )  § 1 3 2.0, p. 6o1 • 
.. BUSINESS OF THE COURTS COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPORT ( 1 9 3 3 ) .  , 
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Court to another, it would seem that procedural difficulties 
arising from this divided jurisdiction are not great.47 
II. DEVELOPMENT oF AN AMERICAN CouNTERPART OF 
ENGLISH PROBATE JURISDICTION 
A. THE TRANSITION PROCESS 
We have traced thus far the evolution of probate courts in 
England from a system in which the complete administration 
of an estate could and frequently did require judicial proceed­
ings in three courts to the modern organization under which 
probate business is handled in a single court-the High Court 
of Justice. We turn now to the establishment of probate courts 
in America. Some of the English historical influences are to 
be noted in the early development of our own probate court 
organizations. But mixed with these influences were some 
courageous attempts to establish one court possessing the com­
bined powers of the English ecclesiastical, .common-law, and 
chancery courts. The objective was a system under which 
an entire probate proceeding could be conducted and super­
vised, in one court, from the probate of a will and grant of 
letters to the final distribution of the estate. Due to vari­
ations in populations, community needs, considerations of ex­
pense, and natural local differences in opinion, different 
systems of probate courts have developed. 
In very early colonial times testamentary jurisdiction was 
commonly given to the General Courts or vested in the gov­
ernors and their councils. Somewhat later it was given to 
county or other trial courts as they were established, although 
the General Courts frequently continued to exercise some 
testamentary j urisdiction. By the middle of the seventeenth 
'7 A large portion of probate business is handled in the Probate Division ; and 
recourse to the Chancery and King's Bench Divisions yet remains for certain 
contentious matters in the administration of decedents' estates. But all are in 
the same High Court of Justice. 
. 
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century numerous variations had developed in the colonies.48 
In some instances the governor was made the ordinary, al­
though it was common for him to commission deputies or sur­
rogates to probate wills and grant letters, reserving to himself 
supervisory control over their acts by way of appeal.49 
Orphans' courts were created in several states to include juris­
diction over executors and administrators as well as guard­
ians. 50 Elsewhere probate jurisdiction was lodged in the es­
tablished courts-superior courts in some places,51 inferior 
courts in others. 52 
The first plan of having the governor appoint deputies or 
surrogates to probate wills and grant letters constituted but a 
slight departure from the practice of the English ecclesiastical 
courts. The creation of separate orphans' courts with many of 
the powers possessed by all three courts under the English 
system was a step in recognizing the need for a unification of 
the processes of probate and administration. And conferring 
' 
"' For a summary of these developments and variations, see PoUND, ORGANI-
ZATION OF COURTS ( 1 940) 26-8o. 
•• Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the Colony of Georgia, 1 7  55-I 774, 
published by Jones (I 8 8 1 )  5 ; THE COMPACT WITH THE CHARTER AND LAWS 
OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH, edited by Brigham ( I 836) 3 2 ;  I La;ws of 
New Hampshire, I 679-I 7o2, edited by Batchellor ( I 904) 206-207 (act of 
1 687) ; Acts and Laws of New Hampshire, I 696-I ]25, printed by Green ( I p6) 
I OI (act of I 7 I  8) ; Acts a'nd Laws of New Hampshire, printed by Fowle 
( I 7 7 I )  20 5-2o6 (act of 1 7  7 I )  ; Acts of the Province of New Jersey, printed 
by Bradford ( 1 732)  3 8  (act of 1 7 1 3 ) ; I Laws of New York, I 69 I-I 75 I ,  
printed by Parker ( I 752)  I4-1 5 {act of  1 692) ; Laws of  North Carolina, 
edited by Potter (I 8 2 I )  I I 2  (act of I 7 I 5) ; Acts and Laws of Rhode Island, 
printed by James Franklin ( r 73o) 5-7 (act of r 663) ; 7 Statutes at Large of 
South Carolina, edited by McCord, 1 7 2  (act of 1 72 1 ) .  
50 See notes 54-58, infra. ' 
•• See notes 68-70, infra. 
62 2 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, I 6 65-1 678, edited 
by Trumbull ( 1 852)  3 9  (act of r 666) (county courts) ; 1 Laws of New 
Hampshire, r 679-1 702, edited by Batcheller ( 1 904) 206-207 (act of r 687) ; 
Complete Revisal of t�e Acts of Assembly of the Province of North Carolina, 
printed by Davis ( 1 7 7 3 )  524-525  (act of 1 7 7 3 )  (to probate wills, grant 
letters and determine controversies in intestate estates in matters not involving 
more than £so) . 
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this jurisdiction upon general trial courts already established 
served to unite probate jurisdiction with general judicial ad­
ministration. 
B. AMERICAN INNOVATIONS 
In observing the evolution of probate courts in America, 
three aspects in their development are to · be noted : the range 
of their powers, the scope of their jurisdiction, and the par­
ticular forms assumed by them. 
The powers lodged in the various bodies, persons or courts 
were extremely limited in the early stages of probate develop­
ment. In many cases they consisted merely of the power to 
probate wills and grant letters, following the practice of the 
ecclesiastical courts. Very gradually these powers were ex­
tended to include a needed control and supervision over ex­
ecutors and administrators in their administration of estates.53 
But the process of increasing powers of ·control in probate 
courts cannot yet be called complete in any state. All too often 
resort must be had to equity or common-law courts to sell 
land to pay debts, to partition land in connection with distribu­
tion, to contest wills, to construe them, or e�en to adjudicate 
contestedclaims againstan estate. 
In Pennsylvania,54 Maryland,55 Delaware/6 Virginia 57 
63 For substantiation of this development in particular states see opinion of 
Daly, J., in Brick's Estate, I 5  Abb. Pr. u (N. Y. I 862) ; opinion of Werner, J., 
in Matter of Runk, 200 N. Y. 447, 452-456, 94 N. E. 3 63 ( I 9 I I ) ; REDFIELD, 
SURROGATES' CouRTS IN NEW YORK (4th ed. I 89o) I-I 7 ;  Atkinson, "The 
Development of the Massachusetts Probate System," 42 MrcH. L. REV. 425 
(I943 ) ; opinion of Woodward, J. ,  in Horner & Roberts v. Hasbrouck, 4 I  Pa. 
I69, I 7 7-I 79 ( I 862) ; REPPY and TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY 
BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS ( I 9 2 8 )  I 74-I 7 7  (for New Jersey) ; 
I WOERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. I 9 2 3 )  478,  489. 
"' Act of I 7 I 3, in I Laws of Pennsylvania, I 700-I 7 8 I ,  edited by Dallas 
(I 797)  98 .  See also Abridgment of Laws of Pennsylvania, I 7oo-I 8 l l , edited 
by Purdon ( I  8 I I )  407. Tlris act reestablished orphans' courts which had been 
discontinued in Pennsylvania. Reference to their existence as early as I 69 3  may 
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and New Jersey 58 separate orphans' courts were early es­
tablished. 
"The idea was taken from the Court of Orphans of the city 
of London, which had the care and guardianship of children of 
deceased citizens of London in their minority, and could 
compel executors and guardians to file inventories, and give 
securities for their estates. . . . The Court of Orphans 
was one of the privileges of that free city ; and that the people 
of Pennsylvania might enj oy the saz:ne protection, it was 
transplanted into our law, at first without any change of name, 
but afterwards called the Orphans' Court. The beginnings of 
this court were feeble. But it grew in importance with the 
increase of wealth and population, was recognized in our Con­
stitution of I 776, and in each of our subsequent constitutions, 
and has been the subject of innumerable Acts of Assembly." 59 
Thus a jurisdiction over the persons and estates of minors came 
to include the administration of decedents' estates. Elsewhere 
guardianship and curatorship (or conservatorship, as it is some­
times called) has been appended to probate jurisdiction. And 
in many states there has been added adoption proceedings, 
change of name, solemnization of marriages, and even the 
granting of divorces. More closely connected with the ad­
ministration of estates, the administration of state inheritance 
or transfer taxes, supervision of testamentary trusts, and more 
be found in I Charters and Acts of Assembly of the Province of Pennsylvania, 
printed by Miller ( I 762) app., p. 9 ·  
55 Laws of Maryland, printed by Green ( 1 7_77) c. 8 (act of February, I 777) ; 
id. c. 9 (act of October, I 7 77) . 
56 Act of I 7 2 I  in I Laws of Delaware, I 700-I 797> printed by Samuel and 
John Adams ( I 797)  8 7-94. Later references to orphans' courts in Delaware 
may be found in an act of 1 742, in Laws of the Government of New-Castle, 
Kent, and Sussex upon Delaware, printed by B. Franklin ( I  7 5 I )  273-282_ 
entitled "An Act for the better Settling Intestates' Estates." 
57 For a statute providing for the annual holding of an orphans' court in 
Lunenburg County, Virginia, see Act of 1 748 in 6 Statutes at Large of Virginia, 
edited by Hening ( I 8 1 9 )  2 I O. 
58 Act of I 846. See Nixon's Digest of the Laws of New Jersey, 1 7o9-I 855 
( I 855)  p. sso. 
•• From the opinion of Woodward, J., in Horner & Roberts v. Hasbrouck, 41 
Pa. 169 at 1 7 8  ( 1 862) . 
ORGANIZATION OF PROBATE COURT 403 
recently of inter vivos trusts, have been added. The extent 
of these superimposed functions will be discussed later. _ 
From the summary already given it is apparent that there 
was no general agreement as to the form of tribunal for the 
administration of estates. This function, bestowed upon the 
town councils by Rhode Island, remains there to this day, al­
though each council may elect a probate judge to preside in 
the local probate courts.60 Probate judges are still appointed 
by the governor in New Hampshire,61 following the early 
practice when the governor appointed commissioners to probate 
wills.62 The surrogates in New York and New Jersey, origi­
nally appointed by the governor or prerogative court/3 are 
now elected by the electors of each county.64 In New York 
the extent of their-powers and scope of their jurisdiction have 
been vastly increased. New Jersey, on the contrary, has re­
stricted the surrogate to the probate of wills and grant of letters 
only when there is no contest ; 65 in case of contest and in most 
other matters resort must be had to the orphans' or prerogative 
coutt. 66 The separate orphans' courts early established in 
Pennsylvania, Maryland and Delaware, and later in New 
Jersey, are still continued. 67 And the separate probate courts 
established elsewhere have in the main persisted. 
But significant innovations were launched in three states. 
As early as I 72 r South Carolina conferred upon its county and 
precinct courts "full
, 
power to determine the right of adminis-
60 R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 938) c. 568, § 3 · 
61 N. H. Canst., arts, 46, 7 3· 02 I Laws of New Hampshire, 1 679-1 702, edited - by Batchellor ( 1 904) 206 
(act of 1 68 7) . 
63 See Brick's Estate, 1 5  Abb. Pr. Rep. 1 2  at 24-28 (N. Y. 1 862) ; and In 
the Matter of Coursen's Will, 4 N. ]. Eq. 408 at 41 3-4I4  ( 1 843 ) . 
64 N. Y. Canst., art. 6, § I 3 i N. ]. Canst., art. 7, § 2, par. 5 ·  
65 N. ]. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7) §§ 3 :2-22, 3 :7-5. 1 .  
60 N. ] .  Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7) §§ 3 :2-22; 3 :7-5. 1 ; 3 :7-23 . r ; 3 :2 7  t o  3 :32 ; 
(Supp. 1 94I-43) 3 :7-1 3.4 ; 3 :7-1 3.5 · 
67 Pa. Canst., art. 5, § 2 2 ;  Md. Canst., art. 4, § I ;  Del. Canst., art. 4, §§ 1 ,  
33 ; N. }. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7) § 2 :7-1 .  
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tration of the estates of persons dying intestate . . . and 
also all disputes concerning wills and executorships, in as full 
and ample manner as the same have or might have been here­
tofore determined by any Governor, or Governor and Coun­
cil." 68 In I 778 Georgia conferred jurisdiction upon its 
superior courts "to determine in all matters of dispute con­
cerning the proving of wills and granting letters of administra­
tion." 69 In I 773 North Carolina conferred jurisdiction upon 
its superior courts in "all Suits and Matters relative to 
Legacies, filial Portions, Estates of Intestates." 70 Here in 
courts of general jurisdiction, compounded with civil and 
criminal jurisdiction, was the administration of estates. How­
ever, this plan of conferring powers of probate and administra­
tion upon courts of general jurisdiction w<ts not to be perma­
nent in any of these three states. 71 It remained for other 
states to initiate a movement which would unite probate juris­
diction with law and equity. 
One minor phenomenon of consolidation occurred early, 
however, which has had an unfortunate effect upon probate 
courts. Under the stress of quantity of judicial business the 
establishment of inferior county courts with a limited civil 
and criminal jurisdiction was common. Probate powers were 
added to their jurisdiction in several states. 72 In thirteen 
"" 7 Statutes at Large of South Carolina, edited by McCord ( I 84o) I T� (act 
of I 72 I ) .  
69 Digest of the Laws of Georgia to I 799, edited by Watkins ( I 8oo) 226. 
7° Complete Revisal of all the Acts of Assembly of the Province of North 
Carolina, printed by Davis ( 1 7 73 )  5 1 1 .  See also Laws of North Carolina, 
edited by Iredell ( 1 79 1 )  296-29 7  (act of 1 77 7 ) .  
71 In  South Carolina the office o f  ordinary was established i n  I 799· See Acts 
of South Carolina, 1 795-1 804, printed by Faust ( 1 8o8)  3 1 5 .  
In  Georgia probate powers were vested in  a register of probate appointed 
by the legislature in each county beginning in 1 7 77 .  Georgia Constitution of 
1 7 77, compiled by Marbm;y & Crawford ( 1 8oz) art. 52.  See also REDFEARN, 
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN GEORGIA ( 1 9  3 8) I 53 ·  
North Carolina conferred probate powers upon county courts in 1 8 3 7 .  Laws 
of North Carolina, 1 8 36-3 7, printed by Lemay ( 1 8 3  7 )  55·  
72 POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS ( I 940) 83-85, 1 3 7• 
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states 73 at the present time probate matters come under the · 
jurisdiction of county courts. Often these courts are presided 
over by judges who are untrained in law. As a consequence 
their decisions are usually reviewable on appeal by a trial de 
novo in courts of general jurisdiction. Certainly this fusion of 
probate courts with county courts has not produced any eleva­
tion of probate courts in the public esteem. On the contrary, 
it has undoubtedly been a factor in minimizing the importance 
of probate matters. 
III .  CLASSIFICATION oF AMERICAN PRoBATE CouRTS 
A. VARIATIONS OF PROBATE COURT ORGANIZATION IN THE 
SAME STATE 
Before attempting a classification of present-day probate 
courts, it should be emphasized that the system of probate 
courts in several states is not unitary and hence not susceptible 
of a single classification. Under some systems two separate 
tribunals have been created to supervise the complete ad­
ministration of an estate. In other states different kinds of 
tribunals exist in different counties of the same state for 
administering probate matters. Where either of these situ­
ations exist, each court or kind of court must be considered 
separately in the appraisal to follow, and may require one, 
two, or even three classifications for the probate courts of a 
single state. 
I .  Probate courts as single or multiple units 
In a number of states certain remnants of the tri-court system 
under the English ecclesiastical practice still persist. The 
New Jersey system suggests considerable early English influ­
ence. Its intricacies can only be appreciated by a detailed 
13 Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin. 
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description. Three courts have probate jurisdiction : the 
surrogate's court, the orphans' court and the prerogative court. 
There is one prerogative court for the entire state presided 
over by the chancellor sitting as ordinary or surrogate gen­
eral. 74 There is one surrogate in each county 75 and also one 
orphans' court in each county. 76 The surrogate is both the 
judge and clerk of his own court ; 77 he is also clerk of the 
orphans' court.78 The prerogative court has jurisdiction 
throughout the state to probate wills, grant letters and to hear 
and finally determine disputes that arise thereon.79 The sur­
rogate of each county also has power to probate wills and 
grant letters except when doubt appears on the face of a will 
or a caveat is filed against a will or a dispute or contest arises 
as to the existence of a will or the right to letters. 80 In any 
of these cases the m atter is transferable to the orphans' court. 81 
In general the orphans' courts have no original jurisdiction to 
probate wills or grant letters. Their sole jurisdiction to do 
so arises on transfer from the surrogate in case the matter is 
disputed or contested. 82 The orphans' courts also have power 
to grant allowances to w'dows and children pending a will 
contest, 83 to determine heirship of an intestate where real 
estate is involved, 84 to approve compromises of will contests or 
claims of the estate against a third person, 85 to order the sale 
of real estate for the payment of debts, 86 determine rights of 
" N. J. Const., art. 6, § 4, par. 2.  
7 5  N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 3 7 )  § 2 :7-1 2. 
76 N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7 )  § 2 :7-r . 
77 N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7 )  § 2 :3 1-4, 2 :3 1-1 6. 
78 N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 37 )  § 2 :7-4. 
79 N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7) § 3 :1-1 .  
!0 N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1937)  §§ 3 :2-22 and 3 :7-5 . 1 .  
81 Ibid. 
sa Ibid. 
83 N . J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 37 )  § 3 :2-29 . 
.. N. J. Rev. Stat, ( 1 9 3 7 )  §§ 3 :4-1 to 3 :4-3 . 
"" N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7) § 3 : 1 5. 
06 N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7) § 3 :25-23. 
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beneficiaries under a will or of the next of kin in an estate, 87 
and determine controvers�es respecting allowances of ac­
counts.88 In short, the jurisdiction of the surrogate is limited 
to the probate of wills and issuance of letters in nonadversary 
proceedings. The remainder of the administration is had in 
the orphans' court. The probate of a will may be either before 
the surrogate of the proper county or in the prerogative 
court. 89 Thus, if a proceeding is initiated before the local sur- · 
rogate, the services of the orphans' court will certainly be re­
quired; but if a proceeding is initiated in the prerogative court 
in the first instance that court has power to conduct the entire 
proceeding. 
In North Carolina there is a similar division of probate 
jurisdiction between the clerk of the superior court and the 
superior court itself. Indeed the clerk is himself a court 90 
and handles most of the details of administration. However, 
in the case of a contest on probate of a will or grant of letters, 
the matter is transferred to the superior court for the hearing.91 
The clerk may order the sale of personal property,92 but resort 
must be had to the superior court for the sale of land.93 Also 
the clerk has jurisdiction with respoct to the inventory and ac­
counting.94 Much the same division of jurisdiction prevails in 
Virginia. The clerk, as well as the court, has power to probate 
wills and grant letters.95 But any decision of the clerk may 
be appealed to the circuit court or its equivalent. 96 Probably 
the clerk does not have as much power as the clerk in North 
87 N. ]. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9  3 7) §§ 3 :26-2, 3 :26-6. 
88 N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7) § 3 :1-2. 
"" N. ]. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1 9 3 8-40) § 3 :2-3. 
90 N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) §§ 2-1 , 28-1 ; Edwards v.
· 
Cobb, 95 N. C. 4 ( 1 8 86) . 
For a statement of the history of this allocation of probate jurisdiction see 
Hardy & Co. v. Turnage, 204 N. C. 5 3 8, 1 6 8  {3. E. 823 ( 1 9 3 3 ) .  
91 N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) § 28-30. 
92 N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) §§ 2 8-73 to 28-8o. 
"" N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) § 2 8-8 1 .  
94 N. C .  Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) §§ 2 8-50, 28-1 1 7, 2 8-u 8.  
96 Va. Code ( 1 942) §§ 5247, 5249· 
96 Va. Code ( 1 942) § 5249· 
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Carolina. It is sufficient to note, however, that in both of 
these states the clerk has j udicial ,powers and shares with the 
court of general jurisdiction the control over the administra­
tion of estates. Likewise in Delaware the register of wills in 
each county has power to probate wills, grant letters, remove 
representatives, approve bonds, pass upon accounts and settle­
ments of representatives and to grant discharges. 97 But a 
proceeding to sell land to pay debts must be had in the orphans' 
courts. 98 Pennsylvania also has a register in each county who 
has power to probate wills and grant letters. 99 Other matters 
in connection with the administration of an estate are handled 
in the orphans' court.100 · 
The important thing to observe in all these case.s is the 
division of jurisdiction between two tribunals. The first of 
these, variously called the surrogate, the register of wills, or 
the clerk, performs a function limited for the most part to the 
probate of wills and grant of letters ; and, under the practice 
of some states, only when the matter is not contested. In other 
states, such as Delaware, the register of wills has quite broad 
powers, making it possible for most of the administration to 
be done under his supervision. The second of these tribunals, 
variously called the orphans', the superior, district, or circuit 
court, supervises the remainder of the administration and 
especially in matters that are more likely to be contentious or 
involve more than ministerial functions. 
In several other states the clerk of the probate court has 
power to admit wills to probate and grant letters on excep­
tional occasions/01 such as ·in the absence of the judge or in 
"' Del. Rev. Code ( 1 93 5 )  §§ 3799, 3 804, 3 807, 3 8 I I, 3 8 1 3, 3 844 and 3 866. 
98 Del. Rev. Code ( 1 9 35 )  c. 99 ·  By means of appeal from the register's 
court, most other matters can �e heard in the orphans' court. Del. Rev. Code 
( 1 935)  §§ 3 8 3 5, 3 843 ; Del. Const., art. 4, § 34· But appeals from certain 
other matters lie directly to the superior court. Del. Rev. Code ( 1 935)  
§§ 3 8 2 7, 3 866. 
99 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 930) t. 20, § 1 86 1 .  
""'Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 930) t .  20, §§ 2241  through 2254. 
101 See discussion under VII-B, infra. 
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vacation of the court, but these are regarded as extraordinary 
rather than ordinary powers. 
2 .  Different kinds of probate courts in the same state 
From the very beginning there was a tendency to establish 
a probate court in each county.102 But variations in population 
and considerations of expense have led to the establishment 
. of different kinds of probate courts within the same state. 
In Indiana probate jurisdiction has been conferred upon the 
circuit courts of each county.103 However, in Marion and 
V anderburgh counties, two populous counties of the state, 
separate probate courts have been established to · handle the 
administration of estates.104 These probate courts are separate 
from the circuit courts of these counties but are fully co�rdinate 
with them. 
In Oregon the county courts have been given probate juris­
diction ; 105' but, in counties having a population of over 30,000, 
county courts have been abolished and county judges made 
circuit judges to preside over the "department of probate" 
in the circuit courts of those counties.106 The probate courts 
in these larger counties are not unlike those in Indiana except 
that the former may be said to be an integral part of the court 
of general jurisdiction, rather than coordinate with it. 
In New Mexico the district court has had concurrent juris­
diction with the probate court in all probate matters since 
1 941 107 and any estate of $2,000 or more may be "appealed" 
[ transferred] to the . district court.108 Thus probate JUriS­
diction is optional in either of two courts. 
102 POUND, ORGANIZATION OF CoURTS (1 940) 1 36, 250. 
"" Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 933) § 4-303. 
, .. Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 9 3 3 )  §§ 4-2901 ,  4-3001 .  
105 Ore. Const., art. 7, § 1 2. 
100 0re. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) §§ 93-J I O, 1 3-206, 1 3-207, 1 3-209. 
107 N.M. Stat. ( 1 941 ) § 1 6-3 1 2. 
108 N.M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 ) §§ 1 6-419, 1 6-420. 
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In Alabama the probate court does not have exclusive juris­
diction. Administration in equity remains optional ; 109 or a 
proceeding commenced in the probate court may be removed 
to the circuit court.110 Thus probate jurisdiction in Alabama 
i� possible in any one of three courts, each of which has adequate 
and complete power to function. 
In Tennessee probate jurisdiction is vested in the county 
courts composed of all the justices of the peace of the county.m 
Judicial powers are exercised by the chairman who is, in effect, 
the probate judge.112 However, when no person has applied 
or can be procured to administer upon an estate, chancery has 
jurisdiction to appoint a representative after six months.113 
A proceeding to sell real estate may be had either in the county, 
the circuit, or the chancery court.114 Appeals from the county 
court ordinarily lie to the circuit court,115 but to the court of 
appeals or the supreme court if jurisdiction in the particular 
matter appealed from is concurrent with the circuit or chancery 
courts.116 
In Vermont most appeals from the probate court go to the 
county court, 117 but an appeal on a question of law goes directly 
to the supreme court.118 In this one respect the probate courts 
of Vermont require a double classification. 
In Wisconsin probate jurisdiction has been vested in the 
county courts throughout the state.119 The judges of these 
county courts, however, must be members of the bar except 
in counties having a population of less than I 4,000 in which 
109 Ala. Const., art. 6, § 1 49. 
110 Ala. Code ( 1 940) t. I J, §§ 1 3 8  through 144: 
111 Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 9 3 8 )  §§ 101 �13, 1 02.25. 
112 Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 9 3 8) §§ 1 0202, 10204. 
113 Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 9 3 8 )  §. 8 1 55. 
m Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 93 8 )  § 1 02.26. 
115 Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 9 3 8) §§ 9028, 9060. 
116 Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 93 8 )  §§ 902�1, 9059. 
117 Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 9 3 3 )  § 3002. 
m vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 9 3 3 )  § 300 1 .  
119 Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) . § 253 .01 .  
I 
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case they may be lay judges.120 Appeals from county courts 
in counties having a population of more than I s,ooo go directly . 
to the supreme court and are heard upon the record of the pro­
ceedings below, but in counties having a population of r.s,ooo 
or less (of which there are some twelve counties) appeals lie 
to the circuit court and are heard de novo. 121 
Ohio provides for separate probate courts in each county, 
but counties of less than 6o,ooo population are authorized to 
"consolidate" their probate court with the local court of com­
mon pleas, such "consolidated court" to be presided over by 
the judge of the common pleas court.122 This does not operate 
to extinguish the probate court but merely to provide for a 
unified personnel .123 Appeals from probate courts in Ohio 
go directly to a court of appeals, provided that a record has 
been made of the probate proceedings ; but if a record has not 
been taken of the proceedings an appeal lies to the court of 
common pleas of that county, where there is a trial de novo.124 
It is a matter of common knowledge among lawyers in Ohio . 
that parties avail themselves of this second trial in the common 
pleas courts in most cases. Where there has been a "con­
solidation" of the probate courts with common pleas courts, 
this may mean a trial de novo before the same judge-a use­
less and futile gesture, it would seem. But because of this 
variation in the method of appeal, the probate courts of Ohio 
occupy two positions in the hierarchy of courts. 
A similar "consolidation" of courts exists also in New Y ark 
and Pennsylvania. Separate surrogates' courts in New York 
and separate orphans' courts in Pennsylvania exist in every 
120 Wis. Stat. ( I 9;3 )  § ZSJ.oz. 
121 Wis. Stat. ( I 943 ) § 3 24.0 I .  
122 0hio Const., art. 4 ,  § 7 ;  Ohio Gen: Code (Page, I 9 3 7 )  §§  I OSO I-4, 
IOSO I-47• 
123. State ex rei. Sattler v. Cahill, i 22 Ohio St. 3 54, I 7 I N .E. 59 5 (I 93  o) • 
,.. Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. I 943)  § I OSO I-s6. 
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county.125 But in counties of less than 40,000 population in 
New York the county judge also presides over the surrogate 
court of that county, whereas in counties having a larger popu­
lation the legislature may provide for a separate surrogate.126 
Similarly in counties of not more than 1 so,ooo population 
in Pennsylvania the common pleas judge presides over the 
orphans' court, but in larger counties the legislature must, and 
in any other county may, establish separate orphans' courts.127 
In both of these states the courts performing probate functions 
are distinct. The "consolidation," as in Ohio, is one of judicial 
personnel, prompted in each case by economical considerations 
in the less populous communiti�s. 
B. NORMS TO BE APPLIED IN ANALYZING AM ERICAN PROBATE 
JURISDICTION 
Up to this point we have considered the multiple character 
of probate court organization in some states and the variations 
of organization in the same state. It is now our purpose to 
classify all probate court organizations on the basis of their 
most important characteristics. Before doing this, however, 
it is desirable to discuss the norms to be applied in making 
this classification. 
·Probate courts have been variously classified as courts of 
"limited," "inferior," "special and limited," "limited though 
not special," or "limited though not inferior" jurisdiction ; and 
also as courts of "general," "superior" or "coordinate" juris­
diction.128 These descriptives are not only inconsistent but 
are likely to represent but partial views. It is true that their 
predecessors, the ecclesiastical courts, were not courts of gen-
.,,. N.Y. Const., art. 6, § 1 3 ;  Pa. Const., art. s, § 2.2 .  
126 N.Y. Const., art. 6, § 1 3 ·  
127 Pa. Const., art. s ,  § 2.2 .  As t o  the counties i n  which the legislature has 
established separate orphans' .courts to be presided over by separate orphans' 
judges, see Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 9 3o) t. 20, §§ 2083, 264I 1  266I,  268I ,  
2 70 I  and Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. I 943) t .  20,  §§ 2 7o6, 2'723a, 2 7 3 1 .  
126 See references cited i n  I WOERNER, ADMINISTRATION ( 3 d  ed, I 923)  484 ; 
I CLEAVELAND, HEWITT and CLARK, PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE OF CoN­
NECTICUT ( I929) I J :Z. 
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eral jurisdiction.129 Nor were they courts o f  record. Never­
theless, they were "courts," and their judgments were subject 
to recognition and obedience through the process of excom­
munication.130 The establishment of probate courts in America 
was made without any such limitations on their powers.131 
Nevertheless, a number of reasons have contributed to their 
characterization as "inferior" in certain respects. 
As will be seen from the discussion which follows, it is not 
easy to classify probate courts under our systems of court or­
ganization. By creating them and giving them power to pro­
bate wills and supervise the administration of estates, we have 
set off to them a specialized function. Because of this special­
ized task assigned to them, we have been inclined to call them 
courts of "special or limited jurisdiction," and, therefore, of 
"inferior jurisdiction." 132 Upon a little consideration, it 
will be seen that this conclusion is not warranted. In giving 
this jurisdiction to the probate courts, we have in the same 
process not given it to the general trial courts which we call 
"courts of general jurisdiction." In matters probate, there­
fore, probate courts truly have "general jurisdiction." 
To courts of general jurisdiction, we have indulged a pre­
sumption in favor of the regularity of their proceedings and 
the validity of their judgments. No such presumption is made 
in the case of courts of inferior jurisdiction.133 In actions at 
law, general trial courts have general jurisdiction. In probate 
matters it can equally be said that trial courts do not have, but 
that probate courts do have, general jurisdiction. In these 
respective fields, it should be clear that each court is a court 
of original jurisdiction, not superior or inferior in the first 
129 I WOERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. I 92 3 )  § I 40. 
180 3 BLACKST. COMM. 1 0 1 .  "" I WoERNER, ADMINISTRATION ( 3d  ed. 1 9 2 3 )  48 r .  
182 For an early example of this type of reasoning, see Strouse v. Drennan, 
4I Mo. 289  at 297 ( I 86 7 ) .  
122 For a concise summary o f  this doctrine and its origin, see I WoERNER, 
ADMINI�TRATION (3d ed. I923)  § 1 43 •  
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instance, as to any other court. Despite this seemingly simple 
statement, there has not been general agreement that a pro­
bate court is one of general jurisdiction within its field of 
operation. Indeed, the constitution of Missouri at one time 
provided that "inferior tribunals shall be established in each 
county for the transaction" of probate matters.134 By the same 
constitution, they were also made courts of record. Despite 
the inferiority intended for tl).em, it was held that "their juris­
diction pertaining to wills and administrators is general 
and the same may be said of the circuit court ; but 
their action, on subjects exclusively and originally confided to 
them, is entitled to the same weight as that of any other court 
of record." 135 Thus, despite the commands of the constitu­
tion, probate courts in Missouri were held courts of general 
jurisdiction within a defined sphere and their jurisdiction "as 
general as that of the circuit court." Accordingly, their pro­
ceedings and judgments operating upon subjects within a 
defined sphere were entitled to the same presumptions of 
regularity and validity as those of courts of general jurisdic­
tion. 
The inferior position accorded to probate courts historically 
has left its indelible mark upon the effect accorded to their 
proceedings. The rule was early developed that "inferior 
jurisdictions and special authorities, must show their juris­
diction, and must pursue their authority strictly." 136 The 
result has been that every stage of a probate proceeding must 
laboriously recite each fact upon which its jurisdiction is predi­
cated. Otherwise a sale or ju�gment is void and is subject ta 
collateral attack-a vulnerability well known to every title 
""' Mo. Const. of 1 82o, art. 5, § 1 2 .  
135 Johnson v .  Beazley, 6 5 Mo. 2 5 0  at 2 5 6  ( r 8 7 7 ) .  See also Schultz v: Schult�, 
1 0  Gratt. (5 1 Va.) 3 5 8, 3 7 7-379  ( 1 85 3 ) . 
136 Morrow v. Weed, 4 Iowa 79 at 1 24 ( 1 856) . This case contains an ex­
cellertt statement of the foundations of this doctrine, its unfortunate consequences, 
and a resume of the autho;ities at that date. 
· 
ORGANIZATION OF PROBATE COURT 415  
examiner. The resulting blemish upon land titles and con­
sequent relitigation of all the matters supposedly concluded 
in the probate tourt are facts too well known to require com­
ment. After this rule' became well intrenched, remedial 
measures were commenced. First, probate courts were made 
courts of record. Then presumptions were made as to the 
regularity of their proceedings and validity of their judg­
ments. The importance of these two steps cannot be over­
stated. 
By statute in a number of states at the present time proceed­
ings of probate courts are now accorded the same presumptions 
of regularity and validity as those of courts of general juris­
diction.137 Elsewhere such a presumption has been made even 
in the absence of statute.138 In Connecticut, Florida, Maine, 
Maryland, Vermont and Wisconsin, however, no such pre-
,., Ala, Code. ( 1 940) t. q, § 2 7 8 ;  Idaho Code ( 1 932 )  § r-1 203 ; Mass. 
Ann. Laws ( r 9 3 2 )  c. 2 1 5, § z ; N.M. Stat. ( r 94 r )  § r 6-4 r r ;  N.D. Comp. 
Laws ( 1 9 1 3 )  § 85 3 3 ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 930) t. zo, § zo8 5 ;  R.I. Gen. 
Laws ( r  93 8) c. 5 7 3 ,  § 8 ;  S.D. Code ( 1 9 3 9) § 3 5 .or o5 ; Utah Code ( r  943) 
§ roz-14-1 5 .  
138 Arizona. Varnes v .  White, 40 Ariz. 427 at  43 1 ,  12  P.  (zd) 8 70  ( 1 9 3 2 ) ; 
Arkansas. Massey v. Doke, 1 2 3  Ark. 2 I I , 1 85 S.W. 2 7 1  ( 1 9 1 6) ; Graham v. 
Graham, 1 75 Ark. 530, 1 S.W. (zd) 1 6  (1 927 ) ; 
California. Luco v. Commercial Bank, 70 Cal. 3 39, 1 1  P. 650 ( 1 8 86) ; 
Burris v. Kennedy, ro8  Cal. 3 3 1  at 3 3 8, 41 P. 45 8 (! 895) ; 
Georgia. Stanley v. Metts, 1 69 Ga. r o r ,  1 49 S.E. 7 8 6  ( 1 929) ; Wood v. 
Crawford, r 8 Ga. 52  6 ( r 8 55)  ; 
Illinois. Illinois Merchants' Trust Co. v. Turner, 341 Ill. 1 0 1 ,  1 7 3 N.E. 52 
(1 930) ; Housh v. People, 66 Ill. 1 7 8  (1 8 7 2 ) ; People v. Cole, 84  Ill. 3 2 7  
(r 876) ; People v .  Gray, 72  Ill. 3 4 3  ( 1 874) ; Matthews v .  Hoff, 1 1 3  Ill. 9 0  
(r 88s) ; 
Indiana. Sims v. Gay, 1 09 Ind. 501 ,  9 N. E. r zo ( r 8 86) ; 
Iowa. McFarland v. Stewart, 1 09 Iowa 56 r ,  8o N. W. 657  ( r 899) ; 
Kansas. Denton v. Miller, r r o  Kan. 292, 203  P. 693 ( 1 922) ; _ 
Kentucky. Goss' Exr. v. Ky. Refining Co., 1 3 7  Ky. 3 9 8, 1 25 S. W. r o6 r  
( 1 9 1 0) ; 
Michigan. Church v. Holcomb, 45 Mich. 2 9, 7 N. W. r 6 7  ( r 8 8o) ; Chapin 
v. Chapin, 229  Mich. 5 1 5, zor N.  W. 530  ( 1 9 24) ; 
Minnesota. Davis v. Hudson, 2 9  Minn. 27,  I I  N. W. 1 3 6  ( r 8 8 r ) ; 
Mississippi. Gillespie v. Hauenstein, 7 2  Miss. 8 3 8, 1 7  So. 6o2 ( 1 895 ) ; 
Missouri. Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250 ( 1 8 7 7 ) ; Desloge v. Tucker, 196 
Mo. 5 8 7  at 6or ,  94 S. W. 2 8 3  ( r 9o6) ; 
Nebraska. Foote v. Chittenden, 1 06 Neb. 704 at 707, 1 84 N. W. r 67  ( 1 9 2 1 ) ; 
New Hampshire. Kimball v. Fisk, 3 9  N. H. 1 1 0  ( r 859) ; 
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sumption is indulged.139 This presumption, according to the 
j udicial acts of probate courts the same force and effect as to · 
those of courts of general jurisdiction, represents a noteworthy 
and important step in their development. 
A second important test of a court's position in any judicial 
organization is whether it has been made a "court of record." 
Most, but not all, probate courts in this country have been 
created or subsequently made courts of record.140 This being 
New Jersey. Plume v. Howard Savings Inst., 46 N. J. L. 2 1 1  ( r 884) (as to 
orphans' court) ; 
New York. Van Deusen v. Sweet, 5 1  N. Y. 3 7 8  ( r 8 7 3 ) ; Bearns v. Gould, 7 7  
N. Y. 4 5 5  ( r 879) ; Harrison v .  Clark, 8 7  N. Y. 572  ( r 882) ; O'Conner v. 
Huggins, 1 1 3  N. Y. 5 1 1  ( r 889) ; 
Ohio. Shroyer v. Richmond, r 6  Ohio St. 455 ( r 866) ; 
Oklahoma. Hunter v. Wittier, 1 20 Okla. 103,  250 P. 793  ( r 926) ; Drum v. 
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 1 8 9  Okla. 307, l l 6  P. (2d) 7 1 5  ( 1 94 1 ) ; 
Oregon. Russel v. Lewis, 3 Ore. 3 80 ( 1 872) ; Slate's Estate, 40 Ore. 349, 68 
P. 3 99  ( r 9o2) ; 
South Carolina. Clark v. Neves, 76 S. C. 484, 5 7  S. E. 6 14  ( r 9o6) ; 
Tennessee. Townsend v, Townsend, 44 Tenn. 70 ( r 867) ; 
Texas. Reeves v. Fuqua (Tex. Civ. App. 1 9 1 6) 1 84 S. W. 6 8 2 ;  Jones v. Sun 
Oil Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1 940) 145 S. W. (2d) 6 r 5  rev'd on other grounds, 1 3 7  
Tex. 3 5 3, 1 5 3  S .  W. (2d) 5 7 1  ( 1 941 ) ; Tucker v .  Imperial Oil and Develop­
ment Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1 9 2 1 )  2 3 3  S. W. 3 3 9 ;  
Virginia. Saunders v .  Link, 1 1 4  Va. 285, 7 6  S .  E .  3 2 7  ( 1 9 1 2) ; 
Washington. In re Upton's Estate, 1 9 9  Wash. 447, 9 2  P. (2d) 2 10  ( 1 939) ; 
Christianson v. King County, 2 39  U. S. 3 56, 3 6  S. Ct. 1 1 4  ( 1 9 1 5) ; 
West Virginia. State ex rel. Conley v. Thompson, r oo W. Va. 2 5 3, qo S. E. 
456 ( 1 925) ; 
Wyoming. Lethbridge v. Lauder, 1 3  Wyo. 9, 76 P. 682  ( 1 904) . 
139 Connecticut. Palmer v. Palmer, (D. C. Conn. 1 940) 3 1  F. Supp. 861 ; 
Florida. State ex rel. Everette v. Petteway, 1 3 1  Fla. 5 1 6, 1 7 9  So. 666 ( 1 9 3 8 ) ,  
1 3 5  Fla. 757, r 85 So. 6 1 9  ( 1 9 39) ; 
Maine. Appeal of Waitt, 1 40 Me. 1 09, 34 A. (2d) 476 ( 1 943 ) ; 
Maryland. Talbot Packing Corp. v. Wheatley, 1 72 Md. 3 65, 1 90 A. 8 3 3  
( 1 9 3 7 ) ; 
Vermont. Probate Court v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America, 1 o6 Vt. 207, 
1 7 1  A. 3 3 6  ( r 9 34) ; Abbott v. Abbott, 1 1 2 Vt. 449, 28 A. (2d) 3 7 5  ( r 943) ; 
Wisconsin. Estate of Anson, 1 7 7  Wis. 441, r 8 8 N. W. 479 ( 1 922) ; Estate 
of Ott, 228  Wis. 462, 279  N. W. 6 1 8 ( 1 938) . This last Wisco!lsin case is based 
on Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 3 1 0.045 which requires the petition for letters to allege 
and the order to find the facts necessary to the j urisdiction of the court. But see 
Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 3 1 6.33 whi�h prevents the invalidation of a sale by a repre­
sentative except for causes that would invalidate it had it been made pursuant to 
an order of a court of general jurisdiction. 
140 Ala. Const., art. 6, § 1 48 ; Ariz. Const., art. 6, § r o ;  Cal. Const., art. 6, § 1 2 ;  
Colo. Const., art. 6, § 2 3 ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § §  3 6.02, 36 . 14, 7 32.07 ; Idaho 
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true, and, since all courts of general jurisdiction are likewise 
courts of record, this test alone cannot be very significant. 
The fact that a probate court is not a court of record is a 
distinct indication that it is regarded as inferior. 
Even though a probate court be termed a court of general 
or coordinate jurisdiction, in many cases appeals from it are 
taken to the courts of general jurisdiction and heard de novo. 
Behind this plan of procedure on appeal lies a mistrust in 
probate courts, at least in contentious matters.141 In  relation 
to the appellate court in this instance, the probate court is 
an inferior court.142 And, even though the appeal is not heard 
de novo, the inferiority, though not so pronounced, still exists. 
Another test to determine the status of a probate court is 
the extent to which jurisdiction has been conferred upon it  
in probate matters. As has been seen, the jurisdiction of the 
ecclesiastical courts was to probate wills, grant letters and 
entertain suits for legacies ; but the jurisdiction of probate 
courts in America has not been so narrow. Probate courts 
· usually have power to h�ar and determine issues on disputed 
claims, accountings, legacies, the sale of land to pay debts, 
Canst., art. 5, § 2 I ; Ill. Canst., art. 6, § I 8 ;  Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  
c. 3 7, §§ I 7 I ,  299 ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 93 3 )  §§  4-3 24, 4.:_2902, 4-3002 ; Iowa 
Code ( I 93 9 )  § Io76 I ; Kan: Canst., art. 3, § 8 ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) 
§ 59-3 o i  ; La. Canst., art. 7 ,  § 3 5 ;  Me. Rev. Stat. ( I  930) c. 7 5, § I ; Md.  Canst., 
art. 4, § I ; Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 93 2 )  c. 2 I 5, § I ; Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943 ) 
§ 27 .3 1 7 8 (26) ; Minn. Canst., art. 6, § 7 ;  Mo. Canst., art. 6, § 34 ;  Mo. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) § 1990 ;  Mont. Canst., art. 8, § 2 5 ;  Neb. Canst., art. 5, § I 6 ;  
Nev. Canst., art. 6, § 8 ;  Nev. Camp. Laws ( 1 929)  § 8403 ; N. H. Rev. Laws 
(I 942) c. 346, § I j  N. J. Rev. Stat. ( I 9 37 )  § 2 : 7-I ; N. M. Canst., art. 6, § 2 3 ;  
N. Y. Judiciary Law, art. 2 ,  § 2 ;  N. D. Camp. Laws ( I 9 I 3 )  § 8 5 I 4 ;  Ohio Canst., 
art. 4, § 7 ;  Okla. Canst., art. 7, § I I ;  Ore. Canst., art. 7, § I ;  Pa. Stat. Ann. 
(Purdon, I 93o) t. 2o, §§ 2o8I ,  2082, 2083, 2085 ; S. C. Code ( I 942) § 206 ; 
S. D. Canst. art. 5, § 20 ;  Tex. Canst., art. 5, § I 5 ;  Utah Canst., art. 8, § I 7 ;  
Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 9 3  3 )  § 2 7 I 9 ;  Wash. Canst., art. 4, § I I ; W. Va. Canst., art. 8, 
§ 24; Wis. Stat. ( I 943 ) § 253 .08 .  
"1 See POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES ( I  94 I) 3 I I .  
1" "All courts from which an appeal lies are inferior courts, i n  relation to the 
appellate court before which their judgment may be carried ; but they are not, 
therefore, inferior courts, in the technical sense of those words." Chief Justice 
Marshall in Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch (9 U. S.) 1 73 at r 85 (t 8o9) . 
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partition of land, and a multitude of matters relating to the 
management of the estate. However, in some states resort 
must be had to the court of general jurisdiction for the en­
forcement of claims, for authority to sell land for the payment 
of debts or legacies, or for partition of lands. To the extent 
that its jurisdiction is incomplete and resort must be had to 
other courts, the probate court remains, in a sense, inferior. 
Furthermore, the functions of probate courts have fre­
quently been combined with certain minor jurisdictions in 
civil and criminal matters such as is exercised by county 
courts.143 At the same time, the qualifications of judges pre­
siding over such combined courts have frequently coincided 
with those required of judges of such inferior courts. A 
degradation of the probate court has resulted rather than an 
elevation of the inferior court with which it was combined. 
Finally the caliber of judicial personnel has not been un­
related to the organization of courts and the respect which we 
have for them. A large portion of probate business in Eng­
land receives the attention of the chancellor, the vice­
chancellors and judges of the common-law courts, each of 
them eminently qualified for these tasks. In vesting all pro­
bate jurisdiction in one court in America, we have lost sight 
of the qualifications and ability possessed by English judges · 
who have presided over probate matters. The qualifications 
for the office of judge of county and pther similar courts of 
an inferi01:; status in this country have been notoriously low; 
and qualifications for the office of probate judge in a large 
number of states are not much higher. If a lay judge is al­
lowed to preside over an inferior court, appeals with a trial 
de novo are likely to be the answer to objections against lay 
personnel. . Inefficiency and loss of prestige are the prices paid 
for such a system. Administrative ability and a specialized 
legal knowledge on the part of modern probate judges are 
143 POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS ( 1 940) 1 3 7, r 8o-I 8 I .  
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indispensable qualifications necessary to  bring the American 
probate courts to a position fully equal to that of our courts 
of general jurisdiction.144 
C. GENERAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN PROBATE COURTS 
No single formula is adequate to describe the present-day 
organization of probate courts in America. Furthermore, a 
single characterization of the probate court system ef a given 
state would be an inaccurate description in a number of 
instances. But, despite an inability to generalize broadly, 
some useful classifications are possible ; and from these classifi­
cations, some conclusions may be drawn with respect to the 
status, the powers, and other incidents that an ideal probate 
court should possess . . 
It is the purpose of this study to consider the present-day 
probate court or courts of each state and appraise" them in 
terms of their relation to the court organization of that state. 
In making the classification that is to follow it is obviously 
impossible to appraise all probate courts on the basis of all the 
tests outlined above. Some one test alone must be used as a 
yard stick. Most probate courts are now courts of record; 145 
and in a substantial number of states there is the same pre­
sumption of jurisdiction in favor of probate proceedings as 
is made in favor of courts of general jurisdiction.146 If ap­
peals from the probate court �re taken to the court of general 
jurisdiction, the former certainly occupies an inferior position 
in relation to the latter ; but if appeals lie to the same tribunal 
as do appeals from the court of general jurisdiction, then the 
two courts occupy coordinate positions. It is believed that 
this one factor of the court to which an appeal lies from a 
probate court is the most significant criterion in determining 
1" See VII and VIII, infra. 
us See note I 40, supra. 
146 See notes I 3 7 and I 3 8, supra. 
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the position or status to be ascribed to the latter. Consequently 
this one test is employed to the exclusion of all others in the 
arralysis which follows. 
Without attempting to trace the history or development of 
probate courts in any state, it may be said generally (and per­
haps none too accurately) that probate courts exist in four 
different forms in the United States today. First, the most 
numerous group of states has separate courts, but with 
definitely inferior attributes in the local hierarchy of courts. 
This form of court exists in twenty-three jurisdictions and 
also has some kind of partial existence in ten other jurisdictions. 
Second, there is the system typified by California, where the 
court of general jurisdiction embodies both the trial court 
and the probate court ; in other words, there is combined in 
one judge and one court the two functions of presiding over 
the ordinary trial court of general jurisdiction and also of 
supervising the administration of probate matters. This 
unified system exists in nine states and prevails in part in 
seven others. Third, there is the somewhat less numerous· 
group of states in which there exist separate probate courts, 
without the inferior status of those mentioned in the first cate­
gory, but having a place in the local court system more or less 
coordinate with the court of general jurisdiction. Appeals 
from their judgments are taken to the same courts and in the 
same manner as are appeals from courts of general jurisdiction. 
This form of court prevails in five states, and also has a partial 
existence in six others. Fourth, there are a few states in which 
probate matters are or may be committed to the jurisdiction 
of chancery-a legacy of the former English practice. 
These variations within these four categories are sufficient 
to indicate the impossibility of generalizing and, also, to war­
rant the observation that our present product of probate courts 
is the result of additions and subtractions, impacts and influ­
ences, of each generation. Many· of these changes have been 
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wrought in the interest of improving the efficiency and oper­
ation of probate courts ; others have been made in the interests 
of economy or for the avowed purposes of bringing the pro­
bate court closer to the people and .thus making it more demo­
cratic ; or to make it available at all times. All of these may 
seem worthy objectives ·in themselves, and they should be so 
. considered as long as they are not made at the expense of 
efficiency and simplicity in the administration of estates. 
I .  Separate probate courts with inferior status 
In about two-thirds of the states the probate court is a 
separate court but relegated to an inferior position in the ju­
dicial organization of those states. As already indicated, the 
separate probate court was an early institution in America. 
The specialized nature of probate proceedings readily justified 
its separability. Furthermore, while it may have been agreed 
that the transmission of property from one generation to an­
other required some judicial supervision, yet the process of 
effecting its transmission was so close and personal to the 
parties concerned that some court with less of the technical 
procedure employed in trial courts-a court which was open 
at all times 147 and where the parties interested could go at 
any time and discuss their affairs in an informal atmosphere 148 
-seemed a necessary part of every community. The separate 
probate court in every county answered these requirements.149 
But with this separate court in every county also came in 
most instances a relaxation of the qualifications of the probate 
judge. This suggested the necessity of closer scrutiny and 
supervision over his judicial acts when dispute or contest arose. 
The supervision of uncontested matters by a probate judge 
m Statutes in nearly all states provide that the probate court shall be open at 
all times. 
"" POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS ( 1 940) 262.  
"" For a summary of this development see PouND, ORGANIZATION OF CouRTS 
( 1 940) I J 6-I J 7> 250. 
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without legal training or judicial experience, but with rights 
secured by an appeal, usually in the form of a trial de novo 
before a court presided over by a judge adequately trained, 
became the established practice.150 This procedure of a trial 
de novo on appeal from probate courts amounts to nothing less 
than a method of control over their proceedings without the 
supervision of a competent judge in the first instance. Thus 
created as inferior tribunals, there is little incentive to improve 
their judicial position. A trial de novo in the court of general 
jurisdiction on appeal is thought to be cheaper than to have 
the affairs of the probate court directed by competent person­
nel in the first instance. Twenty-six states 151 have created 
probate courts in this image. In seven others 152 appeals lie 
150 PoUND, ORGANIZATION �F CoURTS ( I  940) I 40, 2 50. 
151 Colo. Stat. ( I 935)  ·c. 46, § I 68, c. q6, § 243 ; Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 93o) 
§ 5624; Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) § 6-5or ; Idaho Code ( I 93 2 )  § I I-406 (unless 
errors of law appear on face of the record) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  
c .  3 ,  § 48 7 ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-2408 ;  Ky. Civ. Code ( r 938)  
§ 726 ;  Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 93o) c. 75 ,  §§ 32, 36 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 9<t3) 
§ 2 7 .3 1 7 8 (42) ; Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 I )  § 525 .7 2 ;  Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942) 
§ 29 1 ;  Neb. Comp. Stat. ( 1 929) § 3o-r 6o6 ; N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c. 365, 
§ I I ;  N. M. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § r 9-I oo r ; N. D. Comp. Laws ( r 9 I 3 )  §§ 86 I6, 
8620 (unless on question of law alone) ; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 9 3  7) §§ 1 2223-
2 1 ,  I 2223-27 (if no record made of proceedings in probate court) ; Okla. Const., 
art. 7, § r 6 ;  Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  t. 20, § 275 ; Ore. Comp. Laws ( I 940) § I o-
8 I o ;  Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 93o) t. 20, § 2005 (on appeal from register of 
wills to o_rp.hans' court) ; In re Geho's Estate, 3 3 Berks 43, aff'd. 340 Pa. 4 1 2, 1 7  
A. (2d) 342 ( 1 94 1 ) ; R. I .  Gen. Laws ( I 9 3 8 )  c. 573, § I ; McSoley v. Slepkow, 
54 R. I. 3 74, I 7 3  A. I 24 ( I 934) ; Davis v. lliggins, 59 R. I. 339 ,  I 9 5  A. 495 
(I 93  7) ; S. D. Code (I 939)  § 35 .2 r r  I ;  Tenn. Code (Michie, I 9 3 8 )  § 903 3 ;  
Tex. Rules Civ. Proc. (Supp. 1 944) Rule 3 34 ;  Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 9 3 3 )  § 30 I6  
(amended by Vt. Laws, r 941 ,  No. 42 ,  p .  5 3 )  ; Va. Code ( I  942)  § 5 249 ; Saunders 
v. Link, r r 4 Va. 285, 76 S. E. 3 2 7  ( I 9 I 2 ) (appeal from clerk of circuit court) ; 
Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 3 24.03 (on appeal to circuit court from courts in counties of 
less than I 5,ooo population) .  
In this study we have not attempted to study those statutes which provide for 
probate j urisdiction to be exercised by other courts in exceptional cases. See, for 
example, Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 I )  c. 3, § zo8, providing for admin­
istration to be carried on in the county or circuit court in estates in which the 
probate j udge is interested ; and Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 93 7 )  § 27 . 1 204 providing 
for the probate in the circuit court in chancery of foreign wills not required to 
be probated in order to be effective in the foreign jurisdiction. Such j urisdiction 
is the exceptional, not the normal, one. 
152 Ala. Code ( I 94o) t. 7, §§ 7 8 3 ,  784 ; Del. Const., art. 4, §§ 33 ,  34 ;  Del. 
Rev. Code ( I 935)  §§ 44I 8, 44I 9  (on record if taken, otherwise de novo) ; Fla. 
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to the court of general jurisdiction upon the record made in 
the probate court. This may imply a little more confidence 
in the probate court. At least it eliminates the necessity of a 
complete rehearing, but does not eliminate the court of gen­
eral jurisdiction as an intermediate court of appeal. 
2. Probate courts unified with courts of general jurisdiction 
Under the California Constitution of I 849 153 the exercise 
of probate jurisdiction was conferred upon county courts. 
There were separate county courts in each county, but the 
state was divided into districts with only one district judge for 
each district of several counties. It was found that many 
county judges did not have sufficient work to keep them busy 
at all times ; and also that, when a district judge was needed 
in civil or criminal matters, 'he was frequently far away in 
another county and not readily accessible. It was observed 
that, frequently, large estates came under the jurisdiction of 
the county courts and required able and capable supervision. 
Simple calculations w�re sufficient to show that no substan�ial 
expense would be incurred if a separate judge were provided 
for each county and the jurisdiction of the county courts con­
solidated with that of the district courts. Accordingly, it 
was proposed in the Constitutional Convention of I 8 7 8-79 . 
to consolidate these two courts and have a separate "superior 
court" and "superior judge" for each county. Judicial ability, 
accessibility, respon�iveness to the local community, elimi­
nation of competition between the' different counties in the 
same district as to the selection of the judge-all at no in­
creased expense-were believed to be thus available, although 
Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  §§ 6 r .oi-6r .o7, 7 32 . I 8 ;  N. J. Prerog. Ct. Rules ( I 94 I  re­
vision) Rule 9 3  (but court in its discretion may permit testimony not previously 
available) ; N. C. Gen. Stat. (I 943 ) §§ I-274, I-275 ; S. C. Code ( I  942) § 23 I ;  
Ex parte White, 3 3  S. C. 442, I 2  S. E. 5 ( I 8 9o) ; Sartor v. Fidelity & Deposit 
Co., I 6o S. C. 390, I 5 8  S. E. 8 I 9  ( I 9 3 I ) ; W. Va. Code ( I 93 7 )  §§ 5 763, 5764, 
5765. 
103 Cal. Const. of I 849, art. 6, §§  5, 6. 
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there was some dissent voiced to these alleged advantages. 
Nevertheless, after some debate/54 this plan was embodied in 
the California Constitution of I 8 79 155 and has been in op­
eration since that date. Thus the county courts were abolished 
and their jurisdiction transferred to the newly created superior 
courts-courts of general jurisdiction. 
'fhe same system had been inaugurated in Nevada some 
fifteen years earlier in the Constitution of I 864 156 and with 
hardly a dissenting voice. The arguments in favor of the 
plan were succinctly stated in the debates of the Nevada Con­
stitutional Convention and are worth restating here : 
"In the first place, under such a system, we have all the 
judicial business done in the county which could be done by 
the District Judge and by the County Judge of that county ; 
that is to say, we have ample force on the bench, in each county, 
to discharge all the duties that could be discharged in that 
county by the District and County Judges, and we have those 
duties performed, too, more expeditiously, and more eco­
nomically; and we, at the same time, obviate the necessity of 
<J.n appeal from the County Judge, or, if you please, from 
the Justices of the Peace to the County Judge, and from the 
County Judge to the District Judge, and then again from the 
District Judge to the Supreme Court. We rid ourselves of all 
this delay and difficulty by adopting this resolution, and thus 
we avoid, as it were, two intermediate stumbling-blocks in 
the way of justice, wiping them out of our judicial system 
altogether. In each of those inferior courts, expenses are 
necessarily incurred, and time wasted by litigants, b,efore they 
can reach the court of final resort. 
"Not only that, Mr. Chairman, but if you adopt the system 
proposed, you dignify the character of your judiciary in the 
several counties, and secure the respect of litigants for the 
courts, to a degree which, I humbly submit, they do not always 
challenge at the
, 
present time. · Further than that, you also 
,.. z Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of California, 
r 8 78-r 879  ( r 8 8 r )  pp. 972-976. 
105 Cal. Const., art. 6, § 5. 
168 Nev. Const. of 1 8 64, art. 6, § 6. 
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secure the services on the bench, of men of ability-men in 
whom the community can confide. You get men whose quali­
fications are known, coming from the neighborhoods in which 
they are elected, and known to all the citizens within their 
counties, and you avoid the great struggle which, aside from 
political considerations, would always be sure to arise, to a 
certain extent, under the old system of judicial districts com­
prising several counties in each, between the different counties 
of those respective districts, where men would naturally be 
combatting and struggling over the question of which county 
should present the candidate for District Judge." 157 
Whether Californi� was influenced by the reform in 
Nevada is not clear. At least no reference to the system al­
ready in operation in Nevada is to be found. F�om the dis­
cussions on this proposed system, it is probable that California 
was influenced solely by considerations peculiar to itsel£.158 
This plan of conferring probate jurisdiction upon the courts 
of general jurisdiction was widely copied from California, 
especially in the western states. In  addition to California .and 
Nevada, it has been adopted rn Montana/59 Utah/60 Wash­
ington/01 Wyoming/62 and Arizona.163 But this plan is not 
confined to the west. It also exists in Iowa/64 Indiana/65 and 
Louisiana. 166 Moreover, this system may be said to prevail in 
Alabama 167 and New Mexico 168 insofar as an administration 
107 Nevada Constitutional Debates and Proceedings, I 864 ( I 866) p. 2 3 3 · 
158 2 Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of California, 
I 878-I 879  ( I 8 8 I )  pp. 972-976. 
ll!o Mont. Const., art. 8, § I I .  
100 Utah Const., art. 24, § 9 ·  
101 Wash. Const., art. 27, § I o. 
162 Wyo. Const., art. 5, § I o. 
1l!2 Ariz. Const., art. 6, § 6. In Arizona and California there is a separate court 
and judge for each county. Other stat� in which probate matters are handled by 
courts of general j urisdiction, are divided into districts with one judge presiding 
over courts in several counties except in the most populous places. 
1"' 1owa Code ( I 9 39 )  §§ I 0763, 1 1 8 I 9. · 
1 .. Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 9 3 3 )  § 4-303.  
100 La. Const., art. 7, § 3 5. 
ll!7 �la. Code ( I 94o) t. 1 3, §§ I 3 8-I44. 108 N. M. Stat. ( I 941 ) §§ 1 6-3 1 2, 1 6-41 9, 1 6-420, 
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proceeding may be removed to the circuit or district courts of 
thdse states. Insofar as a probate proceeding is under the 
supervision of the circuit courts (or the hustings courts or law 
and chancery courts in certain cities) in Virginia 169 or of the 
superior courts in North Carolina,170 the same may be said 
of these courts. In a certain sense this is also true in those 
counties of Oregon having a population of over 30,000 in 
which the probate court has been made a division of the cir­
cuit court.171 In the three counties of Ohio in which the pro­
bate court has been "consolidated" with the common pleas 
courts, 172 there may be an appearance of a unified court, but 
this is not so. The probate courts there have neither been 
extinguished nor merged with the common pleas courts. 
Rather there has been a union of the personnel of the judge 
presiding over those two courts. 173 Indeed a decision of the 
probate court'may be reviewed de novo on appeal before the 
same judge sitting as a common pleas judge.174 
The old county courts in California in exercising their pro­
bate jurisdiction had been regarded as courts of limited and 
special jurisdiction.175 What was the nature of this fusion 
with the court of general jurisdiction ? It has been described 
thus : "It may be said that the probate court is gone, but that 
the probate jurisdiction remains. And that jurisdiction is 
now vested in the same court that exercises jurisdiction in cases 
of law and equity." 176 In exercising that jurisdiction, how­
ever, the court of general jurisdiction does not have general 
powers, but only those powers formerly exercised by courts 
of probate. Except for the power to exercise equitable juris-
160 Va. Code ( r 94�) §§ 5247, 5360, 59 ro, 59 14, 5920, 5935, 5947· 
170 N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) §§ 28-3o, 3 3-3 1 .  
171 Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) §§ 1 3-2o6, 1 3-207, 1 3-209, 93-3 1 0. 
172 0hio Gen. Code (Page, 1 93 7 )  §§ I050 I-47, r oso r-so. 
173 State ex rei. Sattler v. Cahill, 1 2 2  Ohio St. 354, 1 7 1  N. E. 595 (r 93o) . 
m Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1 943) § rosor-s6. 
175 Pryor v. Downey, so Cal. 3 8 8  at 400 (I  87  s ) .  
·. 
176 In re Estate of Davis, I J 6  Cal. 590 at 597, 69 P. 4 1 2  ( r 9o2) ,  
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diction as an incident of its probate functions, the superior . 
court in probate is entirely distinct from the same court in a 
civil or criminal proceeding. It remains essentially a probate 
court and must confine its movements to probate matters. A 
remedy sought in the wrong side of the court may be as fatal 
as though sought in the wrong court.177 This same concep­
tion of divisible jurisdiction prevails also in Montana 178 and 
Wyoming.179 
The Constitution of Washington, not unlike that of Cali­
fornia, provides that "the superior court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all cases in equity and in all cases at law . 
and all criminal cases of all matters of probate." 180 
But it is said that "the Constitution does not make the superior 
courts probate courts. On the contrary it vests the superior 
courts with jurisdiction of 'all matters of probate' ; hence the 
court is not shorn of its general powers simply because the 
cause before it may be one which was cognizable formerly in 
177 In  re  Estate of  Davis, 1 3 6  Cal. 590, 69 P.  4 1 2  ( 1 902) ; In  the Matter of 
Estate of McLellan, 8 Cal. (2d) 49, 63 P. (2d) 1 1 20 (1 936) ; Fisher v. Superior 
Court, 2 3  Cal. App. (2d) 528, 73 P. (2d) 8 92  ( 1 9 3 7 ) .  In the last case cited, 
a proceeding to contest a will after probate was declared ineffectual because filed 
in the general, rather than the probate, jurisdiction of the superior court, as re­
quired by the California probate code. This means that only probate matters 
must be tried on the probate side and non-probate matters on the non-probate side 
of the court. Three cases may seem to violate this principle : In re Thompson's 
Estate, 1 0 1  Cal. 349, 35  P. 99 1  ( 1 894) ; In re Clary's Estate, 1 1 2  Cal. 292 , 44 P. 
569 ( 1 896) ; and In re Riccomi's Estate, 1 8 5 Cal. 458, 1 9 7  P. 97 ( 1 9 2 1 ) .  In 
each of these cases, however, relief essentially equitable in nature was sought on 
the probate side of the court, whereas· it should have been sought on the equity 
side of the court. The estate of a deceased person was involved in each case, 
which probably accounts for the mistaken choice of forum. Nevertheless in each 
instance the parties submitted and the matter was tried as an equitable matter' 
and the adj udication upheld. The pleadings also supported the equity j urisdic­
tion which j ustified the court in ignoring1:he fact that the remedy was formally 
sought under the probate j urisdiction. If the parties had objected before trial, 
however, a different result might have been obtained .  See Hampshire v. 
Woolley, 72 Utah 1 06, 269 P. 1 3 5  ( 1 928 )  as an example of this procedure. 
178 In re Sprigg's Estate, 68 Mont. 92, 2 1 6  P. I Io8 ( 1 9 23 ) ; State ex rel. Hahn 
v. District Court, 83 Mont. 400, 2 7 2  P. 525  ( 1 92 8 ) .  
17° Church v .  Quiner, 3 1  Wyo. 2 22, 2 2 4  P .  1 073 ( 1 924) . 
180 Wash. Const., art. 4, § 6. 
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a court of probate." 181 It has been repeatedly held that the 
superior court sitting in probate matters loses none of its 
powers as a court of general jurisdiction.182 It is said that "the 
constitution simply throws probate matters into the aggregate 
jurisdiction of superior courts as courts of general jurisdiction, 
to be exercised along with their other j urisdictional powers, 
legal and equitable, and as a part of those general powers." 183 
This unitary notion of the s�perior court has likewise been fol­
lowed in Oregon/84 Utah/85 and Arizona.186 
181 Reformed Presbyterian Church v. McMillan, 3 1  Wash. 643 at 646-647, 
72 P. 502 ( 1 903) .  
182 State ex rei. Keasal v. Superior Court, 76 Wash. 2 9 1 ,  1 3 6  P. 147 ( 1 9 1 3 ) ; 
In re Martin's Estate, 82 Wash. 226, 1 44 P. 42 ( 1 9 14) ; State ex rei. Neal v. 
Kauffman, 86  Wash. 1 72, 149 P. 656 ( 1 9 1 5 ) ; In re Wren's Estate, 1 63 Wash. 
65, 299 P. 9 72  ( 1 93 1 ) ; In re Kelley, 1 9 3  Wash. 1 09, 74 P. (2d) 9 04 ( 1 9 3 8 ) .  
183 State ex rei. Keasal v .  Superior Court, 76 Wash. 2 9 1  at 298, : 3 6  P .  147 
( 1 9 1 3 ) .  
184 1n re Will of Pittock, 1 02 Ore. 1 5 9, 1 99 P .  633 , 202 P. 2 1 6  ( 1 9 2 1 ) .; In re 
Faling's Estate, 1 1 3  Ore. 6, 228 P. 8 2 1 ,  23 1 P. 148 (1 924) . This is confined 
to those counties in Oregon now having a population in excess of 3o,ooo and in 
which probate jurisdiction is vested in the circuit courts, department of probate. 
In the first case cited the court construed a will and decided a will contest in the 
same proceeding. In the second case it allowed attorneys' fees in connection with 
a will contest, which could not have been done had the court had jurisdiction 
solely over probate matters. The court said that its mode of proceeding was in 
the nature of a suit in equity. Completeness of administration in one proceeding 
was the objective. 
185 In Utah it is said : "We therefore have no courts which are known as 
probate courts, or as law courts, or as equity courts ; but we have courts possessed 
of general original j urisdiction, which are known as district courts. The district 
courts of this state, therefore, administer the estates of decedents as a part of their 
original jurisdiction, the same as they hear and enter judgments on promissory 
notes, or enter decrees in equity, foreclosing mortgages or quieting titles.'' 
Weyant v. Utah Savings & Trust Co., 54 Utah 1 8 1  at 204, 1 82 P. 1 89 ( 1 9 1 9) . 
Other cases implying or holding that the court's j urisdiction is independent of 
the nature of the subject matter are : In re Tripp's Estate, 5 1  Utah 359  at 363, 
1 70 P. 975  ( 1 9 1 8) ; In re Reiser's Estate, 5 7  Utah 434 at 440, 1 95 P. 3 1 7  
( 1 9 2 1 ) ; I n  re Agee's Estate, 6 9  Utah 1 30, 252 P. 8 9 1  ( 1 927) ; In re Thomp­
son's Estate, 72 Utah 1 7  at 3 2-3 5, 2!59 P. 1 0 3  ( 1 9 2 7 ) . But see Hampshire v. 
Woolley, 72 Utah 1 06, 269 P. 1 3 5  ( 1 928)  where a writ of prohibition was 
granted to. restrain exercise of non-probate jurisdiction by district court sitting 
in probate ; In re Rogers' Estate, 7 5  Utah 29o, 284  P. 992  ( 1 9 30) where the 
pleadings were held insufficient to invoke the non-probate jurisdiction of the 
court sitting in probate. 
In In re McLaren's Estate, 99 Utah 340 at 346-47, 1 06 P. (2d) 766 ( I 940) 
the question of the power of a district court sitting in probate to pass upon a 
non-probate matter was held waived by the parties. The court said that the 
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This conception of jurisdiction has several noteworthy con­
sequences. For many purposes the line of demarcation be­
tween the equity and probate jurisdiction of the court need not 
be observed. In either case it is in the same court and before 
the same j udge. Thus the court of general jurisdiction may 
do many things in connection with a probate proceeding that 
would otherwise have required a separate action or proceed- · 
ing addressed to its non-probate side. It can construe a will 187 
or make partition of property/88 even though not essential t.o 
the exercise of its probate jurisdiction. But, where the matter 
is one in which there is a right to trial by jury, it must not be 
impaired by calling it a probate matter-in which there is 
ordinarily no right to a jury triaP89 The fusion of probate 
with law and equity cannot so easily abolish their essential 
differences. Furthermore courts must be ever alert not to 
proceed by citation or publication against a person in an al­
leged probate proceeding-a proceeding in rem-and end 
up by a judgment or decree in personam, for such may violate 
the requirement of due process.190 
proper procedure "when a contested question· arises in a probate proceeding in­
volving the determination of disputed facts, is to strike the matters from the 
probate calendar and transfer it to the calendar of civil cases to be heard and 
determined as a contested civil matter. . . • The matter of transferring a 
cause from the probate calendar to a civil calendar in the same court is not a 
matter of j urisdiction but one of procedure." 
186 Estate of Hannerkam, 5 1  Ariz. 447, 77 P. (zd) 8 1 4  ( 1 9 3 8 )  in which the 
district court in an action in which administratrix was substituted as party plain­
tiff approved a settlement of the action, which it could only do under its probate 
power. 
187 Reformed Presbyterian Church v. McMillan, 3 r Wash. 643 at 646-647, 71. 
P. 502 ( 1 903) . 
188 In re Wren's Estate, r 63 Wash. 65,  299 P. 9 7 2  ( 1 9 3 1 ) .  
189 Id. 
190 The importance of keeping this distinction clear is well brought out in In 
re McLaren's Estate, 99 Utah 340 at 3 54-355,  r o6 P. (zd) 766 ( 1 940) in 
which the court said : "But again, warning should be sounded regarding the 
situation where a civil case is tried as a probate matter and probate matter tried 
as a civil case when they are respectively purely matters cognizable only as civil 
and as probate. It is one thing to determine a civil matter as a probate matter 
or a probate matter as a civil case and quite another thing to try a probate matter 
as a probate matter and a civil case as a civil case, although they may be addressed 
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3 · Separate probate courts but coordinate with those of 
general jurisdiction 
Several developments in Massachusetts have resulted in a 
profound change in the essential character of the probate court 
in that state. By a statute in I 8 62 191 the probate courts were 
made courts of record. In I 8 9 I another statute 192 made them 
"courts of superior and general jurisdiction with reference to 
all cases and matters in which they have jurisdiction." The 
method of accomplishing this was not left to a mere designa­
tion. The statute indicates how this is to be done, viz., by a 
presumption "in favor of the proceedings of the probate courts 
as would be made in favor of the proceedings of the other 
courts of superior and general jurisdiction." Both of these 
changes were in the right direction, but still the procedure on 
appeal was left untouched. Trials de novo on appeal re­
mained before one justice of the Supreme Judicial Court under 
whose direction there could even be a trial by jury. Final 
appeal from the decision of the single justice was heard before 
the full Supreme Judicial Court sitting as the Supreme Court 
of Probate.193 Finally in I 920 appeals were taken directly 
to the full bench of the Supreme Judicial Court.194 The .hear­
ing before the single justice was eliminated. And the appeal 
has been since treated as an appeal in a suit in equity under the 
to the wrong divisions of the court. The :first is a matter of substance ; the 
second a matter of labels and ministerial ' adjustment. . . • The probate 
division by virtue of its jurisdiction of the estate ,and the heirs for general 
purposes of administration could not in probate proceedings wherein the party 
was served by the mailing to him of a probate notice of the contest, have given 
judgment against him in a matter essentially civil i.n its nature." See also In 
re Martin's Estate, 8 2  Wash. 2 26, 144 P. 42 ( 1 9 14) ; and In re Kelley, 1 93 
Wash. 1 09, 74 P. (2d) 904 ( 1 9 3 8 ) .  
191 Mass. Acts and Resolves, 1 862, c. 68, p. 56, now Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1932) 
C. 2 1 5, § I . 192 Mass. Acts and Resolves, x 89 x ,  c. 415 ,  § 4, now Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1932) 
c. 2 1 5, § 2 ;  and see Commissioners' Report (Mass.) for Consolidating Public 
Statutes ( 1 9 0 1 )  notes on c. t 62, §§ 2, 8 .  
192 NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSA­
CHU�ETTS (3d ed. 1 9 3 7 )  § 250, 
1 "'  Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 93%)  c .  2 1 5, § 9 et seq. 
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general equity jurisdiction.195 Questions of fact as well as of 
law are considered with respect to the evidence given in the 
probate court.196 Thus the procedure on an appeal from the 
probate court was substantially the same as from the superior 
courts, i.e., on the record made in the court below and without 
a trial de novo.197 This last step was the most fruitful in 
elevating probate courts to a stature fully coordinate with that 
of the superior courts in Massachusetts. 
Several other states have felt that the character of probate 
proceedings was such as not only to justify separate probate 
courts, but also that their function was of suth moment that 
they be given the same standing as courts of general juris­
diction. Thus in Pennsylvania the orphans' courts are courts 
of record ; 198 and their proceedings are entitled to the same 
recognition and presumptions of validity as those of common 
pleas courts ; 199 and appeals are prosecuted to the superior 
or supreme court in the same manner as are appeals from the 
common pleas courts. 200 
In New York substantially the same comparison may be 
made. The surrogates' courts are courts of record, 201 and their 
proceedings and decrees are entitled to a presumption of 
regularity and validity. 202 Appeals lie to the Appellate Di­
vision of the Supreme Court, in the same manner as from the 
Supreme Court. 203 
A similar summary may be made in Maryland. The 
orphans' court is a court of record ; 204 appeals are taken di­
,.. Ibid. 
198 1d. c. 2 1 51 § u . 
197 NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSA­
CHUSETTS (3d ed. 1 93 7 )  § 2501 note 4· : Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t. 2o, §§ 208 1 1, zo821 2083, zo85.  
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t. zo,  § zo8s.  
""' Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 930) t .  I 71 §§ I 8 I1 I 85 ;  t. u, §§ I o9 I ,  I I 07·  
201 N. Y. Judiciary Law, art. 21 § z .  
200 N:'Y, Surr. Ct. Act, § 43· See also O'Conner v .  Huggins, I I 3 N. Y. 51  I 
( I 8 8 9 ) .  
""" N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § z88. 
""' Md. Const., art. 4, § I. 
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rectly to the Court of Appeals of Maryland where they are 
heard on the record made in the orphans' court. 205 
The administration of probate matters in New Jersey by 
the surrogate's court, the orphans' court, and the prerogative 
court has already been detailed. Appeals from orphans' courts 
lie to the prerogative court and from the latter to the court of 
errors and appeals.206 The common pleas courts are the courts 
of general jurisdiction and appeals from them lie to the su­
preme court and from the latter to the court of errors and 
appeals. 207 In this respect, the orphans' courts may be termed 
coordinate with the common pleas courts. 
. The probate courts of Ohio, like the common pleas courts, 
are courts of record,208 and are accorded a presumption in favor 
of their proceedings. 209 Appeals lie directly to the courts of 
appeals in the same manner as do appeals from the common 
pleas courts, 210 unless no record was made of the proceeding 
in the probate court, in which case appeals are heard de novo 
in the common pleas court 211 from which an appeal will then 
lie to the court of appeals. To the extent that appeals lie and 
are taken to the courts of appeal directly from probate courts, 
the latter are coordinate with the common pleas courts ; but, 
to the extent that no record is made in the probate court and 
appeals are taken to the common pleas courts with a trial de 
novo, the probate courts are definitely of an inferior status. 
In Wisconsin probate matters come under the jurisdiction 
of the county courts,212 which also handle a limited amount of 
civil and criminal matters in some counties under special legis-
""" Md. Code (I 939)  art. 5, §§ 64, 66. 
206 N. J. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 7 )  § 2 :3o-I 6. 
""' N. J. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 7 )  §§ z :z7-355, z :z 7-3 5o. 
208 Ohio Const., art. 4, § 7· 
209 Shroyer v. Richmond, I 6 Ohio St. 455 (I 866) . 
210 0hio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. I 943) § I 05ox-s6. 
211 lbid . 
... Wis Stat. ( 1 943)  § 253 .0 1 .  
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lation.213 These courts are courts of record.214 In counties 
having a population of 1 4,000 or more the county judge must 
be a member of the bar or have previously occupied the office 
of probate judge.215 In other counties no such qualifications 
are required. A layman may be county judge.216 Appeals 
from counties having a population of more than 1 5,000 lie to 
the Supreme Court ; 217 in the remaining twelve counties ap­
peals lie to the circuit court with a trial de novo. 218 In the 
former case, the hearing on appeal is on the record of the pro­
ceedings in the county court, and otherwise has the same pro­
cedure as do appeals from circuit courts. 219 Thus in counties 
having a population of more than 1 5 ,ooo the county courts 
occupy a position coordinate with the circuit courts in t,he 
matter of appeals. In  other counties, their position may only 
be described as inferior. 
In Indiana administration of decedents' estates is had in the 
circuit courts by circuit judges for the most part/20 similar to 
the California system. In Marion 221 and Vanderburgh 222 
counties, however, separate probate courts have been created . 
and designated as courts of record.223 Appeals from the circuit 
court in probate matters lie to the supreme court or one of the 
courts of appeals.224 As might be expected the appeal is not 
heard de novo but on the record, since the matter originally 
was heard by a circuit judge. Similarly appeals from these 
213 Wis. Stat. ( I 943) App. p. 8. 
'" Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 253.08. 
216 Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 253 .02. 
216 Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253 .021 except in counties where civil or criminal j uris-
diction has been conferred upon county courts. 
217 Wis. Stat. ( I  943) § 3 24.0 I .  
218 Ibid. 
219 Wis. Stat. ( r 943 ) § 32.4·04. 
"" Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 933) § 4-363 .  
221 Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 933) § 4-290I • 
..,. Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 9 3 3) § 4-3oor .  
223 Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 9 3 3) §§ 4-2902, 4-3002, 
... Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 9 3 3 ) §§ 4-2 I 41 6-200 I ,  
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two separate probate courts lie to the supreme court or a court 
of appeals. 225 Thus these two probate courts may be said to 
have the same standing as circuit courts in Indiana. 
In the District of Columbia there is a separate probate term 
each year of the United States District Court there.226 That 
term of court is presided over by the district judge. Never­
theless there is a separate probate court, with a union of per­
sonnel.227 Appeals are taken to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in the same manner as 
appeals from the district court. 228 Hence the probate court 
for the District of Columbia is fully coordinate with the district 
court there. 
In Tennessee the chancery courts have concurrent jurisdic­
tion with the county court to appoint an administrator six 
months after the decedent's de�th. 229 The county courts have 
concurrent jurisdi_ction with the chancery and circuit courts in 
proceedings to sell real estate of decedents, and for distribution 
and partition. 230 Appeals from the county courts lie to the 
circuit courts with a trial de novo 231 except that, if the juris­
diction of the county court in the matter appealed from is con­
current with that of chancery and circuit courts, an appeal 
lies directly to the court of appeals or supreme court.232 Inso­
far as appeals from the county court lie directly to the court 
of appeals or supreme court, the former may be termed co­
ordinate with the courts of general jurisdiction in the present 
classification. 
A Vermont statute provides that appeals from probate courts 
lie directly to the supreme court on questions of law,233 but 
""" Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 93 3 )  §§ z-p x 8, 2.-32.2.2., z-32.2.3 .  
226 D. C. Code (1 940) § x x-sox .  
227 Ibid. 
228 D. C. Code ( 1 940) § 1 7-I O I .  
229 Tenn. Code (Michie, ' x 9 3 8 )  § 1 03 82..  
""" Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 93 8 )  §§ 82.63, 1 03 2.6, 1 03 80. 
\ 231  Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 9 3 8 )  §§ 902.8, 9033, 906o. 
232 Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 93 8 )  §§  902.9, 9059. 
233 Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 93 3 )  § 3 00 1 .  
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otherwise to the county courts.234 To the extent that appeals 
lie directly to the supreme court, the probate courts of Vermont 
are coordinate with the courts of general jurisdiction. 
In Illinois, appeals from a final order of the probate court 
in a proceeding for the sale of real estate lie to the appellate 
or supreme court of that state, 235 rather than to the ,circuit 
courts. In this one instance, probate courts in Illinois are 
clearly coordinate with those of general jurisdiction. 
In each of the first five states discussed here, probate pro­
ceedings are believed to be of such a character and volume 
as to justify a separate probate court substantially on a par 
with those of general jurisdiction. Certainly in Massachusetts, 
New York and Pennsylvania, and in certain communities of 
New Jersey, Maryland and Ohio., the populat1on and amount 
of probate business is large enough to warrant the establish­
ment of separate courts. 
4· Probate matters handled in chancery 
In most states the aid of chancery may be sought only when 
the power of the probate court is insufficient for the desired 
end. In Alabama any person interested in an estate may, at 
any time prior to final settlement, take the proceeding into 
chancery. Even under the early decisions of that state, no 
reason need be given. It was a matter of absolute right.236 
This was probably a broader jurisdiction than was exercised 
by English chancery courts over decedents' estates. In I 9 I 5 
this was embodied in a statute there.237 Under the present 
practice an estate may be removed either to the circuit court 238 
or to chancery.239 In effect then, there is concurrent juris- · 
""' Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 9 3 3 )  § 3002. 
236 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, r 941 )  c. 3 ,  § 486. 
236 See SIMS, CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN ALABAMA ( r 9o9) § 6S8 
and cases there cited. 
l!ll7 Ala. Acts, 1 9 1 5, p. 738.  
238 Ala. Code (1 940) t .  1 3, §§ 1 3 8, 1 39. 
239 Ala. Const., art. 6, § 1 49· 
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diction in the probate, circuit and chancery courts to administer 
estates in Alabama. 
In Mississippi jurisdiction over probate matters in the county 
courts was abandoned in 1 890 and conferred entirely upon 
the chancery courts.240 This put probate jurisdiction in a 
court which had exercised it upon special occasions previously 
and which had ample equipment and personnel capable of 
the new task assigned to it. Furthermore, it eliminated any 
question as to the amount of equity powers possessed by the 
probate court or whether the circumstances of a particular ad­
ministration proceeding warranted the intervention of chan­
cery.241 
Prior to I 9 3 9 there were separate probate courts in Arkansas. 
By a constitutional amendment, effective January I ,  I 939, the 
judges of the chancery courts have been given the added duty 
of presiding over the probate courts.242 It is said that the pro­
bate courts have not lost their identity by such consolidation, 
but that they remain probate courts in chancery.243 However, 
the effect of transferring this function to the judges of the 
chancery courts cannot be merely formal ; it will likely import 
into probate proceedings some of the equitable practices and 
doctrines known and practiced in courts of chancery. 
In addition to these three states where chancery has a hand 
regularly in the administration of probate matters, there are 
numerous situations that arise in the administration of estates 
where it is thought that the machinery of probate courts is 
inadequate to deal with the problem ; and that because of 
special circumstances, the invocation of equity jurisdiction is 
justified. This is an established practice in most states at the 
present time. The occasions for this special jurisdiction of 
..., Miss. Canst., art. 6, § I 59· 
"" Some idea of the extent as to the uncertainty of equity powers possessed by 
probate courts is described in POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS ( 1 940) 140. 
242 Ark. Canst., Amend. 24 ;  Ark. Acts, 1 9 3 9, Act 3, p. 6. 
243 Lewis v. Smith, 1 9 8  Ark. 244, 1 29  S. W. (2d) 229  ( 1 9 39 ) .  
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equity over the administration of estates are not within the 
primary purpose of this study and cannot, therefore, be treated 
here.244 
IV, CouRT ORGANIZATION rN RELATION TO CoNTENTIOus 
AND NoNCONTENTIOUS BuslNESS 
In any matured system of law the administration of a de­
cedent's estate may involve both contentious and noncon­
tentious matters. Thus, first, it is entirely possible that all 
interested parties are agreed that a will is valid, or that there 
is no will and that the property should be distributed to credi­
tors and to devisees or heirs on some fair basis. Or, second, 
there may be a dispute as to whether the will propounded is 
valid ; there may be adverse claims to the office of executor or 
administrator; a creditor's claim may be disputed by an ex­
ecutor or administrator ; a dispute may arise as to priorities in 
the payment of legacies when the estate is insufficient to satisfy 
ali:' As to this second type of administrative matter, it is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that it involves the judicial 
determination of controversies of the same general chanicter 
as are handled by the civil side of a trial court of general juris- -
diction. It calls for the same capacity to supervise impartially 
the trial of contested issues, the same ability to determine ac­
curately the application of complicated rules of law to' the 
transmission of property interests. 'In short, it would seem 
that the contentious business of the court should be handled 
by a judge with as high qualifications as the trial judge. 
As to noncontentious matters, the situation may be different. 
Here it is conceivable that the estate could be distributed with­
out any judicial intervention at all. Indeed, the Roman law 
system, with it� conception of universal succession,245 accom-
... As to the jurisdiction of equity to administer estates, see 1 WoERNER, An­
MINISTRATION (3d ed. 1 92.3) § 1 56 ;  "Equitable Jurisdiction of Probate Courts 
and Finality of Probate Decrees," 48 YALE L. J. 1 2.73  ( 19 39 ) .  
- ... BUCKLAND, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW (zd ed. 1932)  z8z  ff. 
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plished just that. And the modern tendency of legislation 
in the United States to dispense entirely with administration 
in the case of small estates is to the same effect. 246 N everthe­
less, there are many cases where some judicial action is de­
sirable even though there are no controversies among the 
interested parties. . This becomes particularly important In 
view of the current trend, elsewhere noted, 247 to provide that 
the probate court distribute land by its decree. In spite of the 
lack of disagreement among persons interested in the estate, 
they may well need the aid of a court to determine what is 
a just basis of distribution ; they may wish to distribute in such 
a way as to avoid disputes in the future ; and, to further that 
end, they may desire to have an official record of the distribu­
tion which has been made. Thus, the noncontentious business 
of the court is an important function of the judicial organiza­
ti.on. No statistics are required to justify the observation that 
the vast majority of smaller estates is handled by American 
probate courts without any controversies whatever. Ad­
ministration in court is then desired solely for the purpose of 
having the property of the decedent disposed of in an orderly 
way. 
As to the noncontentious business of the court, it is not so 
clear that an efficient trial judge is needed. Certainly, by 
hypothesis, there are no disputed issues to try. And much of 
the noncontentious business is mere routine which can well 
be handled by a superior type of clerk or probate register. Of 
course, insofar as the action of the court in noncontentious 
business involves the avoiding of potential disputes, it would 
seem to call for the same understanding of the intricacies of 
property law as is necessary when ther� is an actual dispute. 
It is the purpose of the discussion which foll�ws to consider 
. how far the court organization in typical jurisdictions is adapted 
... See ATKINSON, WILLS ( 1 937)  52.9-540. 
"'7 See Subdivision V of this monograph. 
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to a differentiation between contentious and noncontentious 
business. The sharp differentiation in English law will first 
be pointed out. Then the probate judicial organizations of 
various typical states will be considered in connection with the 
questions : How far have they retained the distinction between 
contentious and noncontentious business emphasized in the 
English system which served as their model! How far have 
they developed a basis of differentiation unlike the English 
model? The answer to these questions will involve some con­
sideration of the matter of will contests and of appeals by trial 
de novo in the court of general jurisdiction. But it must be 
pointed out that the handling of contentious and noncon­
tentious business is under consideration here only as a matter 
of court organization and not as a matter of probate procedure. 
In the English ecclesiastical courts, the line between con­
tentious and noncontentious business was pretty much the line 
between probate in common and in solemn form, heretofore 
referred to. If a will were probated in common form there 
was no notice to interested parties ; proof generally consisted 
merely in the executor taking oath that he believed the instru­
ment presented was duly executed by a competent testator. 
If a caveat were filed by the next ;of kin, proof in solemn 
form then had to be made; interested parties were cited; and 
the attesting witnesses testified as to the execution of the will. 
The hearing was before the ordinary. Contested issues as to 
the account of the personal representative and as to.a legatee's 
right to his legacy could also be tried in the ecclesiastical courts. 
As to the real estate, noncontentious business would seem to 
have been handled withou.t any judicial assistance whatever; 
and contentious matters were dealt with either in the courts 
of law or of equity, depending upon the nature of the con­
troversy. 
Doubtless the distinction between the probate of a will in 
solemn form and in common form was not developed primarily 
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for the purpose of judicial efficiency. One reason for it must 
have been the belief that the decedent's estate required man­
agement from the moment of his death ; and that to wait for 
notice before the appointment of an executor or administrator 
would result in a wasting of the property of the decedent. 
This idea is voiced in the Report of the Commissioners Ap­
pointed to Inquire into the Practice and Jurisdiction of the 
Ecclesiastical Courts, which appeared in r 832 .248 Concluding 
that the probate in common form should be retained, the 
report states : 
"For Probate so granted in common form, the only security 
is the Oath of the Executor ; and experience has proved that 
for the immense. majority of cases it is amply sufficient. A 
very little consideration will show that it would be absolutely 
impossible to establish any a priori guards or cautions, which 
would not, from the delay and expense, occasion an infinitely 
greater loss to the Public, than may sometimes arise from what . is called snatching Probate of a paper, afterwards found not 
entitled thereto. Any notice to Heirs-at-law, next of Kin, 
prior Devisees, or Legatees, would be found utterly incom­
patible with the expe�ition and economy, which are the most 
essential ingredients in the administration of every-day 
justice." 
However, it must have seemed both inefficient and unduly ex­
pensive to require citations to interested parties and proof by 
both attesting witnesses before the ordinary in a case where 
there was no controversy whatever as to the due execution 
of the will. 
The present English probate organization distinguishes 
sharply between contentious and noncontentious business ; and 
it would seem that this distinction bears a direct relation to the 
maintenance' of efficiency in the court organization. N oncon­
tentious business is defined in the Supreme Court qf Judicature 
... p. 37· 
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Consolidation Act of I 9 2 5, 249 in almost exact! y the same terms 
as are used in the Court of Probate Act of I 8 57/50 as follows : 
" 'Noncontentious or common form probate business' means 
the business of obtaining probate and administration where 
there is no contention as to the right thereto, including the 
passing of probates and administrations through the High 
Court in contentious cases where the contest has been ter­
minated, and all business of a noncontentious nature in matters 
of testacy and intestacy not being proceedings in any action, 
and also the business of lodging caveats against the grant of 
probate or administration." 
The Principal Registry of Probate at London has jurisdiction 
of noncontentious business,251 and legislation also provides 
that grants may be made in common form by district probate 
registrars. 252 Without doubt the bulk of the probate business 
of England is handled as noncontentious business by probate 
registrars. Otherwise it would be quite impossible for five 
judges to handle all the probate business for the people of 
England. In the latest edition of Tristram and Coote's Pro­
bate Practice this noncontentious procedure is described.253 
"The solicitor, in order to obtain a grant of representation 
to a deceased person in the Principal Registry, must leave at 
the Receiver's Department the 'papers to lead the grant,' viz. 
the will and codicils (if any) ; the oath ; the bond (if any) ; 
the Inland Revenue affidavit, duly stamped, and such affi­
davits, renunciations, certificates, etc., as may be necessary. 
The Receiver gives a receipt for the papers . . . • 
"In the registry, the calendars are searched to ascertain 
that no other grant has been made . in respect of the same es­
tate, the papers are examined at the 'Seats' Department, 
and, if approved, a form of grant is prepared, and attached 
... 1 5�1 6 Geo. 5, c. 49, § 1 75, p. 1 197  at u86 ( 19z5 ) .  
""' zo-z 1 Viet., c. 77> p .  4u (1 857) • 
..,_ 1 5-1 6 Geo. 5> c. 49> § 1 50 ( 19Z5) • 
...  1 5-1 6  Geo. 5> c. 49> § 1 5 1  ( 1 9Z5) . 
"'" TRISTRAM & COOTE'S PROBATE PRACTICE ( 1 8th ed. 1 940) 14. 
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to a photographic copy of the will and codicils (if any). 
The grant is signed by the Registrar and sealed with the seal 
of the Probate Division. 
"On the production of the receipt given by the Receiver 
the grant usually can be obtained at the Sealer's Department 
after 1 2 :30 p. m. on the fourth. day after the papers were 
lodged." 
Contentious probate business is handled before one or more 
judges of the High Court.254 
In the United States the form of probate court organiza­
tion in the maj ority of jurisdictions appears to indicate some 
recognition of the difference between contentious and non­
contentious business ; though in others this differentiation has 
apparently been lost sight of. Thus, as is indicated later, 
in a large group of states an appeal from the decision of the 
probate court involves a trial de novo in the court of general 
trial j urisdiction. In those jurisdictio11s the probate judge 
ordinarily is not required to have as high qualifications as 
the trial judge. Not infrequently he is not required to be a 
member of the bar at all ; his salary is, in practically all cases, 
less than that of the judge of the trial court of general juris­
diction. In a general way it may be said that noncontentious 
matters come before the probate judge and that, in those mat­
ters in which the contest is more serious, the issues are settled 
before the trial court of general jurisdiction. There is noth­
ing to prevent the probate judge from hearing contentious 
matters. Indeed, ordinarily he must do so in the first in­
stance. But, if a party is sufficiently interested to appeal, he 
can have the issues tried anew by the trial judge. In a con­
siderable group of states there is more or less of an attempt to 
retain the old distinction between probate in common and in 
solemn form. That is to say, probate may be summary and 
... rs-r 6 Geo. s, c. 49, §§  zo, 55> s6 ( 1 925 ) ; r 8-I 9 Geo. s, c. z6, § 6 
(1928).  
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without notice ; or it may be on notice to interested parties ; 
and the proceeding on notice may be either the original hear­
ing or a subsequent hearing on the issue before the same court. 
In many states provision is made for a proceeding known as 
a contest, which is a trial of the issue on the due execution of 
the will. It has sometimes been said that the contest is similar 
to the old probate in solemn form. 255 However, in some 
states it would seem to resemble the device of framing the 
issue devisavit vel non and sending it over to a court
. 
of law 
to be tried. 256 Very commonly contest takes place in the 
trial court of general jurisdiction. A brief consideration of 
the procedure in a few typical .states will illustrate the extent 
to which there is any differentiation of function with respect 
· to contentious and noncontentious business. 
Florida, although it has recently enacted a new probate 
code,257 is one of those jurisdictions which still retains some­
thing of the old distinction between probate in common and 
in solemn form. Probate is in the county judge's court. No 
citation to interested parties before probate is required unless 
a caveat has been filed by an heir or distributee.258 Then the 
caveator must receive notice. When a will is admitted to 
probate, the personal representative or any other interested 
person may take steps to have interested parties served with 
notice, including notice by publication. A subsequent hear­
ing in the judge's court for revocation of probate (which 
apparently takes the place of the will contest or probate in 
solemn form found in some states) may be had on the peti­
tion of an interested party. The privilege of petitioning for 
revocation of · probate is limited to any heir or distributee of 
the estate of a decedent except those who have been ser.ved 
256 See Luther v. Luther, 1 2 2.  Ill. 558, 1 3  N. E. 1 66 ( 1 8 8 7 ) ; Shaw v. Camp, 
61 Ill. App. 68  ( 1 895) ; Collier v. Idley's Exrs., (N. Y. 1 849) I Bradf. Surr. 
94· 
... Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1 943) t. zo, § 1 96 1 .  
057 Fla. Acts, 1 93 3, c. I 6 I oJ, p .  544· 
068 Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  §§ 73:1..2.3, 732.·:1.9· 
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with citation before probate or who are barred under section 
732.29 (the section dealing with the case where an heir or 
distributee has filed a caveat) .259 
In Georgia the procedure follows much more closely the 
English ecclesiastical procedure.260 Probate may be either 
in common or ·in solemn form before the court of ordinary. 
The statutes also provide for an appeal with trial de novo 
in the . superior court, which is the trial court of general 
jurisdiction. 
In Missouri the original hearing for probate of the will may 
be without notice,261 but there is no provision for contest in the 
probate court. This takes place in the trial court of general 
jurisdiction and is in the nature of an appeal with trial de 
novo.262 Unlike Florida, however, the Missouri statute per­
mits any interested party to contest and does not limit the 
'right to contest to persons who were not served with notice of 
the original application for probate in the probate court. 263 
Missouri is also one of those states which recognizes that an 
appeal from a decision of the probate court involves a trial 
de novo of the issues in the circuit court.264 
In nearly half the states no grant of probate or administra­
tion, other than the appointment of a special administrator, is 
possible without notice to interested parties unless such notice 
is waived. In some of these there is a provision for contest 
after probate; in others there is not. In Michigan, for ex­
ample, there is no provision for contest after probate, as such. 
But if interested parties file a contest before probate in the 
259 Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1941 )  § 73 2.30. 
260Ga. Code Ann. ( 1 937 )  §§ I I J-601 ,  I I J-6o2, 1 1 3-605. As to appeals, 
see §§ 6-2o1 ,  6-501 .  
' 
2'11 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) § 529 ; State ex rei. Mitchell v. Gideon, 2. 1 5 
Mo. App. 46, 2 3 7  S. W. 22o (1 922) . 
""" Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 3 8 ;  Techenbrock v. McLaughlin, 
209 Mo. 533,  1 0 8  S. W. 46 ( 1 908) .  
263 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 3 8  • 
..,. Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) § 291 .  
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probate court, the whole matter may be tr�tnsfe)ired to the 
circuit court for hearing.265 Moreover, provisions for appeal 
by trial de novo in the circuit court 266 have the �ffect of a con­
test after appeal in the trial court of general jurisdiction. 
ln California the trial court of general jurisdiction, namely 
the superior court, is the court in which probate matters are 
heard. Moreover, appeals are not trials de novo but are 
heard by the same appellate courts which hear appeals in civil 
cases. In spite of the fact that the petition for probate or 
administration is always heard on notice to interested par­
ties, 267 statutes provide for a contest after probate, which 
takes place in the superior court sitting in probate.268 · Contest 
after probate is permitted by an interested person, "other 
than a party to a contest before probate and other than a per­
son who had actual notice of such previous contest in time to 
have joined therein." 269 In California, since notice is re­
quired before probate and since the trial court of general ju­
risdiction is the court handling probate matters, it would seem 
that the provisions for contest after probate are at variance 
with any attempt to differentiate between contentious and 
noncontentious business. Quite possibly contest after probate 
bears some slight resemblance to probate in solemn form. 
But if so, it merely means that there may be two hearings, 
instead of one, on the question of the due execution of the 
will. 
In at least two important jurisdictions, New York and 
Massachusetts, where proceedings for probate or adminis­
tration are initiated on notice to interested parties, there is, 
strictly speaking, neither contest after probate nor trial de 
265 Mich. Stat, Ann. ( 1943) § z7.3 1 7 8 (36 ) .  
266 Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1943) § z7.3 1 7 8 (36) .  
267 Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1 94 1 )  §§ 3z7, 441 . 
268 Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1 94 1 )  § 3 80. 
268 Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941)  § 3 80. 
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novo on appeal.270 In New York, in order to contest the will, 
objections must be filed in the surrogate's court at or before 
the close of testimony for the proponent, or at such subse­
quent time as the surrogate may direct. 271 But it is clear that 
this contest takes place in the surrogate's court before the will 
is admitted to probate. In Massachusetts, the only contest is 
one arising in the probate court before the will is admitted to 
probate.272 The probate judge, however, has the power to 
send issues to the superior court to be tried there before a 
jury.273 
To present an adequate account of the differentiation be­
tween contentious and noncontentious business, something 
should be said with reference to the function of clerks and 
registers of probate. This matter is discussed at some length 
in subsequent paragraphs. At this point it may be observed 
that, in most jurisdictions, the clerk or register has no judicial 
powers. But, even if he does not, the clerical business of the , 
court may be so handled by him that the judge is enabled to 
supervise a very large volume of judicial business. This ob­
viously is true in New York City, although the New York, 
statutes do not give the clerk of the surrogate court judicial 
powers. 
By way of conclusion on the general question of the dis­
tinction between contentious and noncontentious business, the 
following observations are presented for consideration : The 
common practice of having a probate judge with inferior 
270 See 2. WARREN'S . HEATON, SURROGATES' CoURTS (6th ed. 1 941 ) § 1 8 2. ;  
NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW I N  MASSACHUSETTS 
(3d ed. 1 9 3 7) § 3 0. 
on N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 147. It is true, however, that on an appeal upon the 
facts, the appellate court has "the same power to decide the questions of fact 
which the surrogate had" and may receive further testimony. See N. Y. Surr. 
Ct. Act, § 309 .  
272 Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 9 32.) c .  1 92, §§ z-3. See also NEWHALL, SETTLE­
MENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS (3d ed. 1 9 3 7) 
§ JO • 
.,. Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1932) c. 2. 1 5, § 1 6. 
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qualifications handle all probate business in the first instance, 
with contest or trial de novo in the trial court of general ju­
risdiction, doubtless, in a rough way distinguishes between 
contentious and noncontentious business. It is true, the pro­
bate judge has jurisdiction over contentious as well as non­
contentious business. But if a party to the contentious busi­
ness regards the issue of sufficient importance, he can, by the 
device of contest or appeal, have it tried again in the trial 
court. However, it would seem that this is a very inefficient 
way of distinguishing between contentious and nonconten­
tious business. The probate j udge, in spite of his lack: of su­
perior qualifications, does try contentious matters in the first 
instance ;  and when they are tried anew in the trial court, the 
result is a wasteful duplication of judicial effort. The preva­
lent doctrine that there should be one trial and one appeal 
would seem to be applicable to issues in probate courts as 
well as elsewhere. Where there is adequate notice for the 
first hearing and a judge of sufficient ability, there would 
seem to be little or no justification for a retrial of the issues 
in the probate or any other court. Such is the result reached_ 
in New York and Massachusetts, where no contest after pro­
bate is provided for and a judge who is sufficiently qualified 
to make a final decision on the issues sits in the surrogate or 
probate court. . 
There are, however, strong arguments for an ex parte 
hearing without notice, somewhat like the old probate in com­
mon form. This prevents the expense and inconvenience of 
a special administratorship, and probably results in less wast­
ing of the estate immediately after the death of the decedent. 
If such a hearing is permitted, it �ould be possible, as in 
England, to have its routine handled by clerks or registrars. 
But the whole matter could well be under the direct super­
vision of a judge of recognized competence. A further hear­
ing on the issue involved at such summary hearing should 
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then be premitted before the same court, but only on the pe-
tition of interested parties who were not served with notice 
or did not appear in the first hearing. 
V. JURISDICTION OF PRoBATE CouRTS OvER LAND 
As has already been indicated,274 one of the most serious 
defects in the English probate system of the period prior to 
the middle of the nineteenth century was the great divergence 
. in the treatment of real and personal estate. The ecclesiasti­
cal courts had no jurisdiction whatever over the decedent's 
land. They admitted wills of personalty to probate ; but 
wills of land were not probated there nor anywhere else. 
The personal representative took title �o personalty; the title 
to land passed to the heir or devisee immediately on the death 
of the decedent. But by English legislation previously de­
scribed 275 the treatment of land and personalty became prac­
tically uniform. A will of land is now probated just as a will 
o(personalty. The jurisdiction of the Probate Division over 
the administration of the decedent's land was accomplished 
by the simple expedient of a statute which provides that in­
terests in land pass to the personal representative just as chat­
tels had passed theretofore. 
We are now ready to consider the question : To what ex­
tent have American probate courts acquired jurisdiction over 
. the lands of decedents? Certainly they have departed radi­
cally frorri the pattern of the English ecclesiastical courts ; 
yet it is clear,that the deyelopment has not been like that of 
the modern English probate jurisdiction. 
The subject of our inquiry is obviously significant as a 
matter of procedure and due process. It is believed that the 
entire proceeding to administer the estate of a deceased person 
is a unit and is a proceeding in rem. If that be true, and if 
.,.. See subdivision I, supra •. 
"'" 6o-61 ·Vict., c. 65 ( 1 897) . 
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the probate court does in fact administer the real estate of 
the decedent, then a reasonable notice to interested parties at 
the time of the initial step in the administration proceeding 
would suffice for hearing on all subsequent matters.276 On 
the other hand, if the probate court has no general j urisdic­
tion over land, but acquires it merely for the purpose of some 
paHicular step in the proceeding, such as land sales or the 
collection of rents, then notice to interested parties must be 
given at each such step. 
Here, however, we are interested primarily in court or­
ganization rather than in procedure or due process as such. 
But in that connection also the question of jurisdiction over 
land is significant. It · is commonly assumed that inferior 
courts, such as justice courts and county courts, are not to be 
entrusted with issues involving the determ:ination of titles 
to land. These matters are normally placed in the hands of 
the trial judges or of others equally well qualified. If, then, 
the probate court has jurisdiction of the land of the decedent, 
that is a strong argument for a highly qualified judge in the 
judicial organization. 
It is believed that in every jurisdiction in this country the 
probate court has some jurisdiction over land of the decedent. 
The extent of this jurisdiction, however, varies greatly. For 
convenience our subject of inquiry may be stated in the form 
of three questions. First, does the probate court have juris­
diction over the probate of a will of land? Second, to what 
extent, if any, does the personal representative have title to 
land during administration? Third, does the probate co�rt 
exercise general control over the land of the , decedent 
throughout the course of administration? In other words, 
is the decedent's land subject te> the jurisdiction of the probate 
"'" This, of course, refers to a minimum requirement. It would seem desirable, 
aside from questions of constitutionality, to have some sort of notice for sales of 
land. 
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court from the initial steps to have the will probated or to 
secure a grant of administration up to the time of the final 
order of distribution? 
First, as to probate of wills of land, it is believed that 
the old English doctrine that a will of land is not subject to 
probate has almost entirely disappeared in this country. In 
nearly every jurisdiction a testamentary disposition of land 
must be admitted to probate before devisees can claim under 
it. This result in many states is based on statutes to the effect 
that no will is effectual to pass title to real or personal prop­
erty without probate or that a will cannot be introduced in 
evidence until admitted to probate.277 In a very few jurisdic­
tions the necessity for and effect of probate of a will of real 
property may not be the same as that of a will involving per­
sonalty ; 278 but it is believed that wills involving real prop­
erty are subject to probate in all states. 
Second, does the personal representative have title to land 
during administration? In general, the answer is that he 
does not. That is to say, the majority of jurisdictions adhere 
to the old English view that title to personalty passes to the 
""' See, for example, Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 2 7.3 I 7 8 (9o) : "No will shall 
be effectual to pass either real or personal estate, unless it shall have been duly 
proved and allowed in the probate court as provided in this chapter, or on appeal, 
in the circuit court or supreme court; and the probate of a will of real or per­
sonal estate, as above mentioned, shall be conclusive as to its due execution." 
Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 942) § 394. I 3 o :  "No will shall be received in evidence 
until it has been allowed and admitted to record by a county court ; and its 
probate before such court shall be conclusive, except as to the j urisdiction of the 
court, until superseded, reversed or annulled." 
In some states the courts have decided, without the aid of a statute, that a will 
devising land must be admitted to probate. Inge v. Johnston, I I  o Ala. 6 so, 20 
So. 757 ( 1 895) ; Farris v. Burchard, 242 Mo. I 1  I 45 S. W. 825· ( I 9 I I ) .  
278 Thus, in New York (N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § I 44) specific provision is made 
for the probate of a will involving real property. But it would seem that this 
is not necessary to prove title. See Bouton v. Fleharty, 2 I 5  App. Div. I 8o, 2 I 3  
N. Y. S .  455 ( I 926) ; Corley v. McElmeel, I 49 N. Y. 2 2 8, 43 N .  E .  6 2 8  ( I 896) . '  
In Tennessee the order admitting to  probate may not have quite the same con• 
elusive effect on real property which it has with respect to personalty. State v. 
Lancaster, I I 9 Tenn. 6 3 8, I 05 S. W. 858  ( I 907) ; Grier v. Canada, 1 1 9  Tenn. 
1 71 I 07 s. w. 970 ( 1 907) . 
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personal representative, but that title to real estate passes to 
the heir or devisee.279 In no jurisdiction does title to all the 
decedent's realty pass to the personal representative as is pro­
vided in the present English legislation. It is true, in 
Georgia, Oregon and Virginia, statutes provide that the title 
to land registered under land registration acts (that is, so­
called Torrens system registration) passes to the personal 
representative. 280 And a Georgia statute indicates that in 
that state for some purposes title to devised land passes to 
the executor and not to the devisee during administra­
tion ; 281 but legislation in the same state provides that title 
to intestate land passes to the heir.282 
In two states/83 California and Texas, are found statutes 
which indicate that title to both real and personal property 
In general, on the necessity of probate of a will involving real property, see 
Appendix note to §§ 8 x-85 of Model Probate Code. 
279 Hooker v. Porter, z7 x  Mass. 44I, I J I  N. E. 7 1 3  ( r 93o) ; Richards v. 
Pierce, 44 Mich. 444, 7 N.' W. 54 ( r 88"o) ; Roorbach v. Lord, 4 Conn. 347 
( x 8zz) . For statutes providing that real estate passes directly to the heirs or 
devisees, see N. M. Stat. ( I 94 1 )  § 3 3-702. ; Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 932.)  § 1 366. 
In general, see ATKINSON, WILLS ( I 937)  52.8-530 ;  4 PAGE, WILLS (3d ed. 
I 94I ) § 1 5 86. 
280 Ga. Code Ann. ( 1937)  § 6o-5o8 ; Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) § 70-368 ; 
Va. Code ( 1 942.) § 5ZZ5 (this section provides that the acts establishing the 
Torrens system be continued in force. 'Section 6 I  of that act as amended provides 
that title to registered land vests in the personal representative) .  
"'" Ga. Code Ann. ( r 936) § I I 3-8or : "All property, both real and personal, 
being assets to pay debts, no devise or legacy passes the title until the assent of 
the executor is given to such devise or legacy." 
And see Peck v. Watson, I 65 Ga. 853, I 42 S. E. 450 ( r 9z7) . 
28" Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) § u 3-90I : "Upon the death of the owner of any 
estate in realty, which estate survives him, the title shall vest immediately in 
his heirs at law, subject to be administered by the legal representative, if there 
is one, for the payment of debts and the purposes of distribution." 
""' Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, I 94 1 )  § 300 ;  Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 
1935) art. 3 3 14. 
. 
In a few other states are found statutes which are to the effect that the prop­
erty of an intestate person, both real and personal, passes to his heirs subject to 
the control of the court and to the possession of the administrator. The follow­
ing are of this variety : Idaho Code ( I 9J2 )  § 1 4-I oz ; Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 9 35)  
§ 7072. ; N. D. Comp. Laws ( I 9 I 3 J § 5742 ; Okla. Stat. ( x 94 I )  t .  84, § 2 1 2 ;  
S.D •. Code (1939)  § 56.o i o:i. 
. 
452 MONOGRAPHS ON PROBATE LAW 
passes to the distributee and not to the personal representa- · 
tive. The California statute is as follows : 
((When a person dies, the title to his property, real and 
personal, passes to the person to whom it is devised or be­
queathed by his last will, or, in the absence of such disposi­
tion, to the persons who succeed to his estate as provided in 
Division 2 of this code : but all of his property shall be sub­
ject to the possession of the executor or administrator and 
to the control of the superior court for the purposes of ad­
ministration, sale or other disposition under the provisions of 
Division 3 of this code, and shall be chargeable with the ex­
penses of administering his estate, and the payment of his 
debts and the allowance to the family, except as otherwise 
provided in this code." 
Much can be said for legislation of this character. Certainly, 
there is no real justification today for a distinction between 
real and personal estate with respect to the title of the per­
sonal representative. The explanation for it is purely his­
torical. But it is doubtful whether the modern English rule 
giving the personal representative title to all property of the 
decedent, both real and personal, would work well in the 
United States. Frequently estates are not administered at 
all. And in such cases the matter of determining title would 
be simplified if legislation like the California statute just 
quoted were in force. The title is then in the distributees 
whether the estate has been administered or not. 
Of course, the mere fact that title to realty is in the dis­
tributee or is in the personal representative, during adminis­
tration, does not go far in describing the real situation. In all 
jurisdictions, regardless of what technical rule is in force as 
to the location of title, the distributee has some interest in the 
property as of the time of the decedent's death.284 On the 
... See Brewster v. Gage (C. C. A. zd, 1929) 30 F. (zd) 6o4, aff'd z8o U. S. 
3 Z7, so s. Ct. 1 1 5  ( 1 930) . 
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other hand, even under the California type of statute, it is 
clear that the personal representative has a very substantial 
interest in the estate during the course of administration, 
though it may be described in terms of a right to possession or 
a power of disposition rather than in terms of title. 
The third and most important question to be raised is: 
Does the probate court exercise jurisdiction over the dece­
dent's lands throughout the course of administration? In 
many states there can be no doubt that the answer is in the 
affirmative. Thus, in the California statute as to the title of 
distributees, which has already been quoted, it is stated that 
such title is "subject to the possession of the executor or ad­
ministrator and to the control of the superior court for the 
purposes of administration, sale or other disposition under 
the provisions of Division 3 of this code." Another Cali­
fornia statute provides that the personal representative must 
take possession of all the estate of the decedent, real and per­
sonal. 285 In other states the matter is not so clear ; no such 
statutes as these are found. And it is necessary to consider 
the jurisdiction of the probate court over land in a number of 
specific situations, such as the contents of the inventory, ju­
dicial sales and the decree of distribution. In some of these 
states we shall find that the jurisdiction of the probate court 
is limited to particular proceedings with respect to land or to 
particular lands of the decedent. But in others we may con­
clude from these specific provisions as to jurisdiction that 
the court does have general jurisdiction over the decedent's 
lands during the whole cours� of administration. 
In a majority of states, statutes require that lands be in­
cluded in the inventory.286 It is believed, however, that this 
285 Cal. Pro b. Code (Deering, I 94 I )  § 57 r .  
286 The statutes in the following states so provide : Ariz. Code ( I  9 3 9) 
§ 3 8-803 ; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, I94I) § 6oo ; Colo. Stat. ( I 9 3 5 )  c. I 76, 
§ I45 ; Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 93o) § 491 I (all the property except real estate 
situated outside the state) ; D. C. Code ( 1 940) § I 8-4oi (inventory includes 
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may not be of great significance in determining the question 
of jurisdiction. 287 Its purpose may well be to enable the court 
to determine how large the estate is and whether it is solvent. 
Thus, in Massachusetts land must be included in the inven­
tory.288 Yet the personal representative ordinarily has no 
right to the rents and profits during the administration.289 
The decree of distribution does not deal with real estate.290 
And, while sales of land take place under license of the pro­
bate court, the personal representative has no right to deal 
with any land until such license is obtained.291 One writer 
on the subject has summed the matter up by saying: 292 
"Ordinarily, unless the will provides otherwise, the execu­
tor or administrator has nothing directly to do with real es­
tate." On the other hand, in New Y ark state, where the in­
ventory does not include real estate, 293 the surrogate's court 
realty only if court so orders) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 733 .04 (all the prop­
erty) ; Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) §§ I q-I40I 1  I q-I402 (includes real estate in 
the county where administration is had) ; Idaho Code ( I 9  3 2 )  § I 5-403 ; Ill. 
- Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I94I)  c. 3, §§ 323-324 ;  Iowa Code ( I 939) § I I 9 I 3 ;  
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-1 20I ; Me. Laws, I 935 1  c. 78, p. 257 ;  
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 9 J 2) c .  I 951 § 5 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 27.3 I 7 8  (382) ; 
Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 525.3 3 ;  Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942) § s S ;  Mont. 
Rev. Code ( I 935 )  § I O I 3 I ; Neb. Comp. Stat. ( I 929) § 3o-4o i ; Nev. Comp. 
Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  § 9 8 82 . Ioo ; N. M. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 3 3-302 ; N. C. Gen. 
Stat. ( I 943) § 28-s o ;  N. D. Comp. Laws ( I 9 I J ) § 8 7 I 4 ;  Ohio Gen. Code 
(Page, I 9 3 7) § I o5o9-4I (real estate located in Ohio) ; Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  
t .  5 8, § 2 8 3 ; Ore. Comp. Laws ( I 940) § I 9-40I ;  S .  D .  Code ( I 939) 
§ J5 . I 2o3 ; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 925) § 340 8 ;  Utah Code ( I 943) 
§ Io2-7-3 ; Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 9 3 3 )  § 2805 ; Va. Code ( I 942) § 5403 ; Wash. 
Rev. Stat. ( I 932)  § I 466 ; W. Va. Code ( I 9 3 7) § 4 I 8 2 ;  Wis. Stat. ( I 943) 
§ 3 I 2.0I ("all the property") ;  Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 9 3 I )  § 88-2303. 
287 In Lindholm v. Nelson, 1 2 5  Kan. 223  at 2291 264 P. so ( I 92 8 ) 1  the 
court said : "There are several reasons why it is advisable to have the real estate 
listed in the inventory, but this listing gives the administrator no authority 
over it, and gives the probate court no j urisdiction to dispose of it, except under 
conditions specifically provided by statute." 
288 See note 1 31 supra. 
289 Towle v. Swasey, I o6 Mass. I oo ( I  8 70) . 
290 See NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSA­
CHUSETTS (3d ed. I 9 3 7) § 2 I o ;  Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 93 2 )  c. 206, § 2 I .  
291 Hooker v .  Porter, 2 7 I  Mass. 44I1  I 7 I  N .  E .  7 I  3 ( I 9 3o) . 
202 NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHU-· 
SETTS (Jd ed. I 937)  p. I 891 § 76 • 
... N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, §§ I 95-I 97· 
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is by statute given power "in the cases and in the manner 
prescribed by statute To direct the disposition 
of real property, and interests in real property of decedents, 
and the disposition of the proceeds thereof" 294 and perhaps 
it may be said that the court has at least potential, if not actual, 
jurisdiction over the decedent's land during probate. 
In most states, sales of land to pay debts and legacies are, 
or can be, handled in the probate court.295 In others, it is 
necessary to initiate an independent proceeding in the court 
of general jurisdiction for this purpose.296 If a state is of the 
latter group, it is clear that the probate court does not have 
general jurisdiction of land of the decedent. On the other 
hand, if the sale is in the probate court, it may be that, as in 
Massachusetts, only the specific piece of land to be sold comes 
under the supervision of the probate court for this purpose. 
Other provisions in various states, dealing with the juris­
diction of the probate courts (or of personal representatives) 
over land in particular situations, are statutes as to the specific 
performance of land contracts,297 statutes as to the personal 
representative's right to the possession of land, or to the rents 
' 
... Id. at § 40. The personal representative is given power to tak'e possession 
of the real property and sell, mortgage or lease it. N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, §§ I 3 
and 1 23 .  In general, see 3 WARREN'S HEATON, SURROGATES' COURTS (6th ed. 
1 94 1 )  § 230. . 
..,. States in which the probate court (or other court exercising probate j uris­
diction) does not handle sales of land are Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico 
and West Virginia. In North Carolina the clerk of the superior court has the 
functions of a probate court, but sales of real estate are handled by the superior 
court itself. Indiana probably belongs to this group also. In that state the 
circuit court handles probate business, sitting as a probate court, and also has 
ordinary civil jurisdiction. Sales of land are handled in this court in a separate 
proceeding, but it may be questioned whether such a proceeding is in the pro­
bate or civil side of the court. 
In other states the probate court (or other court exercising probate jurisdiction) 
has jurisdiction over sales of land. This j urisdiction may be exclusive, e.g., 
Ga. Code Ann. ( 1 9 3 7) § 24-1901 ,  or concurrent with some other court, e.g., Va. 
Code ( I 942) § 5396 . 
... For a statute of this sort, see Neb. Comp. Stat. ( r 929) § 30-r I 02 .  
""' See, for example, Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 9 3 2) c .  2.04, § I ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. 
( 1 943) § 2.7·3 i78 (so9) et seq. 
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and profits of it, statutes as to his right to bring particular 
suits with respect to land,298 statutes providing for a specific 
decree of distribution to include interests in land, statutes 
providing for the partition of interests of distributees in . 
land,299 and statutes providing for the determination of heir­
ship.aoo 
Perhaps the most significant of these are the ones dealing 
with the personal representative's control of real estate and 
with the decree of distribution. The California statutes re­
quiring the personal representative to take control of real 
estate have already been referred to.301 The Indiana statute 
provides that the personal representative may take possession 
of the real estate if there is no heir or devisee to take posses-
298 Cal. Pro b. Code (Deering, I 94 I )  § 57 3 : "Actions for the recovery of any 
property, real or personal, or for the possession thereof, or to quiet title thereto, 
or to determine any adverse claim thereon may be maintained by 
and against executors and administrators." 
Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I  94I)  § 7 3 3 .02 provides that the personal representative 
may bring actions with respect to real property for the purpose of quieting title 
for trespass, for waste, and against co-tenants. Provision is also made for heirs 
or devisees themselves, or jointly with the personal representative, to bring 
suits for the possession or recovery of real estate or to quiet the title thereto. 
While presumably in neither of these states would the suit be brought as an 
action in probate, the personal representative would, in suing, be acting as an 
appointee of the court sitting in probate. 
209 These are of two kinds: (a) Those providing for partition where the de­
cedent was a co-tenant. Here the suit would not ordinarily be in the probate 
court. See Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, I 94I ) § 5 75 ·  (b) They may provide 
for a partition in the probate court by heirs or devisees who take the decedent's 
land as co-tenants. 
300 In a jurisdiction where there is a specific order of distribution which in­
cludes land, the proceeding for the determination of heirship is likely to be an 
independent proceeding, whether it is in the probate court or not, because it is 
chiefly employed in a case where there has been no administration proceeding. 
See Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 525.3 I ,  where the proceeding is in the probate court, 
and applies to unadministered land or to situations "when real estate or any 
interest therein has not been included in a final decree." But compare Mich. 
Stat. Ann. ( I 943)  §§ 2 7.3 1 7 8 ( I45 )  to 27 .3 I 7 8 ( 1 49 )  where the determination 
is in the probate court and may be either independent of or a part of the ad­
ministration proceeding. Where the personal representative does not take 
charge of land and the probate court does not purport to distribute it, it would 
seem that the determination of heirship is an independent proceeding. See Ill. 
Ann. Stat. {Smith-Hurd, I 94 1 )  c. 3, §§ 209-2 I 1  (probate court) . 
301 See notes 1 o and I 2, supra. 
ORGANIZATION OF PROBATE COURT :457 
sion, but does not require him to do so. 302 Still other states 
vest the right to possession of land in the heir or devisee. 303 
Some statutes expressly provide that the personal representa­
tive is entitled to rents and profits of land, 304 and, indeed, this 
would seem to be implied where he is given a right to pos­
sessiOn. 
In a considerable number of states the decree of distribu­
tion must make a specific distribution of real and personal 
property of the estate. Thus, the Michigan statute on this 
subject reads in part as follows : 305 
" the probate court shall, by order for that pur--
pose, assign the residue of the estate, if any, to such persons 
as are by law entitled to the same 
"In such order the court shall name the per-
sons and the proportions or parts to which each shall be en­
titled." 
It is not uncommon to have a statute such as the above fol­
lowed by provisions for the partition of interests of co­
distributees. Thus the provisions in the Michigan probate 
code on this subject begin as follows : 306 
"When the estate, real or personal, assigned to 2 or more 
heirs, devisees or legatees shall be in common and undivided, 
and the respective . shares shall not be separa�ed and distin­
guished the probate court may on the petition of 
any of the persons interested fix a date for hearing on the 
partition and distribution." 
In other states the only provisions for a decree of distribution 
are restricted to personal property. 307 
302 See Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 9 3 3) § 6-I I 5 1 .  
... Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942) § 1 29 (personal representative not entitled to 
possession or to rents and profits except on court order) . 
""'E.g., Ariz. Code ( I 939) § 3 8-809. · 
... Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) §§ 2 7.3 I 78 ( I 65) ,  27.3 I 78 ( I 66) . 
806 Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 2.7.3 I 7 8 ( I 68 )  • 
... Ore. Comp. Laws ( I 940) §§ 1 9-12.01 ,  1 9-1 2.02.. 
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Returning to our original question, it would seem that if 
statutes give the personal representative possession of the 
real estate during the administration and provide for a probate 
decree distributing the real estate to those entitled, the probate 
court does have jurisdiction over the decedent's lands through­
out the course of administration. On the other hand we may 
in some instances reach the same conclusion without both of 
these types of statutes. But in other states, all we can con­
clude is that the probate court does have jurisdiction of the 
decedent's lands in �ertain matters during administration. 
· 
In conclusion, it is apparent that a maj ority of probate 
courts have a very considerable jurisdiction over land. While 
it is true that the mere filing of an inventory which includes 
land or. the probating of a will devising land does not call for 
any extensive knowledge of land law, when it comes to making 
a specific decree distributing land, the same knowledge of the 
intricacies of the law of real property is required of the probate 
judge as is called for in the case of the trial judge who con­
strues a complicated land trust agreement. Indeed, whether 
the statutes specifically empower the probate court to construe 
wills or not (and many of them in fact do so) 308 the judge 
who makes a specific decree of distribution, such as is required 
by the Michigan statute already quoted, must be prepared to 
construe an intricate testamentary disposition of land. When 
we add to that the fact that �any statutes also give the probate 
court jurisdiction of testamentary trusts involving land, and 
even, in some states, of inter vivos trusts involving land, the 
conclusion is hard to avoid that a judge is needed in the pro­
bate court who is as well qualified as the judge of the trial 
court of general jurisdiction. Indeed it might be said that he 
should be a specialist in the law of property in its broadest 
aspects. 
808 N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 401· subd. 8. 
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VI. J uRrsDicTION oF PRoBATE CouRTS OvER MATTERS 
OTHER THAN DEcEDENTs' EsTATES 
The scope of probate court functions has ever been a varying 
one. We h�ve already traced one aspect of this in noting an 
expanding jurisdiction and control over the administration 
of decedents' estates. Jurisdiction in other fields has also been 
gradually added to that possessed by the probate court as an 
established institution. The totality of its functions today 
makes the maintenance of a probate court in every county 
almost a necessity. 
Mention has been made of the origin of orphans' courts in 
this country.309 If it was a natural step for probate juris­
diction to be conferred upon orphans' courts, it certainly was 
not an unnatural step for a jurisdiction over minors and their 
estates to be added to organized probate courts elsewhere. 
The historical amalgamation of guardianship and curatorship 
with probate jurisdiction is readily understandable where oc­
casioned by the administration upon a decedent's estate in 
which minors are interested. 
In England guardians of the person and property of minors 
were appointed by the court of chancery and the court of ex­
chequer.310 They were also appointed by ecclesiastical courts 
with respect to personalty.311 In America a general power to 
make such appointments has always been regarded as inherent 
in courts possessing equity powers.312 No interest in a de­
cedent's estate is necessary to invoke this power . . But the ex­
pensiveness and cumbersomeness of equity procedure early led 
to giving this j urisdiction-at least a concurrent one-to other 
courts.313 Guardianship of the persons of minors and of their 
ll09 See discussion under li-B at note 59, supra. 
310,WOERNER, GUARDI.'\NSHIP ( r 897)  § r 6. 
311 ld. at § 3 ·  
312 I d. a t  § r 8.  
313 See, for example, Complete Revisal of all the Acts of Assembly of the 
Province of North Carolina, printed by Davis, zBs-z91 ( 1 773) and Laws of 
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estates has since become an established part of probate juris­
diction. 314 A constitutional provision conferring general juris­
diction upon probate courts in all probate matters has been 
said to include the power to appoint guardians.315 Only in 
rare cases does equity appoint guardians or assume a continu­
ing control over them. 316 
Guardianship over insane persons, lunatics, idiots, imbeciles 
or incompetents by whatever name they may be called, orig­
inally within the jurisdiction of the English chancery courts, 
has also been lodged for the most part in established probate 
North Carolina, edited by Iredell, 202-208 ( 1 7 9 1 )  (act of 1 762) . See also 
WOERNER, GUARDIANSHIP ( 1 897)  § r 8 . 
310 This development is fully described in WoERNER, GUARDIANSHIP (I 89 7) 
§ 24. Jurisdiction over guardians of minors and their estates is vested in the 
court exercising probate jurisdiction as follows : Ala. Code ( r 940) t. I 3, § 2 7 8 ; 
Ariz. Code ( 1 939)  § 42-r or ; Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1 9 3 7 )  § 2 8 8 3 ; Cal. Prob. 
Code (Deering, 1 94 1 )  § 140 5 ;  Colo. Canst., art. 6, § 2 3 ; Colo. Stat. ( I  9 3 5 )  
c .  76, § r ,  c .  1 76, § 8 3 ; Conn. Gen. Stat. ( 1 930)  §§ 49 7 3, 4808 ; Del. Rev. 
Code ( 1 9 3 5 )  c. 8 9 ;  D. C. Code ( 1 940) § r r-504 ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 1 )  
§ 36 .o i ; Ga. Code Ann. ( 1 936)  § 24-1901 ; Idaho Canst., art. 5 ,  § 2 I ; Idaho 
Code ( 1 932)  § r-1 202 ; Ill. Canst., art. 6, §§ r 8, 20 ; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith­
Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3 7, § 303 ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 9 3 3 )  §§ 4-303, 4-29 10, 
4-3 o i o ;  Iowa Code ( I 9 39 )  § Io763 ; Kan. Canst., art. 3> § 8 ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. 
(Supp. 1 943)  § 59-30 1 ; Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 942) §§ 25. I I 01 3 8 7 .020 ; Me. Rev. 
Stat. ( I 9 3o) c. 7 5, § 9 ;  Md. Code ( 1 939)  art. 93 ,  § r s z ;  Mass. Ann. Laws 
( 1 9 3 2 )  c. 2 1 5, §§ 3, 4 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943 )  § 2 7 . 3 I 7 8 ( r 9 ) ; Minn. 
Canst., art. 6, § 7 ;  Minn. Stat. ( 1 941 ) § 525 ·54;  Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 404 ; 
Mo. Const., art. 6, § 3 4 ;  Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I  942) § 243 7 ;  Mont. Rev. 
Code ( - 93 5 )  § I 040I ; Neb. Const., art. 5, § r 6 ;  Neb. Camp. Stat. ( 1 929) 
§§ 2 7-503, 27-504; Nev. Canst., art. 6 ,  § 6 ;  N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c .  346, 
§ 4 ;  N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7 ) §§ 3 :7-2J . I ,  3 :7-2 8 ;  N. M. Stat. ( r 94 r )  § r 6-
4 r o ;  N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, §§ 40, 1 7 3 ;  N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943)  §§ 2-r 6, 3 3  -r ; 
N. D. Canst., art. 4, § r r r ;  N. D. Camp. Laws ( r 9 I 3 )  § 8524;  Ohio Canst., 
art. 4, § 8 ;  Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 93 7 )  § r osor-5 3 ; Okla. Canst., art. 7, 
§ 1 3 ;  Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t. 20, § 2 7 1 ; Ore. Camp. Laws ( 1 940) §§ 1 3-sor,  
2 2-ro r ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 9 3 0) t. 20,  § 2241 ; R. I .  Gen. Laws ( r 93 8 )  
c .  426 and c .  569, § r ;  S. C. Code ( 1 942) §§  zo8, 209 ; S. D.  Canst., art. 5, 
§ 2 0 ;  S. D. Code ( 1 939)  §§ J 5 . r 8o r  et seq. and 32 .0909 ; Tenn. Code (Michie, 
1 93 8 )  § 1 0225 ; Tex. Const., art. 5, § r 6 ;  Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 925) 
art. 4 1 02 et seq. ; Utah Code ( 1 94 3 )  § 1 02-1 3-r et seq. ; Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 9 3 3 )  
§ 2 723 ; Va. Code ( 1 942) § 5 3 1 6 ;  Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 2) § 1 3 7 1 ;  W. Va. 
Canst., art. 8, § 24 ;  W. Va. Code ( 1 93 7 )  § 3 5 7 ; Wis. Stat. ( 1 943 )  §§ 253 ·03, 
3 1 9.or ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( r 9 3 1 )  c. so. 
315 Stewart Oil Co. v. Lee, (Tex. Civ. App. 1 943)  1 7 3 S. W. (2d) 79 r ; 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hansen, 3 6  Okla. 459, 1 �9  P. 6o 
( 1 9 1 2) ; Monastes v. Catlin, 6 Ore. I I 9  ( 1 8 7 6 ) .  
""' WOERNER, GUARDIANSHIP ( 1 89 7 )  52-53 .  
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courts in this country or in courts exercising probate juris­
diction. 317 
Recognizing the need for some supervision over incompe­
tents and to satisfy the requirement of the federal law designed 
to insure that the compensation and insurance paid by the 
U.S. Veterans' Bureau is properly conserved for their benefit, 
servicemen, their estates and dependents, thirty-four states 
have enacted the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act with 
some variations.318 A degree of uniformity has thus been at­
tained in the appointment of guardians for such servicemen 
and the administration of their estates derived frorri the Vet­
erans Administration. The original act as promulgated by 
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1 928  provides 
317 Ibid. Curatorship or conservatorship over estates of insane persons and 
other incompetents is vested in the court exercising probate jurisdiction as 
follows : Ala. Code ( I 940) t. 1 3, § 2 7 8 ;  Ariz. Code ( I 939)  § 42-1 3 5 ;  Ark. 
Dig. Stat. ( I  9 3 7) § 2 8 8 3 ; Cal. Pro b. Code (Deering, I 941 )  § I 40 5 ;  Colo. 
Const., art. 6, § 2 3 ; Colo. Stat. ( I 9 3 5 )  c. Ios, § 9, c. I 76, § 84 ; Conn. Gen. 
' Stat. ( I 930) § 48 I 5 ;  Del. Rev. Code ( I 935 )  c. 89 ; D. C. Code ( I 940) t. 2 I ,  
c. 2 (limited j 1.1risdiction oply) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 744.24 et seq. ; Ga. 
Code Ann. ( I 936) § 24-I 90I ; Idaho Const., art. 5, § 2 I ; Idaho Code ( I 9J2)  
§ 1-I  202 ; Ill. Canst., art. 6 ,  §§ I 8 ,  2 0 ;  Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 941 )  
c. 3 7, § 303 ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 9 3 3 )  §§ 4-303, 4-29 Io, 4-3 o i o ;  Iowa Code 
(I 939)  § I 0763 ; Kan. Const., art. 3, § 8 ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943)  
§ 59-30I ; Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 942) §§ 25 . 1  I o, 3 8 7.020, 3 8 7.2 1 0 ;  Me. Rev. 
Stat. ( I 930) c. 75, § 9 ;  Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 9 3 2 )  c. 2 I 5, § 3 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. 
( 1943) § 2 7 .3 I 7 8 ( I 9 ) ; Minn. Const., art. 6, § 7 ;  Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  · 
§ 525.54; Miss. Code ( I 942) § 4 30 ;  Mo. Const., art. 6, § 34 ;  Mo. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. ( 1 942) § 243 7 ;  Mont. Rev. Code ( I 9 3 5 )  § I 04I 2 ;  Neb. Canst., art. 5 ,  
§ I6 ;  Neb. Camp. Stat. ( I 929) §§ 2 7-503, 27-504 ; Nev. Canst., art. 6 ,  § 6 ;  
N. H. Rev. Laws ( I 942) c. 346, § 4 ;  N. J. Rev. Stat. ( I 9 3 7 )  § §  3 :7-3 3, 
3 :7-4I ; N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § I 6-4 1 o ;  N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943)  §§ 2-I 6, 
3 3-I ; N. D. Canst., art. 4, § I I I ; N. D. Comp. Laws ( I 9 1 3 )  § 8524 ;  .Ohio 
Canst., art. 4, § 8 ;  Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 93 7) § 1 050I-5 3 ; Okla. Canst., 
art. 7> § I 3 ;  Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 I )  t. 20, § 2 7 1 ; Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) 
§§ I 3-50 I ,  2 2-Io i ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, r 930) t. 20, § 224I ; R.  I.  Gen. 
Laws ( I 9 3 8 )  c. 426 and c. 569, § I ; S. C. Code ( I 942) §§ 208, 2 09 ; S. D. 
Canst., art. 5 ,  § 2 0 ;  S. D. Code ( I 93 9 )  §§ 3 5. I 80I et seq. and 3 2.0909 ; Tenn. 
Code (Michie, I 9 3 8) § to22 5 ;  Tex. Canst., art. 5, § I 6 ;  Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
(Vernon, I 925)  art. 4 I 02 et seq . ;  Utah Code ( I 943) § I 02-I 3-I et seq. ; 
Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 9 3 3 )  § 2723 ; Va. Code ( I 942) § Ioso ;  Wash. Rev. Stat. 
( I 9 32 )  § I 3 7 I ; W. Va. Canst., art. 8, § 2 4 ;  W. Va. Code ( I 9 3 7 )  § 3 5 7 ;  
Wis. Stat. ( I 943 )  § §  253.03, 3 I 9 .0I ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 9 3 I )  c. so. 818 See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED ( I 942) 7 3 5• 
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for guardianship proceedings to be had in "any court of com­
petent jurisdiction." 319 The revision of this act by the com­
missioners in 1 942 makes no mention of any specific court.320 
Nowhere is a reference to be found as to whether the probate, 
equity or court of general jurisdiction is referred to. Pre­
sumably the court where guardianships for other incompetents 
are cognizable is intended. 
Jurisdiction over juvenile delinquents has involved totally 
different problems from general supervision over the prop­
erty of minors or incompetents. Juvenile courts have been 
created in many places.321 In some states such jurisdiction 
has been merely added to that of courts of general jurisdiction. 
In Idaho, Michigan and South Dakota it has been tacked on to 
the jurisdiction of probate courts.322 
More closely related to the primary function of the adminis­
tration of estates is the supervision over testamentary trusts. 
While it is true that the administration of a decedent's estate 
ceases upon final set_tlement and distribution by the personal 
representative to the testamentary trustee, it is also true, in a 
very real sense, that the subsequent administration by the 
testamentary trustee is but a continuation of the administra­
tion by the executor or administrator. In any matter requir­
ing it, the jurisdiction of equity might be invoked at the in­
stance of the trustee or of any beneficiary either as a (emedial 
or a declaratory process. Any such procedure could be re­
peated any number of times. The more often equity juris­
diction is invoked in the administration of a single trust, the 
319 Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act ( 1 928 )  § 4· 
320 Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act ( 1 942) § 5· 
321 For a discussion of this jurisdiction and of the various courts established 
to handle such matters, see 5 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS ( 1 932)  and 
Supplement ( 1 93 8 )  § 277 .  
"'" Idaho Code ( 1 93 2 )  § 3 1-1 302 ; Mich. Const., art. 7 ,  § 1 3 ;  Mich. Stat. 
Ann. ( 1 943) § 27 .3 1 7 8 (57 1 ) ; S. D. Code ( 1 939)  § 43 .0302.  In a few other 
states probate courts have been given j urisdiction in juvenile matters in certain 
counties. 
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more nearly it approaches complete supervisory jurisdiction. 
Equity has the power to exercise arid frequently does exercise 
such complete supervision. Because of the similarity of the 
problems involved, the close relationship between the pro­
bate administration of the decedent's estate and the continued 
administration of the testamentary trust created by the de­
cedent's will, and the fact that the trustee is often the same 
person who has served as executor, there has been a marked 
tendency to subject the latter administration to probate, rather 
than equity, supervision. Such is now an integral part of the 
probate statutes of some twenty-four states.323 An exami­
nation of these statutes reveals that the amount of such super­
vision varies from a duty on the part of the trustee to account 
periodically to the court to a more or less complete super­
vision approximating that of the probate court over the ex­
ecutor in the prior administration of the estate of the decedent. 
Many of the same arguments could be assigned for sub­
jecting inter. vivos trusts to the same supervision. Only a 
preceding probate administration is lacking. However, 
many settlors prefer not to subject the trust created, by them 
323 Ariz. Code ( I 939)  § 3 8-I509 (for settlement of accounts) ; Cal. Prob. 
Code (Deering, I 94 I )  § I I 20 ;  Colo. Stat. (Supp. I 943 ) c. I 76, § 227  (but 
testator may provide for no supervision in county court) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. 
( I 93o) §§ 4972-4976 ;  Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 9 3 3 )  §§ 4-29 Io, 4-3 o i o  (in 
Marion and Vanderburgh counties) and (Burns, Supp. I 943) §§ 6-250I to 
6-2526 ;  Iowa Code ( I 939)  §§ I0764, I I 8 7 6 ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) 
§§ 59-I 6o I to 59-I 6 I I (but testator may provide for no supervision in probate 
court) ; Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 93o) c. 75, § 2, c. 82,  §§ I-I J (concurrent with 
superior court) ; Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. 2 I 5, § 6 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) 
§ 27.3 I 7 8 ( I 9 ) ; Mont. Rev. Code ( I 935)  § I 0352 ; Neb. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 
I94I ) §§ 3 o-I 8oi  to 3 o-I 866 ;  Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  §§ 7 7 I 8-
77I 8 .26 ; N. H .  Rev. Laws ( I 942) c. 3 6 3 ; N. J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. I 94 I-43 )  
§§ 3 :7-I 3 ·4> 3 :7-1 3·5 (only to qualify and have letters issued) ; N .  Y .  Surr. 
Ct. Act, §§ I 67-I 7 I  (limited control) ; N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943) § 2 8-53 (for 
filing inventory and rendering accounts) ; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 9 3 7 )  
§§  I050I-53 ,  I 0506-3 9 ;  Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 9 30) t. 20 ,  § 2 242 (or­
phans' court) ; S. C. Code ( I 942) § 209 ; Utah Code ( I 943)  §§ I02-I 2-3 I ,  
I02- I 2-32  (for rendition o f  accounts) ; Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 9 3 3 )  c .  1 34 (for 
rendition of annual accounts) ; Wash. Rev. Stat, (Supp. I 94 I )  §§ I I 548-I to 
I I 548-28 (amended. by Wash. Laws, I 943, c. I 52) ; Wis. Stat. ( I 943) 
§ 25J •OJ.  
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to judicial supervision, but to rely upon the integrity and 
ability of the trustee whom they have selected. Indiana, 
Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada and Pennsylvania have �rought 
inter vivos trusts under the supervisory control of probate 
courts.324 In Maine such jurisdiction may be invoked either 
· in the probate or superior court.325 In Kansas such juris­
diction is possible where the beneficiary is a person under 
guardianship. 326 Recent legislation has extended this juris­
diction to include life insurance trusts in Pennsylvania.327 
A number of other functions have been added piecemeal 
to the broadening horizon of probate jurisdiction. Marriages 
may be solemnized by probate judges in some states.328 Di­
vorces may be granted in the probate courts of Massachu­
setts, 329 and in the county courts of Colorado 330 if the amount 
of alimony sought does not exceed $'2000. Adoption pro­
ceedings have been lodged here in more than one-third of the 
states ; 331 and proceedings for change of nan:te in a few 
,.. Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 9 3 3 )  §§ 4-29 10, 4-30 10  and (Burns, Supp. 1 943) 
§§ 6-2 5 1 2  et seq . ;  Iowa Code ( 1 9 39 )  §§ 10764, I I 8 7 6 ;  Mass. Ann. Laws 
( 1 9 3 2 )  c. 2 1 5, § 6 ;  Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 1 ) §§ 7 7 1 8 . 1 1 ,  7 7 1 8 .1 2 ;  
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1 943 )  t. 20, § 225 3a. 
""" Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 930)  c. 75, § 2 ;  c. 82, §§ 1 4-1 6. 
326 Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 94 3 )  §§ 59-1 601 to 59-1 6 1 1 .  
327 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. :i943 ) t. 20, § 2253b. 
828 No attempt is made here to collect the legislation on this subject. Fre-
quently this power is bestowed upon judges of courts of record. 
329 Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 9 3 2 )  c. 2 1 5, § 3 ·  
880 Colo. Stat. ( 1 93 5 )  c. 56, § 3 · 
831 Ala. Code ( 1 940) t. 2 7, §§ 1-9 ; Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1 93 7 )  § 254 ;  Colo. 
Stat. ( 1 9 3 5 )  c. 4, § I  (jurisdiction in district or county court provided there 
is no j uvenile court in the county) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. ( 1 9 30) §§ 48o9-48 1o ;  
Del. Rev. Code ( I 9 3 5 )  §§  3 550-3553  (orphans' court) ; Idaho Code ( 1 932)  
§ 3 1-1 1 o6 ; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c .  4 ,  §§ I-I J (in circuit or 
county court) ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, Supp. 1 943 )  § 3-1 I 5 ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. 
(Supp. 1 943) § 59-2 1 0 I ; Ky. Rev. �tat. ( r 942) §§ 405 . I40 to 405.990 ; Me. 
Rev. Stat. ( 1 930) c. 75,  § 9 ;  Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 932)  c. 2 1 0, § I  and c. 2 1 5, 
§ 3 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943)  § 2 7.3 1 78 (54I )  et seq. ; Neb. Comp. Stat. 
( 1 929) § 43-I o 1  et seq . ;  N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c. 3 46, § 5 ;  N. J. Rev. 
Stat. ( I 93 7 )  § 9 :3-I (orphans' court) ; N. Y. Domestic Relations Law, § I09 
et seq. (concurrent with certain other courts) ; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 
1 943)  §§ 105 1 2-9 to 1 05 1 2-2 3 ; Okla. Stat. ( 1 94I ) t .. I o, §§ 46, 49 ;  Ore. 
Comp. Laws ( I 94o) § 63-40I ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. I 943 )  t. 1, 
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states. 332 The granting of writs of habeas corpus has also 
been given to some probate courts,S33 presumably on the as­
sumption that when the general trial judge is not available, 
the probate judge can function since he is a judicial officer. 
The combination of small civil and criminal jurisdiction 
with probate matters has been alluded to in discussing the 
early history of probate courts.834 In a dozen states at the . 
present time limited civil and criminal jurisdiction is lodged 
in the court having probate jurisdiction.335 
Some form of inheritance or estate taxes are now levied by 
every state except Nevada. The assessment of such a tax 
must needs occur more or less contemporaneously with the 
administration of the estate, because values at the date of 
death will determine the amount of tax, and payment by the 
personal representative out of assets in his hands is the most 
feasible and certain way of securing payment to the sovereign. 
In the determination of the tax the services and offices of the 
probate court in charge of the administration will be needed. 
The nature of the part to be played by the probate court in the 
accomplishment of this task varies all the way from furnishing 
§§ r-s {orphans' court except in Philadelphia county where the municipal 
court has jurisdiction) ; R. I. Gen. Laws { 19 3 8 )  c. 569, § r ;  S. D. Code ( 1 9 39 )  
§§  14.040I to 1 4.0408 ; Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 93 8 )  §§ 956 1 ,  1 0225 (con­
current with circuit court) ; Vt. Pub. Laws { 1 93 3 )  § 3 322  {amended by Vt. 
Laws, 1 941 ,  No. 46, § 2 ) ; Wis. Stat. ( 1 943 ) c. 3 22. . 
In Arizona, California, Iowa, Louisiana, Nevada, Nbrth Carolina, Utah, 
Virginia, Washington and Wyoming adoption proceedings are had in the 
court of general j urisdiction, which also handles probate matters. 
""" Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 942) §§ 4or .o r o  to 401 .04o ;  Me. Rev. Stat. { 1 930) c. 
75, § 9 ;  Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 9 3 2 )  c. 2 15 ,  § 3 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. { 1 943)  
§§  2 7·3 I 7 8 (54I-545, s6r-s6z) ; Ore. Camp. Laws ( 1 940) §§  I I-701 to 
u-703 ; R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 93 8 )  c. 5 69, § r ;  Tenn. Code {Michie, 1 9 3 8 )  
§ 1 0225· 
332 Ala. Code ( 1 940) t. 1 3, § 2.97 ;  Ind. Stat. (Burns, 19 33) § 4-2 9 1  o; Kan. 
Canst., art. 3, § 8 ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. {Supp. 1 943) § 59-3 0 1 ; Ohio Canst., art. 
4, § 8 ;  Ohio Gen. Code {Page, 1 9  3 7 )  § LO so r-;-5 3 ; Ore. Const., art. 7, § I J  • 
.. , See discussion under 11-B and notes 7 2  and 73 ,  supra. 
335 A limited civil or criminal j urisdiction, or both, is vested in the cour� hav­
ing jurisdiction in probate matters in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Ken­
tucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas and 
Wisconsin. 1 
• 
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information to those actually assessing the tax to the actual 
assessment of the tax itself. The former method of having 
the probate court furnish the information and data to those 
charged with the assessing function exists in Delaware, Okla­
homa and South Carolina. 336 In nearly half the states this 
task is performed by or under the direction of the probate 
court, 337 while in a few others the probate court on appeal may 
hear and determine all questions relating to such tax. 338 
VII. THE PERSONNEL oF THE PRoBATE CouRT 
A. THE PROBATE JUDGE 
The problem of probate court organization is not unrelated 
to the personnel of probate courts. Efficiency of operation de­
mands competence on the part of those persons who are charged 
with the duty of administering the business of such courts. 
In the administration of decedents' estates probate courts have 
supervision of matters having a financial value far in excess 
of what is commonly believed. Justices of the peace are 
usually restricted to a jurisdiction of a few hundred dollars, 
whereas probate judges are given exclusive jurisdiction of 
estates that may be valued in the thousands or millions of 
""' Del. Rev. Code ( I 9 3 5 )  § I 3 8 ;  Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I ) t. 68, § 9 89r; S. C. 
Code ( I  942) § 2489. 
337 Cal. Gen. LawsJDeering, 1 9 3 7) Act 8495, §§ I 5, I 6 ;  Colo. Stat. ( 1935)  
c .  85,  § 59 ;  Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 9 35 )  § 1 3 80 ; Idaho Code ( 1 932 )  § 14-
4 1 7 ;  Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 940) c. 1 2o, §§ 3 85, 3 8 8 ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, 
1 9 3 3 )  § 6-24I o ;  Iowa Code ( I 939)  § 7 3 3 6 ;  Md. Code ( I 9 39 )  art. S r ,  §§ 
r o9 to 1 4o ;  Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 2 9 I .25 ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942) § 5 86 ;  
Mont. Rev. Code 'fr 9 35 )  § ro4oo. I 3 ;  Neb. Comp. Stat. ( I 929)  §§  77-22 I I ,  
7 7-22 1 3 ;  N. Y. Tax Law, §§ 249t, 249w;  N. D. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 925)  
§§ 2346 b 2 6, b 25, b 3 8  (amended by N.  D.  Laws, I 927, c .  267, § 4) ; Ohio 
Gen. Code (Page, I 9 3 7) §§ 5340, 5 345 ; Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) § 2o-I 3 5 ;  
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930)  t. 72, § 2 3 2 I ; S. D. Code ( I 9 3 9 )  § §  5 7.2202, 
5 7.23os, 57 .2 3 0 7 ;  Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 9 3 9 )  art. 7 I 3 I ; Utah 
Code ( I 943 ) § 8o-I 2-I 5 j  Vt, Pub. Laws ( 1 9 3 3 )  §§ r os s, I 063-I 067 i  Wis. 
Stat. ( 1 943) §§ 72. 1 2, 72. I 5, 72 ·55 ·  
838 Ark. Acts, 1 94 r ,  Act 13  6, p .  3 3 3 ;  Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I  9 30)  § 1 3 84 ;  Ill. 
Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 940) c. uo, § 3 8 8 ; Mass. Ann. Laws ( r 9'32)  c. 
65, § 2 7 ;  N. Y. Tax Law, § 249x ; Va. Code ( I 942) § r r o ;  W. Va. Code 
( 1 9 37 )  § 862. 
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dollars. In approximately one-half of the states, it is possible 
to elect laymen to office. · The probate court of one such 
state has been characterized as "a court thatis not required to 
know any law and that does not know any more than the law 
requires." 339 
r .  American failures to appraise the standards for the office 
It is generally accepted that supreme court and trial judges 
should be capable men-"learned in the law," as is sometimes 
said. From the earliest time such a requirement has occupied 
a permanent place in the constitutions of most states. In the 
few states where this is not a constitutional or statutory re­
quirement, persons elected or appointed to such positions have 
nevertheless been lawyers, due largely to the general feeling 
that such should be the case. Similar requirements were 
seldom made for probate judges. The reasons for this were 
severaL In the first place, most of the work of probate judges 
was nonlitigious in character. It was also largely administra­
tive. Secondly, the creation of separate probate courts in each 
county has given rise to a belief that each county could not 
support an office of probate judge with such qualifications. 
Furthermore, men with such qualifications have not always 
been available in every community. Lower requirements, 
shorter tenure, and smaller salaries have been the solution.340 
In the meantime the economic and social elements of life 
have become more complex and technical. This is reflected 
in the complex provisions of wills and trusts, and the character · 
of property ownership, all of which require the supervision of 
probate judges. The probate of wills, the granting of letters, 
and the approval of final settlements no longer constitute the 
bulk of their duties. A knowledge of business, investments 
339 Caron v. Old Reliable Gold Mining Co., 1 2  N. M. 2 1 1  at 226, 7 8  P. 63 
(1 904) . 
340 See Atkinson, "Organization of Probate Courts and Qualifications of Pro­
bate Judges," 2 3  J. AM. Juo. Soc. 9 3  at 94 ( 1 9 39) . 
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. and accounting are a necessary part of the equipment of a 
modern probate judge. Complicated wills require interpreta­
tion to assure proper administration and distribution. Under 
many statutes the equitable jurisdiction of probate courts has 
been increased in response to a need.341 Indeed our probate 
courts have always combined the jurisdiction and powers of 
the English ecclesiastical and chancery courts, but seldom 
have we stopped to consider the full implications of this latter 
jurisdiction . .  The modern probate judge needs to know, more 
than ever before, general substantive law in order to supervise 
the activities of fiduciaries and to insure justice to every class 
of beneficiaries. Furthermore the 'Yhole problem of the ad­
ministration of decedents' estates needs to be viewed as one 
of transferring the various forms of wealth owned and con­
trolled by the decedent to the persons ultimately entitled 
thereto, viz., creditors, the state (as entitled to inheritance 
taxes) , heirs, devisees, and legatees. The task requires not 
merely a manual transfer, but an effective legal transfer so 
that there will be no cause to question its effectiveness in the 
future. The very fact of the nonlitigious character of the pro­
ceeding suggests that an additional c;ompetence and intel­
ligence be exercised by those entrusted with this duty. 
Another phenomenon has also occurred to increase and 
complicate the task of the probate judge. Guardianships and 
curatorships of minors, insane persons, incompetents and war 
veterans, adoptions, change of name, solemnization of mar­
riages and granting of divorces in some few states, have been 
added gradually to that of administering decedents' estates. 
Each of these functions demands a penetrating and specialized 
understanding of human nature.342 In a number of states 
jurisdiction over testamentary trusts, and in a few instances 
,.., For a recent sum,mary of this development see note, "Equitable Jurisdiction 
of Probate Courts and Finality of Probate Decrees," +8 YALE L. J. r z73  ( 1 939) . 
... See discussion under VI, supra. 
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over inter vivos and insurance trusts, has been added. Some 
part in the assessment of inheritance taxes has been added 
to probate duties in practially every state. In the midst of 
these added duties, no probate judge has been heard to com­
plain of lack of sufficient w,ark to do. 
2. Standards for the office of probate judge 
(a) Qualifications. The qualifications required for the 
office of probate judge have not been as exacting as those of 
general circuit or district judges. Admission to the bar or 
being learned in the law is a usual constitutional requirement 
for the latter. Legal or judicial experience is common! y an ad­
ditional requirement. In the case of probate j udges, however, 
the standards are but faintly comparable. In approximately 
one-half of the states 343 probate judges are not required to be 
lawyers or to have had any legal experience. This makes it 
possible for laymen to administer the affairs of this office, and 
in many localities this is the case.344 It has been observed many 
times that a l�w school diploma and rpembership in the bar 
are not in themselves certifications of competence. It is 
equally true that the absence of these is not a mark of incom­
petence. The affairs of many probate qmrts presided over 
by laymen are administered with integrity and common sense. 
But it should be obvious that no layman, however efficient or 
conscientious, should be expected to appreciate and pass upon 
the multitudinous legal aspects involved in the administration 
of an estate. The fact that he can fill out the blanks in a 
printed form does not imply an intelligence necessary for the ' 
843 Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware (register of wills) , Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, "' 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey (surrogates' and orphans' 
court j udges) , Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wi�consin (in 
a very few counties) • 
"" A.s an example, see Smith, "Some Comments on the Di$trict Probate 
System," 7 CONN. BAR. J. s6 ( I9J3) .  
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effective sale or lease of a piece of real estate owned by the 
decedent, nor the wisdom to adjudicate the conflicting claims 
of heirs or beneficiaries. Since many matters are not ques­
tioned at the time or subjected to the scrutiny of immediate 
appellate review, something c'lose to perfection is desirable 
to eli�inate any question of their efficacy at some distant 
time. 
Maine, Maryland, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla­
homa, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Wisconsin have seen 
fit to require that probate judges shall have become members 
of the bar as a prerequisite to holding office. 345 In California, 
Nevada, Washington, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Arizona, 
Iowa, Indiana, Louisiana, Virginia and North Caroli 11a, pro­
bate matters are under the jurisCliction of the courts of general 
jurisdiction and hence administered by the judges of those 
courts. Among this group of states, all but Indiana and North 
Carolina make admission to the bar an essential requirement 
in order to qualify for this office. 346 And in Arkansas and 
Mississippi, where prol;>ate matters come under the jurisdiction 
of chancery judges, a similar requirement is made of these 
judges.347 In Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
York and Pennsylvania, where probate courts are essentially 
on a par with the courts of general jurisdiction, the require-
... Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 9 3o) c. 75, § 3 (amended by Me. Laws, I 9 3 3, c. 62) ; 
Md. Const., art. 4, § 2 ;  N. Y. Canst., art. 6, § I 9  (except as to county of 
Hamilton) j N. D. Const, art. 4> § I I I j Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 93 7) § I 0 50 I-I 
(or have previously served as probate judge immediately prior to election) ; 
Okla. Const., art. 7, § I I ;  Pa. Canst., art. 5, § 2 2 ;  S. D. Const., art. 5, § 2 5 ;  
Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 253 .02 (except in counties having a population of less 
than I4,ooo or have previously served as probate judge provided the county 
court has no civil or criminal jurisdiction) . 
... Ariz. Const., art. 6, § 5 ;  Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, I94I)  § I 5 7 i  
, Cal. Const., art. 6, § 23 ; Iowa Code (I 939) § I 08 I 5 i  La. Const., art. 7 ,  § 39 ; 
Mont. Const., art. 8, § I 6 ;  Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  § 6 I 8 ;  Utah 
Const., art. 8, § 5 ;  Va. Const., art. 6, § 9 6 ;  Wash. Const., art. 4, § I 7 ;  Wyo. 
Const., art. 5, § I 2 . 
... Ark. Const., art. 7, § I 6 ;  Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 9 3 7 )  § 2 8 I 9 ;  Miss. Const., 
art. 6, § I 54· 
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ments for the office of probate judge are in each instance the 
same as for trial judges and include admission to the bar,348 
except in Massachusetts and New Jersey where no such re­
quirement is made for any judicial office. It should be said, 
however, that the long record of successful judicial adminis­
tration in those states indicates the presence of other factors in 
producing the high quality of their judges. 
To inaugurate a system in any state designed to raise the 
qualifications for probate judges is easier said than done. In 
the first place the public is not fully appreciative of the neces­
sity of such a move, for the reasons already discussed. 
Secondly, there are laymen already occupying these offices, 
some of whom are doing a creditable job, who feel that they 
have a vested interest in that office as long as their constituents 
are willing to elect them. Such a system was proposed in 
Kansas in 1 939  in connection with the adoption of a new pro­
bate code which had been carefully studied and drafted to 
accomplish a needed improvement in probate administration. 
In order not to oust those who had previously held the office 
of probate judge, it was provided that only members of the 
bar or past probate judges should be eligible for that office. 
The pressure against this reform, however, was so great as to 
cause its elimination from the code upon its adoption. 349 Such 
a provision did find approval in Ohio and Wisconsin, how­
ever.350 
(b) Method of selection. Originally surrogates or dep­
uties held their offices by appointment from the governor. 
With an increasing need for permanent deputies of that kind, 
the office became assimilated to various other judicial offices 
for the purpose of selecting the occupant. In New York and 
348 Md. Const., art. 4, § � ; N. Y. Const., art. 6, § 1 9 ;  Pa. Const., art. s, § �2. • 
..., See note to § 3 of "The Kansas Probate Code," 1 3  KAN. Juo. CouN. BuL. 
1 2.  ( 1 939) . -
360 0hio Gen. Code (Page, 1 9 3 7) § 1 0501-1 ; Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 253 .02. 
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New Jersey, for example, the office of surrogate, originally 
appointive, later became elective. The judges of the orphans' 
courts in Delaware and New Jersey, and the probate judges 
of Massachusetts and New Hampshire are appointed by the 
governors of those states, as are the judges of courts of gen­
eral jurisdiction.351 Circuit judges in Virginia, who exercise 
most of the control over the administration of estates are 
chosen by the legislature ; 352 but the clerks of the circuit courts 
in Virginia, who exercise a small part of probate jurisdiction, 
are elected locally.353 Probate judges in Rhode Island are 
elected by the town councils.354 In Connecticut, Florida and 
Maine probate judges are elected, whereas general trial judges 
are appointed by the governor.�55 Elsewhere the office of 
probate judge is elective. 
It would be beyond the scope of this study to discuss the 
relative merits of the vario)ls methods of selecting judges. 
The appointive method is largely confined to a few eastern 
states and a portion of New England. The experience of that 
system over a period of several generations has been found to 
secure the very best in judicial talent.356 Where general trial 
judges are appointed, there would seem to be no reason for 
employing a different method in the selection of probate 
judges. 
351 Del. Const., art. 4, § 3 ;  N. ]. Const., art, 7, § z (z) ; N. ]. Rev. Stat. 
( I 9 3 7) § z :6-z ; Mass. Const., c. z, § I, art. 9 ;  N. H. Const., arts. 46, 73 ·  Such 
appointments must be confirmed by the senate in Delaware and New Jersey. 
The United States district judges in the District of Columbia, who also sit in 
probate, are appointed by the President of the United States, 
352 Va. Const., art. 6, § 96. 
352 Va. Const., art. 6, § I I z ;  Va. Code ( I 94z) § r z4. 
""' R. I. Gen. Laws ( I 93 8 )  c. 5 68, § 3· 
355 Conn. Const., art. 5, § 3 and amend. Z I ; Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 93o) § 4764 
(superior cou;-t j udges are appointed by the legislature upon nomination by the 
governor) ; Fla. <;:onst., art. 51 §§ 8, I 6 ;  Me. Const., art. 6, §§ 4, 7 ;  Me. Rev. 
Stat. (I 9 3 o) c. 7 s, § 3 .  Confirmation of circuit judges by the senate is re-
quired in Florida. 
' ' 
356 See -references under note 3 57, infra. 
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(c) Tenure. The question of tenure, like that of qualifi­
cations for office, has received much discussion.357 Frequent 
approval of judicial officers by means of frequent elections is 
said to represent a democratic ideal. Longer tenure designed 
to secure an efficient, fear less and courageous administration 
of office is a contrary objective. A tenure of such duration as to 
attract competent, public-spirited men from a more lucrative 
business is of primary importance. In each state the term of 
office is likely to emphasize only one of these ideals or ob­
jectives. 
Terms of office range all the way from one year to life 
tenure. Two and four-year terms are most common, though 
six years is not uncommon. The term of judges of the orphans' 
courts in Pennsylvania is ten years and in Delaware twelve 
years. The surrogates in New York City are elected for 
terms of fourteen years, whereas surrogates in other counties 
of New York hold office for only six years.358 In the District 
of Columbia, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire probate 
judges are appointed for life.359 
These terms of office in themselves are significant only as 
they reflect one or more of the objectives enumerated above. 
The importance attributed to probate courts is to be observed 
by comparing the term of office of probate judges with that 
357 See HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES ( 1 944) ; "Report 
of Special Committee on Judicial Selection and Tenure," 63 AM. B. A. 'REP. 
406 ( 1 9 3 8 ) ; Hutcheson, "Administrative Officers," 2 3  A.B.A.J. 9 30  ( 1 93 7 ) ; 
McCormick, "Judicial Selection-Current Plans and Trends," 3 0  ILL. L. REv. 
446 ( 1 93 5 ) ; "Report of the Cincinnati Conferepce on the Selection and Tenure 
of Judges in Ohio," 8 UNJV. CJN. L. REV. 359  ( 1 9 34) ; Freightner, "Judicial 
Selection and Tenure," I 5  IND. L. J. 2 I 5  ( I 94o) ; Wood, "Judicial Selection 
and Tenure," 9 RoCKY MT. L. REV. I 9 7  ( I 93 7 ) ; Swancara, "Short Terms as 
Debilitators of the American Judiciary," I I RocKY MT. L. REV. 2 I 7 ( 1 9 39 ) ; 
Daniels, "Selection and Tenure of Judges," 8 DuKE B. A. J. I ( 1 940) ; Hyde, 
"Selection and Tenure of Judges," 2 7  A.B.A.]. 763  ( 1 941 ) .  
358 New York County Law, § 2 30. 
869 U. S. Const., art. 3, § r (the United States district j udges for the District 
of Columbia serve as probate judges .there ; D. C. Code ( I 94o)  § n-sor ) ;  
Mass. Const., c. 3 1  art. I ;  N. H.  Const., arts. 73, 78  (not beyond age 70) . 
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of judges of courts of general jurisdiction. 360 If  the term is 
less, the office is less likely to attract the same calibre of talent 
than the latter office. In about one-third of the states the 
terms of both offices are the same. In Colorado, Florida, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri and Ohio 
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In Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Utah 
and Wyoming, the're is identity of judges of the two courts and hence of their 
terms of office. Where life tenure is indicated, good behavior is implied and re-
tirement at age seventy is sometimes provided. , 
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the four-year term for probate judges and a six-year term for 
circuit or district judges is provided. In Idaho, Kansas, Okla­
homa, South Dakota and Texas two and four-year terms re­
spectively are provided; in New Mexico and North Dakota 
two and six years ; in Maine four and seven years ; in Ten­
nessee one and eight years ; in North Carolina four and eight 
years ; in West Virginia six and eight years. 
(d) Salary. The variations in salaries of probate judges 
reflect both a variation in monetary values in different localities 
and the importance attached to the office locally. The ques­
tion of salary, like the question of tenure, is in large measure 
determinative of the kind of person who will seek the office. 
Much variation is to be found in the prevailing practices 
for compensating probate judges. Some are expected to be 
content with fees. Some must turn over to the county or state 
all fees in excess of a designated amount. In either case the 
net amount of compensation received by a probate judge will 
depend on the amount of business in his jurisdiction, which in 
turn depends on the population and wealth. Some states 
have a fixed salary for probate judges throughout the state ; 
others have adopted a variable scale depending upon the 
county (presumably based upon population) or upon the 
population of the county directly. In a few instances the 
amount of salaries is left to local boards ; 361 or the amount of 
salary provided by statute may be supplemented locally where 
warranted by the volume of business and the population.362 
In certain places additional compensation is paid for additional 
services, such as acting as juvenile judge,363 or in connection 
with inheritance tax appraisements. 364 
361 Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 942) § 25.250 ; N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943)  § 2 8-r 7 r ;  
Wis. Stat. ( r 943) § 59.1  5· 
862 Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 933 )  §§ 4-3201 through 4-3 2 1 9 ;  R. I. Gen. Laws 
( 1 9 3 8 )  c. 5 74> §§ 3· 5· 
862 Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § 27 .3 1 7 8 (4) . 
""' Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( r 942) § 5 8o ;  Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 9 3 7 )  § 5348-
roa. 
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As in the case of tenure of office, the amount of compensa­
tion in each case is to be compared with that received by the 
judges of the courts of general jurisdiction.365 In most cases 
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The authors are advised that in Missouri the statutes providing for salaries of 
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the two salaries are subject to noticeable differences, the 
amount paid to probate judges being the lesser of the two. 
· In the states where the unified court system prevails, there is 
identity of judges and consequently of salaries. This applies 
also to the judges of the orphans' courts of Delaware, New 
Jersey and certain counties of Pennsylvania in which the com­
mon pleas judges also preside over the orphans' courts� Only 
in Pennsylvania do the judges of the orphans' courts (where 
separate from the common pleas courts) receive the same com­
pensation as do common pleas judges. Her� the salary scale 
varies between $9,000 and $ I4,ooo, depending upon the 
county.366 In New York City and Chicago the salary of pro­
bate judges has been made to correspond to that of trial 
judges.367 
B. OTH ER PERSONNEL 
As in courts of general jurisdiction, a clerk is a part of every 
probate court organization. Invariably the duties of the clerk 
are "clerical," i .e., to keep the records of the court proceed­
ings and to receive and file petitions and other papers that are. 
deposited in the court. In a few states clerks are empowered 
to issue orders for hearings before the court, appoint appraisers 
to make inventories, approve bonds, etc. Even these are 
hardly more than ministerial duties. It is but another step 
to empower the clerk to probate wills and grant letters in 
cases where there is no dispute as to the validity of the will 
probate judges in certain counties are regarded as unconstitutional ; instead the 
fees of office, up to the amount paid to circuit judges, are retained. 
In Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Utah 
and Wyoming, there is identity of judges for the two courts and hence of their 
salaries. 
' 
366 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 93o) t. 1 7, §§ 834, 8 3 6. It is not to be implied 
from this statement that all receive the same salary, but only that, county for 
county, orphans' court judges receive !he same as do common pleas j udges in 
tha:t county. 
367 N. Y. Jud. Law, art. s, §§ 1 42, 143 ; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 
37, § 3 20, c. 5 3> § 2 2 .  
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or any contest as to who is entitled to letters. In most instances 
these are regarded as routine functions which any efficient and 
trustworthy clerk can perform. They are the substantial 
equivalent of those performed by the registrars in the English 
ecclesiastical courts. Where statutes have invested clerks of 
probate with powers of this kind, the judge is free to handle 
the more important matters of probate administration. 
A study of the various statutes reveals that clerks have been 
given powers varying all the way from those of a clerical 
nature to complete judicial powers·corresponding to those pos­
sessed by the judge. Under the recent Florida code the clerk 
may perform "all non-judicial functions which the judge may 
perform." 368 The Kansas code makes the probate judge the 
clerk of the probate court and authorizes the �ppointment 
of assistants as deputy clerks. 369 Statutes of every state either 
provide for or contemplate the performance of clerical duties 
in keeping the court records and files. Some authorize tpe 
clerk to issue notices or citations for hearings before the 
court. 370 Others provide for •the approval or fixing the 
�mount and approval of bonds of personal representatives, 371 
368 Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94I ) § 3 6.04. 
369 Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943 )  § 59-202. Such a statute fixes upon the 
probate judge the primary responsibility for keeping the records of the probate 
court, but permits assistants to accomplish this objective. It also makes it possible 
in a sparsely settled county for the judge to be his own clerk where the amount 
of business does not warrant the employment of a deputy clerk. 
370 Ariz. Code ( I 939)  § 3 8-2005 ; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, I 94 I )  § I 207 i 
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 9 30) § 4783 ; Idaho Code ( I 9 J 2) § I 5-I 505 ; Mass. Ann. 
Laws ( I 932)  c. 2 I 7, § 2 1 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943)  § 27 .3 I 78 ( I 2 ) ; Minn. 
Stat. ( I  94I ) § 525.09 5 (when authorized by court) ; Miss. Code ( I  942) § I  248 ; 
Mont. Rev. Code ( I 9 3 5 )  §§ Io3 6o, 1 0 3 76 ;  Neb. Comp. Stat. ( I 929)  § 27-544 ;  
N. J. Rev. Stat. ( I 937)  §§  2 :3 1-3 7, 3 :2-2 2 ;  N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § p ;  N. C. 
Gen.' Stat. ( 1 943)  § 2-1 6 ;  Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 925) §§ 3 306, 3 3 3 3 ; 
Utah Code ( 1 943)  §§ 1 02-2-I, I o2-14-I o ;  Wis. Stat. ( I 943)  § 253.27 (in 
judge's absence) ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 3 I )  § 88 .904. 
3n Ala. Code ( I 940) t. 1 3, § 300 ; Del. Rev. Code ( I 9 3 5 )  § 3 8 1 3 ;  Ind. Stat. 
(Burns, I 9 3 3 )  § 6-50I ; Iowa Code ( I 939)  § I I 8 J 2 ;  Miss. Code ( 1 942) 
§ I 249 (order new bonds) ; Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 935)  § I 03 76 (in absence of 
judge from county, but subject to setting aside or modification by judge within 
thirty days) ; Utah Code ( I 943) § 102-2-I ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 9 3 I )  § 88-
1 503 ·  
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appointing appraisers for the inventory,372 supervising the in­
veptory,373 or making orders as to personal property.874 Of 
a slightly higher order are powers to hear and pass upon claims 
against the estate, 375 to make decrees barring creditors/76 to 
audit accounts, 377 and to grant discharges to personal represent­
atives.378 
Under the English system, as we have seen, there was a 
division of function between the ecclesiastical courts and chan­
cery in the administration of-decedents' estates. The power 
to probate wills and grant letters, exercised by the ecclesiastical 
courts,S79 was essentially judicial in character even though no 
question was raised or contest involved. Vestiges of this dual 
organization exist in this country today in Delaware, the Dis­
trict of Columbia and Pennsylvania where separate offices of 
registers of wills are maintained, leaving the major task of 
administering estates to the orphans' or probate court. 380 Es­
sentially this same system prevails in Mississippi 381 and 
372 Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 9 32 )  c. 2 1 7, § 2 2 ;  Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 1 248 ; Utah 
Code ( 1 943 ) § 102-2-I ; Va. Code ( I 942) § 5249 ; W. Va. Code ( I 9 3 7 )  
§ 42 73 ·  
373 Del. Rev. Code ( I 935)  §§  3 828-3 842 ; N. J. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 7 )  § 3 :9 . 
"" Iowa Code ( I 939)  § I I 83 2 ;  N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) §§ 28-73 to 28-8o ;  
Utah Code ( I  94 3 )  § I 02-2-1 (perishable property) . 
375 D. C. Code ( I 94o) § I 9-403 ; Md. Code ( I 939)  art. 93 ,  § 28 2 ;  Miss. 
Code ( I 942) § I 248 ; Mont. Rev. Code ( I 9 3 5 )  § I0376  (in absence of judge 
and when not contested, but subject to setting aside or modification by judge 
within thirty days) . 
376 N. J. Rev. Stat. ( I 9 3 7 )  § 3 :25-9. 
377 Ala. Code (I 94o) t. I 3> § 3oo ; Del. Rev. Code ( I 935)  § 3 844 ; Iowa 
Code ( I 9 39 )  § I I 8 3 2  (intermediate accounting) ; Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 930) c. 
75, § 2 3 ; Miss. Code ( I 942) § I 249 (during vacation but subject to approval 
or disapproval by court) ; Mont. Rev. Code ( I 9 3 5 )  § I 0 3 76 (intermediate 
accounting, in absence of judge, but subject to setting aside or modification by 
judge within thirty days) ; N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943)  §§ 2-I 6, 28-I 62 ; Pa. Stat. 
Ann. (Purdon, I 9 3o) t. 20, § 1 86 r .  
378 N .  C .  Gen. Stat. ( 1 943)  § 2 8-I 6 2 ;  Del. Rev. Code ( I 9 3 5 )  § 3 866. 
379 See discussion under I-A, supra. 
380 See discussion under III-A-I ,  supra. Del. Rev. Code ( I 9 35)  §§ 3 799-
3876 ;  D. C. Code ( I 940) § I 9-403 ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 9 30)  t. 20, 
§ 1 9 8 1 .  In Pennsylvania, however, in case of a contest, the register of wills 
may send, or the orphans' court may order him to send, the matter to the latter 
court for hearing. 
381 Miss. Code ( 1942) §§ 1 248� 1249. 
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Virginia 382 where such functions are performed by the clerk 
of the court instead of by a register presiding over the separate 
register's court. In effect the register of wills or clerk has 
supplanted the ecclesiastical courts in performing this function. 
This practice of having a judicial function performed by a 
ministerial officer is . thus justified by history as well as by 
modern convenience. In the states above mentioned this 
power is lodged in the register or clerk, whether or nut there is 
a contest or dispute as to the matter. Other states have been 
willing to entrust this function to the surrogate or clerk pro­
vided that no contest or dispute is involved. This practice 
prevails in New Jersey,383 Alabama,384 Iowa 385 and North 
Carolina,386 and the clerk of the superior court in North 
Carolina is himself a court.387 In Delaware the deputy regis­
ter of wills may exercise this power in such circumstances,388 
whereas the register may do so irrespective of a contest. 
In Maryland the register of wills exercises these preroga­
tives during vacation of the orphans' court_389 In Arkansas/90 
Indiana, 391 Missouri 392 and West Virginia 393 the clerk pro­
ceeds similarly during vacation, but subject to a subsequent 
confirmation or rejection by the court. In Montana, during 
any absence of the judge, whether during term time or not, 
the clerk possesses this power when there is no contest. 394 
In Mississippi 395 and Utah 396 the clerk may appoint special 
382 Va. Const., art. 6, § 1 0 1 ; Va. Code ( 1 942) §§ 5 247, 5249· 
382 N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 3 7 )  §§  3 :2-22, 3 :7-5· 1 · 
380 Ala. Code ( 1 940) t. 1 3, § JOO, 
385 lowa Code ( 1 9 3 9 )  § 1 1 83 2. 
386 N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943)  § 2 8-30. 
387 Edwards v. Cobb, 95 N. C. 4 ( 1 8 86) . 
388 Del. Rev. Code ( 1 9 3 5 )  § 3 803 .  
389 Md. Code ( 1 93 9 )  art. 9 3; § 283 .  
39Q Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1 9 3 7) § 4. 
331 lnd. Stat. (Burn�, 1 9 3 3 )  § 6-1 02. 
332 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) §§ 1,  2440. 
393 W. Va. Code ( 1 93 7) §§ 42 7 3, 4274• 
39• Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 935 )  § 1 03 76. 
895 Miss. Code ( 1942) § 1 248 • 
... Utah Code (1943) § 102-a-1. 
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or temporary administrators, and in North Carolina 397 may 
revoke letters already granted. The register of wills in Penn­
sylvania 308 at any time, and the clerk in Mississippi 399 dur­
ing vacation subject to the subsequent approval of the court, 
may do likewise. . 
This vesting in the clerk of judicial powers in probate does 
not stop here. In Missouri the clerk may exercise almost com­
plete judicial power during vacation, subject to a subsequent 
confirmation or rejection by the court.400 In Alabama 401 
and North Carolina 402 the clerk has such power at all times 
in the absence of contest. This means that all matters in these 
two states which are noncontentious in fact may be supervised 
by the clerk. In Delaware the register of wills regularly 
supervises the administration of decedents' estates except for 
the sale of real esta:te. 403 And in certain counties of South 
Carolina the judge may confer complete judicial power upon 
the clerk. 404 
One further aspect of this lodgment of power in the clerk 
should be mentioned. Where there is a vacancy in the office 
of judge provision is made in New Mexico 405 and South 
Carolina 406 for the clerk to act as judge pro tern during such 
vacancy. In one respect this practice offends every principle 
previously advocated on the question of judicial qualifications. 
As an emergency measure, it may be justified on the basis that 
the clerk is the one person who is likely to be familiar with 
the affairs of the court and would likely be capable of function­
ing temporarily until a successor is selected and qualified. 
397 N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) § z-1 6. 
808 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 930) t.  zo, § 1 863 (when granted to wrong per-
son or on probate of after-discovered will) .  
800 Miss. Code ( 1 942) § §  I Z49, x z s x .  
"'" Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 194z) § 2440. 
401 Ala. Code ( 1940) t. 1 3, § 300 . 
... N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) § z-1 6. 
403 Del. Rev. Code ( 1 940) cc. 9 8, 99· 
"" S. C. Code ( 1 94z) § zo6. 
4011 N. M. Stat. ( 1 941 ) § 1 6-41 5 • 
..,. S, C. Code (1 942) § 364:z. 
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Thus we witness all gradations of power lodged in some 
inferior officer under a wide variety of circumstances. Each 
represents an attempt to facilitate the administration of the 
work of the probate court. Some may seem to vest too much 
power in such officer. A critical analysis should be accom­
panied by an examination as to how the system works in a 
particular locality. The qualifications and abilities of the clerk 
will be relevant in any individual case. Professor Atkinson 
points out that even routine matters may be so seriously mis­
handled as to cause serious consequences. 407 The right of 
appeal or possibility of correction by the judge is no more than 
a partial justification. A more fundamental solution in con­
nection with every grant or substitution of power would be a 
requirement of higher qualifications on the part of the officer 
who is invested with the power and who will act in the first 
instance. Whether there is a separate judge for each county, 
or but one judge for several counties, the judge should as­
sume �he primary responsibility for every judicial act. If 
the clerk is empowered to act, either in contentious or noncon­
tentious matters, it seems desirable that his acts should be sub­
ject to the subsequent approval or disapproval of the judge. 
VIII.  STANDARDS FOR AN IDEAL PRoBATE CouRT 
By way of conclusion, we shall propose an answer to the 
question : What are the standards for an ideal probate court? 
It is readily concede� that, in any legal study covering so vast 
an area, the conclusions of the authors cannot be wholly ob­
jective. Necessarily, they are based, not only on the legal 
and factual data heretofore presented, but also on the in­
dividual background and experience of the respective writers. 
Nevertheless, it is believed that each conclusion hereinafter 
•07 Atkinson, "Organization of Probate Courts and Qualifications of Probate 
Judges," 23 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 93 at 96 ( 1 939) .  
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presented finds ample support in the materials discussed
. 
in 
the preceding pages. 
The standards for an ide�l probate court will be considered 
from three standpoints : first, the place of the court in the 
judicial organization ; second, the subject matter of the juris­
diction of the court ; and third, the personnel of the court. 
First, the probate court should be given a place in the 
judicial organization fully coordinate with the trial court of 
general jurisdiG:tion. Historically, that has been the course 
of development in England; and that is the trend in the 
United States. The nature of the business of the probate 
court, the fact that it handles estates unlimited in value and 
character, and that its jurisdiction may well include £he specific 
administration and distribution of both the real and the per­
sonal property of the estate, all point to a conclusion that a 
superior court is needed. If such a court is set up, then appeals 
with trial de novo in the court of general jurisdiction would 
necessarily be eliminated. The only appeals would be to the 
appellate courts to which appeals are made in actions at law 
and suits in equity. 
Second, the probate court should be the same court as the 
court of general jurisdiction or should be a division of it. 
This does not mean merely a unification of judges, such, for 
example, as is the plan in certain counties in Ohio and Penn­
sylvania. It means a unification of courts. Indeed, this unifi­
cation should be so complete that, if, after a proceeding is 
begun, it is found to come under the equity or common-law 
jurisdiction of the court, it can be transferred to another docket 
of the court or to another division, without beginning the pro­
ceeding anew. Only in this way can be completely avoided 
the hardships incident to determining where the shadowy, 
marginal line of probate jurisdiction is to be drawn. The ques­
tion of whether a given matter should be in equity or in pro­
bate will cease to be one i� which a slight misstep on the part 
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of the attorney may prejudice an innocent litigant. Such a 
judicial organization is advocated by Dean Roscoe Pound in 
his recent book on Organization of Courts. In presenting the 
principles and outline for a modern court organization he sug­
gests that there be three chief branches, a court of appeal, a 
superior court and a county court branch. Discussing the 
second of these, he says : 408 
"The second branch, the Superior Court, should be given 
complete jurisdiction of first instance, civil and criminal, the 
civil jurisdiction, for reasons set forth in preceding chapters, 
to include law, equity, and probate. Certainly there should 
be no mandatory setting off of these types of cases to separate 
divisions. But the organization of this branch should be so 
flexible that if experience showed good reason for setting off 
some or all of them in that way, it could be done by rule of 
court, or more simply by assigning cases to j udges in such a 
way as to effect a practical segregation, which, however, could 
be changed or revoked later if experience or changed conditions 
rriade such action advisable." 
This type of judicial organization can be adapted to operate 
both in metropolitan areas and in rural districts. Without 
doubt, in large cities there will be a number of judges selected 
for the trial courts of general jurisdiction. Statutory pro­
visions should set up some sort of judicial council, or other ad­
ministrative machinery, whereby these judges can be assigned 
to particular specialized matters. Just as some may be 
assigned solely to criminal matters or to domestic relations 
cases, so others should be assigned to the probate work of the 
court. This is in fact done in certain metropolitan areas in 
California.409 But the writers would advocate going even a 
'step farther than does the California system. In that state, 
""' POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS ( I 940) 2 8 1 .  
""' Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1 941 ) § §  67, 67a ; Rules o f  Superior Court 
of California (as amended to July z ,  1943 ) ,  rules 24 and 25, LARMAC> CoN­
SOLIDATED INDEX TO CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF CALIFORNIA ( 1 943) I 788-
I 79 I •  . 
' 
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the superior court, when it hears a probate matter, is the 
"superior court sitting in probate." While it is not another 
court, still its jurisdiction is so different that a proceeding can­
not ordinarily be transferred from its probate to its civil juris­
diction, but would have to be started anew. The probate 
jurisdiction of the trial courts in the state of Washington is to 
be preferred in this particular. In that state, as has been 
seen, there is not a court "sitting in probate." It is all a part 
of the same jurisdiction whether the subject matter be civil 
or probate. 
In rural areas of sparse population objection may well be 
raised to a separate judge of probate if he is to have the.same 
qualifications and salary as the judge of the trial court of gen­
eral jurisdiction. It may be felt that the small amount of 
probate business does not justify such an expensive court. But 
when the probate jurisdiction is added to that of the civil and 
criminal jurisdiction of the trial court, not only is this objection 
eliminated, but the advantages of a unified court are also 
obtained. 
If the objection is made that in many states the unit for the 
trial court is a district which may include several counties and 
that the emergency character of some kinds of probate busi­
ness may well require a judge in each county, the answer is 
that the trial judge may be assigned to a circuit which includes 
a number of counties ; but clerks may be elected or appointed 
in each county to take care of routine business under the super­
vision of the judge, and, of course, the court can sit in each 
county.410 This is, in fact, the system adopted in Montana 
and in some other states. 
"0 It may be added that, not only should there be a clerk in each county, but 
the court should be open for business at all reasonable times; 'The tendency of 
modern legislation is to dispense with terms of court for probate business. See 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-2 I I :  "There shall be no terms of the 
probate cpurt. It shall be optm for the transaction of business at the county seat 
· at all reasonable hours. Hearings may be had at such other places in the county 
as the court may deem advisable." 
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What should be included in the subject matter of the juris- ,. 
diction of the ideal probate court? Certainly if we have the 
unified court, then this question becomes less important. If 
it is the same judge or a division of the same court, it becomes 
much less important whether he is sitting in equity or in pro­
bate as to the particular question before him. · Nevertheless, 
in the interests of efficiency and simplicity of administration, 
it would seem that all matters directly connected with the 
administration of the decedent's estate should be within the 
probate division of the court. Such has been the definite trend 
of legislation in the United States even where probate courts 
are entirely separate from the trial courts of general juris­
diction. And it is believed that that trend is sound. In that 
particular the English judicial system might profit by imitat­
ing some American models. 
As to matters other than decedents' estates, it is clear that 
the probate jurisdiction should include guardianships and 
matters closely related, such as adoptions. But this juris­
diction should not be weighted down with all sorts of ir­
relevant administrative matters, such as are sometimes as­
signed to county courts which sit in probate matters. 
Third, what can be said as to the personnel of the court? 
Obviously, if the judge is a judicial officer of the trial court of 
general jurisdiction, he should have, and will have, the same 
qualifications as that judge, with ·a corresponding tenure and 
salary. But even if that were not the case, the nature of pro­
bate jurisdiction calls for such qualifications. He should be a 
member of the bar, preferably with experience 'in practice or 
on the bench. 
As to other officers of the court, such as clerks or registers, 
there should be an adequate number of well qualified persons. 
Should they have judicial powers ? Considering the various 
patterns in the statutes heretofore analyzed, we find three 
possible answers. First, in some states such officers do have 
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judicial powers ; in other words, for some· purposes, they 
function as courts. Second, in other states, they have no 
judicial powers whatever, but can perform only ministerial 
acts. In still a third group of states, the clerk or register 
acts in certain matters either subject to the subsequent ap­
proval of the judge or subject to the lack of disapproval of 
the judge within a specified period. 
Cit would seem that, if, as is herein advocated, a noncon­
tentious, summary procedure is permitted, efficiency would 
require that some judicial powers be given to the clerk or 
register in these matters. However, the judge should be held 
to strict accountability for these acts. The jurisdiction de­
scribed in the third group of states is believed to be preferable. 
But it should be limited to noncontentious matters. If the 
judge disapproves of the act of the clerk, or if the matter is 
contentious, then it should come before the judge in person. 
That these conclusions follow as a matter of course from the 
legal and factual data herein presented can scarcely be denied. 
That they have seldom been reached by legislative bodies in 
America is believed to be due, not to the uncertainty of the 
conclusions, but to the fact that, until very recently, the realm 
of probate law has been one outside the sphere of scholarly 
investigation or legislative reform.411 And this legal structure 
for more than a century has been added to or amended, bit by 
bit, to accomplish the specific, narrow objectives of particular 
m A recent example of ; scientific and comprehensive legislative approach to 
probate reform is found in New Jersey. At its I 944 session the New Jersey 
legislature agreed upon a revised constitution for that state which is to be sub­
mitted to the people at the general election this year. The proposed constitu­
tion provides for a superior court having complete general original j urisdiction -
in all cases, and divided into two. sections: ( I )  a law section to exercise civil and 
criminal j urisdiction at law, and matrimonial j urisdiction in certain cases ; and 
( 2) an equity and probate section to exercise all other jurisdiction. Further 
provision is made that either section shall exercise the j urisdiction of the other 
when the ends of j ustice so require. Proposed N. J. Rev. Const. ( I  944) art. 5, 
§ 3, pars. 2-3. [Since the publication of this monograph the proposed New 
Jersey constitution was defeated in a popular referendum.] 
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legislators or of a few of their constituency, without any con­
sideration of the historical development or of the proper 
functions of probate courts and probate legislation as a whole. 
If  these pages have contributed something toward a broad 
and comprehensive view of the problems of probate court 
organization they will not have been written in vain. 
The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as 
a Proceeding in Rem* 
Lewis M. Simes 
F
OR over a century American courts and text writers 
have referred to the administration of a decedent's 
estate as a proceeding in rem. Indeed, it has recently 
been asserted that a probate proceeding is "universally recog­
nized as a proceeding in rem." 1 But more cautious persons 
have been content to suggest that it is at least "quasi in rem," 2 
or have carefully skirted the fog which is wont to envelop this 
area of the law and given it silent treatment. Thus, the 
American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Judg­
ments (which purports to include the law of probate decrees 3) 
gives examples of judgments in rem,4 and mentions in that 
connection judgments of a court of admiralty, judgments 
under land registration statutes and proceedings for forfeiture 
of things used in violation of law, but does not refer to pro­
bate decrees. At a later point, after positively asserting that 
an admiralty proceeding to enforce a maritime lien on a 
vessel, or a proceeding for a registration of title to land is in 
rem, it continues with this guarded observation : 5 "So, also, 
* Originally printed as an .article in 43 Mich. L. Rev. 675 ( 1 945) . 
1 Hopkins, "The Extraterritorial Effect of Probate Decrees," 5 3  YALE L. J. 
22 1  at 225  ( 1 944) . A similar statement is made in Carey, "A Suggested Funda­
mental Basis of Jurisdiction with Special Emphasis on Judicial Proceedings 
Affecting Decedents' Estates," 24 ILL. L. REV. 44 at 49 ( I 929 ) .  
2 "The administration of an estate under the probate jurisdiction of a court, 
which involves the appointment of an administrator and culminates in a final 
decree of distribution, is a proceeding in rem, or, as said by some, quasi in rem." 
Carter v. Frahm, 3 1  S. D. 3 79 at 3 9 2, 1 4 1  N. W. 3 70  ( 1 9 1 3 ) .  And see {:amp­
bell v. Drais, 1 25 Cal. 253  at 258, 5 7  P. 994 ( r 899) . 
3 "The Restatement of this Bubject deals also with the determination of the 
court in other judicial proceedings, such as proceedings in admiralty, or in 
probate, or for divorce." REST,ATEMENT, JUDGMENTS ( r 942) 3· 
' RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS ( 1 942) 6, 7· 
" RESTATEMENT, JuDGMENTS ( 1 942)  § 32 .  
489 
490 MONOGRAPHS ON PROBATE LAW 
probate courts, acting within their jurisdiction, can give judg­
ments in rem, binding on all the world." 
In view of the uncertainty which still e�ists, this paper 
proposes to consider just what is meant by the proposition 
that the administration of a decedent's estate is a proceeding 
in rem. Since the Restatement of Judgments is believed to 
be the only satisfactory rationalization of our law of res 
judicata, and since the writer has to some extent followed its 
approach to problems in this field of the law, this discussion 
may be regarded as a kind of unsolicited appendix to that Re­
statement. Moreover, like the Restatement of Judgments, 
this paper deals primarily with the effect of decrees in the 
state in which they are rendered. While decisions involving 
problems in the field of conflict of laws as to the effect of 
foreign probate decrees cannot be ignored, this discussion 
does not address itself to an analysis of those problems. Indeed, 
it may be suggested that there has been, on the part of some 
writers and a few courts, altogether too much of a desire to 
shape the concept of a probate proceeding in rem with a view 
to permitting a court to administer assets outside the juris­
diction rather than for the purpose of attaining the simpler 
objective of avoiding a trial of the same cause or issue twice. 
In other words, it is believed that the legal implications which 
arise from affixing the in rem label to probate proceedings 
should be worked out primarily in accordance with the prin­
ciples of res judicata and not distorted to enable the court to 
exercise jurisdiction over assets in another state, however 
laudable it may be to accomplish that result. 
This discussion will be directed to the consideration of three 
questions. First, from a consideration of the American 
decisions on the subject, can it be concluded that the adminis­
tration of a decedent's estate is a proceeding in rem? Sec�nd, 
if it is an in rem proceeding, what notice is necessary to prevent 
collateral attack on decrees rendered as a part of the proceed­
ing? Third, what persons and what things are bound by a 
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valid decree in rem rendered in a proceeding for the adminis­
tration df a decedent's estate ? 
I. ARE PROCEEDINGS FOR ADMINISTRATION IN REM ? 
It must be recognized that the proceeding in rem is but a 
procedural device arising from judicial necessity, and that, 
whatever form it may take, persons and not things are the 
interested parties. Nevertheless, if we are to determine 
whether probate proceedings are in rem, we must know what is 
meant by a proceeding in rem. For this purpose we can do 
no better than to quote from the Restatement of Judgments: 6 
"Where a thing is subject to the power of a State, a proceed­
ing may be brought to affect the interests in the thing not 
merely of particular persons but of all persons in the world. 
Such a proceeding is called a proceeding in rem, as distin­
guished from a proceeding brought to affect the interests in 
the thing of particular persons only, which is called a pro­
ceeding quasi in rem. . . .  
"Proceedings quasi in rem are of two types. In the first 
type the plaintiff asserts an interest in property and seeks to 
have his interest established as against the claim of a desig­
nated person or designated persons. . . . 
"In the second type of proceeding quasi in rem the plaintiff 
does not assert that he has an interest in the property, but 
asserts a claim against the defendant personally, and seeks to 
compel to the satisfaction of his claim the application of prop­
erty of the defendant, by attachment or garnishment." 
These statements make it clear that a proceeding in rem 
has at least two characteristics : first, it concerns a thing within 
the jurisdiction of the court ; and, second1 its decrees deter­
mine interests of all persons in the thing. If the proceeding 
is quasi in rem, the first characteristic is present ; but, unlike 
the proceeding in rem, its decrees determine only the interests 
of one or more specific parties in the thing. 
• RESTATEMENT, JuDGMENTS C r94z) § 3z, comment a. 
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Before applying these definitions to the American case law 
on the question of the in rem character of probate proceedings, 
it is desirable to consider briefly just what was the character of 
English proceedings relative to the administration of dece­
dents' estates. Now here in the early English cases has been 
found a categorical statement that administration proceedings 
in ecclesiastical courts were in rem. However, in the first 
edition of Smith's Leading Cases, the author, in commenting 
on the Duchess of Kingston's Case, makes this observation: 7 
"Judgments of the courts ecclesiastical are of two sorts­
in rem and inter partes. A grant of probate or administration 
is in the nature of a decree in rem, and actually invests the 
executor or administrator with the character which it declares 
to belong to him. Accordingly, such grant of probate or ad­
ministration is conclusive against all the world." 
Attention should also be called to the elaborate review of the 
English authorities in Hargrave's Law Tracts,8 in which the 
author seeks to show that a grant of administration or the 
probate of a will is conclusive in the courts of law and equity. 
He does not state that it is in rem, but his whole argument 
implies that. 
It must, however, be conceded that administration in 
equity 9 could scarcely have been thought of as in rem in 
view of the fact that courts of equity are almost universally 
regarded as acting in personam. Since there was no probate 
of wills of land in England prior to the middle of the nine­
teenth century, it is clear that the actions commonly brought 
to test the validity of devises,-namely, trespass or ejectment 
-were in personam. Doubtless, also actions in courts of law 
7 30 LAW LIBRARY (1837-1840) uo. This statement also appears in later 
editions of the work and is cited by American courts. 
8 HARGRAVE'S LAW TRACTS (1787) 457• 
• In general as to the administration of a decedent's estate in equity, see Atkin­
son, "Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction," 8 Mo. L. REv. 107 
at II8 (1943); LANGDELL, BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION (2d ed. 
1908) arts. VI and VII; MAITLAND, EQUITY (rev. ed. 1 936) 248-257. 
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against the executor or administrator in his representative 
capacity to satisfy contract claims against the decedent were in 
personam. 
In order to give any adequate picture of the American case 
law on the question of whether a proceeding to administer a 
decedent's estate is in rem, it is necessary to consider one by 
one the various important decrees normally rendered in the 
course of an administration. Thus the modern American 
probate court may, in the course of the administration, admit 
a will to probate, grant letters to personal �epresentatives, sell 
real or personal property to pay debts or legacies, pass upon 
creditors' claims, settle the accounts of the personal represent­
ative, decree distribution of the estate, and perhaps render 
final orders as to still other matters. Hence, it is entirely pos­
sible that some of these decrees may have strictly in rem op­
eration and that others do not. 
That the order admitting the will to probate is in rem is 
universally concluded.10 This question has arisen in a variety 
10 Hall's Heirs v. Hall, 47 Ala. 290 (I872); Dickey v. Vann, 8I Ala. 425, 
8 So. I95 (I 886); McCann v. Ellis, 172 Ala. 6o, 55 So. 303 (I 9 I I); 
Griffin v. Milligan, I77 Ala. 57, 58 So. 257 (I9I2); Estate of Carpenter, I27 
Cal. 582, 6o P. I62 (I9oo); Estate of Relph, I92 Cal. 45I, 22I P. 36I (I923); 
Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 
1944) I48 P. (2d) 445, aff'd on rehearing, 150 P. (2d) 24I; Torrey v. Bruner, 
6o Fla. 365, 53 So. 337 (I91o); In re Will of Storey, 20 Ill. App. I83 (1886); 
Crippen v. Dexter, 79 Mass. 330 (I859); Brigham v. Fayerweather, I40 Mass. 
4II, 5 N. E. 265 (I886); Bonnemort v. Gill, I67 Mass. 338, 45 N. E. 768 
(I897); In re Estate of Meredith, 275 Mich. 278, 266 N. W. 351 (I936); 
Woodville v. Pizzati, II9 Miss. 442, 8I So. I27 (I9I9); State ex rei. Mitchell 
v. Gideon, 2I5 Mo. App. 46, i37 S. W. 220 (I922); State ex rei. Rue£ v. 
District Court, 34 Mont. 96, 85 P. 866 (I9o6); In re Estate of Sweeney, 94 
Neb. 834, I44 N. W. 902 (I9I3); Bogardus v. Clark, 4 Paige (N.Y.) 623 
(I834); Matter of Horton, 2I7 N.Y. 363, III N. E. Io66 (I9�); In re 
Wohlgemuth, I I o App. Div. �44, 9 7 N. Y. S. 3 6 7 (I 906) ; In re Eno's Will, 94 
Misc. 100, I57 N.Y. S. 553 (19I6), aff'd I72 App. Div. I24, I58 N.Y. S. 
234 (I916); Olney v. Angell, 5 R.I. I98 (I858); Saunders v. Link, I I4 Va. 
285, 76 S. E. 327 (I9I2); Culpeper Nat!. Bank v. Morris, I68 Va. 379, I9I 
S. E. 764 (I937); Will of Dardis, I35 Wis. 457, 1I5 N. W. 332 (I9o8); 
Tompkins v. Tompkins, 24 Fed. Cas. No. I4,o9I, I Story 547 (I84I); Broder­
ick's Will, 2I Wall. (88 U. S.) 503 (1874). See also elaborate dicta in 
Deslonde v. Darrington's Heirs, 29 Ala. 92 (I856); State v. McGlynn, 20 Cal. 
233 at 269 (1862); Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65 (1847). 
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of forms where an heir or devisee who had no notice of the 
proceeding came in subsequently and sought to attack the 
decree collaterally in another proceeding in the same state. 
Invariably he has been unsuccessful if jurisdictional require­
ments of notice and a fair hearing are complied with.11 It 
should be observed that, since in nearly all states probate is 
now necessary for a devise of land, the decree has in rem 
operation with respect to dispositions of land a'S well as of 
personalty. 
A little more difficulty has been experienced in the case of 
the will contest in some jurisdictions, although the conclusion 
has generally been the same.12 Thus in some jurisdictions 
statutes permit probate or contest in chancery, and it has been 
argued that, since equity acts in personam, the proceeding 
cannot be in rem. But the courts have replied that this is a 
statutory proceeding; and while it happens to be in a court 
of equity, for purposes of the operation and binding effect of 
the decree, it is in rem.13 At one time American statutes were 
in force permitting a contest to be effected by asking the court 
to direct the framing of an issue devisavit vel non to be sent 
to a court of law for trial before a jury.14 Indeed, this pro-
11 Of course, other jurisdictional requirements should be complied with also. 
And if the person whose estate is being administered is not dead, the entire pro­
ceeding is void because the requirements of due process are not complied with as 
to him, since he is not a party to the proceeding and cannot be a party. Scott v. 
McNeal, 1 54  U. S. 34, I4 S. Ct. 1 I o8 ( I 894) . 
1.2 McCann v. EHis, 1 7 2.  Ala. 6o, 55 So. 303 ( 1 9 1  I ) ;  In re will of Storey, zo 
Ill. App. I 83 ( t 886) ; People ex rei. Frazer v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 39 Mich. 
1 9 8  ( I 8 7 8 ) ; In re estate of Sweeney, 94 Neb. 8 34, I 44 N. W. 902. ( I 9 I 3 ) ; 
Hutson v. Sawyer, 1 04 N. C. I ,  I O  S. E. 85 ( I 8 89 ) ; Taylor v. Dinsmore, (Tex. 
Civ. Ap� 1 9 3 8) I I 4  S. W. (zd) 2.69. See also cases cited in notes 1 3  to zz in­
clusive, infra. Dictum : Estate of Carpenter, I Z 7  Cal. 5 8 2, 6o P. I 62 ( 1 9oo) . 
Contra, on statute then existing : McArthur v. Scott, I I 3 U. S. 340, 5 S. Ct. 6sz 
( I 885) . 
13 Ex parte Walter, 2.02 Ala. 2 8 I ,  8o So. I I 9  ( I 9 1 8 ) ; Woodville v. Pizzati, 
1 1 9  Miss. 442., 8 1  So. 1 2. 7  ( 1 9  I 9 )  ; Connolly v. Connolly, 3 2  Gratt. ( 73 Va.) 
657  at 664 ( t 8 8o) ; Dower v. Seeds, 2 8  W. Va. I 1 3  at 1 34 ( t 8 86) ; Dower v. 
Church, 2 1  W. Va. 2. 3  ( r 8 8 2 ) .  
1• For a description o f  the practice i n  Virginia and a comparison with the 
English practice, see Wills v. Spraggins, 3 Gratt. (44 Va.) 555  ( 1 847) . 
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cedure is not entirely obsolete at the present time.15 Now, 
if this were regarded as analogous to the English chancery 
practice of ordering an heir or devisee to go over into a court 
of law and frame an issue of devisavit vel non to be tried in 
. an action of trespass or ejectment/6 the courts would have 
been forced to conclude that it was an in personam proceeding. 
But; again, obvious considerations of pvblic policy and good 
sense caused them to conclude that this too was a proceeding 
in rem.17 In some states, such as California, statutes expressly 
provide that, in a contest, the contestant shall be plaintiff and 
the proponent defendant.18 From this it has been argued that 
such statutes make the proceeding adversary and hence in 
personam ; that an in rem proceeding is necessarily ex parte. 
But this argument has not been accepted by the courts.19 In­
deed, it should be observed that because some of the parties 
to a proceeding are adverse to others does not prevent it from 
being in rem. It may be that the designation of .certain per­
sons as plaintiffs or defendants in some statutes gives such 
persons a slightly different status as to burden of proof and 
perhaps as to some other procedural matters.20 But doubtless 
all persons in the world who have an interest in the estate 
1G See, for example, Pa. Stat. Ann (Purdon, Supp. I 943) t. zo, § I 9 6 1 .  
16 For a brief description of this practice in England, see z STORY, EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE ( 1 St ed. I 836) 6 7 I .  
" Wills v .  Spraggins, 3 Gratt. (44 Va.) 555 ( I 847) .  
lB Cal. Pro b. Code (Deering, I 94 I )  § 3 7 I .  
'" Estate of Relph, 1 9 z  Cal. 45 I ,  Z Z I  P. 36 I  ( I 9z3 ) . See particularly the 
discussion at page 458 of the California report. 
20 In Estate of Relph, I 9 Z  Cal. 45 1 at 459, 460, z z 1  P. 36 1  ( I 9z 3 ) ,  the court 
said : 
"The contest of a· will, on the other hand, while a proceeding in rem, is at 
the same time an adversary proceeding, the parties to which consist, on the one 
hand, of those persons interested in the estate who have appeared and filed 
written grounds of opposition to the probate of the will (commonly referred to 
as the contest) ; and, on the other hand, those persons interested in the will who 
have appeared and filed written answer thereto. • • • 
"In the proceeding upon the contest of the will the petitioner for the probate 
thereof is not even a necessary party litigant thereto." But compare Estate of 
Carpenter, I Z 7  Cal. sSz ,  6o P. r6z ( 1 9oo) ,  denying the settlement of a con­
test by arbitration because of the fact that the proceeding is in rem. 
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as successors to the decedent are potential if not actual parties, 
may appear and be heard, and are bound by the decree. 
Provisions in will contest statutes extending the time within 
which contests may be brought for persons under a disability 
have caused some difficulty. The question is asked: If the 
order admitting the will to probate is set aside only as to the 
person m1der a disabi�ity, but not as to other persons, how can 
it be in rem, for a decree in rem is said to bind all the world? 
Sometimes it has been held that the decree can be set aside as 
to the persons under a disability and not as to others ; 21 some­
times that it must be set aside, if at all, as to all persons.22 
But whichever view is taken (and this would seem to be 
purely a matter of statutory interpretation) it would not de­
tract from the essentially in rem character of the decree. For 
it can be binding as to all the world except the incompetents, 
and still no difficulty should be experienced in calling it in 
rem. 
There is little dissent from the proposition that the order 
appointing the executor or administrator is in rem. 23 That 
is to say, it is not subject to collateral attack in another pro­
ceeding on the ground of lack of notice, if the requirements 
of notice and a fair hearing for a proceeding in rem have been 
complied with. A curious Alabama decision 24 provides al­
most the only dissent from this proposition. In that case it 
was held that, although in respect to the grant of letters the 
"'- Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Superior Court, 2 1  Cal. App. (2d) 551 ,  
69 P.  (2d) 92 1  ( 1 9 3 7 ) ; Spencer v .  Spencer, 31  Mont. 6 3 1 ,  79  P.  po ( 1'904) . 
"" McCann v. Ellis, 1 7 2  Ala. 6o, 55 So. 303 ( 19 1 1 ) .  
23 Matter of Olcese, 2 1 0  Cal. 262, 29 1  P. 1 9 3  ( 1 93o') ;  Coca-Cola Inter­
national Corp. v. New York Trust Co., 22 Del. Ch. 344, 2 A. (2d) 290 ( 1 938)  
(dictum) ; Gibbs v .  Beckett, 229 Iowa 6 1 9, 295 N. W. 1 65 ( 1 940) ; Anderson 
v. Qualey, 2 1 6  Mass. 1 06, 1 0 3  N. E. 90 ( 1 9 1 3 ) ; Fridley v. Farmers' & 
Mechanics' Savings Bank, 1 3 6  Minn. 3 3 3, 1 62  N. W. 454 ( 1 9 1 7 ) ; State ex­
rel. Gott v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 3 1 7  Mo. 1 078, 2 9 8  S. W. 8 3  ( 1 927) ; 
Quindort's Admr, v. Pergeau, r 8  N. J. Eq. 472 ( 1 867) ; In re Reilly's Estate, 
1 65 Misc. 2 14, 3 00 N. Y. S. 1 2 85  ( 1 9 3 7 ) ; Denny v. Searles, 1 50  Va. 701, 143 
S. E. 484 ( 1928 ) . 
20 White v. Hill, 1 76 Ala. 48o, 5 8  So. 444 ( 1 9 r :z. ) .  
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proceeding was in rem, it was in personam GtS to the determi­
nation of the person who was nearest of kin and thus entitled 
to first consideration as an appointee. 
Decisions are. also numerous to the effect that the final 
decree of distribution has in rem operation, and cannot be 
collaterally attacked merely because an interested party was 
not served or did not have notice.25 Here the significance of 
the decree itself varies considerably from state to state. Thus 
in many jurisdictions there is a final decree specifically declar­
ing what interests the distributees take in personalty and in 
realty. In others the decree of distribution does not deal 
with real estate, but title is regarded as passing to the heir or 
devisee by virtue of the statute of descent or by the will. In 
some states the personal representative's distribution of per-
'" Wm. Hill Co. v. Lawler, 1 1 6 Cal. 3 59, 48 P. 3 2 3  ( I 897) ; Estate of Ross, 
I 85 Cal. 8, I 95 P. 674 ( I  92 I )  ; Edlund v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal. 69o, 2 89  P. 841 
(I 93o) ; Estate of Madsen, 3I Cal. App. (2d) 240, 8 7  P. (2d) 903 ( I 939) ; 
Connolly v. Probate Ct., 25 Idaho 35 ,  I 3 6  P. 205 ( I 9 I J ) ; In re Estate of 
Togneri, 296 Ill. App. 3 3 ,  1 5  N. E. (2d) 908 ( 1 93 8 ) ; Loring v. Steinman, 
I Mete. (42 Mass.) 204 (I 840) ; Cleaveland v. Draper, I 94 Mass. I I 8, So N.  
E.  227 ( I 907) ; Ladd v .  Weiskopf, 62 Minn. 29,  64 N. W. 99 ( 1 895 ) ; In re 
Estate of Eklund, I 74 Minn. 28 ,  2 I 8  N. W. 2 35  ( I 928) ; Fischer v. Sklenar, 
IOI  Neb. 553 >  1 6 3 N. W. 86I  ( I 9 I 7 ) ; Starkey v. Kingsley, 69 N. H. 293, 39  
A. ror  7 ( I  897) ; Exton v .  Zule, 14  N. J. Eq. 501  ( I  8 6 I ) ; In re  Estate of  Riley, 
92 N. ]. Eq. 567,  I I 3  A. 485 ( I 92 1 ) ; Roseman v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Md., 1 54 Misc. po, 277  N. Y. S. 471  (City Court of New York, I 9 3S ) ; 
Barrette v. Whitney, 3 6  Utah 5 74, ro6  P. 522  ( I 909) ; Carter v. Skillman, 
Io8 Va. 204, 6o S. E. 775  ( I 9o8) ; Krohn v. Hirsch, 8 I  Wash. 222, I42  P. 647 
(I914) ; In re Nilson's Estate, I09 Wash. I 27, I 86 P. 268 ( 1 9 1 9 ) ; Farley v. 
Davis, 1 0  Wash. (2d) 62, I I 6 P. (2d) 263  ( I 941 ) ; Hendricksen v. Eaker­
Boyer Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 9th, I 944) I 3 9  F. (2d) 877 ; Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. 
S. 43, 28  S. Ct. I ( I 907) ; Christianson v. King County, 2 3 9  U. S. 3 5 6, 36 S. 
Ct. I I 4 (I 9 I 5) • 
See also Spitzer v. Branning, I 3 5  Fla. 49, I 84 So. 770 ( I 9 3 8 ) ; Shriver v. 
State, 65 Md. 2 7 8, 4 A. 679 ( I 886) ; State ex rei. Gott v. Fidelity & Deposit 
Co., 3 I 7  Mo. I o78,  2 9 8  S. W. 83 ( I 927) ; Wolff v. Rager, 3 2 6  Mo. 2 22, 3 0  
S. W. (2d) I 005 (I 93o)  (probate proceedings said t o  be not strictly i n  rem, 
but somewhat in the nature of proceedings in rem) . 
Dictum : Carter v. Frahm, 3 I  S. D. 3 79, I4 I  N. W. 370  ( I 9 I 3 )  (said to be in 
rem or quasi in rem) . 
Contra : Wood v. Myrick, I 6  Minn. 494 ( I 8  7 I )  (but see later cases reversing 
this holding, .cited in this note) ; First Nat. Bank v. Chandler, I 3  3 N. J. Eq. 3 35, 
32 A. (2d) 455 ( I 943)  (decided on basis of statute requiring notice) ; Ruth v. 
Oberbrunner, 40 Wis. 2 3 8  at 267 ( I 8 76) (notice held to be j urisdictional) .  
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sonalty may be adjudicated by the final accounting, so that, in 
effect, the final accounting determines the distribution. But 
whatever the subject matter or character ,of the decree of dis­
tribution, its in rem operation is generally conceded. 
The decree settling the account of the personal repr�sent­
ative has been held to be in rem.26 Apparently by that is 
meant that, assuming jurisdictional requirements for an in 
rem proceeding have been met, it is not subject to collateral 
attack by a person interested in the estate of the decedent in 
so far as it determines what the personal representative was 
justified in taking out of the estate and appropriating for the 
various purposes stated in the account. But suppose the ex­
ecutor's account is short and the decree surcharges him and 
directs him to make good a stated amount from his own assets. 
While under the old law an action by an administrator de 
bonis non to charge his predecessor probably could not be 
brought in the probate proceeding but had to be initiated by 
creditors and distributees in a separate action/7 in many juris­
dictions today this can be done in the probate proceeding. 28 
If  it is done in this way, is it in rem? And if it is in rem, what 
does that mean? In the case of Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry/9 
where such a surcharge was made in the Michigan probate 
court, and an action wa� brought against the executor in Utah 
on the judgment, the court proceeded on the theory that it 
was a decree in personam to the extent that requirements of 
notice for an in personam proceeding were necessary to entitle 
it to recognition in Utah. Without doubt, this was a correct 
26 Horn v. Cornwall, (Idaho I 943 )  1 3 9  P. (2d) 75 7 ;  In re Anderson's Estate, 
I 57 Ore. 3 65, 7 I  P. (2d) I O I 3  ( I 9 3 7) (dictum) .  But compare In re Killian, 
1 72 N. Y. 547, 65 N. E. 56I ,  63 L. R. A. 95 ( 1 902) ,  where a statutory require­
ment of notice for a settlement of accounts was held to be j urisdictional, and 
therefore the decree was void as to interested parties who did not receive the 
statutory notice. 
27 See 3 WoERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. I 923 )  § 5 36. 
28 See ATKINSON, WILLS ( I 9 37 )  6 1 o ;  Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U. 
s. 346, 3 3 s. Ct. 55 0 (I 9 I 2) . 
, 
.. 22 8  U. S. 346 ( 1 9 u) . 
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conclusion in so far as the facts of that case are concerned. 
But, did it not have in rem operation to the extent that a 
devisee who did not have personal service in Michigan could 
not have subjected it to collateral attack in another Michigan 
proceeding. In other words, did it not bind all other persons 
interested in the estate in so far as it decided that this amount, 
and no more, should go into the.estate, though it had purely 
in personam operation as to the executor's duty to pay a sum 
of money? 
Next to decisions concerned with decrees in matters of pro­
bate and contest and with decrees of distribution, perhaps the 
largest number of cases involve proceedings to sell land in 
connection with the · administration of a decedent's estate. 
Here the holdings are conflicting, although the weight of 
authority is to the effect that decrees with respect to the sale 
are in rem. 30 Of course, under English law the land of the 
"" The following are to the effect that the proceeding is in rem : Doe ex dem. 
Duval's Heirs v. McLoskey, I Ala. 708 ( I '84o) ; Perkins' Exrs. v. Winter's 
Admrs., 7 Ala. 855 ( I 845) ; Saltonstall v. Riley, 28 Ala. I 64 ( I 856) ; Satcher v. 
Satcher's Admr., 4I Ala. 26 ( I 867) ; Lyons. v. Hamner, 84 Ala. I 97> 4 So. 26 
(I 8 87 ) ; Neville v. Kenny, I 25 Ala. I49, 28  So. 452 ( I 899) ; Sturdy v. Jaco­
way, I 9  Ark. 499 ( I 858) ; Montgomery v. Johnson, 3 I  Ark. 74 ( I 876) ; 
Roundtree v. Montague, 30 Cal. App. I 7o, I 57 P. 623 ( r 9 r 6 ) ; Good v. Norley, 
28 Iowa r 8 8  ( r 869) (equally divided court) ; McClay v. Foxworthy, r 8  Neb. 
295, 25 N. W. 86 (r 885) ; Brusha v. Phipps, 86 Neb. 822, r 2 6  N. W. 856 
( I 9 r o) ; Sheldon v.  Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494 ( I 854) ; Benson v.  Cilley, 8 Ohio 
St. 604 ( I  8 58 )  ; McPherson v. Cunliff, I r Serg. & R. (Pa.) 422 ( r 824) ; Heath 
v. Layne, 62 Tex. 686 ( r 884) ; Ryan v. Ferguson, 3 Wash. 3 56, 2 8  P. 9 1 0  
( r 8 9 r ) ; Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. (43 U. S.) 3 1 9  ( r 844) ; Magnolia 
Petroleum Co. v. Mayer (C. C. A. r oth, 1 9 3 2 )  58 F. (2d) 48. 
Contra : Mickel v. Hicks, 19 Kan. 578 ( r 8 78) ; Seal v. Banes, r 68 Okla. 
sso; 3 5  P. (2d) 704 ( 1 934) ; Stadelman v, Miner, 8 3  Ore. 348, I 5 5  P. 708, 
I63 P. s 8 s, I 63 P. 9 8 3  ( r 9 I 7) (on rehearing the court determined that the 
requirement of notice had been sufficiently complied with so that no collateral 
attack would be permitted) . 
There are also several cases in which it was determined that a statutory re­
quirement of notice was jurisdictional and that since it was not complied with, 
the sale was void, but it is not asserted that the proceeding was not in rem. See 
Dorrance v. Raynsford, 67 Conn. r, 34  A. 706 ( r 895) ; French v. Hoyt, 6 N. H. 
370 ( I 8 3 3 ) ; Jenkins v. Young, 3 5  Hun. (42 N. Y.) 569 ( r 8 85) . And see 
VANFLEET, COLLATERAL ATTACK ON JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ( r 8 92 )  § 406. 
But these cases would seem to prove little ; though the orders with respect to the 
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decedent was not subject to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical 
court. If it was reached at all to satisfy the debts of the de­
cedent, it was reached in equity. The theory of the proceed­
ing was that, since title to the land passed to the heir or devisee 
at the instant of the decedent's death, chancery was proceed­
ing against such person to appropriate his interest to the pay­
ment of the debt.31 It is still the rule in this country that title 
to land pas�es to the heir or devisee at the moment the decedent 
dies. In some jurisdictions a proceeding to sell land to pay 
debts is an independent proceeding by the personal represent­
ative against the other interested parties. 32 
In McPherson v. Cunli!J/3 one of the earliest cases on the 
subject of the in rem character of probate proceedings, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that the decree of the 
orphans' court could not be attacked collaterally in an action 
of ejectment by one claiming to derive title from one of the 
heirs who resided in Ireland and who evidently had no notice 
of the administration sale. While there were other circum­
stances which might have been relied on to reach this con­
clusion, the court based its decision squarely on the in rem 
character of the decree, when it said : 34 
" . . . It is a proceeding purely in rem against the estate 
of the intestate, and not in personam. So much is it a proceed­
ing against his estate, that it overrules the lien of a judgment. 
The· estate was condemned to a sale, and may well be com­
pared to a· condemnation of goods by a court of exchequer, 
whose condemnation is final, in an action brought to try the 
right of the goods." 
sale of land are in rem, a failure to comply with statutory requirements may 
render them void. See Robertson v. Bradford, 70 Ala. 3 8 5  ( t 8 8 t ) ,  
The two recent cases, hereafter discussed, to the effect that the proceeding for 
the sale of land is not strictly in rem but quasi in rem should also be noted. 
31 LANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION (zd ed. 1 908) 
1 44· 
32 See, for example, Neb. Comp. Stat. ( 1 929) §§ 3 0-I I O I  to 30-I I 25. 
331 1 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 422 ( 1 824) ; 
"" At page 430. 
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A few recent decisions contrary to  the trend of modern au­
thority should be noted. In Montana,S5 and subsequently in 
Idaho,S6 it has been determined that a proceeding to sell the 
real estate of a decedent is not strictly in rem but is quasi in 
rem. What these courts actually held was that the proceed­
ing for sale was void as to heirs or devisees who ·were not 
served as provided by statute or who did not appear. The 
Idaho decision is to the effect that the sale was binding on heirs 
who appeared or were served. In both cases it appeared that 
the statute required personal service or service by publication 
of the order to show cause. In both cases it appeared that 
neither of these requirements was complied with. In a recent 
Oklahoma case 37 it was decided that minor heirs residing in 
the county who were not personally served were not bound 
by a proceeding to sell real estate. A statute required that 
notice be personally served on heirs residing within the county. 
While conceding that other probate proceedings are in rem, 
the court adhered to the view that this proceeding was in 
personam. It would be easier to state the effect of these de- . 
cisions, if we could determine what would have been held if, 
in Montana or Idaho, the statutory requirement for publica­
tion of notice had been complied with, or if, in Oklahoma, all 
'heirs within the county had been personally served. It would 
be perfectly possible to say that the decree would then have in 
rem operation and that it would bind all other persons in or 
out of the state whether they were personally served or not. 
It is not clear whether the Montana and Idaho courts, in 
describing the proceeding as quasi in rem, meant to use this 
term in the sense in which it is used in the Restatement of 
Judgments. But if they did, it would seem that such a doctrine 
would be most unsatisfactory as applied to sales of a decedent's 
05 Lamont v. Vinger, 61 Mont. 530, 202 P. 769 ( 1 9 2 1 ) .  See also 2 BLACK, 
JuDGMENTS (2d ed. 1 902) § 8o8, cited in this case, to same effect. 
"" Kline v. Shoup, 3 8  Idaho 202, 226 P. 729 ( 1 923) . 
87 Seal v. Banes, 1 68 Okla. sso, 35 P. (2d) 704 ( 1 934) . 
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lands. It would mean that the court sells only the interests 
of designated heirs or devisees, not the entire interest of the 
decedent. Since a final order of distribution in many states 
would not be made until after the order of sale, it is entirely 
possible that the proceeding to sell might purport to seize the 
real estate of A,  but a later order of distribution would deter­
mine that B and not A was the heir. Perhaps, all the Montana 
and Idaho decisions mean is this : a substantial compliance 
with statutory requirements for notice as to the sale is neces­
sary in order for the court to have jurisdiction as a proceeding 
in rem. Otherwise the proceeding is merely in personam, 
and binds only persons actually served or those who appear. 
Indeed, as to the Oklahoma decision, it can be said that it 
merely holds that notice to heirs residing in the county is a 
condition precedent tq the court's jurisdiction and that a fail­
ure to comply with that requirement renders the decree totally 
void. 
A few other decisions concern the charader of various other 
orders and decrees in the administration of a decedent's estate. 
· Nearly all of them are to the effect that the decree or order 
is in rem. This has been held with respect to the partition 
among distributees, 38 a decree determining that the estate is 
insolvent,39 an order permitting the personal representative 
to mortgage assets of the estate, 40 an order setting aside a 
homestead/1 and an order determining that all claims not 
properly filed are forever barred.42 On the other hand, a 
decree as to an advancement 43 and an order making an allow� 
38 Wyman v. Campbell, 6 Porter (Ala.) Z I 9  ( I 8 J 8 ) .  
89 Hine v .  Hussey, Admr., 45 Ala. 496 ( I 8 7 I ) .  
'" Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Steely, 54 Idaho 59 I ,  3 4  P. (zd) 5 6  ( I 934) . 
" Bedwell v. Dean, zz:i. Ala. z76, qz  So. zo ( I 9 3o) ; Kearney v. Kearney, 
7 z  Cal. 591, I S  P. 769 ( I 8 87) ; Roundtree v. Montague, 3 0  Cal. App. I 7o, I 57  
P .  6z3  ( I 9 I6 )  . 
.. Tilt v. Kelsey, zo7 U. S. 43, z 8  S. Ct. I ( I 907) .  
· 
43 Cecil v. Cecil, 1 9  Md. 7z ( I 86 z ) .  
..._ _ ,  
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ance to an administrator for extraordinary services 44 were 
declared not to have in rem operation. 
No analysis has been found in the cases,-. -perhaps because 
no practical difficulties are presented,-of the character of a 
judgment or decree determining a contract claim against the 
estate. It is true, one decision 45 appears to be to the effect 
that a decree of the probate court adjudicating a claim is in 
rem, and in view of the general trend of judicial decision it 
is to be expected that courts might so conclude. But suppose, 
as often happens, the claimant, in accordance with the terms 
qf a statute, sues the executor or administrator in his repre­
sentative capacity in a contract action in the court of general 
jurisdiction. Is this contract action in rem as to other persons 
interested in the estate? Obviously, it has in personam qp­
eration in so far as it determines liability on the contract. 
That is to say, if A has a contract claim against the decedent 
and the court determines that the administrator is liable in 
his representative capacity, it does not decide anything about 
the right of B, another claimant on that contract. It may, 
however, decide as to all the distributees and others interested 
in the estate, that the amount found due should be taken from 
the estate to pay the claimant, provided the estate is solvent. 
Of course, no real problem is likely to arise, since the claimant 
and the personal representative both submit themselves per­
sonally to the jurisdiction of the court ; and, if the other per­
sons interested in the estate are bound, the personal.represent­
ative may be said to represent them. 46 
" McMahon v. Ambach Co., 79 Ohio St. 1 03, 8 6  N. E. 5 1 2.  ( r 9o8) . It is 
believed that this was not a final order, and therefore, could be reconsidered in 
the accounting . 
.. Ware v. Farmers' National Bank, 3 7  N. M. 4 1 5,' 24 P. (2d) 269 ( 1 93 3 )  . 
.. In general, as to the doctrine of representation, see RESTATEMENT, JuDG­
MENTS ( 1 942) § 8o, comments a and b. Of coui·se, this doctrine is primarily 
applicable where the action is in personam or quasi in rem. 
504 MONOGRAPHS ON PROBATE LAW 
While most of the decisions are concerned with the question 
of res judicata, a few appear to derive other conclusions from 
the in rem character of probate proceedings. Thus it is held 
that, because the proceeding is in rem, a party who has ap­
pealed cannot dismiss the appeal ; 47 that one not named as a 
party in the initial proceeding to probate a will can neverthe­
less intervene in the appeal because all persons having any 
interest are parties to an in rem proceeding; 48 and that an 
arbitration or compromise cannot be effectuated by particular 
parties, since there is no way of joining all persons in the 
stipulation for this purpose.49 
This survey of the decisions would seem to show that, for 
most purposes, the administration of the estate of a decedent 
consists of one or more proceedings in rem; that such proceed­
ings are properly described in most jurisdictions as strictly 
in rem and not as quasi in rem; that unlike condemnation or 
admiralty proceedings which may consist in a single se!zure 
and sale or other disposition of the res, the administration of 
a decedent's estate involves a considerable number of final 
orders, mo�t of which concern the rights of the successors in 
interest of the decedent to his estate; and in so far as they 
do, they are in rem. There may, however, be orders which 
primarily concern the personal liability of particular persons, 
such as an order surcharging the executor or a judgment on 
a claim against the decedent ;  to the extent that they do not 
concern the res, they are not in rem. 
•7 Matter of Will of Storey, 20 Ill. App. 1 8 3  ( 1 886) . See also Hutson v. 
Sawyer, 1 04 N. C. x, 1 0  S. E. 8 5  ( 1 8 89) . 
"" In re Estate of Sweeney, 94 Neb. 8 34, 1 44 N. W. 902 ( 1 9 1 3 ) .  "See also 
Sheeran v. Sheeran, 96 Minn. 484, 1 05 N. W. 677 ( 1 905) . Compare Griffin v. 
Milligan, 1 7 7  Ala. 57, 5 8  So. 257  ( 1 9 1 2 ) .  · · 
.. Estate of Carpenter, 1 2 7  Cal. 5 82, 6o P. 1 62 ( 1 9oo) ; In re Estate of 
Meredith, 275 Mich. 278, 266 N. W. 3 5 1  ( 1 93 6) . Compare Culpeper 
National Bank v. Morris, 1 68 Va. 3 79, 1 9 1  S. E. 764 ( 1 9 3 7 ) .  
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II. WHAT NoTICE Is SuFFICIENT To PREVENT 
CoLLATERAL ATTAcK? 
We are now ready to consider the question : what notice is 
necessary to prevent collateral attack on a probate decree? 
It is clear that, regardless of the kind of proceeding in rem, 
the requirements of notice are necessarily somewhat less ex­
acting than for a proceeding in personam. Many of the earlier 
cases on probate proceedings state or imply that no notice 
whatever is necessary because they are proceedings in rem. 
It is true, there is a well recognized do<:trine to the effect that, 
in order to acquire jurisdiction, a court must have some power, 
actual or constructive, over the person or the thing which is 
the subject matter of the controversy. 5° The rule is stated in 
the Restatement of Judgments as follows : 51 "A judgment 
is void unless the State in which, it is rendered has jurisdiction 
to subject to its control the parties or the property or status 
sought to be affected." It is, of course, recognized that this 
proposition does not mean that the thing is the defendant. 
Here, as in the proceeding in personam, the parties are in fact 
persons. But in the proceeding in rem, the parties consist in 
an indefinite number of persons. Indeed, a judgment in rem 
may be said to affect all, or nearly all, persons in the world. 
Thus, in the probate proceeding, in determining who are the 
successors in interest of the decedent with respect to his estate 
the decrees determine not only that certain persons have an 
interest but that all other persons in the world do not. Since 
a proceeding in rem determines the rights of persons quite 
as much as a proceeding in personam, it follows that a mere 
control over the thing may not be enough, and that the judg­
ments rendered thereunder will not be valid unless interested 
60 See the opinions of Holmes, J., in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 3 7 S. 
Ct. 343 ( I 9 I 7) and Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, I 7 5 Mass. 
7 I ,  55  N. E. 8 1 2  ( I 900) . 
61 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS ( I 942) § 5· 
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parties have had reasonable notice and an opportunity to' be 
heard. Otherwise the procedure would not meet constitu­
tional requirements of due process. "A judgment is void," 
says the Restatement of Judgments, "unless a reasonable 
method of notification is employed and a reasonable opportu­
nity to be heard afforded to persons affected." 52 There is 
authority involving probate decrees to support this proposi­
tion. 53 But, as has been said, since all persons are bound by 
the decree, somewhat less notice is reasonable than in the case 
of proceedings in personam. 
In determining what is reasonable notice in proceedings to 
administer a decedent's estate, however, it is believed that 
the courts have been and will continue to be profoundly af­
fected by two things, namely: the peculiar function of ad­
ministration proceedings and the recognized English historical 
procedures from which our procedures are derived. It must 
also be recognized that a state may impose by statute juris­
dictional requirements of notice which go farther and are in 
addition to minimum requirements of due process. 
Before considering these aspects of notice in probate pro­
ceedings, attention will first be directed to a principle which 
is particularly significant in its application to probate cases, 
namely that, if reasonable notice is given at the beginning of 
a proceeding, no further notice to interested parties is ordi­
narily required for any further steps in the same proceeding. 
The important question, then, is : Is the administration of a 
decedent's estate, from the filing of the petition for the ap­
pointment of the personal representative to the final order of 
distribution arid the order discharging the personal represent­
ative, one judicial proceeding? This, of course, depends on 
the law of any particular state. But there is no doubt that in 
.. Id. at § 6. 
63 Goodrich v. Ferris, Z I4  u. s. 7 1 ,  29 s. Ct. sSo ( 1 909 ) .  As to proceedings 
in rem, in general, see Roller v. Holly, 1 76 U. S. 3 9 8, 20 S. Ct. 4 1 0  ( 1900).  
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a number of states it is a single proceeding, and that, if the 
law of a given state makes it a single proceeding, jurisdiction 
may be acquired by notice at the beginning of that proceed­
ing. In Michigan Trust Company v. Ferry/4 a testator died 
domiciled in Michigan and defendant Ferry petitioned for 
appointment as executor in that state and was duly appointed. 
Subsequently he removed to Utah and became of unsound 
mind. After he became a resident of Utah, steps were taken 
in the Michigan probate court to remove him. He was ac­
cordingly removed and the Michigan Trust Company was 
appointed administrator. The Michigan probate court also 
decreed that the defendant Ferry was indebted to the estate 
for a sum of over a million dollars." Acti0n was brought by 
the administrator in the federal court of Utah against the 
defendant personally to recover this indebtedness, and the 
decision was for the defendant. The Supreme Court of the 
United States reversed that decision. To the objection that 
full faith and credit should not be given to the Michigan 
decree by the Utah court because there was no personal service 
on the defendant in the Michigan proceeding in which the 
indebtedness was decreed, the Supreme Court of the United 
States, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, said:  
"Ordinarily jurisdiction over a person is based on the power 
of the sovereign asserting it to seize that person and imprison 
him to await the sovereign's pleasure. But when that power 
exists and is asserted by service at the beginning of a cause, 
or if the party submits to the jurisdiction in whatever form 
m�y be required, we dispense with the necessity of maintain­
ing the physical pdwer and attribute the same force to the 
judgment or decree whether the party remain within the 
jurisdiction or not. This is one of the decencies of civilization 
that no one would dispute. . . . This is true not only of 
ordimiry actions but of proceedings like the present. It is 
within the power of a State to make the whole administration 
"' zz8  U. S. 3461 3 3  S. Ct. sso (�9 u.). 
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of the estate a single proceeding, to provide that one who has 
undertaken it within the jurisdiction shall be subject to the 
order of the court in the matter until the administration is 
closed by distribution, and, on the same principle, that he shall 
be required to account for and distribute all that he receives 
by the order of the Probate Court." 55 
The principle that the entire administration is one pro­
ceeding has been clearly recognized by several other courts.56 
Thus, in Culver v. Hardenbergh,57 a sale of land by the pro­
bate court in connection with an administration proceeding 
was attacked on the ground that the court was without juris­
diction. The facts on which this objection was based were 
that two persons havin� been appointed administrators and 
one o� them having subsequently resigned, the court ap­
pointed another person to act in his stead. This latter ap­
pointment was admittedly irregular, and the question was 
whether a sale of land made by that person in hfs official 
capacity was void. The court held that it was not void and 
that irregularities in the appointment did not affect the juris­
diction of the court since that jurisdiction attached on the 
initiation of the proceeding. -After a full analysis of the 
proposition/8 the court concluded with these words : 
55 At page 353 ·  
116 Wm. Hill Co. v .  Lawler, I I6  Cal. 359, 48 P .  3 2 3  ( 1 897) ; Heck v .  Heck, 
34  Ohio St. 369 ( 1 8 7 8 ) ; Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 1 06 P. 522 ( 1 909) ; 
Everett v. Wing, 103  Vt. 488, 1 56 A. 393  ( 1 9 3 1 ) .  
57 3 7  Minn . . 225, 3 3  N .  W. 792 ( 1 8 87) . 
58 See pages 234-236  of the court's opinion, which is in part as follows : 
"By the proceedings for the probate of a will and its probate, or, in case there 
be no will, for the appointment, and the appointment, of an administrator, being 
the first step towards the administration and settlement of the estate, the con­
stitutional jurisdiction of the court attaches to the estate. The jurisdiction given 
by the constitution is entire 'over the estates,' and where it has once attached it 
must coritinue .(unless legally terminated) until its purpose is accomplished; that 
is, until the estate is administered .and settled. Unless the administration of an 
estate is an entire proceeding, so that the jurisdiction of the court to direct and 
control it, once attaching, continues until its close, then it is o�,: may be split up 
into an almost infinite number of subjects of jurisdiction, and the probate court, 
whenever it is necessary for it to take any action, must acquire j urisdiction to do 
the particular thing required of it, as ·though it were an original, independent 
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"We hold, therefore, that when a probate court legally 
probates a will, or appoints a first administrator, it , thereby 
,acquires jurisdiction to direct and control the administration 
of the estate ; and that such jurisdiction (unless previously 
legally terminated) continues over the administration, as one 
proceeding, until its close ; and that all the court may do in 
the course and for the purpose of the administration, including 
the removal or discharge of administrators, and the appoint­
ment of new administrators, is sustained by the jurisdiction 
thus acquired." 
While the modern trend is to regard all steps in the adminis­
tration of a decedent's estate as one proceeding, nevertheless, 
in some jurisdictions, certain steps _are still regarded as sepa­
rate. The steps required to sell land forthe payment of debts 
originally constituted a separate proceeding. The land was 
not brought within the jurisdiction of the probate court, but 
the personal representative, by an independent suit against 
the heir or devisee, might secure an order for a sale of the 
land. Such a proceeding is still brought in some states in some 
court other than that in which probate of the will takes place. 59 
Obviously that is an independent proceeding. Indeed, as 
we have seen, it may not even be strictly in rem. Even though 
statutes provide that sales of land to pay debts are in the pro­
bate court, the steps required .to sell land may still be regarded 
as an independent proceeding. 60 This is likely to be true 
proceeding. If the jurisdiction acquired by the proceedings for the probate of 
the will, or for the appointment of the first administrator, ceases with the probate 
or appointment, then the court cannot appoint commissioners or appraisers, nor 
extend the time for creditors to present claims, nor require an administrator to 
renew his bond, nor direct him to pay debts, or sell personal property, or take 
possession of real estate, or commence an action, or render his accounts, nor do 
any of the scores of things that may be necessary for a probate court to do in the 
course of directing the administration of an estate, without acquiring anew juris­
diction to do the particular thing. 
"On the other hand, if the jurisdiction originally acquired continues beyond 
the probate or appointment, then there is no stopping place short of the close of 
the administration." 
50 See note 3 2, supra. 
60 Lamont v. Vinger, 6 1  Mont. 5 30, 202 P. 769 ( 1 9 2 1 ) .  
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where the statutory requirement of notice for sales of land is 
jurisdictional. 61 On the other hand, if, as is the case in several 
states, the probate court assumes general control of the real 
estate of the decedent throughout the administration, 62 a rea­
sonable conclusion is that the sale of land to pay debts is but 
a part of a single proceeding to administer the decedent's 
estate. 
In some states the personal liability of an executor who is in 
default is not determined as a part of the probate proceeding, 
but in a separate action brought by distributees and creditors 
rather than by the administrator de bonis non.63 The deter­
mination of heirship may be either an independent proceed­
ing or a part of the administration proceeding, depending 
upon the local statute. 64 
Since the courts regard all or most of the steps in adminis­
tration as a single proceeding, the most significant step from 
the standpoint of the requirement of notice is the initial one. 
What notice is necessary for the hearing on the petition for 
probate of a will or for the grant of administration? In this 
connection, it should be observed that the usual circumstances 
suggest a minimum of notice as reasonable. In a large num­
ber of cases it is important to have some one take charge of the 
property of a decedent as soon as he dies. This is obviously 
true in the case of an estate consisting of a farm or of a business 
involving perishable goods, or in any case where protection 
is needed to prevent damage, theft or embezzlement. More­
over, in the vast majority of cases there is no contest among 
the parties interested in the estate, and the administration is 
accomplished merely to make sure that the estate is distributed 
61 See note 3 o, supra. 
62 See Simes and Basye, "The Organization of the Probate Court in America," 
43 MICH. L. REV. l l 3  at 1 2. 1�1 30  ( 1 944) . ' 
63 See note 2.7, supra • 
.. Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) §§ z7.3 1 7 8 ( 145) to z7.3 1 78 ( 1 49) inclusive. The 
proceeding may be either a part of the administration or may be brought as an 
independent proceeding. 
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in an orderly fashion. What is done is essentially adminis­
trative, and the judicial decrees rendered are all of a routine 
character and uncontested. Courts have also sometimes 
pointed out 65 that the death of the decedent is itself a fact 
which is likely to come to the attention of all near relatives, 
so that most interested parties may know that an administra­
tion is likely to be initiated. Of course, numerous instances 
could be pointed out where this is 'not the case; and the fact 
that the decedent is dead does not necessarily suggest to an 
heir the county in which his estate is being administered. 
A further element tending to reduce the requirement of 
notice is the English procedural model furnished by the ec­
clesiastical courts. Probate could be either in common or in 
solemn form.66 If in common form, no notice whatever was 
given. But at any time within thirty years interested parties 
might come in and demand probate in solemn form. The 
issue was then tried anew on notice to interested p'arties. Ifno 
one demanded probate in solemn form, the decree admitting 
the will to probate in common form was regarded as effectual. 
In the case of intestate estates, 67 it is probable that at least the 
surviving spouse could secure a grant of letters without notice ; 
but notice to next of kin was ordinarily given when one of 
them applied for a grant. 
Without doubt, if a given procedure was traditionally fol­
lowed by English courts and copied in this country, that is a 
strong argument that the same procedure in this country is 
65 Knight v. Hollings, 73 N. H. 495 at soo, 63 A. 38 ( r 9o6) ("ordinarily 
the heirs learn of the decease of the person very soon after it occurs") ; Crippen v. 
Dexter, 79 Mass. 3 30 at 3 3 3-334 ( r 859)  ("A man dying, having property, 
usually dies with the knowledge of his kindred ; th€! death itself is a fact of some 
notoriety in his neighborhood, and through the circle of his associates; pro­
ceedings for the settlement of his estate of necessity soon follow, and may be 
easily known to those most interested, so that actual knowledge of the proceed­
ings will generally be had.") 
66 ATKINSON, WILLS ( 1 9 3 7) 42.8. 
87 CoNSET, THE PRACTICE OF THE SPIRITUAL OR ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS (�d 
ed. 1 708)  q.;  4 BURN, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW (9th ed. 1 842.) 366-367. 
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due process.68 In this instance, of course, it may be said that 
the English practice only applied to the administration of 
personalty and that proceedings in England with respect to 
the lands of the decedent had to be initiated with notice. That 
argument, however, has not been accepted by the American 
courts. And the decisions on the point are unanimously to 
the effect that a probate iq common form without any notice 
whatever is due process.69 Moreover, in the United States 
at the present time probate in common form without any notice 
68 See Coler v. Corn EJCchange Bank, 250 N. Y. 1 3 6, 1 64 N. E. 882 ( 1 928) ,  
aff'd 280  U.  S .  2 I 8, 50  S. Ct. 94 ( 1 929) ,  which sustained a summary pro­
ceeding to seize property of a person who deserted his wife and children. The 
decisiou was based in part upon the fact that the procedure had its roots in the 
distant past. Cardozo, Ch. J., giving the opinion of the court, quoted with ap­
proval from Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 26o U. S. 22 at 3 I, 43 S. Ct. 9 ( 1 923) 
as follows : · 
"The Fourteenth Amendment, itself a historical product, did not destroy 
history for the States and substitute mechanical compartments of law all exactly 
alike. If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, 
it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it." 
.. In Sutton v. Hancock, u 8  Ga. 436, 45 S. E. 504 ( I 903 ) ,  the court, in a 
full discussion of this question, so decided. A part of the opinion is as follows : 
"Stated in a word, the contention is that the State has no power to make con­
clusive, after any lapse of time, a j udgment which has the effect to deprive one 
of his property without any notice to him and without giving him an opportunity 
at the time of or before the rendition of the j udgment to say why such judgment 
should not have been rendered. We do not think this proposition is universally 
true. The principle at the foundation of the constitutional provisions just re­
ferred to was brought across the waters with the common law. Any rule or 
procedure which is in accord with the settled usage and practice of the common 
law affords due process, within the meaning of that phrase as used in the various 
constitutions of this country. . It seems, therefore, to be well settled that 
at common law there was a conclusive presumption, after the lapse of time, in 
favor of the validity of a will proved in common form of law, and that this 
presumption had the effect of placing the will upon the same footing as if it had 
originally been proved in solemn form or per testes. Any system of laws which 
recognizes this common-law principle and provides for a reasonable time can not 
be said not to afford due process of law." (pp. 443-444) . 
Other cases to the same effect are : Dickey v. Vann, 8 I Ala. 42 5, 8 So, I 9 5 
( I 8 86) ; Knight v. Hollings, 7 3  N. H. 495, 63  A. 3 8  ( 1 906) ; 'Pratt v. Hawley, 
297  Ill. 244, 1 30 N. E. 793 ( 1 92 1 ) ; Farrell v. O'Brien, 1 9 9  U. S. 89  at 1 1 7, 
1 1 8 ,  25 S. Ct. 727 ( 1 905 ) .  See also Crippen v. DeJCter, 79 Mass. 3 30 ( 1 859) 
and People eJC rel. Frazer v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 39 Mich. 1 9 8  ( 1 8 7 8 ) .  
To the effect that a grant o f  administration o n  intestacy without previous notice 
is'valid, see Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Hill, 1 3 9  Ga. 224, 76 S. E. 
1 001 ( 1 9U) .  
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whatsoever is a part of a procedure in a score of states ; 70 and 
in about the same number of states, it · is possible to have a 
grant of administration without notice. 71 
But if the administration of a decedent's estate may be 
initiated without any notice whatever, what becomes of the re­
quirement of notice and a fair hearing? How can the propo­
sition just stated be squared with the following exppsition of 
that doctrine in the Restatement of Judgments : 72 "A judg­
ment purporting to affect the interests of persons in a thing is 
void, even though the State has power over the �hing, and 
the court has jurisdiction over it, if no notification was given"? 
Obviously the Restatement of Judgments does not ignore the 
judicial authority just cited and the practice in a score of states. 
The explanation would seem to be this. Notice and a fair 
hearing are offered to interested parties when there is probate 
in common form, but they are offered after the probate in 
common form, not before. In the states which permit probate 
in common form it is usual to find a requirement of notice 
immediately after the personal representative is appointed. 
This may take the form either of a notice to creditors or a 
notice of the appointment. Moreover, in practically_ all those 
·70 Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 93 7 )  § I4544 ; Del. Rev. Code ( I935)  § 3 799 ; Fla. Stat. 
Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 732.23 ; Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936)  § I q-6oi ; Ky. Rev. Stat. 
( 1 942) § 394.220 ; Md. Code ( I 9 39 )  art. 93, § 36o ;  Miss. Code ( I 942) §§ 502 
to 504 ; N. H. Rev. Laws ( I 942) c. 349, § 2; N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7 )  § 3 :2-2I ; 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943)  § 3 I-J2, ; Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) § 1 9-204 ; S. C. 
Code ( 1 942) § 8 9 3 2. ;  Va. Code ( I 942) § 5 25 9 ;  Wash. Rev. Stat. ( I 932)  
§ 1 3 8 o ;  W. Va. Code ( I 943) § 4070. In  Indiana, Missouri, Pennsylvania and 
Tennessee probate may be had without notice although there is no sta:tute so 
providing. See l HENRY, PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INDIANA ( I 9 3 1 )  
76o ; State ex rel. Mitchell v. Gideon, 2 I 5  Mo. App. 46, 2 3 7  S .  W. 2 2 0  ( 1 9 2 I ) ; 
2 HUNTER, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' CoURT COMMONPLACE BooK ( 1 939)  
1 1 22. " 
n N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c. 349, · §  2. In three states notice is optional with 
the. court : Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 9 3 7) § 8 ;  Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942) § 8 ;  Ore. 
Comp. Laws ( I  940) § 1 9-2 I I .  In I 3 states the statute is silent as to notice ; in 
these states notice is apparently not required. These states are Alabama, 
Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming. 
72 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1 942� § 3 2, comment f. 
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states, an int�rested party, without being substantially preju­
diced, has a reasonable time in which to have another hearing 
on the same issue after due notice. Thus, in substance, the 
practical result is not very different from that in the states 
where statutes provide that notice must precede a hearing on 
a petition for probate or grant of administration. For 
in those states it is commonly provided that a special ad­
ministrator may be appointed summarily and without notice 
to take charge of the estate pending the hearing on the ap­
plication for probate or administration. In states where pro­
ceedings may be initiated without notice, it would seem that 
interested parties are not seriously prejudiced. The personal 
representative can still be removed for cause, and a will can 
still be probated. 
In jurisdictions where statutes provide for some sort of 
notice to initiate the administration, it is dear that publication 
is sufficient and that personal service on interested parties 
is not required.73 While most of the cases so holding involve 
interested parties out of the jurisdiction, it would seem that 
publication would be sufficient even for parties within the 
state, if the legislature so provided. 74 Of course, if the legis-
"" Estate of Davis, 1 36 Cal. 590, 69 P. 4 IZ  ( I 9oz) ; Farmers' & Merchants' 
Nat. Bank v. Sup�rior Court (Cal. App. I 944) I48 P. (zd) 445, aff'd on re­
hearing, I 50 P. (zd) Z4I ; Loring v. Steinman, 1 Mete. (4z Mass.) zo4 ( � 84o) 
(decree of final distribution) ; In re Estate of Eklund, I 74 Minn. z8, zr 8 N. W. 
z35  ( I 9z8 )  (decree of final distribution) ;  Starkey v. Kingsley, 69 N. H. 293, 
3 9 A. I o 17 ( I  8 9 7 )  (decree of final distribution) ; Matter of Horton, z I 7 N. Y. 
363 ,  I I 1 N. E. 1 066 ( I 9 I6 ) ; Roseman v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., I 54 Misc. po, 
z77  N.' Y. S. 47I ( I 935 ) ; Everett v. Wing, I03 Vt. 488,  I 56 A. 393 ( I 9 3 I )  
(cert. den. 2 84  U. S. 69o) ; Krohn v .  Hirsch, 8 I  Wash. zzz, I4Z P .  647 ( I 9 I4) 
(decree of final distribution) ;  Broderick's Will,. ZI Wall. ( 8 8  U. S.) 503 
( I 874) ; Goodrich v .. Ferris, ZI4 U. S. 7 I >  29 S. Ct. 58o ( I 9o9) (decree of final 
distribution) ; Christianson v. King County, 239  U. S. 3 5 6, 3 6  S. Ct. I I4 ( I 9 I 5) 
(decree of final distribution) . 
" Doe ex dem. Duval's Heirs .v. McLoskey, I Ala. 708 ( I 84o) (sale of land) ; 
Hall's Heirs v. Hall, 47 Ala. 290 ( I 8 7z) ; Sheldon v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494 
( I 854) (sale of land) ; Farley v. Davis, IO Wash. (zd) 6z, I I 6 P. (zd) z63 
( I 94 I )  (decree of final distribution) ; Dower v. Seeds, 28 W. Va. I I 3  at I 34 
( I 8 86 )  (will contest) . · 
ADMINISTRATION AS PROCEEDING IN REM 5 1 5  
lature imposes additional requirements of notice which are 
jurisdictional, then obviously they also must be complied with. 
This leads us to the question : may the legislature impose 
, requirements of notice as to a later step in the administration 
proceeding and make these requirements jurisdictional? 
Statutes not infrequently require some sort of notice at three 
points : at or immediately following the initiation of the ad­
ministration proceeding; at the time creditors are required to 
file their claims ; and at the closing of the estate when the final 
account is settled. If there are sales of real estate, notice of 
them is frequently required. In a few instances some of the 
notices subsequent to the initi�tion of the proceeding h�ve 
been held to be jurisdictional. 75 . But does that mean that there 
is more than one proceeding, or does it merely mean that a 
particular part of the proceeding will be invalid if no notice 
is given? It is possible that the latter may be the proper 
conclusion. 
One more question should be briefly considered. Must 
there be an actual or constructive seizure of the 'res in order to 
give the court jurisdiction? It is true, following the type 
form of proceeding in rem which the courts seem so often to 
have in mind,-such as the admiralty proceeding or the pro­
ceeding to confiscate property,-the seizure of the ·res might 
in some instances be an appropriate method of giving notice 
to interested parties. But tha.t is not the only way, nor is it, 
in some instances, the proper way, to give notice. 76 It is be­
lieved that, as to proceedings in rem in general, notice by 
711 In re Killian, 1 72 N. Y. 547, 65 N. E. 56 1 ,  63 L. R. A. 9 5  ( 1 902) (settle­
ment of accounts) ; Schneider v. McFarland, 2 Comstock (N. Y.) 459 (1 849) 
(sale of land) ; Carter v. Frahm, 3 1  S. D. 3 79, 141 N. W. 370 ( 1 9 1 3 )  (decree 
of distribution) ; Ruth v. Oberbrunner, 40 Wis. 2 3 8  ( 1 876) (decree of distribu­
tion) . 
•• See Scott v. McNeal, 1 54 U. S. 34, 1 4  S. Ct. I I o8 ( 1 8 94) ; Goodrich v. 
Ferris, 2 1 4  U. S. 7 1 ,  2.9 S. Ct •. 58o  ( 1 909) ; Tyler v. Judges of the Court of 
Registration, 1 75 Mas� .. 7! at 77, 78, ·55 N. E. 8 1 2.  ( 1 9oo) . But see WAPLEs, 
PRoCEEDINGS IN REM ( t 8 8  2.) , where th� opposite view is stressed. . .  . . . . 
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publication without seizure of the res can be a sufficient notice. 77 
The jurisdictional requirement is not that the thing be seized 
but that it be within the state. 78 Certainly if a probate court 
did not acquire jurisdiction until the personal representative 
on behalf of the court took charge of the estate, numerous 
difficulties would be experienced, among which is the obvious 
one that the court must have jurisdiction to make the grant 
of letters testamentary or of administration before the personal 
representative takes charge of the es.tate. 
III. WHAT PERsoNs AND THINGS ARE BouND BY A VALID 
PROBATE DECREE? 
If it be determined that a probate decree is valid, the next 
inquiry is : What persons and what things are bound by it? 
Obviously, the principal 'purpose of the whole administration 
proceeding is to determine who are the successors in interest 
to the estate of the decedent and to preserve that estate until 
this is determined. Thus, unlike an eminent domain proceed­
ing or a statutory proceeding to register title to land, the pro­
bate proceeding qoes not determine as to all the world who 
has title to the land and other things in which the decedent 
has an interest. It does not decide, as between the decedent 
and persons claiming adversely to him, who was the owner. 
But it doe_�determine, as to all the world, who are the succes­
sors to whatever interests the decedent may have had. 79 
77 Roller v. Holly, 1 76 U. S. 398 ,  20 S. Ct. 4 1 0  ( 1 9oo) ; Calhoun National 
Bank v. Bentley, 1 89 Ga. 355, 6 S. E. (2d) 288  ( 1 940) ; and cases cited in note 
76, supra. 
78 2 PAGE, WILLS (3d ed. 1 94 1 )  3 8 .  
�· That a proceeding i n  rem can deal only with particular interests has been 
recognized. See Day v. Micou, 1 8  Wall. (85 U. S.) 1 5 6  at 1 62 ( 1 873 ) . In 
that case the court said : 
· "A condemnation in· a proceeding in rem does not necessarily exclude all claim 
to other interests than those which were seized. • • • Decrees of courts of 
probate or orphans' courts directing sal�s for the payment of a decedent's debts 
or for distribution are proceedings in rem. So· are sales under attachments or 
proceedings to foreclose a mortgage, quasi proceedings in rem, at least. But in 
none of these cases is anything more sold than the estate of the decedent, or of the 
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What is the res with respect to which all persons are bound? 
It would appear to be the as�ets of the decedent · within the 
state. That the estate is the subject matter of the proceeding 
is the usual view expressed by the courts.80 A few, however, 
have said that, with respect to the decree admitting the will 
to probate, the will is the res. 81 lt has also been suggested 
that the res may be regarded as the status of testacy or in­
testacy. 82 Several serious difficulties would be encountered 
as to either of these two views. If the will or the status of 
testacy or intestacy is the res, then, a determination of "the 
debtor or the mortgagor in the thing sold. The interests of others are not cut 
off or affected." 
See Kamerer v. Kamerer, 2 8 I  Ill. 5 8 7, I I 7  N. E. I 027 ( I 9 I 7 ) indicating 
that probate decrees do not determine title as between the decedent and third 
parties. 
80 Wyman v. Campbell, 6 Porter (Ala.) 2 I 9  ( I  8 3 8) ; Doe ex dem. Duval's 
Heirs v. McLoskey, I Ala. 708 ( I  840} ; Perkins' Exrs. v. Winter's Admrs., 7 
Ala. 855  ( I 845) ; Lyons v. Hamner, 84 Ala. I 97> 4 So. 26 ( I 8 8 7 ) ; Wm. Hill 
Co. v. Lawler, I I 6  Cal. 359, 48 P. 3 2 3  ( I 89 7 ) ; In re Estate of Togneri, 296 Ill. 
App. 3 3, I 5  N. E. (2d) 908 ( I 93 8 ) ; �oring v. Steinman, I Mete. (42 Mass.) 
204 ( I 84o) ; Ladd v. Weiskopf, 6?- Minn. 2 9, 64 N. W. 99 ( I 895-) ; Fridley v. 
Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, 1 3 6  Minn. 3 3 3, I 62 N. W. 454 ( I 9 I 7) ; McPher­
son v. Cunliff, I I  Serg. & R. (Pa.) 422 ( I 824) ; Barrette v. Whitney, 3 6  Utah 
. 574, I o6 P. 522 ( I 909) .  In State ex rel. Gott v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 3 I 7  
Mo. I o78, 2 9 8  S. W. 8 3  ( I 927 )  the following statement appears at p. I089 : 
"Looking at the administration as an entirety, the res is the property of the de­
<;eased grasped through the personal representative as a court officer ; but in the 
preliminary proceeding for his appointment, the res is the status of the officer." 
And in Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 9 I  U. S. 2 3 8  ( I 8 75 )  the court 
says, at p . .  24 3 : "Shall Mrs. Tisdale receive letters of administration, was the 
res." 
81 Torrey v. Bruner, 6o Fla. 3 6 5, 5 3  So. 3 3 7 ( I 9 I  o) ; State ex rel. Mitchell 
v. Gideon, 2 I 5  Mo. App. 46, 2 3 7  S. W. 220 ( I 9 2 I ) ; Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 
Vt. 65 ( I 84 7 ) .  See, also, Crippen v. Dexter, 79 Mass. 3 30 ( I 859) . 
82 See Hopkins, "The Extraterritorial Effect of Probate Decrees," 5 3  YALE L. 
J. 2 2 I  at 226, 227  ( 1 944 ) .  In the footnote on page 227, this writer says : 
"The notion that jurisdiction in rem attaches to the status of testacy or in­
testacy finds a ready analogy in divorce cases where it is usual to speak of the 
marital status as the res. It seems to the writer unnecessary and confusing to 
extend the conception of jurisdiction in rem usually applied to physical property 
so as to include a relationship or status. The explanation for this unfortunate 
terminology would seem to be the historical distinction in our law between juris­
diction in personam and in rem, and the desire to sustain a claim to jurisdiction 
in these cases without the necessity of personal service of process. It would have 
been more realistic simply to say that the appropriate court has jurisdiction to 
determine the status without the necessity of personal service." 
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validity of the will in the state of domicile would be control­
ling as to land of the decedent in another state; and under 
constitutional provisions as to full faith and credit, the state 
where the land is situated would be compelled to recognize 
the decree admitting the will to probate. It  is, of course, 
elementary that the reverse is the law. 83 Moreover, to regard 
a determination of the validity of a will as a judgment with 
respect to a status is completely to disregard the notion of 
status as it is used in connection with problems of the effect of 
foreign judgments. 84 If the determination of the validity of 
a will can be a matter of status, why not the determination of 
the validity of a deed, or even of a contract? And, incidentally, 
if the validity of a contract is a matter ofstatus, what becomes 
of Sir Henry Maine's famous observation about civilization 
progressing ftom status to contract? 85 Indeed it is believed 
that the notion that the res is the will or that the res is a status 
has been advanced in the hope that it would make for a single 
administration of an estate, even though the decedent left 
assets in two or more states. That this is a laudable objective 
can not be denied, but the writer believes that it should be 
accomplished by legislation or, if necessary, by constitutional 
amendment, and that nothing will be gained by confusing the 
law of res judicata in this way. 
While, as has been· said, this paper does not purport to 
deal with the broad question of the effect of a foreign probate 
decree, the views of the Supreme Court of the United States 
on that problem furnish a guide for the determination of the 
question under consideration here. Nowhere has the theory 
of our highest tribunal been more clearly indicated than in 
83 GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws (zd ed. 1 9 3 8 )  436, 453·  
. ..  RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICTS ( 1 934) § I 1 9 :  "In the Restatement of this sub­
ject, a 'status' means a legal personal relationship, not temporary in its nature 
nor terminable at the mere will of the parties, with which, third persons and the state are concerned." , 
85 MAINE, ANCIENT LAW ( r oth ed, by Pollock 1 930) 1 82, 
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the case of Riley v. New York Trust Company.86 That case 
involved a bill for interpleader brought in Delaware by the 
Coca-Cola Corporation to determine the ownership of some 
of its stock, it being agreed that Delaware was the situs of 
the stock. The stock was the property of the estate of a Mrs. 
Hungerford. The Georgia court, in a probate proceeding to 
which the heirs and devisees were parties, had found that the 
decedent died testate domiciled in Georgia. Thereafter, ad­
ministration proceedings were instituted in New York and 
an administrator was appointed. The New York administra­
tor and certain New York creditors were not parties to the 
Georgia proceeding. The Delaware court found that the 
decedent was domiciled in New York and awarded the stock to 
the New York administrator. On certiorari to the Supreme 
Court of the United States, the judgment was affirmed. Mr. 
Justice Reed, speaking for the court, concluded that, while 
the Georgia decree operated in rem as to property in Georgia, 
it did not bind the Ne'Y York administrator as to property 
outside the state of Georgia. He said: 
" . . . So far as the assets in Georgia are concerned, the 
Georgia judgment of probate is in rem; so far as it affects per­
sonalty beyond the state, it is in personam and can bind only 
parties thereto or their privies. . . . Phrased somewhat 
differently, if the effect of a probate decree in Georgia in per-. 
sonam was to bar a stranger to the decree from later asserting 
his rights, such a holding would deny procedural due 
process." 87 
In the light of that d.ecision, the following conclusions may 
be suggested. Strictly speaking a probate proceeding, being 
in rem, has validity as such only with respect to the estate of 
88 3�5  U. S. 343, 62 S. Ct. 6o8 ( I 942) . Earlier cases suggesting this doctrine 
are Til� v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43, 2 8  S. Ct. I ( I  907) ; Thormann v. Frame, I 76 
U, S. 3 50, 20 S. Ct. 446 ( I  9oo) ; Overby v.  Gordon; I I 7 U. S. 2 I4, 20 S. Ct. 603 
( I 9oo) ; Baker v.  Baker, Eccles Co., 242 U. S. 3 94, 3 7 S. Ct. I 52  ( I  9 I  7) . 
81 At pages 353  and 354· 
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the decedent within the jurisdiction. But as to persons who 
were personally served or-wJ1o appeared, its decrees may 
operate in personam, at least by way of collateral estoppel. 88 
Of course, the foreign jurisdiction may, if it wishes, by statute 
or judicial decision determine that the devolution of title to 
the estate of the decedent in the foreign state is to follow the 
devolution of title to the estate of the decedent in the state of 
domicile. 89 But if property in the foreign state is bound, it is 
bound by the laws of the foreign state and not by the doctrine of 
res judicata . . 
Two situations occasionally arise which should be dis­
cussed with reference to the application of these propositions. 
Suppose the decedent has personal estate both in state A ,  the 
state of his domicile, and in state B. There are administration 
proceedings in both states and at the conclusion of the pro­
ceeding in state B personal property is transmitted by the 
ancillary administrator to the administrator in the state of 
domicile. Or suppose that there is no property of the decedent 
in. the state of domicile, but the will is probated there and an 
88 See the discuss:on of this matter, infra. There is also authority tending to 
support the view that, if the domiciliary p·robate decree purports to dispose of 
personalty in the foreign state, persons who appear or are personally served ate 
bound as to that property. In other words the decree operates directly in per­
sonam. See Loewenthal v. Mandell, 1 2 5  Fla. 685, 1 70 So. 1 69 ( 1 936) . 
89 While it is conceded that there are ca�es inconsistent with this view, it is 
believed that the appointment of a personal representative in state A does not per 
se give him title to property of the decedent in state B. See GoODRICH, CoN­
FLICT OF LAWS (zd ed., 1 93 8 )  § 1 82 .  ·It is true state B may have a statute or 
rule of law to the effect that the appointment of the personal representative in 
state A, which gives him title to personalty in state A, also gives him title to per­
sonalty in state B. And such a statute or· rule would be valid except in so far as 
it might conflict with requirements as to due. process. But the title of the per­
sonal representative is derived from the law of state B, and not from the judicial 
power of the court of state A. Of course, state A may, and probably does, au­
thorize the personal representative to bring into state A any property of the 
decedent in state B ; and in so far as unadministered property is brought within 
state A, the decrees of its probate court can operate in rem as to persons claiming 
interests in it. But, if the courts of state B had, in a probate proceeding, de­
termined the devolution of the property while it was still in that state, the pro­
bate court of state A could not disregard that, even though the property was 
later brought into state A. 
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executor i s  appointed. Subsequently the executor brings un­
administered personal property of the dec�dent from some 
other state into the state of domicile. In each case, do decrees 
of tlie probate court of the state of domicile operate in rem 
as to property brought within the state after the decree is 
rendered? It is believed that they can do so. Our question 
is essentially one of due process.. As to the- case wnere there 
·were no assets in the state of domicile (which would seem to 
be the more difficult) interested parties would be just as likely 
to find out about the probate proceeding if the decedent were 
domiciled in the state as in a case where he had assets but not a 
domicile in the state. Indeed, in trying to find out where 
probate proceedings might be instituted, interested parties 
would normally investigate the state of domicile whether the 
decedent left estate there or not. Thus, it would appear that 
the res is not only the estate of the decedent in the state of 
probate at the time of the decedent's death, but may also in­
clude property subsequently brought into that state.90 
In considering the operation of probate · decrees up to this 
point we have assumed that the only limitations to their 
operation within the state are limitations as to jurisdiction and 
due process. It must be pointed out, however, that there are 
two other limitations. First, the decre_e_ itself may, by its 
terms, limit its operation to particular property or exclude its 
operation as to· particular persons. In jurisdictions where 
the decree of distribution does not deal with real estate, the 
res, in so far as that decree is concerned, is personal estate 
within the state. But in those same states the decree admitting 
the will to probate is binding as to real as well as personal 
property. Thus the res with respect to that decree would be 
the real and personal property of the decedent within the state .
. 
Moreover, if assets of the decedent are not discovered at the 
time of the decree of distribution and are not covered by its 
00 See note 891 supra. 
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terms, then the decree would not operate as to them, even 
though they are within the state. 
Second, certain persons may be excluded from the operation 
of a probate decree by reason of local statutes. It is not un­
common to find a statutory provision to. the effect that heirs 
or devisees shall receive person�! notice or notice by registered 
mail. 91 Three possible consequence; may arise from a failure 
01 Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943)  § 59-2209 : ". • • The petitioner shall 
mail or cause to be mailed a copy of the notice to each heir, devisee, and legatee 
or guardian and ward, as the case may be, other than the petitioner, whose name 
and address are known to him." 
It is not uncommon to provide for the conclusive effect of probate decrees. 
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, I 94 I ) § I 908 : "The effect of a j udgment or 
final order in an action or special proceeding before a court or j udge of this 
state, or of the United. States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or 
order, is as follows : r .  In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, 
or in respect . to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a 
decedent, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title to the 
thing, the will or administration. ." Fla. Stat. Ann. (I 94 I )  § 7 3 2.26 : 
" The probate of a will in Florida unless revoked or revised upon appeal 
shall be conclusive in any collateral suit or controversy relating to the property, 
real or personal, thereby devised or bequeathed, of the due execution of the will 
by a competent testator of his own free will and that such will, at the date of the 
testator's death, was unrevoked." Wash. Rev. Stat. ( I  9 3 2) § I 3 8 5 :  " 
If no person shall appear within the time aforesaid, the probate or rejection of 
such will shall be binding and final as to all the world. 
· " 
On the other hand, a statute may be found which, if taken literally, might 'in­
dicate that decrees have only in personam effect. N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 41 ,  reads 
as follows : "The surrogate's court, in any action or proceeding before it, shall 
have jurisdiction of the following: 
" r .  The petitioner. 
"2: Parties who have been duly cited, including all those described as being 
persons belonging to a class, or connected with the decedent, or as interested in 
the property or matter in question, whether designated by their full and correct 
names or not. 
"3· Persons of full age who have not been judicially declared to be incompe­
tent. to manage their affairs, and public officers, commissions or bodies. 
"a. Who shall, either before or a�ter the filing of the petition, waive the issue 
or service, or both, of the citation by an instrument in writing signed, acknowl­
edged or proved and duly certified, 
"b. Who, whether named in the petition or citation or not, shall appear per­
sonally in court and file written signed notice of appearance acknowledged, or 
proved, and duly certified, 
"c. Who, whether named in the petition or citation or not, shall appear by 
attorney whose authority in writing to appear, so signed, acknowledged or proved, 
and duly certified, shall be filed. 
"d. Who shall appear by attorney appointed pursuant to sections two hundred 
and ·thirty-five or two hundred forty-nine-x of the tax law. The notice of ap-
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to comply with such a requirement : ( 1 ) the court may .con­
clude that the requirement is not jurisdictional, and that a 
failure to comply with it is merely error and does not make 
· the decree invalid as to anyone ; ( 2 ) the court may determine 
that the decree is void as to heirs and devisees who were not 
served, but valid as to all other persons; or (3) the court 
may decide that the decree is totally void. Apparently each 
of these conclusions has been reached as to particular statutes.92 
If the court concludes that the decree is void only as to the 
heirs or devisees within the jurisdiction who are not personally 
served, does that indicate that the decree is in personam or 
quasi in rem, since it does not bind all the world? Formal­
istic definitions of a proceeding in.rem might lead one to that 
conclusion. But it is believed that there is no good reason 
why a decree binding on all the world except a few designated 
persons should not be regarded as a decree in rem. 
So far we have con�idered the extent to which probate 
decrees are res judicata as to the very thing which they deter­
mine about the res. But judgments and decrees also are 
ordinarily effectual as a collat'eral estoppel in totally dif­
ferent causes of action with respect -to questions of fact actually 
litigated and determined.93 There is, however, an important 
pearance shall be signed by such attorney and shall show the fact of his appoint- . 
ment as aforesaid. 
"4· · All parties to any action at law which pursuant to the provisions of the 
surrogate's court act or the civil practice act may be transferred to it." 
Section 8o provides that "Every decree of a surrogate's court is c;onclusive as 
to all matters embraced therein against every person of whom j urisdiction was 
obtained. • • ." But see New York cases cited in note I o, supra, to the effect 
that decrees regarding the probate of wills operate in rem. 
•• To the effect that the proceedings are not void for lack of notice : Hall's 
Heirs v. Hall, 47 Ala. z9o ( I  87z) (probate of will) ; to the effect that they are 
void as to persons not served : Kline v. Shoup, 3 8  Idaho zoz, zz6  P. 7z9  ( I9Z3)  
(sale of  land) ; to  the effect that they are totally void : Carter v .  Frahm, 3 I S. 
D. 3 79, I4 I  N. W. 370  ( I 9 I 3 )  (grant of administration) ; Voyles v. Hinds, I 86 
Ind. 3 8, I I4 N. E. 865 ( I 9 I 7) (contest of will) . 
.. As to this doctrine, when applied to proceedings in personam, see Scott, 
"Collateral Estoppel by Judgment," 56 HARV. L. REv. I ( I 94z) .  For decisions 
involving the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine to probate decrees, 
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limitation on this doctrine when applied to a proceeding in 
rem. As stated in the Rest�tement of Judgments,94 "A judg­
ment in such a proceeding will not bind anyone personally 
unless the court has jurisdiction over him, and it is not con­
clusive as to a fact upon which the judgment is based except 
between persons who have actually litigated the question of 
the existence of the fact." 
Two Massachusetts cases illustrate the application of this 
doctrine of collateral estoppel. In Brigham v. Payer­
weather 95 a leg�tee under a will sued in equity to have de­
clared void a mortgage executed by the testator on the ground 
of insufficient mental capacity. The will was executed after 
the mortgage, and the defendant contended that the order 
admitting the will to probate should have been admitted in 
evidence to show the testator's sanity when he executed the 
mortgage. Finding there was no error, the Supreme Judicial 
Court said: 
"We may lay on one side, then, any argument based on the 
misleading expression that all the world are parties to a pro­
ceeding in rem. This does not mean that all the world are 
entitled to be heard, and as strangers in interest are not en­
titled to be heard, there is no reason why they should be bound 
by the findings of fact, although bound to admit the title or 
status which the judgment establishes. . . . 
"If the defendant as well as the plaintiff had been a party 
to the pr_obate of the will, a different question would arise." 96 
In Sly v. Hunt, 91 just such a situation arose. In an action 
on a contract for services rendered to a testator, the testator's 
see State ex rel. Gott v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 3 1 7  Mo. 1 078, 298  S. W. 83 
( 1 927) ; Munday v. Knox, 323  Mo. 4 1 1 ,  18 S. W. (2d) 487 ( 1 929) . See also 
Overby v. Gordon, 1 77 U. S. 2 1 4  at 227, 20 S. Ct. 603 ( 1 900) . 
.. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS ( 1 942) § 73 ( 2 ) .  See also Comment c to that 
section. 
05 1 40 Mass. 4 1 1 , 5 N. E. 265 ( 1 8 86 ) .  
08 Id. at 4 1 3-415. 
01 1 59 Mass. 1 5 1, 34 N. E. 1 87  ( 1 893) . 
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sanity was put in issue. Plaintiff and defendant both par­
ticipated in the proceeding in. which the will was admitted to 
probate. It was held, . distinguishing Brigham v. Payer­
weather, that the parties were estopped to assert that the 
testator was of unsound mind when he executed the will. 
Without going into detail, it may be suggested that perhaps 
a consideration of the doctrines of collateral estoppel might 
throw some light on the question of the effect of a foreign 
probate decree. Suppose A dies testate domiciled in state X, 
leaving real and personal property in state X and real and per­
sonal property in state Y. Since the probate decrees in state, 
X can only operate directly on the property in that state, they 
have force as judgments in rem only as to that property. To 
the extent that they purport to deal with property in state Y, 
the court is, strictly speaking, without jurisdiction. But the 
laws of state Y are to the effect that the law of state X is to be 
applied in determining the devolution of personal property 
in state Y.. Moreover, any persons who are actually parties to 
the proceeding in state X are bound as to any facts determined 
in that proceeding.. Among these are the facts determining 
that testator died domiciled in state X. Thus, the effect 
of the opinion in Riley v. New York Trust Company,98 
already discussed, is that, as between persons actually ap­
pearing or personally served in a probate proceeding in 
which domicile is determined, there is a collateral es­
toppel 'Yhich operates even in another state. As to the re�l 
estate in state Y, however, the law of that state does not dis­
tribute it in accordance with the law of the domicile. There­
fore, the finding of domicile is irrelevant as to the questions 
involved in the distribution of testator's real estate in state Y. 
By way of summary, the following conclusions are sug­
gested. The proceeding to administer the estate of a decedent 
. is properly described as strictly in rem. Nevertheless, due to 
the peculiar function of administration, to the history of its 
. 
18 3 15  U. S. 3431 6� S. Ct. 6o8 (194�) .  
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procedures, and to the fact that administration is ordinarily 
accomplished by a series of final decrees and not by a single 
decree, many aspects of this proceeding are unique and do not 
precisely fit into the type form of proceeding in rem such as 
the condemnation or the admiralty proceeding. This series 
of steps in the administration of a decedent's estate may be, 
and commonly is, for the purpose of determining the require­
ments of notice and a fair hearing, a single proceeding. While 
probate decrees are strictly in rem to the extent that they 
involve a determination of the persons who succeed to the 
property interests of the decedent within the state, some of 
them may have in personam operation. But as to those which 
are in rem, the res is the estate of the decedent within the 
state. This does not mean that the proceeding determines 
all the owners of the property in which the decedent had an 
interest. Rather it decides who are the successors to the de­
cedent with respect to any interests in property which he may 
have had at the time of his death. While probate decrees 
in rem do not directly operate as to property without the state, 
they can affect it by the operation of the laws of the. foreign 
state ; and doctrines of collateral estoppel may operate to bind 
interested parties as to property in the foreign state. Finally, 
it is believed that the legal doctrines herein discussed amount 
to nothing more than a unique application of recognized prin­
ciples of res judicata. 
, "Parties cannot thus, by their seclusion from the means of 
information, cla.im exemption from the laws that control 
- human affairs, and set up a right to open up all the transactions 
of the past," said Mr. Justice Bradley. "The world must 
move on, and those who claim an interest in persons or things 
must be charged with knowledge of their status and condition, 
and of the vicissitudes to which they are subject. This is the 
foundation of all judicial proceedings in rem." 99 ' 
99 Case of Broderick's Will, 2 1  Wall. ( 8 8  U. S.) 503 at 5 1 9  ( 1 8 74) . 
The Venue of Probate and Administration 
Proceedings* 
Paul E.  Basye 
W 
ITH the division of each state into counties or 
districts and the creation in each such subdivision 
of some court for the probate of wills and the ad­
ministration of estates, it became necessary to designate which 
of such ' courts should undertake these functions in a par­
ticular estate. It is not the purpose of this study to consider 
problems arising out of conflicts of jurisdiction as between 
states insofar as independent determinations of domicile of a 
decedent may be made. . That a decedent died a resident of 
the state undertaking an administration upon his estate will 
be assumed ; or, if he died a nonresident, that there are assets 
within the state justifying administration. This study is con­
cerned solely with the designation and determination of the 
county within the state where such probate and administration 
should be entertained and carried out. 
Historically, venue in civil actions meant the county in Eng­
land to which process was issued to the sheriff to bring a jury 
from that county to Westminster, and later to the county in 
which the trial was to be had. This fitted in well with the pro­
cedural plan then prevailing for summoning the jurors, who 
were presumably acquainted with the facts, from the very com­
munity where the cause of action arose. But when jurors 
ceased to make findings on their own knowledge, a j ury could 
be drawn from the community of trial, and at the same time 
it became possible-indeed necessary-to determine venue 
in advance of trial . It is not possible here to trace the elements 
which have found their way into statutes for determining venue 
I 
in civil actions. Suffice it to say that these statutes bear various 
* Originally printed as an article in 43 Micjl. L. Rev. 471 ( 1 944) . 
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marks of the place where the cause of action arose, where one 
or more of the parties to the action resided, or where the de­
fendant might be found.1 
In the English ecclesiastical courts venue for determining 
the place of administration upon the estate ot a decedent de­
veloped in a wholly different setting. The ordinary ec­
clesiastical courts had jurisdiction to probate wills and grant 
letters upon the estate of a decedent who died, or who was 
domiciled, within the diocese.2 Where, however, the decedent 
was possessed of bona notabilia (effects of a certain value, 
usually in excess of £s, but an amount varying in different 
places and often dependent upon fine distinctions as to the 
nature of the property) 3 in another diocese, probate and ad­
ministration were granted by the Prerogative Court of Canter­
bury or York.4 And where personal property existed in both 
provinces two probates and grants of letters were necessary. 5 
Also, if it appeared, after letters were duly granted by an 
ordinary ecclesiastical court, that the decedent was possessed 
of bona notabilia within another jurisdiction, the probate and 
administration were held to be void.6 Because of the ill­
defined nature and varying amounts of bona notabilia, the 
difficulties, inconveniences 'and mistakes incident to the re­
tention of such doctrine in the law and the consequences of 
void probates and admil).istrations, the royal commissioners, 
in 1 8  32, recommended the abolition of all ecclesiastical pro­
bate j urisdiction.7 This recommendation was translated into 
·1 For a discussion of this development, see I CHITTY, PLEADING ( I  809) 267 et 
seq. ; STEPHEN, PLEADING {Tyler ed. I 924) 268  et seq . ;  5 HOLDSWORTH, HIS­
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. I 924) I I 7-1 I 9, 1 40-I4 2 ;  Foster, "Place of 
Trial in Civil Actions," 43 HARV. L. REV. 1 2 I 7  ( I 930 ) .  
2 BURN, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW (9th ed. by Phillimore 1 842) 292-293• 
8 Id. at 294-296. 
' Id. at 293 ·  
6 ld. at 296. See also REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONERS TO INQUIRE INTO THE 
PRACTICE AND }URISDICTION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES ( I 832)  23 .  
6 REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONERS TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND JURIS­




an accomplished fact in I 8 57 at which time courts of probate 
were established fully coordinate with the common-law courts 
at Westminster.8 
The doctrine of bona notabilia never found its way 'into this 
country.9 It is true that vestig�s of the practice of requiring 
separate administrations on decedents' est�tes where property 
was found in more than one county may be noted in some early 
American statutes.10 At the present time, however, the juris­
diction of a probate court extends to �11 property of a decedent 
in any county in the state. But what county do the .statutes 
designate for the probate of wills and the administration of 
estates, and what county should they designate in the interest 
of convenience and efficiency? 
Such designation should primarily serve the ends of con­
venience, and aid in the prompt and efficient administration 
of estates. In laying down general rules designed to serve 
those ends it may be expected that a certain degree of arbitrari­
ness will appear, but it should be kept at a minimum. Fixed 
rules seem largely to prevail in many old statutes still operating 
at the present time. Although some of these statutes served 
well enough in former times when one's domicile, that of his 
nearest of kin, and most of his property were all likely to be 
confined to a single county, they are not always the most satis­
factory under modern conditions. The sole justification for 
fixed rules in determining venue lies in the necessity for hav­
ing something predetermined to go by, and in resolving 
conflicts when they do occur. A definite trend away from 
an absolute fixation of venue is clearly evident in the more 
recent probate statutes and codes, 11 particularly in the case 
• �o-2 1 Viet., c. 77, p. 423 (r857)  . . 
• In the Matter of Coursen'sWill, 4 N. ]. Eq. 408 at 4 14  ( 1 843 ) .  
'" See, for example, Act of 1 73 3, c. 5 i n  2 Acts and Resolves of the Province 
of Massachusetts Bay, 1 7 1 5�1741 ,  p. 689 (1 7 74) . · 
' 
11 Del. Rev. Code (I 935)  §§·3799 and 3 807 ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § 73 �.06 ; 
9a. Code Ann. ( 1 936) §§ I 1 3-702 and 1 I 3-1 2 1  x ;  Iowa Code ( 1 939)  § 10763 ; 
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of nonresidents. As will be observed from the text of the 
proposed Model Probate Code 12 a maximum latitude of choice 
is given to those who will ordinarily take the initiative in such 
matters, on the assumption that convenience will govern that 
choice within the ·permitted limits. 
It should be emphasized at the outset that the statutes under 
consideration are statutes of venue and not statutes upon which 
the jurisdiction of courts is predicated. Jurisdiction means 
power to hear and adjudicate.13 Venue refers only to the 
choice or designation of a particular county in which the pro­
bate proceedings should be instituted and carried through to 
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-2203 ; Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 930) c. 75, § 9 ;  
Mass. Ann. Laws ( I  9 3 2 )  c .  2 I 5 ,  § 3 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § §  2 7 · 3  q8  ( I  9 ) ,  
(98)  and ( I 2o) ; Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 525 . 8 2 ;  Neb. Comp. Stat. ( 1 929) § 3o-
3 I 3 ;  Nev. Camp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 I )  § 9 882 .01 ; N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c. 
346, § 8 ;  N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943)  § 28-1 ; N. D. Camp. Laws ( r y q )  § 8526 ;  
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 9 37)  § I 0 5 1 I-4 ; R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 9 3 8 ) c. 569, � 3 ;  
Tenn. Code (Michie, I 9 38 )  § 8 I 4 5 ;  Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 9 3 3 )  § 2725 ; Wash. Rev. 
Stat. ( 1 932)  § I 3 7 6 ;  Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 3 1 r .o r .  
· 
'" Section 6 I  of the Model Probate Code dealing with venue for the purposes 
of probate of wills and for all subsequent proceedings in connection with the ad­
ministration of estates is as follows : 
"Venue. 
"(a) Proper county. The venue for the probate of a will and for administra­
tion shall be : 
"(I ) In the county in this state where the decedent had his domicile at the 
time of his death. 
"(2) If the decedent had no domicile in this state, then in any county wherein 
he left any property or into which any property belonging to his estate may have 
come. 
"(b) Proceedings in more than one county. If proceedings are commenced 
in more than one county, they shall be stayed except in the county where first 
commenced until final determination of venue in the county where first com­
menced. If the proper venue is finally determined to be in another county, the 
court, after making and retaining a true copy of the entire file, shall transmit the 
original to the proper county. The proceeding shall be deemed commenced by 
the filing of a petition ; and the proceeding first legally commenced shall extend 
to all of the property of the estate in this state. 
"(c) Transfer of proceeding. If it appears .to the court at any time before the 
decree of final distribution in any proceeding that the proceeding was commenced 
in the wrong county or that it would be for the best interests of the estate, the 
court, in its discretion, may order the proceeding with all papers, files and a 
certified copy of all orders therein transferred to another [ ] court 
which other court shall thereupon proceed to complete the administration pro­
ceeding as if originally commenced therein." 
13 I BEALE, CoNFLICT oF LAws ( I 93 5 )  274 . .  
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completion.14 Power or jurisdiction to entertain and super­
vise the administration of estates is conferred generally upon 
probate courts ; venue is the means of dividing or allocating 
the work among all of the probate courts in the state.15 It 
has even been suggested that there is but one probate court in 
e<�:ch state with a branch in each county.,16 
I. FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE VENUE 
A. A VENUE STATUTE, NOT A JURISDICTION STATUTE 
Under the early statutes designating the particular court 
in which wills should be probated and administration granted 
it was usually provided that the court in the county wherein 
the deceased resided at the time of his death should have "juris­
diction" to grant probate and letters of administration. Death 
and residence within the county were essential "jurisdictional" 
facts to be alleged and found by the court. But if either of 
these was not true in fact, it was said that all proceedings were 
utterly void and could be attacked at any time, directly or in­
direct! y. Notice to interested parties given by a court without 
jurisdiction was regarded · as no notice at all. "The persons 
interested cannot be required to watch the proceedings of all 
the Probate Courts of the State, at all times," said the Cali-
u I BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS ( 1 9 3 5 )  I I 5 .  
15 In the words of Mr. Justice Rugg, "The distinction between jurisdiction and 
venue is plainly established. . . . Jurisdiction is a term of comprehensive 
import. It concerns and defines the power of j udicatories and 'court. It embraces 
every kind of judicial action touching the subject of the action, suit, petition, 
complaint, indictment or other proceeding. It includes power to inquire into 
facts, to apply the law, to make decision and to declare judgment. . . • 
Venue in its modern and municipal sense relates to and defines the particular 
county or territorial area within the State or district in which the cause or prgsecu­
tion must be brought or tried. It commonly has to do with geographical sub­
divisions, relates to practice or procedU£e, may be waived, and does not refer to 
jurisdiction at all. . • ." Paige v. Sinclair, 23 7 Mass. 482  at 483-484, I 30 
N.  E.  I 7 7  ( I 9 2 I ) .  
See also Southern Sand and Gravel Co., Inc. v. Massaponax Sand and Gravel 
Corp., I45 Va. 3 I 7, I 3 3  S. E. 8 I 2  ( I 926) ; In re Summerfield's Estate, I 58 Kan. 
38o, I47 P. (2d) 759 ( 1 944) . 
16 In re Estate of Davidson, I 68 Minn. 1 47 at I 5  I, 2 I O  N. W. 40_ ( 1  926) . 
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fornia court in an early case.17 "The proceedings are sum­
mary and special, and must be in strict conformity with the 
law." Such was the common attitude toward probate courts, 
at that time regarded as inferior tribunals whose proceedings 
must conform in fact to every requirement of the statute. 
In the course of time a very substantial body of authority 
accumulated which construed such statutes as limiting the 
jurisdiction of probate courts to the administration of estates 
of decedents who had actually died domiciled within their 
geographical limits ; yet despite the court's own determination 
of this so-called "jurisdictional" fact, such determination re­
mained open to attack in subsequent and collateral proceed­
ings. The result was chaotic. Several administrations could 
be instituted and carried on in different counties at the same 
time, and debtors subjected to multitudinous actions by dif­
ferent executors or administrators of the same estate. Con­
fusi.on and uncertainty were in the ascendant. No one could 
depend upon the title to property obtained through a probate 
sale. The net effect on titles to real estate was well nigh 
disastrous. 
Gradually, however, the position of probate courts has 
risen in the law's esteem. Made courts of record in most 
states, accorded presumptions by statute as to the validity and 
regularity of their proceedings, and made coordinate with 
courts of general jurisdiction in a few states, they began to 
lose their inferiority.18 The utterly indefensible holdings 
that the jurisdiction of probate courts could be attacked col­
laterally at any time and all dependent proceedings held for 
nought were destined to fall. Faith in judicial proceedings 
was felt to be just as important in probate matters as else­
where. A court may erroneously assume to act in � given 
17 Beckett v. Selover, 7 Cal. 2 1 5  at 2 3 7  ( 1 857 ) . 
18 See Simes and Basye, "The Organization of the Probate Court in America," 
42 MICH. L. REv. 965 at 9 82  et seq. ( 1 944) . 
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case. Today its action may be erroneous but ordinarily it is 
not void. 
. 
Nevertheless there remains a small body of authority 
which continues to construe venue statutes as limiting the 
jurisdiction of probate courts and making their determinations 
of jurisdiction inconclusive. Two administration proceedings 
may be carried on simultaneously, and third parties subjected 
to two actions for the same thing, without any assurance as to 
which will be upheld. Fortunately, however, this possibility 
is confined to two states at the most and is not likely to survive 
much longer the tests of time and necessity. 
B. ESTATES OF RESIDENT DECEDENTS . 
In formulating a statute specifying the county where the 
will of a resident decedent should be probated and h is estate 
administered upon, convenience of the persons interested 
should control.19 Two elements exist here: convenience as 
to assets of the estate; and convenience as to parties. Both of 
these may and usually do suggest the same place. Assets may 
consist of land, tangible personalty, intangible personalty, and 
causes of action to be instituted or prosecuted. At times there 
may be actions to be defended. The various parties in�olved 
include heirs and distributees, witnesses who may be called 
upon to prove 't:h_e will or to testify in proceedings, and per­
sons to be consulted by the executor or administrator in con­
nection with the administration of the estate. 
For resident decedents, the designation in every statute of 
the venue for probate and administration is the county of 
11 "The policy of the statute in fixing venue is the convenience of the parties. 
It is a mere privilege of the defendant which he may waive, if he wishes, and 
which he will be deemed to have waived, unless he raised the objection in the 
manner prescribed by statute. On the other hand, the policy of the statute in 
fixing j urisdiction is to determine the character or nature of the cause of which · 
the sevet:al courts of the state may take cognizance, which cannot be enlarged or 
defeated by any act of the parties. Neither consent nor waiver can confer j uris-
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residence or doJ11icile.20 In the vast maj ority of cases this will 
be the f!lOSt convenient place in terms of the elements men­
tioned. On the basis of convenience and of the universal ac­
ceptance of this single formula in the case of resident dece­
dents, its retention seems a desirable one. 
The phraseology of all present statutes is to the effect that 
administration is to be had in the county in which the decedent 
was a resident or an inhabitant or where he was domiciled. 
A very few designate venue as �he county where he had his 
mansion house. 21 All of these phrases are interpreted as 
, equivalent to domicile.22 A few recent statutes employ the 
term "domicile" 23 because it has a more definite and fixed 
legal meaning. This would seem to be the preferable term for 
determining venue. 
diction, though it may admit venue." Concurring opinion in Southern Sand and 
Gravel Co., Inc. v. Massaponax Sand and Gravel Corp., 1 45 Va. 3 r 7 at 3 32, 1 3 3  
S .  E .  8 r 2  ( 1 92 6 ) .  
,., Only one significant deviation from this universal formula has been noted. 
In Alabama a testator may designate the county where administration is to be 
had on his estate provided he owns property in such county at the time of his 
death. Ala. Code ( r 94o) t. 6 r ,  § 3 5· Another section provides that when a 
resident decedent dies intestate and leaves no assets subject to administration in 
the county of his residence, and no administration is granted in such county within 
three months after his death, then administration may be granted in any county 
where he leaves assets. Ala. Code ( r 94o) t. 6 r ,  § 8o. · Both of these sections are 
designed to serve the interests of convenience. 
In all the citations which follow, reference is made to provisions dealing 
· with the probate of wills as well as administration upon estates. A few statutes 
are explicit to the eff.ect that if probate is had in a given court, administration 
must also be had there, and vice versa. Others are silent on the subject. While 
either may be had without the other, clearly they shduld be in the same· court 
even though not applied for at the same time. 
21 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § 206 ; Md. Code ( r 939) art. 93, 
§ 1 5 ;  Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1942) § 4; N. M. Stat. ( r 94 r )  § 3 3-ro3 ; Va. Code 
( 1 942) § 5247 ;  W. Va. Code ( 1 943) § 4064. 
22 See ATKINSON, WILLS ( 1 9 3 7) 5 60. Only one dissent from this has been 
found-an early dictum to the effect that "inhabitant" is a narrower term than 
"domicile"-which would have little weight today in view of the un.iversal 
acceptance to the contrary. Holmes v. Ore. & Cal. Ry. (D. C. Ore. 1 8 8 1 )  
6 Sawy. 2 76, 5 F .  5 2 3 .  
23 The term "domicile'' i s  used i n  the statutes o f  Florida, North Carolina, Ohio 
and Texas. Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § 732 .o6 ;  N. C. Gen. Stat. ( r 943) § z8-t ; 
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 9 3 7) § 1 0504-1 5 (probate of will only) ; Tex. Clv. 
Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 9 3 9) art. 3 293 ·  
VENUE 
C. ESTATES OF NONRESIDENT DECEDENTS 
535 
In the case of nonresident decedents the factors determin­
ing venue are quite differen� in most cases. The domicile of 
the decedent and presumably of his family has been elsewhere. 
The convenience of the heirs and distributees must be in terms 
of access to the assets of the estate and to the place of adminis­
tration. Convenience for the executor or administrator may 
correspond or differ. Localization of assets is no longer even 
a theoretical possibility. 24 Both tangible and intangible assets 
may be located in several counties. Consequently it is not 
surprising to find each state groping for its own formula, each 
predicated upon some assumed relation between the localiza­
tion of assets and the place of administration. 
In nearly all of the existing statutes designating venue in 
cases of nonresidents, elaborate provisions are found specify­
ing one or more of the following places as the venue for ad­
ministration : the county ( I ) where the decedent's land or 
the greater part (or any part) thereof lies ; 25 ( 2)  where his 
personal estate or the greater part (or any part) thereof is 
located ; 26 (3) where his estate or the greater part (or ;my 
part) thereof is located; 27 ( 4) where the decedent died ; 28 
"" Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 3 57> 59 S. Ct. 900 (1 939) . 
25 Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1 937)  §§ 5 and 14529 ; Ga. Code Ann. ( 1 936)  § 1 1 3-702 
(where land devised) ;  Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3,  § 206; Ky. 
Rev. Stat. ( 1 942) §§ 394. 140 and 395.030 ;  La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1 9 32) art. 
935 (immovable property) ; Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 495 (where land devised) ; 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) §§ 4 and 5 3 1 ; N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7) § 3 :2-41 
(where land devised) ; N. M. Stat. ( r 941 ) § 3 3-103 ; N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 45 ; 
Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) §§ 1 9-206 and 1 9-2 1 0  (only if jurisdiction has not 
been assumed under other subdivisions of § 1 9-2 10) ; Va. Code ( 1 94z) §§ 5247 
and 5 360 ;  W. Va. Code ( 1 943) §§ 4064 and 4 1 23 (where land devised) ;  Wis. 
Stat. ( 1 943)  § 3 1 0.08 (as to probate of wills) . 
"' Colo. Stat. ( 1 9 3 5 )  c. 1 76, § 7 1 ; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3 ,  
§ 206 ;  La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1 9 3 2 )  art. 9 35 ; Md.  Code ( 1 93 9 )  art. 9 3, §§ 1 5, 
45, and 3 5 6 ;  Miss. Code ( 1 942) §§ 495 and 525 ; N. M. Stat. ( 1941)  
§ 3 3-103 ; N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 45· . 
"" Ark. Dig. Sd.t. ( 1 937)  §§ s and 1 4529 ;  Conn. Gen. Stat. ( r 9 3o) §§ 4888  
and 4904 ; Del. Rev. Code ( 1 935)  §§ 3 799 and 3807 ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 941 ) 
§ 732.0 6 ;  Ga. Code Ann. ( 1 936 )  § r r 3-1 2 1 r ;  .Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 93 3 )  
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( 5)  where he died and left assets ; 2� ( 6)  where he leaves assets, 
havirig died out of the state ;30 (7) where he leaves estate, 
having left no estate within the county where he died; 31 ( 8)  
where assets come after his death ; 32 ( 9 )  where there may be 
§§ 6-201 ,  6-302 and 7-403 ; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 59-2203 i Ky. 
Rev. Stat. ( 1 942) §§ 3 94·140 and 3 95 -0Jo ;  Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 930) c. 751 § 9 ;  
Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 9 32 )  c. 2 1 5, § 3 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943)  §§· 27 .3 1 7 8 ( 1 9 ) ,  
( 9 8 )  and ( 1 20) ; Minn. Stat. ( 1 941 ) § 525.82 ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1942) 
§ 4; Mont. R�v. Code ( 1 9 3 5 )  § 1001 8 ;  Neb. Comp. Stat. ( 1 929)  §§ 3o-u s  
and 30-3 1 3 ; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 1 )  § 9 882.0 1 ; N. H. Rev. Laws 
( 1 942) c. 346, §§ 8 and 9 ;  N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 3 3-1 o3 ; N. C. Gen. Stat. 
( 1 943) § 2 8-r ; N. D. Comp. Laws ( 1 9 1 3 )  § 8 5 26 ;  Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 
1 93 7 )  §§ 1 0504-15, 1 05 1 1-4 ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1 930) t. 2o, §§ 341  
and 1 862 ; R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 938)  c .  569, § 3 ;  S .  C. Code ( 1 942) §§ 1 2o, 2 1 1, 
8930  and 896 8 ;  Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 9 3 8 )  § 8 1 45 ;  Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
{Vernon, 1 9 3 9 )  art. 3 293 ; Utah Code ( 1 943 ) § 1 02-r-2 ; Vt. Pub. Laws 
( 1 93 3 )  § 2735 ; Va. Code ( 1 942) §§ 5247, 5 36o ;  Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 932)  
§ 1 3 7 6 ;  W. Va. Code ( 1 943 ) §§ 4064 and 4 1 2 3 ; Wis. Stat. ( 1 943)  §§ 25 3.03 
and 3 1 I .o 1 ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 3 1 )  § 88-207. 
28 Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1 9 37 )  §§ 5 and 1 45 2 9 ;  Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 942) §§ 3 94.1 40 
and 3 95·030 ; La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1 9 3 2 )  art. 9 35 ; Md. Code ( 1 939) art. 93 ,  
§§  1 5  and 356 ; Miss. Code ( 1 942) §§ 495 and 5 2 5 ;  Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
( 1 942) §§ 4 and 53 r ;  N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 3 3-1 03 ;  N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 45 ; 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943 ) § 28-1 ; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann . .  (Vernon, 1 9 3 9 )  art. 
3293 ; Va. Code ( 1 942) §§ 5247 and 536o ;  Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 932)  § 1 3 7 6 ;  
W .. Va. Code ( 1 9 3 7 )  § §  4064 and 41 23 .  
20 Ala. Code ( 1 940) t .  6 1 ,  §§ 35  and So ;  Ariz. Code ( 1 9 39 )  § 3 8-10 1 ; Cal. 
Pro b. Code (Deering, I 941 ) § 30 I ; Idaho Code ( 1 9  3 2) § I 5-I 0 I ; Mont. Rev. 
Code ( 1 9 3 5 )  § 1 00 1 8 ;  Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t. 58, § 5 ;  Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) 
§§ 1 9-206 and 1 9-2 1 0 ;  S. D. Code ( 1 93 9 )  § J5 .0 I O I ; Utah Code ( 1 943 )  
§ 1 02-1-z ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 1 )  § 8 8-207. 
30 Ariz. Code ( 1 939)  § 3 8-x o 1 j Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1 94 1 )  § 301 ; 
Idaho Code ( 1 93 2 )  § 1 5-10 1 ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 9 3 3 )  §§ 6-2or,  6-302 and 
7:-403 ;  Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 93 5 )  § r oo 1 8 ;  N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 45 ; N. C. 
Gen. Stat. ( 1 94 3) § 2 8-r ; Okla. Stat. ( r 941 ) t. 5 8, § 5 ;  Ore. Camp. Laws 
( 1 940) § 1 9-206 and 1 9-21 0 ; S. D. Code ( 1 9 39 )  § J S .O I O I ; Utah Code 
( 1 943 )  § 1 02-1-2 ; Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 2 )  § 1 3 76 ;  W. Va. Code ( 1 943) 
§§ 4064 and 41 23 ; Wis. Stat. ( 1 943)  § 2 5 3 .03 (as to probate of wills) ; Wyo. 
Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 1 )  § 8 8-207. 
31 Ariz. Code ( 1 939)  § 3 8-xo 1 ; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1 94 1 )  § 301 ; 
Idaho Code ( 1 9 3 2) §§ I 5-I O I  and I S-102 j Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 93 5 )  § IOOI 8 j  
Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t. 5 8, § 5 ;  S. D. Code ( 1 939)  § J5.o1 o 1 ; Utah Code ( 1943) 
§ 102-r-2 ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 1 )  § 88-207. 
32 Ala. Code ( 1940) t. 6 1 ,  §§ 35 and So; Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 9 3 3 )  §§ 6-zor, 
6-3o:i. and 7-403 ;  Iowa Code ( 1 9 39)  §§ 10763 and 1 1 825 ; Me. Rev. Stat. 
( 1 930) c. /75, § 9 ;  Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525.82 ; N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, §- 45 1 N. 
C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 94·3) § z8-1 ; Ore. Comp. Laws ( 1 940) §§ 1 9-206 and 1 9-zio;  
Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 93 8) § 8 1 45.  
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any debt or demand owing to  him; 33 ( I  o )  where the personal 
'representative or kin of such person has a cause of action ; 34 or 
( I  I )  where any suit in which the estate is interested is to be 
brought, prosecuted or defended. 35 And in most of them 
preference or priority is prescribed in a designated order, 
though all too often without regard to the convenience of any­
one. In some instances the presence of land in the state gives 
precedence over personalty in the determination of venue.36 
In other statutes the very opposite is true.37 It is not easy to 
reconcile these different forms or amounts of wealth as a basis 
for determining venue. The place of death itself would' 
· seem to bear no relation to the convenience of anyone insofar 
as the task of administration is concerned, and yet the county 
of death is designated as the venue in a surprisingly large 
number of states, due, no doubt, to the persistent influence of 
the English ecclesiastical courts, which sometimes authorized 
probate and administration in the diocese where death oc­
curred.38 The proximity of the executor, administrator and 
distributees to the assets of the estate would ordinarily serve 
their convenience better than an administration in a distant 
county compelled by the pr�visions of an arbitrary statute. 
The importance of this matter can be appreciated where prop­
erty is to be looked after, rents collected, or a business con-' 
tinued or liquidated. 
83 Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1 9 3 7) § 1 4529 ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 )  § 7 32.06 ;  Ky. 
Rev. Stat. ( 1 942) §§ 394.140 and 395.o3o ; ·N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, §§ 45 and 46;  
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 937)  § 105 u-4 ; R. I .  Gen. Laws ( 1 93 8 )  c .  569,  § 3 ;  
Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 9 3 8 )  § 8 145.  
34 N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c. 346, § 8;  N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 45· 
35 Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 93 8 )  § 8 145. 
36 Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 193 7)  §§ 5 and 14529 ; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  
c. 3, § 206 ; Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 942) §§  394.140 and 395.030 ;  La. Civ. Code 
(Dart, 1 93 2 )  art. 935 ; Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 495 (probate of wills) ; Mo. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) §§ 4 and .5 3 1 ; N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 3 3-103 ; ' Va. 'Code 
( 1 942) §§ 5 247 and 536o ; W. Va. Code ( 1 943) § 4064. 
87 Colo. Stat. ( 1 93 5 )  c. 1 7 6, § 7 1 ; Md. Code ( 1 939)  art. 93 ,  §§ 1 5  and 3 56 ;  · 
Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 525 (letters of administration) ; N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 45· 
88 BURN, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW (9th ed, by Philiimore 1 842) 292-293.  
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After the varied provisions of all the statutes are compared 
and considered, it seems clear that little advantage is to be 
gained by a rigid designation of venue. Choice within limits 
might well be left to those persons who will take the initiative 
in applying for letters and who will likely be appointed to 
undertake the task of looking after the estate. 39 A statute 
with flexible provisions permitting a degree of freedom may 
be considered as operating in a medium of individual choices ; 
and in most cases individual choices will be guided largely by 
convemence. 
Doubtless this objective has been paramount in those states 
having statutes authorizing probate and administration of the 
estate of a nonresident in any county in which assets of the de­
cedent are located. The presence in any county of assets be­
longing or due to an estate is an essential and at the same time 
sufficient condition for a probate court to entertain proceed­
ings for the administration of the estate of a nonresident. 
II.  PowER oF PRoBATE CouRTS TO DETERMINE VENUE 
In order for a probate court to grant letters testamentary 
or of administration there must first be a showing of death. 
To invoke action by a particular probate court it must be shown 
secondly that the decedent was domiciled in the �ounty at the 
time of his death, or, in the case of a nonresident (under the 
terms of many present statutes) ,  that he died within the county 
39 One Texas statute goes so far as to permit administration in the county of ap­
plicant's residence where the only purpose is to appoint an administrator to re­
ceive funds from the federal government. Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939) 
art. 3 2 93A. A companion statute, based upon presumed convenience,·Tex. Civ. 
Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 9 39) art. 3293 ,  provides that administration on the estate 
of a nonresident decedent who died out of the state may be had in the county 
where his next of kin reside. 
As the last of several enumerated,places of venue in Missouri, probate and ad­
ministration may be granted in any county in the state. Mo. Rev. Stat, Ann. 
( 1 942) §§ 4 and 5 3 1 ·  ' 
These are but isolated instances confined within a narrow compass. 
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or that some part of his property is located within the county. 40 
The judicial determination of the existence of these facts is 
the basis upon which all subsequent proceedings depend. The 
important thing to observe in this connection is that the same 
tribunal which proposes to undertake the administration of an 
estate also passes upon the very facts necessary to entitle it to 
do so. This necessity and power to make such a determination 
corresponds to a similar necessity and power long recognized 
to exist in courts of general jurisdiction. And such a deter­
mination must conclude other courts -in the same state. 
These two facts are often called "jurisdictional facts�" 41 
Only death is strictly a jurisdictional fact. If the alleged 
decedent were not dead, the proceedings purporting to ad­
minister and distribute his property would be wholly void. 42 
The second fact-of do;nicile within the county, or death 
within or the location of assets within the county in the case 
of a nonresident decedent-is not truly a jurisdictional fact, 
although many courts have so treated it, as will be pointed out 
presently. A court may entertain and allow an administra...: 
tion to proceed to completion, as if local domicile were a 
reality. At most the statutory directi�ns for venue are 
violated. This is not deemed a serious error as long as there 
is no conflict with a probate court in another county, and ' it 
would serve no useful purpose to require a new and separate 
administration again in another county. Indeed positive 
harm is more likely to result if duplicate proceedings are per­
mitted.43 Consequently, a finding of this jurisdictional fact . 
40 ATKINSON, WILLS ( 1 9 3 7 )  § 205 ; 2 WOERNER; ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 
1 92 3 )  §§ 204-207. 
" See 2 WOERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1 92 3 )  §§ 204, 208. 
'" Scott v .  McNeal, 1 54 U. S. 34, 14  S. Ct. I I 08 ( 1 894) ; ATKINSON, WILLS 
( 1 9 3 7 )  § 205 ; 2 WOERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1 9 2 3 )  § 208 .  We are 
not here considering the statutes authorizing administration upon estates of ab­
sentees . 
.. For a case illustrating how far such conflicts may go, see State ex rei. Carter 
v. Hall, 1 4 1  Mo. App. 642, 1 2 5  S. W. 559  ( 1 9 1 0) where one probate court 
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(domicile in the case of a resident or corresponding fact in the 
case of a nonresident) should be treated as binding and con­
clusive and not subject to collateral attack.44 Any assault 
upon such a determination should be made directly or by 
appeal. 
Ill. CoNFLICTS OF VENUE 
A. AS TO .RESIDENT DECEDENTS 
Despite the avowed. purpose of statutes to limit the super.:. 
vision of decedents' estates to one probate court, it is easily 
possible that administrations may be commenced independ­
ently in two or more counties within the same state more or 
less simultaneously. In the case of resident decedents it may 
b� alleged and judicially determined by each of two ur more 
probate courts that the decedent died domiciled in the same 
county where the court is located. This has happened in a 
number of instances. Let us look into the results of such 
·competing jurisdictions. 
In the first place this duplication, or possibly triplication, 
of effort is quite unnecessary. There is no justification for 
more than one tribunal to 'l;lndertake the administration. In 
the second place an unseemly competition between two courts 
of equal jurisdiction is highly undesirable. Such judicial 
rivalry cannot be tolerated under any system. Furthermore, 
confusion, uncertainty and positive injustices may result. Each 
of two or more executors or administrators may seek to take 
possession of the same assets belonging to the estate ; each 
may seek to recover debts owing to the estate. In either 
situation a person may be subjected to more than one action 
brought for the same purpose. An interplea,der or correspond-
ordered an examination to discover assets held by the administrator to whom 
letters had been first granted in another county, and threatened contempt pro­
ceedings for refusal. 
" Explicit statutes precluding collateral attaCk are now found in many states. 
See notes 66-78, infra. 
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ing remedy is possible for such a person, but he would be 
justified in feeling that a properly drafted probate coc;le should 
eliminate such a possibility. Real estate titles traced through 
an administration may be subject to different paths and dif­
ferent ownerships, depending upon which administration is 
regarded as the controlling on�. Such a condition still persists 
in Kentucky and Rhode Island.45 It existed in Kansas until 
remedied by the probate code adopted there in I 9 3 9· 46 Many 
other states likewise formerly adhered to this view. 47 
Where such a view prevailed in the past, one difficulty was 
no doubt due to the judicial construction of the local statutes, 
many of which were phrased in terms of "jurisdiction" rather 
than "venue." Residence was "jurisdictional" and always 
open to question. Thus the present statutes in Georgia/8 
Iowa/9 Kentucky, 50 Maine/1 Massachusetts, 52 Michigan/3 
Montana,M New York/5 North Carolina/6 North Dakota,57 
'" Miller v. Swan, 9 I  Ky. 3 6, I 4  S. W. 964 ( I 89o) ; People's Savings Bank v. 
Wilcox, I 5 R. I. 2 58, 3 A. 2 I I ( I  8 8 6 ) .  The same rule prevailed in Kansas prior 
to the adoption of the new probate code there in I 939 ·  See Ewing v. Mallison, 
65 Kan. 484, 70 P. 3 69 ( I 902) ; Dresser v. Fourth Natl. Bank, I O I  Kan. 40 I1 
I68  P. 672  ( I 9 I 7) ; In re Summerfield's Estate, I 5 8  Kan. 3 8<'>, I47  P. (2d) 759 
( I 944) . For a fuller citation of authority see ATKINSON, WILLS ( I93  7 )  560;  2 
WOERNER, ADMINISTRATION (Jd ed. I 92 3 )  672 ; Evans, "The Venue of Probate 
Proceedings in Kentucky," 6 Ky. St. B. J. I 3 (Dec. I 94 I ) .  
The soundness o f  the Rhode Island position has recently been questioned by its 
supreme court in Eckilson v. Greene, 6 r R. I. 3 94, I A. (2d) I I 7 ( I  9 3 8 )  in view 
of R. I. Gen. Laws ( I 938)  c. 569, § I  (enacted since the decision in the Wilcox 
case) , to the effect that "The j urisdiction assumed in any case by the court, so far 
as it depends on the place of residence of a person, shall not be contested in any 
suit or proceedings except in the original case or an appeal therein or when the 
want of j urisdiction appears on the record." 
•• Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943)  § 5 9-2203 .  See also 2 BARTLETT, KANSAS 
PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE ( I 9 3 9 )  § 999·  
47 See 2 WOERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d ed.  I 92 3 )  673 .  
'" Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936)  § I I r6o3. 
49 Iowa Code ( I 9 3 9 )  § I 0763 .  
liO Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 942) § 395.030. 
151 Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 93o)  c. 75, § 9 ·  
•• Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 93 2) c .  2 I 5, § 3 · 
66 Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943 ) §§ 2 7. 3 I 7 8  ( I 9 )  and ( 1 2o ) .  
64 Mont. Rev. Code ( I 9 3 5) § 1001 8. 
66 N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, §§ ++• 45, 46 and 47· 
.. N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) § 2.8-1, 
.., N. D. Comp. Laws ( I 9 1 3 )  § 8526.  
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Ohio 58 Oregon 59 Virginia 60 West Virginia 61 Wisconsin 62 ' ' ) ' ' 
and Wyoming 63 are unfortunately phrased in terms of juris-
diction. Where collateral attacks have been permitted, courts 
have treated domicile as jurisdictional. 64 But if such a statute 
is construed as a venue statute, as is now done in nearly all 
states, then the probate court first assuming jurisdiction over 
the administration of a resident decedent's estate by appropri­
ate proceedings is entitled to retain such jurisdiction and to 
exercise it exclusive of every other probate court in the state.65 
\Vhen proceedings have been begun in two separate pro­
bate courts more or less simultaneously, the determination of 
priority may be simply resolved by requiring courts in which 
((proceedings are commenced" second in point of time to with­
hold action so long as jurisdiction over the estate has been as­
sumed and continues to be exercised by the first court. In 
other words, such jurisdiction first assumed by one court is
­
not subject to collateral attack. The applicable Wisconsin 
statute 66 is typical : 
uThe jurisdiction assumed by any county court in any case, 
so far as it depends on the place of residence of any person or 
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in any action 
or proceeding whatsoever except on appeal from the county 
court in the original case or when the want of j urisdiction 
appears on the same record." 
The same language, in substance, is contained in the statutes 
of California/7 Kansas, 68 Maine, 69 Massach usetts/0 Mich-
58 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, r 93 7) § 1 o 504-15 .  
59 Ore. Camp. Laws ( 1 940) § 1 9-2 1 0. 
"" Va. Code ( 1 942) § 5247. 
61 W. Va. Code ( 1 943 ) §§ 4064 and 4 1 2 3 .  
"' Wis. Stat. ( 1 943 )  § 253.03 .  
"" Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( r 9 3 1 )  § 8 8-207. 
• •  See Evans, "The Venue of Probate Proceedings in Kentucky," 6 Ky. St. B. 
J. 13 (Dec. 1 941 ) .  ' 
66 Atkinson, "Old Principles al)d New Ideas Concerning Probate Court Pro­
cedure," 23 J. AM. ]UD. Soc. 1 3 7  at 1 3 8  ( 1 9 3 9 ) .  
66 Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 25 3 ·05. 6 7  Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1 94 1 )  § 302. 
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igan,71 Minnesota,72 New Y ork,73 North Carolina/4 Ohio/5 
Oklahoma, 76 Rhode Island,77 and Vermont. 78 Thus the first 
assumption of jurisdiction prevails and excludes subsequent I 
action by other courts, subJect to correction by three methods : 
( r ) by revocation of letters in the first court ; ( 2.)  by appeal 
from the decision of thaJ court ; or (3) by collateral attack 
when the "want of jurisdiction appears on the same record." 
The application of these provisions against collateral attack 
would seem to prevent another probate court from granting 
letters on the same estate. But even though a second grant 
68 Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943 ) § 5 9-223 .  The method used here provides 
for a stay in all courts except the first, until the question of venue is finally de­
termined. See note 1 2  for form of this statute as it appears in the Model Probate 
Code. 
" Me.  Rev. Stat. ( 1 930) c. 75, § 1 6. 
70 Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 932 )  c. 2 1 5, § 2. The statute of the form mentioned 
was superseded by the present statute in 1 8 9 1  when probate courts were made 
courts of general jurisdiction. In Kennedy v. Simmons, 308 Mass. 4 3 1  at 432, 
32  N. E. (2d) 2 1 5  ( 1 94 1 )  it is stated that the former statute was no longer 
necessary because under the new statute the decrees of "probate courts were to be 
given the same effect as that usually attributed to those of a court of superior and 
general jurisdiction." 
71 Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § 27.3 1 7 8 (2 r ) .  
72 Minn. Stat. ( r 94r ) § 525.82.  This statute is like the Kansas statute cited 
in note 6 8, supra. 
73 N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 44· The form of this statute differs from the others. 
"] urisdiction, once duly exercised over any matter by a Surrogate's Court, ex­
cludes the subsequent exercise of j urisdiction by another Surrogate's Court over 
the same matter, . Where letters testamentary or of 
administration have been duly issued from . . . a Surrogate's Court hav­
ing jurisdiction, all further proceedings to be taken with respect to 
the same estate must be taken in the same court." 
7• N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943 ) § 28-2. "The clerk who first gains and exercises 
jurisdiction under this chapter thereby acquires sole and exclusive j urisdiction 
over the decedent's estate." 
75 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1 943) § r o5o4-r 5 . The result in Ohio is 
implicit under this statute providing for notice and hearing and from which a 
right of appeal exists. 
70 Okla. Stat. ( r 94 1 )  t. 5 8, § 7 · "The county court of the county in which 
application is first made for letters testamentary or of administration 
excludes the jurisdiction of the county court of every other county." 
77 R. I. Gen. Laws ( r 93 8 ) c. 569, � r .  
78 Vt. Pub. Laws ( r 9 3 3 )  § 2 7 2 7 .  "When a probate court has first taken cogni­
zance of the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, . such court 
shall have j urisdiction of the disposition and settlement of such estate to the ex­
clusion of other probate courts." Vt. Pub. Laws (r 9 3 3 )  § 2728  corresponds to 
the Wisconsin statute quoted. above. See note 6 6, supra. 
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of letters is not contested, and thus not made the subject of · 
attack, the probate court there should nevertheless defer or 
stay all action until the determination by the first court has 
become final. Thus if it should be duly determined in the 
first court, or on appeal from that court, that the decedent's 
domicile was not in its county, then the proceedings there 
should be dismissed, and the proceedings next begun in an­
other county should continue. If perchance a third court were 
involved, the same rule as to stay should likewise apply to 
it. This idea of a positive duty on the part of other courts 
to stay proceedings first found form in the Minnesota statute 79 
referred to above and was later embodied in the Kansas Pro­
bate Code 80 with one slight amendment. All this, of course, 
.implies V?luntary obedience by the courts which entertain 
proceedings later in point of time, or compulsory obedience 
by appropriate proceedings in a superior or supervisory 
tribunal. 81 The net result is orderly procedure and the ex­
ercise of jurisdiction at any given time by one court only. 
While this method may, in isolated instances, result in a 
determination of domicile, and hence place of administration, 
in a place not too convenient to some of the interested parties, 
it has the advantages of orderly procedure, the exercise of 
jurisdiction at any given time by one court only, the avoidance 
of duplication of function by the courts, and the prevention 
of more than one action against a debtor to the estate. Also 
the effect upon titles is salutary where conflict between courts 
cannot have more than momentary duration. 
Perhaps it is not enough to say that when proceedings have 
been commenced in one court, similar proceedings shall be 
stayed elsewhere. It may be well to add that· the jurisdiction 
assumed by the first court is not only exclusive and exhaustive 
but also that any action of a second court is void. The idea is 
79 Minn. Stat. ( 1941 ) § 5 25.82. 
80 Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943)  § 59-2203. 
81 State ex rel. Carter v .  Hall, 14 1  Mo. App. 6.j.2, 1 25 S. W. 559 ( 1910) i 
Sewell v. Christison, County Judge, 1 14 Okla. 1 77, 245 P. 632 ( 1  926). 
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implicit in the fundamental conception of probate jurisdiction 
that where one court assumes jurisdiction over the adminis­
tration of an estate, the exercise of control by another court 
over such estate is thereby exhausted and any attempted or 
purported exercise of control by another court is void. In 
short, the power is exclusive ; its exercise by one court exhausts 
the power, subject to the condition that if such court should 
relinquish its control over the estate, the power would be 
subject to exercise anew by another court. 
B .  AS TO NONRESIDENT DECEDENTS 
In the case of resident decedents it has been observed that 
conflicts in jurisdiction may arise because of two or more in­
dependent determinations of domicile within the state. As 
far as any one state is concerned, it has been generally as­
sumed that a person could have but one legal domicile within 
the state. Hence by some final determination, either in the 
probate court first entertaining jurisdiction or on appeal from 
that court, the fact of domicile will be determined so as to be 
binding throughout the state as far as that administration is 
concerned. In other words, only one court is entitled to under­
take the administration in the first instance. 82 
In  the case of nonresident decedents there may be a real 
choice as to venue in two different situations. In addition 
there is a third situation in which each of two'or more probate 
courts may undertake an administration proceeding approxi­
mately concurrently on the basis of an erroneous representa­
tion and a finding that the necessary factual basis for venue 
exists. Each of -these situations contains the seeds for two or 
more simultaneous administrations with their attendant evils. 
Each deserves a method of resolution. 
The first two present genuine choices open to those who 
may be interested in applying for administration. Thus one 
type of statute provides in effect that letters may be granted 
u ATKINSON, WILLS ( 1937) 560, 562 . 
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in any county where the decedent left assets. 83 Companion 
statutes here frequently add that the court of that county in 
which application is first made, and which first grants letters 
or otherwise assumes jurisdiction, shall have exclusive juris­
diction ; 84 or that "the jurisdiction assumed by any court, 
insofar as it depends on the location of the decedent's estate, 
shall not be contested except on appeal or when the want of 
jurisdiction appears on the record." 85 Another common type 
of statute in the western states modeled after the California 
Code specifies various bases of venue in categorical order and 
particularly provides that venue "in all other cases shall be 
in the county where application for letters is first made." 86 
Both of these species of statutes providing for alternative 
places of venue, it will be noted, deal with cases where any 
one of several courts is entitled, in the first instance, to under­
take the administration on a particular estate. Once pro­
ceedings have been commenced in any court, all the estate of 
83 See note 3 o, supra. 
84 Ariz. Code ( I 939)  § 3 8-I o i ; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, I 94 I )  § 30 I ; 
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 93o) § 48 8 8 ;  Del. Rev. Code ( I 935 )  § 3 807 ; Idaho Code 
( I 9 3 2 )  §§ I 5-Ioi and I 5-Io2 ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 9 3 3 )  § 6-3o2 ; Iowa Code 
( 1 9 39 )  § 1 1 824 ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 59-2203 ; Me. Rev. Stat. 
( I 93o) c. 75, § I 6 ;  Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 932)  c. 2 I 5, § 7 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. 
( I 943)  §§ 27.3 I 7 8 (22)  and ( 1 2o) ; Minn. Stat. ( I 94I ) § 525. 8 2 ;  Mont. Rev. 
Code ( I 9 35)  §§ I OO I 8  and I OO I 9 ;  Neb. Comp. Stat. ( I 929)  § 30-3 1 3 ;  Nev. 
Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  § 9882 .o i ; N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, §§ 44 and 46; N. 
C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943l § 2 8-2 ; N. D. Comp. Laws ( I 9 1 3 )  § 8526 ; Ohio Gen. 
Code (Page, I 9 3 7 )  § I 0 5 I I-4 ;  Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I ) t. 5 8, §§ 6 and ? ;  R. I. 
Gen. Laws ( I 93 8 )  c. 569, § 3 ;  S. D. Code ( I 93 9 )  § 3 5 .0 I o 2 ;  Tex. Civ. Stat. 
Ann. (Vernon, 1 9 39)  art. 3 294;  Utah Code ( I 943) § I 02-I-3 ; Vt. Pub. 
Laws ( I 9 3 3 )  § 2727 ; Wash. Rev. Stat. ( I 9 32 )  § I 3 7 7 ;  Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) 
§ 2 5 3 .04 ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 9 3 I )  § 8 8-208. 
· 
85 See notes 6 6-7 8, supra. 
86 A complete list of such statutes is as follows : Ariz. Code ( I  9 3 9) § 3 8-I o I ; 
CaL Prob. Code (Deering, I 94 I )  § JO I ; Idaho Code ( I 9 3 2 )  § 1 5-1 0 I ; Mont. 
Rev. Code ( I  935)  § I OO I  8 ;  Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94I )  § 9 8 82 .o i ; N. D. 
Comp. Laws ( I 9 I 3 ) § 8sz6 ; Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  t. 5 8, §§ s-7 ; s. D. Code 
( I 939)  § J5 .o r o i ; Utah Code ( I 943 )  § Io2-1-2 ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 9 3 1 )  
§ 8 S-2o7. This same result is implicit under the ,Kansas and Minnesota statutes, 
although not expressed in this manner. Likewise a similar construction obtains 
under the Texas and Washington statutes. 
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the decedent is brought under its jurisdiction and control, 87 
and further jurisdiction in any other court is no longer pos­
sible. Resolution of the conflict here is sometimes, but not 
always, contained in the statute itself or in the companion 
statutes mentioned above, Priority in time determines the 
power to proceed. 
The third possibility mentioned above in which conflicts 
are likely to occur, arises, to put an example, under statutes 
authorizing the administration of estates in the county where 
the land or estate of the nonresident decedent, or the greater 
part thereof, is located. Courts of two different counties may 
grant administration upon the belief that the greater part of 
the decedent's estate lies there. Mathematically the "greater" 
part may be in only one county, but before undertaking such 
measurement, such jurisdiction needs .. definition in terms of 
value, area, size, or some other appropriate measuring stick. 
Without pursuing this thought further, it is sufficient to point 
out that each of two or more courts may honestly believe itself 
justified in assuming jurisdiction according to its measure­
ment of an extraneous fact upon which its jurisdiction is made 
to depend. Again we must fall back upon the simple ex­
pedient of recognizing that the first court to acquire juris-
87 The term "jurisdiction" as used here re,fers merely to the power of a court 
to take cognizance of the proceedings and control over the property through the 
executor or administrator. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, its control ex­
tends to all property of the estate throughout the state. Ala. Code ( 1 940) t. 6 1 ,  
§ 87 ;  Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1 941 ) § 30 1 ; Conn. Gen. Stat. ( 1 9 30) § 48 8 8 ;  
Del. Rev. Code ( 1 9 3 5 )  § 3 807 ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 9 3 3 )  § 6-302 ; Iowa Code 
( 1 939)  § I 1 8 2 5 ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943)  § 59-2203 ; Md. Code ( 1 939)  
art. 93 ,  § 1 6 ;  Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 932 )  c .  2 1 5, § 7 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) 
§ 27 .3 1 7 8 ( 1 2o) ; Minn. Stat. ( 1 941 ) § 525. 82 ; Neb. Comp. Stat. ( 1 929)  § 30-
3 r 3 ;  Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 941 ) § 9882 .0 1 ; N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, §§ 44-46 ; 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) § 28-2 ; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 9 3 7 )  § 105 1 1-4 ;  
Okla. Stat. ( 1 941 ) t .  58 , §§ 6, 7 ;  R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 9 3 8 )  c .  5 69, § 3 ;  S. C. 
Code ( 1 942) §§ 2 I I , 220;  S. D. Code ( 1 93 9) § 3 5 .01 0 2 ;  Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
(Vernon, 1 9 3 9 )  art. 3294;  Utah Code ( 1 943) § 1 02-1-3 ; Vt. Pub. Laws 
( 1 9 3 3 )  § 2 7 2 7 ;  Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 32)  § 1 3 7 7 ;  Wis. Stat. ( 1 94 3 )  § 3 1 1 .0 1 ; 
Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 3 1 )  § 8 8-208 .  
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diction is entitled to retain it,88 subj ect to deprivation of that 
jurisdiction only in the manner indicated. 
c.· WHEN JURISDICTION IS ACQUIRED 
In addition to the statutes which specify priority as between 
two or more permissible places of administration according 
to the county in which the application for letters is first filed,89 
many statutes provide that the court in which proceedings are 
"first commenced" 90 or "first legally commenced," 91 or the 
court "where administration is first lawfully granted" 92 or 
which shall "first take cognizance thereof by the commence­
ment of proceedings" 93 shall be entitled to retain jurisdiction 
over the administration of the estate to the exclusion of all 
other probate courts within the state. It is thereby intended to 
specify the time when<a court acquires control and to declare 
an order of priority as between two or more courts. A defini­
tion of this precise point of time is essential whenever legal 
proceedings are in rem. This problem has been an acute one 
in states without any specific legislation on the subject as well 
as under the variously phrased statutes mentioned above. 
From an examination of the statutes and decisions it appears 
that there are two views as to just when a court acquires juris-
88 Bremer v. Lake Erie & W. R. R., 3 1 8  Ill. 1 1 , 1 48 N. E. 862 ( 1 92.5) 1 In re 
Estate of Kladivo, 1 8 8 Iowa 47 1 ,  1 7 6  N. W. 262 ( 1 920) ; Bolton v. Schriever, 
1 3 5  N. Y. 6 5, 3 I N. E. I oo1 ( r 892) ; Sewell v. Christison, County Judge, I 14  
Okla. I 77, 245 P. 632  ( I 926) . See statutes cited in  note 8 7, supra. 
89 See notes 84 and 8 6, supra. 
90 Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 59-2203 ; Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 930) c. 75, 
§ I 6. 
•• Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525. 82. 
•• Ala. Code ( 1 940) t. 6 r ,  § 87 ; Del. Rev. Code ( 1 9 3 5 )  § 3 807 ; Ind. Stat. 
(Burns, I 9 3 3 )  § 6-302 ; Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943)  § 2 7.3 t 7 8 ( 1 2o) ; Neb. Comp. 
Stat. ( 1 929)  § 30-3 I 3 i  N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 4+ (but cf. § 46 wherein the 
time of filing the petition has been made the criteri\)n) ; N. C. Gen. Stat. (1943) 
§ 2 8-2 ("the clerk who first gains and exercises jurisdiction") ; Ohio Gen. Code 
(Page, 1 93 7) § 105 1 1-4 1  R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 93 8 )  c. 569, § 3 ·  · · 
93 Conn. Gen. Stat. ( 1 930) § 488 8 1 Iowa Code ( 1 9 39)  § I 1 82.4 ;  Mass. Ann. 
Laws ( 1 9 3 2 )  c. 2 1 5, § 7 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) § 27.3 1 7 8  (22) ; N. Y. Sutr. 
Ct. Act, § 44 ; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933 ) § 2.72.7 1 Wis. Stat. (1943) § 2.53•04-. .  • 
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diction : ( I )  when the application or petition for letters is 
filed with the · court ; and (2) when the court, acting on the 
application, appoints an executor or administrator to adminis­
ter the estate, thus assuming control· over it. 
The first view is predicated upon the theory that the pro­
ceedings are commenced by the filing of a petition for ad­
ministration ; and that the subsequent action of the court in 
acting on the petition is but a continuation and part of the 
proceedings already commenced. The simple lodging of the 
petition for letters vests the court with jurisdiction and con.:. 
trol, precluding action by another court. A few statutes 
specifically provide that a probate proceeding may be com­
menced by filing a petition and causing it to be set for hearing. 94 
The second view stems from the theory of res judicata, that 
where two actions involving the same issue are pending at 
the same time, the first one to be determined by final judg­
ment shall control and may serve as a bar in any other action 
. between the same parties involving that same issue.95 This, 
of course, is a well-recognized rule of civil procedure. Ju­
dicial action, not the mere filing of a petition, is the sine qua 
non of jurisdiction. 
It has also been said that a court can only acquire jurisdiction 
in an in rem proceeding by doing some act which is equivalent 
to seizing the res ; that since a probate proceeding is in rem, 
no jurisdiction over the estate can exist until the court does 
some affirmative act amounting to a seizure, such as appoint­
ing a personal representative to take charge of the estate. 
Undoubtedly in the vast majority of cases the court to 
•• Such statutes are found in New York, Kansas and North Dakota. See N. Y. 
Surr. Ct. Act, § 48;  Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943)  § 59-2204 ; N. D. Comp. 
Laws ( 1 9 1 3 )  § 8 5 30 ;  Minnesota formerly had such a statute, Minn. Stat. 
(Mason, 1'9 2 7 )  § 8708, but neither this section nor any similar provision -was 
adopted as a part of the Minnesota Probate Code of r 9 35 .  However, the same 
result will obtain under Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .82 .  See note 9 7  infra. 
95 2 FREEMAN, JuDGMENTS (5th ed. 1 925)  c. r o. See also Sewell v. Christi­
son, County }udge,, 1 r 4  Okla. 1 77, 245 P. 632  ( 1 926) . 
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which a petition is first presented will likewise be the first to 
grant letters. But such is not always the case, especially where 
notice for a hearing on the · petition must be given for a 
specified minimum length of time. A second court to which 
a petition is later addressed may speed up its action to such a 
degree that it is the first to grant letters. Thus where the 
hearing and order are in reverse order to that of the filing of 
the applications, it becomes important to determine the precise 
time when jurisdiction may be said to attach so as to preclude 
jurisdiction by another court. 
The authorities are divided in their views on this point. 
Among the states having statutes specifying jurisdiction upon 
the commencement of proceedings, or having no legislation 
on the subject, New York,96 Minnesota,97 Missouri,98 
Kansas,99 North Dakota/00 and Texas 101 are committed to the 
first view, saying that the commencement of administration 
proceedings by the filing of a petition is conclusive as to the 
time when the court acquires jurisdiction ; 102 and that any 
subsequent proceeding in any other court is without juris­
diction and void. The New York statute, for example, pro-
"' N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, §§ 44, 45 and 46 ; In re Daniel's Will, 140 Misc. 89, 
249 N. Y. S. 436 ( 1 93 1 ) ; In re Humpfner's Estate, 146 Misc. 46r, 263 N. Y. S. 
309 ( 1 9 3 3 ) ; In re Feinberg's Estate, 1 55 Misc. 844, 280 N. Y. S. 540 ( 1 935) . 
97 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1 927)  § 8 7o8 ; Hanson v. Nygaard, 1 05 Minn. 30, 
I I ?  N.  W. 235, 1 2 7  Am. St. Rep. 5 2 3  ( r 9o8) ; In re Estate of Martin, r 8 8  
Minn. 408, 247 N .  W. 5 1 5  ( 1 9 3 3 ) ; In re Gilray's Estate, 1 9 3  Minn. 349, 258  
N. W.  584 ( 1 9 3 5) .  . 
98 In the Matter of the Estate of Greening, 2 3 2  Mo. App. 78, 89 S. W. (2d) 
1 23 ( 1 936 ) ,  noted in I Mo. L. REV. 192 ( r 936) . Here the court said that the . 
order of appointment controlled, but that this related back to the "very inception 
of the proceedings" when the will and application for letters were filed. 
9° Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 59-2203. 
100 N. D. Comp. Laws ( 1 9 1 3 )  § 8 5 26. 
101 Stewart v. Poinboeuf, I I I  Tex. 299, 2 3 3  S. W. 1 095 ( r 92 r ) .  
102 In ,addition to these five states, there are some 24 additional states where 
statutes· specify the time of application under certain circumstances as equivalent 
to the time when j urisdiction may be said to attach. See note 84, supra. This 
makes a total of 29 states where the filing of the application may be said to confer 
j urisdiction, at least to the extent of determining priority over other courts of 
coordinate authority. 
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vides that "jurisdiction, once duly exercised over any matter 
by a Surrogate's" Court, excludes the subsequent exercise of 
jurisdiction by another Surrogate's Court over the same mat­
ter. . . .  " It was held at a very early date under this statute 
that the presentation of a petition for probate, alleging resi­
dence of the decedent within the county, gives exclusive juris­
diction to try the question of residence, of which the court 
cannot be deprived by subsequent proceedings in the sur­
rogate's court of another county.103 In addition, statutes exist 
in twenty-eight states explicitly giving priority in given cir­
cumstances to the court in which an application for letters is 
first filed. 
The second view also has its adherents. Delaware/04 
Indiana/05 Nebraska/06 New Hampshire/07 Ohio/08 Okla­
homa, 109 Rhode Island 110 and South Carolina 111 do not regard 
their probate courts as acquiring jurisdiction without some 
positive action, such as acting on an application by granting 
letters. Such judicial order or judgment, they say, is the only 
means by which the court may grasp jurisdiction.112 A dozen . 
applications may be pending in as many different courts, but 
jurisdiction exists in none until acted upon. Thus in an early 
California case it was said that the statute in effect at that time 
did not contemplate the "presentation of a petition as the 
103 Matter of Buckley, 4I Hun (N. Y.) I o6 ( I 8 86) . See REDFIELD, LAW AN!'J 
PRACTICE OF SURROGATES' CoURTS IN NEW YORK (4th ed. I 890) I I  6. 
"'' Del. Rev. Code ( I 9 3 5) § 3 807. 
105 Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 9 3 3 )  § 6-3 02. 
106 Neb. Camp. Stat. ( I 929) § 3 0-3 I 3 . 
107 Tilton v. O'Conner, 68 N. H. 2 I 5, 44 A. 303 ( I 894) . 
108 0hio Gen. Code (Page, I 93 7 ) § I 0 5 I I-4. . 
109 Sewell v. Christison, County Judge, I I 4  Okla. I 77, 245 P. 6 J 2  ( I 926 ) .  
See also Jackson v .  Haney, I 66 Okla. I 3, 2 5  P .  (2d) 7 7 I  ( I 9 3 3 ) ,  involving 
conflicting j urisdiction in the appointment of a guardian for a minor. 
110 R. I. Gen. Laws ( I 9 3 8 )  c. 569, § 3 ·  
111 Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Castleberry (C. C. A. 4th, I 904) I 3 I F. I 7 5 ·  
112 In the statutes of Delaware, Indiana and Nebraska, cited in notes I 04, 1 05, 
and 1 o6, supra, it is specifically provided that the administration first lawfully 
granted shall exclude the j urisdiction of every other court. 
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means of giving the Court jurisdiction," but as information to 
the court.113 
In addition, statutes exist in Connecticut,114 Iowa,115 
Maine, 116 Massachusetts, 117 Michigan, 118 North Carolina, 119 
Vermont 120 and Wisconsin 121 to the effect that the court 
which shall first take cognizance of the administration of an 
estate by the commencement of proceedings shall be entitled 
to retain it to the exclusion of every other court. Thus far, 
these statutes have received no clear judicial construction as to 
just when proceedings are commenced. 
In favor of the first rule it has been said to be fairer to 
predicate priority on the filing of the first petition, provided 
the respective applications for administration have not been 
made with such haste as to suggest some positive fraud or col­
lusion. As said in a Texas case : 122 
"The fairest and most reasonable test is priority in invoking 
the exercise of jurisdiction. . The date of an adjudica-
113 In the Matter of the Estate of Howard, 22 Cal. 395  at 3 9 8  ( I 863) . How­
ever, the court here was discussing two statutes entirely dissimilar to those under 
consideration. The sole purpose of quoting from the opinion is to indicate the 
early conception of. the California court as to the office of the petition for probate. 
Indeed the opinion indicated that a petition was solely for the purpose of indicat­
ing to the court a willingness on the part of the executor to accept his trust. 
114 Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 9 30) § 48 8 8. 
llli Iowa Code ( I 9 39) § I I 824. . 
• 116 Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 930) c. 75, § I6 .  
111 Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 9 3 2) c. 2 1 5, § 7· In addition to this section, another 
Massachusetts statute is unique in providing that "If it appears before final decree 
in any proceeding pending in a probate court tha,t said proceeding was begun in 
the wrong county, said court may order the proceeding with all papers relating 
thereto to be removed to the probate court for the proper county, and it shall 
thereupon be entered and pending in the last mentioned court as if originally 
commenced therein, and all prior proceedings otherwise regularly taken shall 
thereupon be valid." Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 93 7) c. 2 1 5, § 8A. 
118 Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943 ) § 27.3 I 78  (22) . Cf. § 27 .3 I 78  (uo) which 
gives priority to the administration first legally granted. 
119 N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943) § 28-2. "The clerk who first gains and exercises 
jurisdiction . • • over the decedent's estate." 
120 Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 9 3 3 ) § 2727. . · · 
= wis. Stat. ( I 943 ) § 253.04. Cf. § 3 I I .O I  which gives priority to the ad­
ministration first legally granted. 
122 Stewart v. Poinboeuf, I I I Tex. 299 at 305, 2 3 3  S. W. I 095 ( I 9 2 I ) . 
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tion on his application may be delayed by circumstances be­
yond the applicant's control, such as the number of causes on 
the court's docket or time taken by the court to render a 
decision. One ought not to lose his right to an adjudication, 
properly sought, because a clerk or sheriff is delayed in issuing 
or serving process duly applied for, nor because an earlier 
adjudication is secured from another court." 
Such a rule makes the acquisition of jurisdiction independent 
of the speed with which- two probate courts might otherwise 
move toward acquiring jurisdiction by granting letters sooner 
than they would in the ordinary course of events. Where 
such application is for domiciliary administration and predi­
cated upon domicile, fraud or collusion, if it exists, may be 
corrected in most cases in the probate court itself or by ap­
peal.123 
If there is any weakness in the first view, it may be exempli­
fied by supposing that the first of two courts in which applica­
tion for letters has been filed, refuses to grant letters or 
otherwise proceed. The sudden cessation of a jurisdiction 
ov�r the decedent's estate which the court says it never had, 
seems an anomaly. In answer it may be said that jurisdiction, 
or the potential power to assume jurisdiction, exists from the 
instant the application was filed, but the court terminates its 
jurisdiction and thus makes it possible for another court to 
take it up. This corresponds to the express statutory state­
ment that proceedings may be commenced by the mere filing 
of a petition for probate or administration. Where such 
123 In addition to the remedy by appeal, the assumption of j urisdiction may 
always be questioned in the probate court directly, although the time for making 
such a direct attack varies in the different states. Kennedy v. Simmons, 3 o 8 Mass. 
43 I ,  3 2  N. E. (2d) 7 I 5  ( I 94 I )  (at any time, by analogy of the common law 
and equity courts to correct their decrees by bill of review) ; In re Estate of 
Neely, I 36 Me. 7 9, I A. (2d) 772 ( I 93 8 )  (even after appeal time) ; Eckilson v. 
Greene, 6 I R. I. 3 94, I A. ( 2d) I I 7 ( I  9 3 8 )  (until the time for appeal has ex­
pired) ; Hotchkiss v. Ladd's Estate, 62 Vt. 209 ( I 89o) .  Statutes in California 
and Maine make the grant of letters and assumption of jurisdiction final except 
on appeal, and not subject to collateral attack except for fraud. Cal. Prob. Code 
(Deering, I 94 I )  § 3 02 ;  Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 930) c. 75, § I 6. 
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statutes exist, it cannot be denied that jurisdiction exists from 
the time the petition is filed. 
The second view, based upon the doctrine of res j"\].dicata, 
has the support of history and of logical consistency. Under 
civil procedure two or more actions may pend between the 
same parties and involve the same issue. Ordinarily no serious 
harm results from the mere pendency of duplicate actions. 
The ultimate legal rights of the parties are not affected until 
final judgment. The same cannot be said of a probate pro­
ceeding, which is essentially a proceeding in rem.124 The 
rights of parties interested in the estate are not affected merely 
by the decree of final distribution ; they are affected by every 
step taken in the proceeding. In consequence, the jurisdiction 
of the court must attach at the commencement of the proceed­
ing in order to insure that the court which undertakes to super­
vise administration of the estate has the exclusive j urisdiction 
and power to make all necessary orders. Otherwise we witness 
an unseemly race between courts of coordinate jurisdiction and 
a species of competition completely unworthy of the judicial 
process. As was aptly said in a recent Oklahoma case : '"To 
hold that the time of appointment determines jurisdiction 
would promote mad races between courts of co­
ordinate jurisdiction to see which could enter a final order 
first. This would tend to discourage that deliberation so es­
sential to a determination of the rights of parties in judicial 
tribunals." 125 
In answer to the argument that the in rem character of the 
proceeding compels the conclusion that it is not initiated until 
the seizure of the res, two things may be said. First, this is 
124 ATKINSON, WILLS ( 1 9 37 )  43 8-440 ; Atkinson, "Old Principles and New 
Ideas Concerning Probate Court Procedure," 23 J. AM. JuD. Soc. 1 3 7  at 1 3 8  
( 1 9 39 ) ; Ladd v. Weiskopf, 6 2  Minn. 29, 64  N .  W. 9 9 ,  69 L. R.  A.  785  (r 895) . 
125 Jackson v. Haney, 1 66 Okla. 1 3  at 21 ,  25 P. (2d) 7 7 1  ( 1 9 3 3 ) .  It should 
be stated that this quotation is from a concurring opinion written by a judge who 
believed that jurisdiction attached upon the filing of the petition for letters, con­
trary to the opinion held by the majority of the court. See note r o91,supra. 
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a question of venue and not o f  j urisdiction, and i f  i t  is more 
convenient to say that the proceeding is commenced by the 
filing of the petition no unyielding principle of jurisdiction 
prevents such a statute. Second, whatever may be said as to 
a proceeding quasi in rem, there is no rule of law that seizure 
of the res is always necessary in order for a court to acquire 
jurisdiction in a proceeding strictly in rem.126 The analogy 
of the admiralty proceeding is not and should not be followed 
in probate matters: 
The provision of the Model Probate Code,127 following 
the language of the Minnesota and Kansas Probate Codes, 128 
has embodied the first view. It has not only expressed this 
view, but it has specifically provided what shall be done in 
other probate courts where proceedings have also been started. 
Such are to be stayed there pending a decision in the first 
court as to whether such proceedings are in a permissible 
county under the statute. If jurisdiction is assumed there, 
the second court, "after making and retaining a true copy of 
the entire file, shall transmit the original to the proper 
county." On the other hand, if the first court should decline 
to take jurisdiction, the second court 'becomes free to proceed. 
Moreover, it is immaterial whether the proceedings first 
begun are "legal" or not. The question of domicile within 
the county, assets within the county, or other basis for ap-
126 Roller v. Holly, 1 7 6 U. S. 3 98, 20 S. Ct. 4 1 0  ( r 9oo) . See also 2 PAGE, 
WILLS, (3d ed. 194 1 )  3 8  where it is said : 
"It is the presence of the thing within the state which confers j urisdiction in 
rem. It is sometimes said that the seizure of the thing is necessary ; but this would 
seem to be taking a detail in the enforcement of the j urisdiction, which is quite 
necessary in the case of movable property but not so necessary in the case of im­
movable property, and turning it into a rule of j urisdiction. Fairness requires 
that some kind of notice be given so that those who have claims to the property 
may assert them in time. The due process clause of our constitution may make 
void or erroneous a decree which is rendered without such notice. It is not, how­
ever, the notice which gives the j urisdiction. It is the presence of the thing within 
the state." 
127 See note r 2, supra. 
128 Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 525 .82 ; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 5 9-2203. 
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propriate venue, or whether the first county is one of several 
counties in which administration might have been begun, is 
left for final decision in the first court to which an application 
is presented. But that decision is not necessarily limited to 
the original decision of this court. It may be redetermined on 
appeal or in the probate court itself by motion to revoke 
the letters.129 By this means it is ordinarily possible for any­
one to contest the first proceeding until a final conclusion is 
reached. But when the court in which proceedings are first 
filed renders a final decision that it has jurisdiction in the ad­
ministration of the estate, that court is entitled to proceed, free 
from competition elsewhere in the state.130 
A Ma,ssachusetts statute 131 permits a change of venue at 
any time before final decree if it appears that the proceeding 
was begun in the wrong county. Statutes in Arkansas 132 are 
even broader, permitting removal of an administration from 
one county to another upon the petition of the personal repre­
sentative or a maj ority of the heirs stating that the greater 
portion of the property is in such other county or that a major­
ity of the heirs wish such removal. Such flexibility of venue 
for the administration 'bf estates was not noted elsewhere, 
although a similar transfer of venue in guardianship pro­
ceedings exists in Minnesota.133 Such provisions as these, al­
though isolated, reflect a tendency to adjust probate procedure 
to the interests of convenience.134 
· 
129 See cases cited in note I23 ,  supra. 
130 See the Minnesota and Kansas statutes cited in note I 2 8, supra. 
131 Mass. Ann. Laws ( I 9 32) c. 2 I 5, § SA. · 
132 Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 9 3 7 )  §§ 229-23 8. 
= Minn. Stat. ( I 94I ) § 525.57.  See also Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, I 94 1 )  
§ I 6o3 which provides that a guardianship proceeding may be  transferred to 
"any other county which at the time of such transfer would have jurisdiction ·to 
issue original letters in such proceeding." In the case of a testamentary trust 
Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, I 94 I )  § I I  2 8 provides for a transfer of the trust 
proceedings upon petition of the trustees or any interested party stating the rea­
sons for 'such transfer. Presumably convenience alone would be sufficient. 
"" The venue section of the Model Probate Code has been drafted to ·permit a 
change of venue and transfer of proceedings in the interest of convenience. 1 See 
note I 2, supra. 
Dispensing with Administration* 
Paul E. Basye 
W
. ITH an elaborate system existing in every state 
for the administration of decedents' estates, it 
should not be assumed that every estate is or ileed 
be subjected to official supervision by a probate court. Ac­
c<;>rding to studies made in this connection there is approxi­
mately one administration for every four deaths/ In  some 
cases there is no estate to be administered. In others it is of 
such small value that administration is neither required nor 
justified. Even when a decedent dies possessed of a moderate 
or large estate, it does not follow that administration is ab­
solutely essential. It is the experience of every lawyer that 
an administration in many estates is not needed. On the other 
hand, the opinion of many heirs and beneficiaries that an 
administration on the estate in which they are interested is 
or should be unnecessary is an erroneous one. The purpose 
of this study is to consider the precise circumstances which 
will justify dispensing with a formal administration, in whole 
or in part, on the estate of a decedent, and the extent to which 
modern legislation has specifically provided for its being 
dispensed with, or has favored or permitted "informal" or 
"unofficial" administrations . . . 
The formal process of administration is peculiar to the 
common law. A personal rypresentative was unknown to 
the Roman law and to the civil law. Under these systems 
* This monograph is being published simultaneously in the Michigan Law 
Review. The writer is indebted to Professor Thomas E. Atkinson, of the New 
York University Law School, especially for his criticism of that part dealing 
with dispensing with ancillary administration. 
The statutes which are discussed herein are complete to January r, 1 945. In 
' addition all legislation passed during 1 945 which was available at the time of 
printing is also included. 
1 Powell and Looker, "Decedents' Estates," 30 CoL. L. REv. 9 1 9  at 922, 9 2 3  
( 1930) ; ATKINSON, WILLS ( 1 93 7) 5 3 8-539  and notes 5r55· 
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the estate of the decedent. passed directly to the heir in the 
event of intestacy or to the instituted heir where there was a 
will, without any intervening administration whatever as 
known to the common law. 2 Such an heir took the property 
absolutely but became personally liable for all debts of the 
decedent even though they exceeded the amount of property 
received.3 Only if the heir renounced the succession or 
claimed the benefit of inventory was he freed from liability 
for the decedent's debts.4 Thus the personality of the de­
cedent was continued in the heir, and the decedent's estate 
passed immediately and absolutely to the heir who became 
liable for the payment of the decedent's debts and legacies 
given in the will. These obligations could be enforced as 
against the heir: In this light they might be regarded as 
administrative duties although not subjected to supervision 
by any court. It remained for the common law to develop the 
practice of appointing a personal representative accountable 
to the State to continue the personality of the decedent for a 
period long enough to insure the payment of his debts and 
any legacies provided for in the will.5 Thus court control 
over such a personal representative has led to the elaborate 
system of probate courts and supervision both in England and 
in America. The origin of this institution has been attributed 6 
to the desire to protect cred�tors and to secure the payment of 
fees and inheritance taxes-both legitimate interests of the 
sovereign. 
The phenomenon of a complete lack of any official ad­
ministration upon a decedent's estate under the civil law is 
described here in order to suggest a close analogy to those 
• Rheinstein, "European Methods for the Liquidation of the Debts of Deceased 
Persons," zo IowA L. REv. 43 1  ( 1 93 5 ) .  
3 Id. at .432...:_433·  
• Id. at  435-436. 
• Id. at 438. 
• Id. at 438. 
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situations in Anglo-American law in which there rieed be or 
is no formal administration. 7 In this connection it will be ob­
served that under the civil law the property of a decedent 
is never removed from commerce, whereas under our probate 
system it is largely taken out of commerce for the period of 
administration. Any worthy procedure of this kind should 
not impair too seriously the purposes for which administration 
is provided. At the same time it should be welcome both to 
heirs and distributees, and would advance the social interest 
of keeping property in commerce without substantial inter­
ruption upon the occasion of death. 
There are two general situations in which administration 
might be dispensed with, either in the public interest or on 
behalf of those concerned in the estate. First, administration 
is scarcely justified in many small estates provided no one is 
adversely affected by its omission. This may be said of most 
estates of deceased minors, who have but limited capacity 
to contract debts and whose estates are likely to be small. 
Second, many estates of substantial amount may not require 
administration, if all the interested parties can resolve their 
conflicting intere�ts among themselves. Each of these situ­
ations suggests the desirability of a careful and complete state­
ment of the objectives to be achieved by an administration, 
' how far each of them is secured only, or more effectively, by 
' an administration, and to what extent administration may be 
dispensed with without seriously impairing the larger ob­
jectives. 
I .  FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATION 
Under the Anglo-American system of administration the 
title to a decedent's personal property passes to his executor 
• Id. at 468-47 5· This analogy is fully developed by Professor Rheinstein in 
the article cited. One should read it in full to appreciate the close parallels 
which prevail under the two systems. 
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or administrator for the period of administration. During 
that time his functions are: ( I )  to collect the assets belonging 
to the estate, ( 2)  to pay the debts of the deceased and claims 
against the estate, and (3)  to distribute the residue to the 
heirs or legatees. Each of these functions involves or may 
involve a resolution of conflicting interests. The collection 
of assets implies a positive duty on the part of the personal 
representative. Such is for the benefit of creditors as well as 
distributees of the estate, since a collection of assets may be 
necessary in order to pay creditors. At the same time the in­
terests of distributees are opposed to those of creditors, inas­
much as the latter have a prior interest in the distribution of 
the estate. The payment of the debts of a decedent implies an 
opportunity for creditors to present and have a judicial deter­
mination of their claims and, in case of an insolvent estate, a 
resolution of the claims of competing creditors. The pay­
ment of claims against the estate (as distinguished from debts 
of the decedent) involves a determination and payment of 
funeral expenses, costs and expenses of administration, claims 
arising in connection with the carrying on of a decedent's busi­
ness and whatever estate, inheritance or succession taxes, ·and 
other obligations which may be similarly classed. And finally 
the distribution of the residue to the heirs or legatees may 
involve a resolution of many kinds of conflicting interests, as 
between different classes of distributees and between dis­
tributees of the same class. It may also present problems of 
advancements, ademptions, contributions and the like. 
The idea is fundamental in our system that some person 
occupying an official position under a supervisory court should 
perform these functions. This is due primarily to the state's 
solicitude for creditors of the decedent, and perhaps second7 
arily to the belief that only in this way can the residue of the 
estate be properly and justly distributed to �hose ultimately 
. ' \, . , 
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entitled to it. The social a,nd economic desirability of main­
taining personal credit by the means of official administration 
has prevailed over the �ore direct method of the civil law. 
Furthermore, the complicated nature of property interests 
often makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the heirs or dis- ' 
tributees to divide the decedent's property among themselves 
although they may be willing to do so. Our probate courts 
are maintained to effectuate the prompt settlement of estates 
and to resolve such conflicts as occur in the process. In a 
sense, an admrnistration is a liquidation of the decedent's 
estate, 8 affording creditors a means of realizing upon their 
claims and at the same time limiting the liability of the heirs 
who succeed to the property of the decedent. 
II .  PERSONS INTERESTED IN AND AFFECTED 
BY ADMINISTRATION IN TERMS OF 
STATED FuNCTIONs 
The three general functions of administration having been 
stated, it remains to determine which groups of persons are 
interested in each of these objectives, to what extent the process 
of administration is essential for their accomplishment, and 
in what circumstances it could be dispensed with. 
A. COLLECTION OF ASSETS 
Upon the death of a decedent it is ordinarily desirable that 
someone take charge of his property and proceed to m.ake 
collection of that which is not already in possession. This 
may be necessary 'in the interests of preserving the property 
and making it available for those ultimately entitled to it. 
It may involve the bringing of suits for the collection o.f debts 
• See Bordwell, "The Conversion of the Use Into a Legal Interest," z I IowA 
L. REV. I at 34 ( I 935) ; and dissenting opinion of Campbell, J., in Lafferty v. 
People's Savings Bank, 76 Mich. 35, 43 N. W. 34 at 45 ( I 8 89 ) .  
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owed to the decedent. - In
· 
each of these cases the heirs 9 and 
creditors of the estate will be intert::sted, because each aids in 
the realization of their respective claims upon the estate. If 
a debtor of the estate is willing to pay, he is entitled to know 
with certainty that the payment will operate to discharge his 
debt. Consequently each of the three classes of persons in­
.terested in the estate, heirs, creditors and debtors, is concerned 
in this function of administration. Under the system pre-
. vailing in many states at the present time, a debtor who pays 
the heirs directly may remain liable to a personal represent­
ative, if one is subsequently appointed. 
B. PAYMENT OF DEBTS AND CLAIMS 
Society's concern for creditors of the decedent has been 
the prime purpose in maintaining probate courts in which 
estates could be administered.10 If an heir proceeds to take 
possession of the decedent's property without administration, 
a creditor may petition the probate court for letters of ad­
ministration and then present his claim for allowance in the 
administration proceeding. If, however, the heirs pay the 
creditor, he ceases to be an interested party to require adminis­
tration or be concerned with the disposition of the property 
by the heirs. In providing machinery for liquidation of de­
cedents' estates the state is said to be concerned in seeing that 
the assets shall be applied to the payment of debts and claims 
which otherwise might remain unpaid. 
The heirs also are interested in having the assets of the 
estate applied to the discharge of claims against it. Otherwise 
their interest in the residual estate remains subject to the claims 
• The' term "heirs" as used th.t;oughout , this study is intended to include de­
visees and legatees as well as next of kin unless the context indicates to the con­
trary. 
10 2 WoERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1 923)  § 201 .  
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of creditors. Only by the machinery of a formal administra­
tion can the existence of ·debts be determined and their pay­
ment provided for. And the claims of creditors will not 
ordinarily be barred by the statute of limitations in the absence 
of administration, for the running of the statute is ordinarily 
suspended between the date of the decedent's death and the 
time when a personal representative is appointed.11 This in­
terest on the part of the heirs is particularly significant where 
land is involved, because of the necessity for some effective 
judicial method to release it from the potential claims of 
creditors and permit it to become freely alienable, unencum­
bered by claims that are without foundation or are not as­
serted with reasonable promptness. 
C. DISTRIBUTION OF RESIDUE 
After the collection of assets and the payment of debts and 
claims against the estate, the heirs and legatees remain the 
sole interested parties in the remaining function to be ac­
complished, viz., the distribution of the residual estate to them­
selves. In most cases this involves a simple division of . 
property among those entitled to it . in aGcordance with their 
interests. In other cases it may involve a partition, or some 
kind of arbitrary allocation, of different pieces of property 
to different distributees. Where interests in property are 
more complex, the distributees themselves may desire an 
official distribution according to law or the provisions of the 
decedent's will. 
In addition to securing a proper and satisfactory distribution 
to themselves, the distributees will doubtless have some oc­
casion later to transfer the property so received by them. In 
n Id. at § 401 . · See also comment, "Executors and Administrators-com· 
parison of Nonclaim Statutes and the General Statutes of Limitations," 3 6  MICH. 
L. REv. 973  ( 1 938) . 
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that event they will be much interested to know that the dis­
tribution has been an effective one and of such a character that 
it will be readily accepted by a purchaser. This is particularly 
true where the property is land, and it is true also for personal 
property which requires some kind of official or public record­
ing for its transfer. 
III .  ExTENT TO WHICH FuNCTIONS OF ADMIN­
ISTRATION MAY BE AccoMPLISHED 
WITHOUT ADMINISTRATION 
A. ANTE-MORTEM DEVICES TO AVOID ADMINISTRATION 
Many methods are available by which the use or right of 
enjoyment of wealth may pass to others at the time of a 
decedent's death without leaving an estate td be administered. 
The creatio11 of inter vivos trusts and joint estates are both 
well recognized methods of accomplishing this end, although 
either of these devices may subject the property to inheritance 
taxes. Also, savings bank deposits naming other persons as 
beneficiaries are upheld in most states as another means of 
transmitting the beneficial enj oyment of property at death, 
which does not constitute a strict testamentary disposition. 
Insurance is another method, although the insured alone 9-oes 
not always, during his lifetime, create the fund which becomes 
payable to beneficiaries at the time of his death. In none of 
these cases is there any property which would become assets 
in the hands of a personal representative appointed to ad­
minister the decedent's estate. 
In the absence of any fraud upon creditors at the time .of 
creating any of these funds or estates, each of them is perfectly 
valid for the. purpose intended. These methods operate to 
prevent an executor or administrator subsequently appointed 
from making a successful claim to the fund, and also to prevent 
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any claim by creditors of the decedent. There are, -however, 
other devices which are often used to avoid administration but 
which, if discovered, are not valid to insulate the particular 
transactions from the claims of a personal representative or of 
creditors. Thus, fully executed deeds not delivered in the 
decedent's lifetime, endorsed securities and the like are often 
resorted to without being qutstioned. Or interested parties 
may simply appropriate unregistered property of a kind which 
may pass by delivery. But these latter devices are always 
dangerous and not immune from the claims of a personal 
representative or of creditors, il attacked.12 Furthermore, 
unless a limitation exists on the grant of administration, such 
transactions ordinarily remain open indefinitely to the claims 
of creditors. 
B. SUM MARY SETTLEMENT AFTER APPOINTMENT 
OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
Administration is often commenced when it is believed 
that an estate is larger than it turns out to be or when the total 
amount of assets is unknown. If it subsequently appears that 
the estate is not large and would be eventually distributable 
to the decedent's family in any event, there is a feeling that it 
should be made available to them at a time when their need 
for it is likely to be the greatest, and that the benefits of a 
formal administration should be available without requiring 
its usual procedure, formalities and duration. In such estates 
there can be no justification in subjecting the estate to the . 
usual expenses of administration or in withholding delivery 
to the family until the expiration of the ordinary period for 
full administration. The following discussion is intended to 
consider existing statutes designed to accomplish this result. 
12 See Oswald, "Legal Efficacy of Attempted Methods of Avoiding Probate,'' 
5 WASH. L. REV. I ( 1 930) . 
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In several states statutes already have been adopted to achieve 
this purpose, and they are becoming more widely acceptable 
with time. 
I .  A method for small estates 
(a) As dependent on family exemptions and allowances. 
According to common custom, the rights of homestead and 
all exemptions enjoyed by the head of a household are trans-. 
ferred to and continued in the widow and minor children after 
his death.13 It is also usual to provide for a family allowance 
" 
of a sum sufficient to provide for their maintenance and sup-
port during the period of administration and until distribution 
of the estate may be made to them.14 The amount of such 
allowance will naturally vary with the number of persons in 
the family, their standard of living and the size of the estate. 
In a few states there is also an allowance to the widow of a 
certain amount of money or other property as her absolute 
property and as such it is not considered a part of the estate.15 
The property of the decedent, to the extent that it comprises 
the homestead or exempt property or is applied in payment 
of the family allowance or the widow's absolute property, is 
ordinarily' not subject to the claims of creditors. Upon the 
setting off of the homestead and exempt property and the 
payment of a family allowance and widow's absolute property, 
there is a removal or withdrawal of these items of property 
from the estate for the purposes of administration.16 If the 
estate is thereby exhausted, there is no reason why the per­
sonal representative should not then render a final account­
ing and be discharged even though the usual period of ad-
13 See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS ( I 9 35 )  § 2.28 ; I WOERNER, AD­
MINISTRATION (3d ed. 1 9 2 3 )  §§ 94-I 04. 
1< 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS ( I 9'35) 636-63 7 ;  I WOERNER, AD­
MINISTRATION (3d ed. I 92 3 )  §§ 7 7-93 .  
15 1 WOERNER, ADMINISTRATION ( 3d  ed. 1 923) §§ 7 7, 7 8, 82. 
18 Bell v .  Bell, 2 Cal. App. 3 3 8, 8 3  P. 8I4 ( r 9o5) .  
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ministration has not expired. Creditors would not be aided 
and no useful purpose would be served by keeping the estate 
open longer. 
A survey of existi-ng legislation reveals that the statutes of 
Florida,17 Illinois/8 Kansas/9 Kentucky,20 Minnesota,21 
Missouri, 22 Oregon, 23 Wisconsin 24 and Wyoming 25 provide 
for an early termination of administration in this manner. 
Not infrequently they provide that if it appears upon the re­
turn of the inventory that the estate does not exceed a home­
stead and exemptions, the court may order the same turned 
over or assigned to the widow and minor children and the 
personal representative discharged aQ.d the estate closed. · 
Such an order operates to vest the persons entitled thereto with 
the complete title to the personal estate.26 
Some of these statutes include the family allowance or 
widow's absolute property in the list of items which can thus 
be used to exhaust the estate. · Thus the Illinois statute pro­
vides for a summary distribution of the property of the estate 
when it does not exceed the amount of the widow's or child's 
award or both after the payment of first class claims, and for 
a discharge of the personal representative. This is also true 
of the Wisconsi! statute. The Minnesota and Missouri 
. . 
statutes authorize such a procedure if the estate does not exceed 
the exemptions and allowances to the surviving spouse. The 
Oregon statute applies if the value of the estate does not exceed 
17 Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 734.o8. 
18 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94I ) c. 3 ,  § 450. 
19 Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 5 9-I507. 
"' Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) §§ 395 .460 and 3 95·490. 
21 Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 525.5 I .  
22 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I  942) § 249 . 
.. Ore. Comp. Laws ( I 940) § I 9-6o4. · 
"' Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 3 1 1 .04, to be renumbered Wis. Stat. ( I 945) § 3 I I .o5. 
"" Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 I )  § 8 8-2905 (amended by Wyo. Laws I 943, c. ro5, 
§ s ) .  • 
.. Such is the effect of all of these statutes. See Bell v. Bell, 2 Cal. App. 3 38, 
8 3  P. 814 ( I 9os ) .  
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$ I  so over and above the exempt property. This $ I  so allow­
ance is thus available to provide a small fund from which 
funeral and administration expenses may be paid, since dis­
tribution is made subject to their payment. 
The recent Florida statute 27 on this subject is represent­
ative of the best in draftsmanship and contains the following 
clear and concise statement both of function and procedure : 
"If at any time during the course of administration it shall 
be made to appear . . . that the estate does not consist of 
more than the homestead and exempt personal property of 
the decedent, the county judge may thereupon direct and 
order the distribution of said estate among the persons entitled 
to receive the same and upon said distribution may thereupon 
_enter his order relieving, releasing and discharging the per� 
sonal representative." 
(b) As dependent on size of estate. A similar type of 
statute designed to accomplish the same purpose is predicated 
upon the size of the estate rather than upon its exhaustion by 
setting off the homestead, exemptions and widow's absolute 
property, and payment of a family allowance. The total 
value of property left by the decedent, irrespective of whether 
real or personal and whether within the tfehnical scope of 
homestead and exempt property, determines the applicability 
of the statute. Such statutes are particularly common in the 
western states which have patterned their probate laws after 
the California Code. 
The California Probate Act of I 8 S I 28 provided for a sum­
mary procedure of this kind whenever it appeared upon the 
return of the' inventory that the value of the whole estate of 
an intestate did not exceed $ soo. In this event the court was to 
assign it by decree for the use and support of the decedent's 
27 Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 ) § 734.08 .  
28 Cal. Laws, 1 85 1 ,  p. 464, § 1 2 6, now Ca,l. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) 
§ 642. 
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widow and minor children. Thereafter, the Act provided, 
"there shall be no further proceedings in the administration, 
unless further estate be discovered." The amount was raised 
to $ I ,SOO in I 8 7 I ,29 and to $2,500 in I 9 2 I .30 In connection 
with the amendment of I 8 7 I which raised the amount to 
$ I  ,soo, a note of the commissioners states that "The distinction 
is too great between the family of one who has invested in real 
property and happens to own it when he dies, and one who, 
not so provident, or it may . be m�re conscientious towards 
his creditors than careful of his family, has provided no home­
stead. Again, but few estates which do not amount to more 
than $ I  ,soo, could pay the expenses of administration. In 
any such cases, it is better that the family enjoy it than to spend 
it in useless administration." 31 The distinction to which the 
commissioners referred is between estates which included 
homesteads, which were exempt up to $5,ooo, and those which 
included personal property only. 
The net result of this new statute is to carry forward for the 
benefit of the surviving family of the decedent a new kind 
of exemption, made up of a stated maximum amount for the 
use and support of the family, and exempt from the claims 
of the decedent's creditors. An estate consisting of property 
not exceeding this value is thus made available to the surviv-
. ing family even though all of it would not qualify as exempt 
to the decedent during his life. Under ordinary circumstances 
one who has acquired a homestead is accorded exemptions 
different from another who has acquired an equivalent amount 
of wealth solely in personal property. Statutes of the kind 
under consideration provide a measure of economic security 
to the family of a decedent whose wealth exceeds ordinary 
29 2 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. ( 1 8 72)  p. 204, § 1 469. 
80 Cal. Stats., 1 9 2 1, c. 1 o9, p. 1 0 1 .  
81 2 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. ( 1 872)  p. 205, note to § 1469. 
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exemptions but who has not acquired a homestead, comparable 
to that of the family which has invested its wealth in a home­
stead. 
Legislation · similar to the California statute exists in 
Arizona 32 Idaho 33 Indiana 34 Michigan 35 Montana 36 North ' ' ' ' ' 
Dakota/; Oklahoma,38 Oregon,39 Pennsylvania/0 Washing-
ton 41 and Utah.42 The Arizona statute applies to estates not 
exceeding $2,000; the Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Okla­
homa and Utah statutes to estates not exceeding $ I,SOO. 
These latter were doubtless taken from the California statute 
at various periods between I 8 7 I and I 92 I when the amount 
of $ I ,SOO prevailed in California. The Washington statute, 
on the other hand, allows property up to $3,000 to be set 
off to the surviving spouse which shall include the home and 
household goods. 
An Indian� statute authorizes a summary distribution to 
a surviving widow if an executor or administrator shall dis­
cover that the whole estate of the decedent is not worth over 
$ soo, exclusive of mortgages, bona fide liens or other en­
cumbrances. 
In Michigan, letters may be issued without notice where a 
decedent is survived by a widow or widower, or children under 
32 Ariz. Code ( I 9 39 )  § 3 8-905. 
33 Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943)  § I 5-5o6. 
"' Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 9 3 3) § 6-I 70 3 .  
35 Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943 and Supp. I 945) §§  27 .3 I 78 (448) ,  27 .3 I 7 8 (449) , 
27 ·3 1 7 8 (450) . 
36 Mont. Rev. Code ( I 9 3 5 )  § I O I 49 (amended by Mont. Laws I 94 I ,  c. 5 7 ) .  
37 N. D .  Rev. Code ( I 943 ) § §  JO-I 70I to 30-I 706. 
38 Okla. Stat. (I 94 I) t. 5 8, § 3 I 7 .  It has been held that only personal prop­
erty may be set off under this statute: Minnery v. Thompson, I 46 Okla. 72, 293  
P .  2 3 I  ( I 9JO) .  
•• Ore. Comp. Laws ( I  940) § I 9-604. This statute includes estates which do 
not exceed $ I  so over and above exempt property. Thus it partakes partly of the 
nature of the statutes previously discussed. 
"' Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. I 944) t. 20, § 863.  
41 Wash. Rev. Stat. ( I 9 3 2 )  § I473 ·  · 
'" Utah Code ( I 943)  § I o2-8-2. 
DISPENSING WITH ADMINISTRATION 5 7 1 
the age of sixteen years, or by both, and leaves only personalty 
having a value not exceeding $ soo. After the payment of the 
funeral expenses the estate may be distributed to the widow 
or guardian of the minor children, and the personal represent­
ative discharged without further accounting or notice. 
The Pennsylvania statute applies to estates not exceeding 
$ soo in value. One aspect of this statute gives it the appear­
ance of being based in fact upon an exemption statute, since 
a widow under Pennsylvania law is entitled to an exemption 
of this precise amount. 43 However, this statute applies to 
any decedent and not merely to a deceased husband. Final 
settlement and distribution in such small estates is authorized 
after six months. 
The first group of statutes making summary distribution 
dependent upon the exhaustion of the estate in setting off the 
homestead and exempt property is not radically different from 
the second group predicated upon the size of the estate meas­
ured in terms of a stated monetary value. However, they 
do contain certain different theoretical bases and have some­
what divergent applications. The idea of the former is merely 
to carry forward the immunities formerly possessed by the 
head of the household and nothing more. The latter, on 
the other hand, is predicated upon the idea that a family al­
lowance of a minimum amount should be devoted to the 
continued mai9-tenance and support of the family even to the 
exclusion of creditors. In the language of the Sapreme Court 
of Washington in In re Lavenberg's Estate,44 "They sound 
deeper in the policies upon which homestead and exemption 
laws are made to rest." They are designed to continue for a 
43 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. I 944) t. io, § 47 I .  • 
44 I 04 Wash. S I S  at S I 71 I 77 P. p 8  ( I 9 1 8 ) .  See also Estate of Woodburn, 
z n Cal. 6 8 3, 3 oo P. zz ( 1 9  3 I ) ,  in which it was pointed out that this statute was 
derived from that part of the California Code of Civil Procedure expressly relat-
ing to the support of the family. . 
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period the maintenance of the family as the decedent did dur­
ing his lifetime. The law is said to step into his shoes and to 
make the same provision for his family. The North Dakota 
statute, however, has been construed as a new kind of exemp­
tion statute, providing additional property to the head of the 
surviving family.45 
As might be expected, this right of summary distribution 
is superior to the power of testamentary control. 46 The 
primary function of such statutes is to pass small estates to 
,the surviving spouse and minor children free from the claims 
of creditors and with the least possible expense and delay, 
consistent with the rights of any other persons who may be 
interested in the estate. 47 
In the application of the second group of statutes described, 
some question has arisen as to what property is to be included 
in ascertaining whether the value of the estate is less than the 
amount named. It is generally held that a homestead is not 
to be included. 48 All other real and personal property located 
within the state is included. 49 If property is subject to a lien 
or encumbrance, only its net value is considered, and it is as-
45 See Woods �. Teeson, 3 I N. D.  6 I o, I 54 N. w. 797  ( I  9 I  5 ) .  
48 In re Walkerly's Estate, I o 8  Cal. 627, 4I. P. 772,  4 9  Ani. St. Rep. 9 7  
( I  895) ; I n  re Miller's Estate, I 5 8  Cal. 420, I I I P .  2 5 5  ( I  9 I o) ; McMillan v. 
Boese, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 764, I I 5  P. (2d) 37 ( I 94I ) .  The Utah statute, how­
ever, expressly permits the testamentary disposition of homestead and. exempt 
property. In re Schenk's Estate, 5 3  Utah 3 8 I ,  I 7 8 P. 344 ( I  9 I 9 ) .  
. 
" De Ledesma v'. Stanley, 5 7  Cal. App. 470, 207 P. 693 ( I 922) ; Estate of 
Neff, I 39 Cal. n, 72 P. 632  ( I 9o3 ) .  In general on this po.int see 2 WoERNE.R, 
ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. I 92 3 )  668-669. 
48 Johnson v. Jones, 55 Ariz. 49, 97 P. (2d) 9 3 3  ( I 940) ; Estate of Neff, 
I 39 Cal. ? I ,  72  P. 63 2 ( I 903 ) ; In re Shirey's Estate, I 67 Cal. I 9 3> 1 3 8  P. 994 
( I  9 I 4)  ; In re Adamson's Estate (Cal. I 9 I o) , 5 Co f. Pro b. Dec. 3 9 7. According 
to the preceding decisions distributive rights under these statutes are superior to 
homestead if the decedent's estate is less than the amount specified and includes 
the homestead. In Utah, however, homestead property is apparently included in 
the total estate in computing its value to determine the applicability of .this stat­
ute, and in any event it is made subject to the payment of-expenses of last illness, 
funeral and administration. In te Thorn's Estate, 24 Utah 209, 67 P. Z2 
( I  90I ) ;  In re Mower's Estate, 93 Utah 39o, 7 3  P. · (2d) 967 ( I9J 7).  • . .  
•• Iri re Bruhns' Estate, 5 8  Mont. 526, I 93 P .  I I I4 ( I 92o) ; In re Jarrett's
. Estate, I 3 8  Wash. 404, 244':1'. 694 ( I 926) . 
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signed or distributed subject to such liens or encumbrances.50 
In those states providing for community property ownership 
it is also said to be immaterial whether the property is sepa­
rate or community property.51 In Arizona, however, an 
.amendment to the statute in 1 93 5  expressly excluded the 
�e-half interest to which the surviving spouse is entitled in 
'the community property.52 The statutes of both types are 
almost unanimous in providing that funeral charges, expenses 
of the last illness and expenses of administration shall be 
· satisfied before the residue of the estate may be paid to those 
entitled. 53 To this extent the rights of the family are subor­
dinated to those of preferred claimants. And it has been 
·held in several cases that this right of the surviving members 
w This provision is a part of each of the statutes under consideration. But a 
widow cannot pay funeral expenses and expenses of the decedent's last illness in 
order to reduce the "net estate" to less than $ 1 ,soo. Columbia Trust Co. v . 
. Anglum, 63 Utah 353 , 225 P. 1 089 ( 1 924) . Nor can she obtain her widow's 
· allowance in order to reduce the estate to a value less than $ r ,soo. In re Schenk's 
Estate, 5 3  Utah 3 8 1 ,  1 7 8  P. 344 ( 1 9 1 9) . The statutes contemplate the entite 
estate being subject to administration. While general creditors of the decedent 
may not look to encumbered property so set off, it does not follow that such 
. creditors having a mortgage, lien or o�her encumbrance on such property may 
not subject it to the satisfaction of their claims. Fairbanks v. Robinson, 64 Cal. 
25o, 30 P. 8 1 2  ( 1 88 3 ) .  See also In re Stone's Estate, 1 4  Utah 205, 46 P. I r o t 
( 1 896) ; In re Farmer's Estate, 1 7  Utah 8o, 5 3  P. 972  ( 1 898 ) . But a judgment 
or execution creditor does not have such a specific lien upon property as to en­
title him to precedence over the surviving family. Snyder v. Thieme & Wagner 
Brewing Co., 1 7 3  Ind. 659, 90 N. E. 3 1 4  ( 1 9 1 0) ; Turner v. Hammerle, 1 5 3  
Ind. App. 437, 1 0 1 N. E. 8 2 7  ( 1 9 1 3 ) .  Nor may a debtor o f  the decedent 
purchase an outstanding claim against a decedent after his death and use it as a 
set-off, for this would defeat the widow's right in the minimum of property 
allotted to her under the statute. Haugh v. Seabold, 1 5  Ind. 343 ( 1 8 6o) . 
51 In re Leslie's Estate, 1 r 8 Cal. Jz, so P. 2 9  ( 1 897) . 
52 Ariz. Code ( 1 939)  § 3 8-905. For a case under the prior statute see John­
son v. Jones, 55 Ariz. 411> 9 7  P. (2d) 9 3 3  ( 1 940) which held that the amount 
specified in the statute applied both to community and separate property. 
53 "Certainly the legislature, in exacting these provisions of law, could not have 
intended that the expenses of the last sickness, funeral charges, and expenses of 
. administration should not be a proper charge against small estates, merely con­
sisting of a homestead of less than $ r,soo in value. Such a rule would pauperize 
an intestate upon his deathbed, and tend to deprive him of a Christian burial, 
though the means he may have acquired and accumulated by years of toil were 
sufficient to pay them." From opinion in In re Thorn's Estate, 24 Utah 209, 67  
P. 22 (x gor ) .  
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of the family to the beneficial results c_ontemplated by the 
statute cannot be given effect unless these prior expenses have 
first been satisfied. 54 In Kansas 55 and Minnesota 56 expenses 
during the last sickness and debts having preference under 
the laws of the United States or the state are included among 
the preferred charges. In Florida, however, it has be<;n 
held that the surviving widow of a decedent is entitled to 
distribution of an estate of some $626 as exempt property 
even though funeral expenses are left unpaid.57 A literal 
interpretation of the Kentucky 58 and Wyoming 59 statutes 
would indicate a like result. 
Some variation is found as to the persons entitled to the 
benefits of such summary distribution statutes. Most of the 
early statutes confined their benefits to the surviving widow 
and minor children. This W;J.S true of the California Pro­
bate Act _of I 8 5 I after which so many of the others have been 
patterned. But a few states have recently broadenetl their 
statutes to include either spouse who survives. 60 The Cali­
fornia statute was amended only in I 939 to make its provi­
sions applicable to either spouse. 61 Domicile in the state is 
54 Estate of Parr, 24 Cal. App. (2d) 1 7 1 ,  74 P. (.zd) 792 ( 1 93 7) ; Ross v. 
Smith, 47 Ill. App. 1 9 7  ( 1 893 ) ; In re Thorn's Estate, 24 Utah 209, 67 P • .z .z  
( 1 90 1 ) ; In re Petersen's Estate, 69 Utah 484, 256 P. 409 ( 1 9 27) ; In re Mower's 
Estate, 93 Utah 3901 73 P. (2d) 967 ( 1 9 3 7) . According to the case last cited 
even the homestead property may be subject to these claims if there is not suffi­
cient other property to pay them. 
55 Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 5 9-1 507 (also mentions wages of servants 
during the last sickness) . 
'"' Minn. �tat. ( 1 94 1 ) § 525·5 1 .  
67 Seashole v. O'Shields, 1 39 Fla. 8391 1 9 1  So. 7 4  ( 1 9 39) . 
68 Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) §§ 395.460, 395.490. 
•• wyo. Rev. Stat. ( r 9 3 r) § 8 8-2905 (amended by Wyo. Laws 1 9431 c. zos, 
§ s) . 
. 
•• This is true in the present statutes of Arizona, California, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Missouri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. 
Under the former Utah statute the wife could not mortgage the interest. of the 
children in the property so set off to her for the joint use of all. Booth Mercan­
tile Co. v. Murphy, 1 4  Idaho 2 1 2, 9 3  P. 777  ( 1 908) . 
61 Cal. Stat. 1 9 39, pp. 239o-Z39z .  
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not a prerequisite.62 And in any event the status of a per­
son at the time of the order for summary distribution is the 
controlling circumstance. Thus the heirs of a widow who 
died before a final determination of her rights were held not 
to be entitled to the benefits of such statutes. 63 And a wife 
who abandoned her husband without cause was held to have 
barred herself of the right to his support and to the provi­
sions of the statutes authorizing summary distribution to a 
surviving spouse. 64 But an interlocutory decree of divorce 
will not of itself deprive a surviving wife of these provisions ; 
she must also have lost her right by some fault of her own to 
receive support and maintenance from her husband and have 
ceased to be a member of his family.65 Nor will an ante­
nuptial contract bar a_widow in claiming the benefits intended 
by these statutes. 6ll 
Similarly in determining the propriety of setting off the 
estate to the surviving spouse or family of the decedent, the 
value of the estate at the time of the hearing and order, rather 
than at the time of the inventory, will control.67 In a world 
of rapidly changing values this becomes important upon oc­
castons. 
Distribution is usually made to the surviving spouse alone 
who has the obligation to support any minor children.68 How­
•• In re Lavenberg's Estate, 1 04 Wash. 5 1 5, 1 7 7  P. 3 2 8  ( 1 9 1 8 ) ; In re Jarrett's 
Estate, 1 3 8  Wash. 404, 244 P. 694 ( 1926)  . .  
63 Estate of Bachelder, 123  Cal. 466, 56 P. 97  ( 1 899) . 
"' In re Bose's Estate, 1 5 8  Cal. 428, 1 1 1  P. 258  ( 1 9 1 o) . 
.. In re Beeson's Estate, 201 Cal. 3 6, 255 P. 8oo ( 1 927) . 
66 Woodburn's Estate, 2 12 Cal. 6 8 3, 3 oo P. 2 z ( 1 9  3 r ) . The widow's rights 
under these statutes are here declared to be "in no sense either the rights of in­
heritance or rights depending upon any previous interest in the property of the 
decedent owned by him during his lifetime, and which she may or may not have 
surrendered by virtue of the terms of their antenuptial agreement." 
fff In re Orosco's Estate, 6o Ariz. 266, 1 3 5  P. (2d) 2 1 7  ( 1 943) . In this case 
' the inventory showed an estate of $2,200. Upon the hearing of a petition by a 
surviving husband to have it set off to him, the court found that it was less than 
$z,ooo and awarded it to him in its entirety. , 
08 Johnson v. Jones, 55 Ariz. 49, 9 7  P. (2d) 9 3 3  ( r94o) ; McGuire v. Lynch, 
u6 Cal. 576, 59 P, 2 7  ( 1 899) ; In re Stuart's Estate (Cal. 1 909) ,  5 Cof. Prob. 
Dec. 27o;  Estate of Neff, 1 39 Cal. 7 1 ,  72 P. 632 ( 1 903) . 
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ever, the survival of minor children is not at all necessary to 
entitle the surviving spouse to the benefits of this summary 
distribution.69 . However, if there is no surviving spouse, 
the minor children are entitled to the estate. 70 Some of the 
early statutes made the property distribu�able to the surviv­
ing widow and children, one half to the widow and the other 
half to the children equally, but this has now been changed 
so as to give the widow the exclusive right if  she survives. 71 
In many cases this eliminates an unnecessary guardianship. 
There is one rather unusual feature of the California stat­
ute 72 and those of Arizona 73 and Utah 74 patterned after it . 
. They provide that a surviving spouse who has separate estate of 
a specified amount, shall not be entitled to summary dis­
tribution of such property. This would seem to imply that 
behind the application of the statute is the policy of making 
it subservient to the continued support of the family. Thus, 
if the surviving spouse has sufficient independent wealth or 
separate property, the benefits• contemplated by the statute 
do not exist and the estate of the decedent is administered 
and distributed in the usual manner. The California statute 
specifies that summary distribution shall be denied if the sur­
viving spouse or minor child has other estate of $s,ooo in 
value. Similarly in Arizona, if the surviving spouse has sepa­
rate property, exclusive of his one-half interest in the com­
munity property, equal to the portion to be set apart to him, 
•• McGuire v. Lynch, 1 26 Cal. 5 7 6, 59 P. 27 ( 1 899) ; Woods v. Teeson, 3 1  N. 
D. 6 1o, 1 54 N. W. 797  ( 1 9 1 5 ) .  
70 Most of the statutes so provide. Where the decedent was the wife, her small 
estate was set off to the minor children to the exclusion of the surviving husband 
under the former California statute. In re Leslie's Estate, 1 1 8  Cal. 72, so P. ·29 
( 1 897) . 
,.· McGuire v. Lynch, 1 26 Cal. 5 76, 59 P. 27 ( 1 899) ; Stuart's Estate (Cal. 
1 909) ,  5 Co£. Prob. Dec. 2 70. 
'"' Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) §§ 645, 646. This provision was 
added to the California statute in 1 929. See Cal. Stat., 1 929, c. 1 09,. p. 1 9,6. 
•• Ariz. Code ( 1 9 39 )  § 3 8-905. 
" Utah Code ( 1943) § 102-8'-z. 
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, the whole property, other than his half of the homestead, 
shall go to the minor children. The Utah Code permits the 
court, in its discretion, to exclude frorn any such qistribution · 
any surviving wife, husband or minor child having either 
separate property or income. 
In setting off an estate to the surviving spouse or minor 
children under the provisions of these statutes, no special 
notice to creditors is required or contemplated. 75 Their in­
terests are not involved. But any person who will be ad­
versely affected by such a proceeding may offer certain ob­
jections thereto. Thus such a person will be allowed to 
show that the estate exceeds in value the amount claimed or 
that all of the property has not been inventoried. 76 
Once an order is made setting off the estate, it cannot be 
attacked collaterally except for extrinsic fraud. 77 Thus the 
marital status of the surviving spouse will not be re­
examined 78 or the property reappraised in another proceed­
mg. 
2 .  Accelerated distribution to executor who is 
residuary legatee 
When the executor named in a will is also the residuary 
legatee, statutes in a few states, 79 in lieu of requiring the ex­
ecutor to give a bond that he will faithfully perform the 
duties of his office and account for all property which may 
75 Wills v. Booth, 6 Cal. App. 197 , 9 1  P. 759  ( 1 907) ; Estate of Palomares, 63  
Cal. 402 ( 1 8 8 3 ) ; Estate of  Atwood, I Z7 _Cal. 427 ,  59 P. 7 70  ( 1 90�) ;  Browne 
v. Sweet, I Z 7  Cal. 3 J Z, 59 P. 774 (1 899) . 
76 Estate of Roach, 208 Cal. 394, 2 8 1  P. 6o7 ( 1 929 ) .  
77 Eisenmayer v. Thompson, I 8 6  Cal. 5 38, 1 9 9  P.  798  ( I 92 1 ) ;  McMillan v. 
Boese, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 764, I I S  P. ( 2d) 3 7  ( I 941 ) ;  Johnson v. Johnson, 5 3  
Cal. App. (2d) 8os, u 8  P .  (2d) 6 I 7  ( I 94z) . 
70 Johnson v. Johnson, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 8os, u8 P. (zd) 6 1 7  (1 942) .  
•• Mass. Ann. Laws ( I  9JZ) c .  zo s ,  § 3 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I  943) § 2 7.3  I 78  
(254) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 94J) § 30-305 ;  N.  H. Rev. Laws ( I 942) c .  3 5 2, § I4 i  
R. I. Gen. Laws ( I 93 8 )  c. 5 76, § z ;  Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 93 3 )  § zn9 ; Wis. Stat. 
( 1 943 ) § Jto . xs  (sole or residuary legatee) ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 93 I )  § 8 8-
Ioz (sole legatee) . 
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come
' 
into his hands, permit him to give a bond for the pay­
ment of all claims 80 against the estate and the legacies pro­
vided for in the will. Under some of these statutes he may 
then be relieved of filing an inventory 81 or rendering any 
accounting. 82 The bond given by him is regarded as being 
an adequate protection to creditors and legatees who are 
deemed to be no longer interested in knowing the extent of 
assets contained in the estate or in having a formal account­
ing. 83 In return for being allowed to give. this kind of bond, 
which frequently will be much less than the amount of bond 
ordinarily required, the executor becomes personally liable 
for all debts of the decedent and all legacies given in the 
will even though they exceed the amount of property which 
he receives from the estate.84 To the extent indicated there 
is a _slight relaxation of the control over the executor in an 
effort to minimize his duties. 
Between 1 8 1 9  and 1 8 84 a line of decisions construed such 
statutes as giving such re:;iduary legatee the right to im­
mediate distribution or as giving him immediate ownership 
of the property upon the approval of the bond to pay claims · 
and legacies. These decisions were based upon the theory 
that the administration was thereby terminated and that the 
executor thereafter carried out the terms of the will inde­
pendently of judicial supervision. "There is no longer a 
proceeding in rem," said Judge Cooley, "for the res dis­
appears when the estate passes from the control of the probate 
court and becomes merged in the individual estate of the 
80 The term "claims" is used here to include debts, funeral expenses, and ex­
penses of administration. Some statutes have added inheritance taxes and family 
allowance as items to be included in the conditions of the bond. 
81 In Massachusetts, Nebraska and Rhode Island. In Vermont an inventory 
must be returned within three months. 
"" In Rhode Island. ' In New Hampshire an accounting is to be made only 
"when required." 
· 
83 See Hatheway v. Weeks, 34 Mich. Z37  ( 1 876 ) .  
84 Hatheway v. Weeks, 34 Mich. Z37  ( 1 876) ; McElroy v. Hatheway, 44' 
Mich. 3 99, 6 N; W. 867 (1 88o).  
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executor himself. What before was a jus ad rem in the 
creditor, to be enforced by the aid of the probate court as a 
· lien upon an estate in its charge, becomes now a personal 
obligation of the executor and his sureties, attaching itself 
to no specific property,. and concerning no other persons 
whomsoever. The court has no power, for the purpose of 
enforcing this obligation, to follow the property which be­
fore constituted the assets of the testator ; and the heirs, the 
beneficiaries under the will, or the creditors, are not to be 
summoned when the demand is to be proved, because they 
have no interest in the question of its proof, and therefore 
no right to be heard upon it." 85 Such a conception of the 
function of a residuary legatee's bond was a close approxima­
tion to the instituted heir under the civil law system, mak­
ing the residuary legatee and all his property, including that 
received from the testator, subject to claims of the decedent's 
creditors.86 However, this idea of the function of such stat­
utes was ultimately proved to be erroneous. But, while it 
prevailed such a procedure was the equivalent of a summary 
administration. 
These statutes derive originally from an act of the Mas­
sachusetts Bay Colony. In 1 685  it w�s provided that the 
court might require any executor to give bond with sufficient 
sureties for paying all debts and legacies or to make and 
exhibit a just and true inventory of the estate. 87 In r 784 
one statute 88 was passed making the real estate of a decedent 
subject to execution on judgments recovered against execu-. 
86 Durfee v. Abbott, so Mich. 1.78  at z 8 s, I S  N.  W. 4S4 at 458 ( 1 8&3) .  
86 See Rheinstein, "European Methods for the Liquidation of the Debts of De­
ceased Persons," 1.0 IowA L. REV. 4 3 1  at 469 ( 1 9 3 5 ) .  See also Durfee v. Abbott, 
so Mich. 479, I S  N. W. 559  ( 1 &83) ; Wheeler v. Hatheway, 54 Mich. 547, zo 
N. W. 5 79 ( r &84) . ' 
"' Ancient Charters and Laws of Massachusetts Bay, published by order of the 
General Court ( r 8 r4) 1.06. 
88 Mass. Acts and Laws, 1 784, c. 1 4, p. 76, also found in Mass. Gen. Laws 
( r 8zJ)  session of 1 78 3, c. p, § 7· 
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tors and administrators for .debts of a decedent, and another 
statute 89 provided that a decedent's real estate should be 
chargeable with his debts and that an executor who is a resid­
uary legatee might give bond to pay the debts and legacies. 
In the early case of Gore v. Brazier, 90 a residuary legatee 
had given such a bond, had then sold certain land owned by 
the decedent and was later sued for breach of the covenant of 
warranty in the deed. It was held by Chief Justice Parsons 
that such a bond was not a discharge of the creditor's lien. 
It was pointed out that before the provincial statute of I and 
2 Anne, c. 5, all executors were bound to inventory and ac­
count for the testator's estate in order to furnish creditors 
and legatees with evidence and charge them with waste if any 
assets were embezzled or unaccounted for ; that when legacies 
are specific or could be ascertained without inventory or ac­
counting and the executor was residuary legatee, there is no 
occasion for an inventory or accounting if legatees and credi­
tors can be secured. "In this case," says the court, "that stat­
ute relieves the executor from this duty, on his giving bond 
with sureties to the Judge of Probate for the payment of 
debts and legacies. . This lien .remains in full force, 
and the benefit to be derived by a creditor or legatee from the 
bond is merely cumulative." 91 
But in I 8 I 9 in Thompson v. Brown,92 the Massachusetts 
court held that a license to an executor who was also residuary 
legatee and had given such a bond was not only improper 
but void. By giving such a bond it was said that he thereby 
''acquired a perfect title to the estate," and that no license to 
sell property of the estate was necessary because he could 
sell without it. This dictum that the executor thereby ac-
89 Mass. Acts and Laws, 1 7 84, c. 1 ,  p. 53, also found in Mass. Gen. Laws 
( 1 823)  session of 1 7 83, c. 24, § 1 7. 
· 
90 3 Mass. 523 ( 1 807) . 
01 3 Mass. at 542. · 
•• 1 6  Mass. 1 7 2  ( 1 8 1 9 ) .  
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quired a perfect title -to the estate became the source of con­
fusion and error later in the same court, and accounted for 
a similar · error in some Michigan and Wisconsin decisions 
later. 
Similarly, in r 8 27  the same court declared : "The legisla­
ture has made such bond [to pay the debts and legacies] a 
substitute for the estate of the deceased, so that there is no 
longer any lien upon the real or personal estate of the testator 
by his creditors, after the executor shall have conveyed the 
same to bona fide purchasers." 93 
In the revision of I 835 a provision was added to the stat­
ute 94 in Massachusetts to the -effect that the giving of the 
bond by the residuary legatee conditioned to pay debts and 
legacies should not discharge the lien upon the real estate of 
the decedent for the payment of debts. The commissioners 
who had been appointed to revise the statutes stated in their 
report to the legislature that it was the purpose of this amend­
ment to make the construction of the statute conform with 
that indicated in Gore v. Brazier. Later cases 95 in Mas­
sachusetts returned to the rule of that case. 
A series of cases in Michigan and Wisconsin, however, took 
the position that the giving of such a bond actually terminated 
the administration and operated to pass title to the property 
of the estate to the residuary legatee. Thus in Hatheway v. 
Weeks, 96 the Supreme Court of Michigan said : "Having 
given such a bond, he is not required to make or return any 
inventory; he is bound to acxount to no one ; he takes the 
property of the deceased and becomes at once the absolute 
owner thereof." And in a later case 97 it was said that the 
"" Clarke v. Tufts, 5 Pick. (22 Mass.) 3 3 7  at 340 ( r 827)  . 
.. Mass. Rev. Stat. ( 1 8 3 5 )  c. 63 ,  §§ 3, 4· 
.. Jones v. Richardson, 5 Mete. (46 Mass.) 247 ( r 842) ; Collins v. Collins, 
140 Mass. 502, 5 N. E. 632 ( r 8 8 6) .  
06 34 Mich. 2 3 7  { r 876) . 
07 Wheeler v. Hatheway, 54 Mich. 547, 20 N. W. 579 ( 1 8 84) . 
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approval of the legatee's bond had the effect of closing the 
administration of the estate. · A corresponding view had been 
announced in Wisconsin. 98 But in · I 8 8 9 Michigan re­
examined these cases and reached the same result 99 that Mas­
sachusetts had reached subsequent to I 8 3 5 and without any 
amendment of its statute relative to the effect on creditors' 
liens. Wisconsin did likewise. 100 In other states this same 
result has been reached, 101 although only the Rhode Island 
statute contains a specific provision corresponding to the ad­
dition in the Massachusetts revision of I 8 3 6. 
The net result is that what appeared for a while to amount 
to a true summary administration turned out to be nothing 
more than a statutory method for providing for an executor's 
bond which differs from the ordinary bond in its conditions 
and amount, and which furnishes an additiqnal remedy to 
legatees and creditors. The legal consequences of giving 
such a bond are severe, with little or no advantage to the 
residuary beneficiary in pursuing the course authorized by 
such a statute. Many persons were financially ruined by 
giving such a bond. An examination of statutory annotations 
and. digests reveals no case in recent years in which such a 
bond has been given. What might have been an importation 
of a civil law method has been refused admission into Ameri­
can law of administration. 
3· ·withdrawing estates from administration 
With the development of the law of administration several 
methods have been devised for simplifying, for shortening, 
98 Cole's Will, 52 Wis. 59 1 ,  9 N. W. 664 ( 1 8 8 1 ) .  
"" Lafferty v. People's Savings Bank, 7 6  Mich. 3 5, 43 N .  W. 34 ( 1 8 89 ) .  See 
also In re Estate of Vedders, 1 2 2  Mich. 439, 8 1  N. W. 3 56  (1 899 ) .  
l('" Pym v. Pym, 1 1 8  Wis. 66z, 9 6  N .  W. 429 ( 1 903 ) .  
101 Thompson v. Pope, 77  Neb. 3 3 8, 1 09 N. W. 498 ( 1 906) . In general, 
see 2 WoERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d  ed. 1 9 2 3 )  § 202, 
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or for eliminating substantially or entirely the process of ad­
ministration as it is known in Anglo-American law. One such 
method is that of authorizing the withdrawal of an estate 
from administration. A Texas statute 102 provides that after 
the return of inventory, appraisement and list of claims, any 
person entitled to a portion of the estate as heir, devisee or 
legatee may ask that the personal representative be required 
to render under oath an ,exhibit of the condition of the estate. 
Thereafter the persons entitled to the estate may give bond in 
double the appraised value of the estate conditioned to pay 
all unpaid debts which have been or may thereafter be al­
lowed against the estate.103 When such bond is approved, 
the exhibit passed upon and the amount due to or from the 
personal representative determined, the latter is required by 
an order of the court to make distribution to such persons of 
the portion of . the estate to which they are entitled.104 If an 
estate is entirely distributed to those entitled, the personal 
representative is discharged and the administration declared 
dosed.105 Thereafter the probate court has no jurisdiction 
over the estate or over the personal representative.106 
After the withdrawal of the estate from administration in 
this manner, creditors have a right to rely on the bond or to 
look to the distributees. The statute specifically preserves 
a lien on that part of the estate in the hands of each distributee 
and those claiming under him, with notice of such lien, to 
secure the payment of the claims of creditors.107 If  recovery 
102 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939)  art. 3457· 
11"' Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939)  art. 3458. 
1"' Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3459'· This right in the distrib­
utees is absolute. Pierce v. Foreign Mission Board (Tex. Civ. App. 1 92.0) 
2. 1 8  S. W. 140. But an assignee of a distributee has no such right. Rowe v. 
Dyess (Tex. Comm. App. 1 9 1 9) 2. 1 3  S. W. 2.32. .  
105 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939 )  art. 3465. 
11"' Davis v. Harwood, 70 Tex. 7 1, 8 S. W. 58 ( 1 8 8 8 ) ; Long v. Wooters, 1 8  
Tex. Civ. App. 35, 45 S. W. 1 65 ( 1 89 8 ) .  
107 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939) art. 346 1 .  
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is sought against a distributee, any judgment obtained must 
not exceed the value of the estate distributed to him.108 On 
the other hand, if recovery is sought on the bond, recovery 
is limited only by the amount of the bond and the basis of the 
cause of action is entirely independent of the value of the es-­
tate distributed.109 
The result achieved by this procedure is in some respects 
similar to that already achieved by summary administration 
of small estates which are entirely consumed in the setting off 
of exempt property or in the satisfying of a minimum of 
family allowance. In the latter case, however, there is a 
completion of the functions of administration, while under 
the Texas statute authorizing th� withdrawal of estates from 
administration there is admittedly no such completion. In 
lieu of such completion there is the substitution of a bond as 
a kind of res to insure the accomplishment of the functions of 
administration. 
4· Nonintervention wills 
Another method that has been developed for dispensing 
with administration of estates is that of the independent ex­
ecutor under a nonintervention will. Whether administra­
tion in connection with the decedent's estate is a required 
proceeding, or whether it may be dispensed with in whole or 
in part, is a matter involving several considerations of policy. 
Unless a statute specificially authorizes it, a testator, for ex­
ample, cannot direct that no administration be had on his 
estate. Solicitude for creditors has led most states to regard 
administration as the -normal process to be followed. A testa­
mentary provision that administration on the testator's 
estate shall be independent of judicial control is entirely 
"'" Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 93 9) art. 3464. 
109 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939) art. 3462, 3463. See also Thomas v. 
Bonnie Bros., 66 Tex. 63 5, 2 S. W. 724 ( 1 8 86) . 
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ineffective in most states.110 Doubtless influenced by the pro­
cedure of the civil law, legislation has been adopted in four 
states authorizing their probate courts to give effect to an 
expressed wish of this kind. The purpose of such statutes, it 
is said, is to  provide for the settlement of estates with a mini­
mum of judicial supervision and expense.111 The size of the 
estate has no bearing upon · the propriety of resorting to this 
procedure. 
. 
Statutes recognizing the validity of nonintervention wills 
and independent executors have been passed in Arizona, 112 
Idaho,113 Texas 114 and Washington.115 These statutes are 
of two general patterns, one adopted by Texas and the other 
by \V ashington. The Arizona statute is modeled after the 
Texas statute and the Idaho statute after the Washington 
statute. Neither the Arizona nor Idaho statutes are used 
extensively. In fact, no reported appellate cases appear to 
have been decided in either of these states. But numerous 
cases have arisen both in Texas and in Washington where the 
power to name an independent executor is exercised fre­
quently. A Texas statute provides that "Any person capable 
of making a will may so provide in his will that no other ac­
tion shall be had in the county court in relation to the settle­
ment of his estate than the probating and recording of his 
will, and the return of an inventory, appraisement and lists 
of claims of his estate."116 The Washington statute 117 is 
similar but requires a preliminary finding by the court that 
the estate is fully solvent, which fact may be established on 
110 Sevier v. Woodson, 205 Mo. 202, 1 04 s. W. I ( 1 907) . 
m Wilhelm's Estate v. Matthews (Tex. Civ. App. 1 925)  2 74  S. W. 2 5 1 ; 
Schubach v. Redelsheimer, 9 2  Wash. 1 24, 1 5 8  P. 739  ( 1 9 1 6 ) .  
ll2 Ariz .. Code ( 1 939) § 3 8-1 992. 
113 Idaho-Laws Ann. ( 1 943) §§ 1 5-23 7  and 1 5-23 8 .  
m Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 9 39)  art. 3436-3447 inc. 
115 Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 932)  §§ 1 462 and 1 463. 
116 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 9 39)  art. 3436. 
117 Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 932) § ! 462 .  
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the filing of the inventory. But in Texas, insolvency of the 
estate will not prevent an independent administration 
thereof.118 Where estates are so administered pursuant to 
the express wishes of the testator, the personal representa­
tive, following the probate of the will, need only file an in­
ventory. Thereafter he may administer and settle the es­
tate without the intervention of the court.119 No letters 
testamentary or of administration are granted. Notice to 
creditors is required under the Washington statute but not 
under the Texas statute.120 Both statutes contemplate that 
the powers and duties of such an independ�nt executor shall 
be as full and complete as is possessed by the personal rep­
resentative acting under judicial supervision. The Idaho and 
Washington statutes 121 expressly provide that such an in­
dependent executor may mortgage, lease, sell and convey 
the real and personal property of the estate without an order 
of court in the first instance and without any approval or 
confirmation thereafter, and in all other respects administer 
and settle the estate without the intervention of the court. 
Similar powers are implied under the Texas statute.122 - In 
Washington, so long as the_ executor faithfully performs his 
duties in the management of the estate, the court is prohibited 
from taking any control over the executor or the estate.123 
Under the Texas system the creditor is not {)bliged to pre­
sent his claim to the executor or to the court for allowance 
118 Shackleford's Admx. v. Gat.es, 3 5 Tex. 7 8 I ( I  8 7 2.) . 
119 Ewing v. Schultz (Tex. Civ. App. I 92.o) 2.2.0 S. W. 625 ; Cocke v. Smith 
(Tex. 1 944) , 1 79 S. W. (2d) 9 54 ;  Schubach v> Redelsheimer, 9 2  Wash. 1 24, 
1 58 P. 739 ( 1 9 I6) . 
120 Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 932)  § I 462.. In Texas, no statute specifically so pro­
vides, but the cases imply this. 
12;1-Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § 1 5-2 3 8 ;  Wash. Rev. Stat. ( I 932)  § I 463, 
122 Ellis v. Howard Smith Co., 3 5  Tex. Civ. App. 566, So S. W. 633  (1904) ; 
Cockrell v. Lovejoy (Tex. Civ. App. I 9 J I ) ,  44 S. W. (zd) I 04o ; Martin v. 
Dial (Tex. Comm. App. I 93 3 ) ,  5 7 S. W. (2d) 75· ' · 
= State ex rel. Johnson v. Superior Court, I 3 I  Wash. 264, 230  P. 434 ( I 92.4) . 
DISPENSING WITH ADMINISTRATIO� 587  
or classification, but may demand payme�t of  the executor 
and may sue thereon.124 If a judgment is obtained against , 
the executor, execution may be had against the decedent's es­
tate unless it be insolvent.125 In Washington, however, 
claims must be presented to the executor in the same manner 
as in estates regularly administered. • 
Under the Texas statute/26 the court may accept the resig­
nation of the executor when tendered. Upon the removal, 
resignation or death of the executor, the court has power to 
appoint a successor to the office. A series of statutes in 
Texas 127 is designed to confer upon such successor all the 
powers originally given to the executor named in the will, in­
cluding the power to act independently of any control by the 
court. 
Certain disagreements between the executor on the one 
hand and the heir or creditor on the other hand may' be the 
basis for the executor's resorting to the court for a determina-
- tion thereof. Thus, the executor �ay ask the court to fix the 
attorneys' fees. 128 But the attorney has not been allowed a 
similar privilege, it being said that he has an adequate remedy 
by a separate action.129 A petition by the executor for ad­
vice and instructions from the court has also been enter­
tained.130 
In one sense, this is not a dispensing with administration 
but is a true administra;tion independent of the probate court. 
Such an executor is called an independent executor and the 
management of the estate by him, even though independent 
... Bell's Estate v. Farmers' & Mercliants' Nat. Bank, 3 3  Tex. Civ. App. 408, 
76 S. W. 798  ( 1 903 ) ; Ewing v. Schultz (Tex. Civ. App. 1 92o), 220 S. W. 625. 
126 Bell's Estate v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 4o8, 
76 s. w. 798 ( 1 90J ) .  
,.. Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, r 939)  art. 3470. 
"" Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939) art. 3456A to 3456! inc. 
128 Estate of Perry, r 68 Wa�h. 428, 1 2  P. (2d) 595 ( 1 9 3 2 ) .  
129 Estate o f  Megrath, 142 Wash. 3 24, 2 5 3  P .  4 5 5  ( 1 926) . 
uo Estate of Megrath, 142 Wash. 3 24, 253 P. 455 ( 1 926) .  
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of the court, is nevertheless considered an administration.131 
The power of the court over the administration does not cease 
absolutely, however. A potential jurisdiction remains in the 
court in certain emergencies. Under the Washington 
statute, 132 if it appears that the executor is about to commit a 
t>reach of trust or has committed some breach, the court may 
order his removal. Under the Texas statutes/33 if either 
creditors or other persons interested in the estate show that 
the executor is wasting, mismanaging or misapplying prop­
erty of the estate and that they will be affected thereby,- the 
court may require the executor to give bond for the faithful 
administration of the estate. Only if the executor fails to 
give such bond may the court remove him.134 Judicial con­
trol may thus be invoked ins�antly in Washington for acts of 
mi!>management, but in Texas it is invoked only by ordering 
the executor to give bond and then by removing him for fail­
ure to .comply with such an order. The directness of the 
Washington procedure has much to commend it. The Texas 
statute, on the other hand, preserves more nearly the inde­
pendent administration authorized by the testator. Under 
both statutes, the testator may dispense with the requirement 
of a bond by the executor.135 
It will be noted that, except for special reasons and for 
limited purposes, the administration is expected to continue 
independent of any judicial control. . Unless the power of 
the court over the estate and its administration is invoked in 
some appropriate manner, the administration is carried out to 
a conclusion,including distribution without the advice or su­
pervision of the court in any degree. Under the Washing-
131 Roy v. Whitaker, 9 2  Tex. 346, 48 S. W. 892, 49 S. W. 367  ( 1 898) ; 
Swearingen v. Williams, 2 8  Tex. Civ. App. 559, 67  S. W. 1 061  ( 1 902) . · 
132 Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 2 )  § 1462.  
133 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3439• 
"" Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 344 1 .  
135 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 9 39 )  art. 343 8-3440; Wash. Rev; Stat. 
( 1932.) § 1 439· 
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ton statute,136 a court, upon application to it, has the author­
ity to enter a decree finding and adjudging that all debts have 
been paid and designating the heirs and persons entitled to 
distribution of the estate. A Texas statute 137 provides that 
an independent executor may ask the court to partition or dis­
tribute an estate where the will does not dispose of all of it or 
fails to provide a means for its partition. In these particular 
instances also, the power of the court may be invoked; but in 
other respects the administration by the executor under a non­
intervention will is truly independent. 
5 ·  Other legislation in aid of summary administration 
Ever since the California Probate Act of I 8 5 I was passed, 
legislation in the Western states has exhibited a growing ten­
dency to simplify, to shorten and to minimize expenses of 
administration proceedings. A provision for summary ad­
ministration in the California Act of I 8 5 I 138 as amended by 
the Code of I 8 7 I ,  139 provided that if upon the return of the 
inventory it appeared that the value of the whole estate does 
not exceed the sum of $3,000 "it. is in the discretion of the 
Probate Court to dispense with the regular proceedings, or 
any part thereof, prescribed in this Title, and there must be 
had a summary administration of the estate, and an order of 
distribution thereof at the end of six months after the issu- -
ing of letters ; the notice to creditors must be given to present 
their claims within four months after the first publication of · 
such notice, and those not so presented are barred as in other 
cases." The shortened period of administration, the reduc­
tion of the nonclaim period and the simplified procedure were 
courageous departures from established procedures and rep-
136 Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93z)  § 146z. 
"" Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939)  art. 344z. 
188 Cal. Laws, 1 85 1, p. 464, § u6. 
119 z Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (1 87z) p. zo4, § 1469. 
590 MONOGRAPHS ON PROBATE LAW 
resented appropriate objectives for the administration of 
small estates. Since that time the nonclaim period in Cal­
ifornia has been reduced to six months in all estates, and final 
distribution is possible at any time thereafter. Nevertheless 
the basic purposes of that early statute have not. been without 
influence elsewhere. 
Statutes in Montana and Oklahoma 140 similarly provide 
that the court may in its discretion disp.ense with regular pro­
ceedings, order a summary administration in small estates, 
require that creditors pres�nt their claims within four months 
and permit distribution after six months. A group of Louisi­
ana statutes 141 also provide for the summary settlement of 
small successions, or of those so heavily indebted that no one 
will accept their administration. This they accomplish by 
authorizing the clerk of the district court to sell the effects 
of the estate and apply the proceeds to the payment of debts, 
the whole to be done in as summary a manner as possible. 
The avowed purpose of these statutes is to provide for the 
speedy and economical settlement of estates.142 
Another device for simplifying the problems of the per­
sonal representative in small estates is that of dispensing with 
the usual requirements of notices 143 in connection with the 
various steps of an administration, or of permitting the post­
ing of notices instead of requiring the relatively expensive 
method of publication.144 Usually, of course, when the en-
"" Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 935)  § 1 0 149 ; Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t. 58 , § 3 1 7. 
1.u La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1945)  art. u9o ;  La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1 939)  
§§ 9 707-9 7 1 5. 
142 Hoffman's Heirs v. Hunter, 1 2 7  La. 673 ,  53 So. 903 ( r 9 1o) ; Rizzotto 
v. Grima, 1 64 La. 1 ,  r q  So. 658  ( 1 927) . 
1"" Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 945) § 27 ·3 1 7 8 (449) (of grant of letters) , 
§ 27 .3 • 7 8 (450) (after distribution to widow, widower or minor children) ;  
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) § 249 (of all further advertisements after dis­
tnbution to surviving spouse or minor children) ; Mont. Rev. Code ( 1935)  
§ 1 0 1 7 0  (notice to creditors) ; Utah Code ( 1 943) § 1 02-9-1 (notice to credi­
tors) ; Wash. Rev. Stat. ( r 932)  § 1477  (notice to creditors) . 
1 .. Del. Rev. Code ( 1 93 5 )  § 3 86 1  (amended Laws 1 939,  c. 1 42) ; Fla. Stat. 
Ann. (Supp. 1 945) § 7 35.03 ; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 1 )  § 9 882.308 ;  
Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 567 ; S. C. Code ( 1 942) § 2 1 2. 
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· tire estate is not more than sufficient to satisfy the require­
ments of homestead, exemptions and family allowance, 
creditors would have no interest in being advised as to pro­
ceedings taken by the personal representative. But the pri­
mary purpose of minimizing expenses and providing a speedy 
settlement for the surviving family of a decedent is evident 
in most of these pieces of legislation. 
In three states 145 provision is made for simplifying the 
settlement of small or insolvent estates by dispensing with 
the appointment of a commissioner of accounts or similar offi­
cer where such a procedure is ordinarily f9llowed. 
The summary administration and settlement of small es­
tates by public administratprs or other officials having an 
equivalent function is also provided for in several codes.146 
A Connecticut statute 147 �nacted in 1 945 provides that 
when any person who has received old age assistance dies 
leaving personal estate not exceeding $500 in value and no 
administration is granted within ninety days after death, the 
commissioner of welfare may take possession of such estate 
and dispose of it according to certain statutory provisions. 
A statute 148 in South Dakota gives the county court power 
to combine two or more estates in one probate proceeding 
when the beneficiaries are the same in each estate, thus avoid­
ing the duplication of procedure that would otherwise result. 
The consolidation of estates for the purpose of administra­
tion is possible when two members of the same family, such 
as husband and wife or brothers and sisters, die at the same 
145 N. H. Rev. Stat. ( 1942) c. 356, § 34 ;  Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 93 3 )  § 2 8 3 2 ;  
W. Va. Code ( I 943 ) § 4147. 
146 See, for example, Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, Supp. I 945) § I I44 ; 
Mass. Ann. Laws ( 19 32)  c. 1 94, §§ I 71 I 8 ;  Minn. Stat. ( I 94I )  § 5 25.393 ; 
Mont. Rev. Code ( I 93 5 )  §§ r oo 1 2, I OO I 3 ;  N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, § Io3-b;  
Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I  9 3 I )  § 8 8-9 I 7.  The treatment of  these statutes under 
which public administrators function is not within the scope of tlris study. 
147 Conn. Laws, I 945, Pub. Act J I 2 .  
148 S. D. Code ( I 939)  § 3 2.0909 ( I o ) .  Cf. Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943)  
§ 15-3 76, limited to  community property ownership, and discussed in  subdivi­
sion III-C-4, infra. 
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time or approximately the same time leaving identical heirs 
or beneficiaries under their wills. 
C. JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT WITHOUT APPOINTMENT 
OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
I .  Another method for small estates 
In the preceding discussion treating of the summary settle­
ment of small estates after the return of the inventory, it 
was pointed out that such an administration proceeding, while 
somewhat shorter than usual, was nevertheless complete. 
· Early distribution to the family was shown to be possible be­
cause of the smallness of the estate and its complete consump­
tion in being set off as homes�ead and exempt property for 
the use of the decedent's family. The determination of dis­
tributive rights was seen to be entirely independent for the 
most part of the existence of creditors and other distributees. 
The time ordinarily consumed and the effort involved in the 
determination of the claims of the latter are eliminated by 
· such a procedure. In short, the task of the personal repre­
sentative is relatively so simple that the usual period allowed 
for the administration of an estate is unnecessary. But judi­
cial control over the administration proceeding is full and con­
tinuous while it lasts. 
If these results are obtainable for small estates in compara­
tively short periods of time, it may well be inquired why they 
may not even be accomplished in one step or by one order of 
the probate court. In appropriate cases similar procedure · 
could well be made available by one order or decree of the 
court, and without interposing a personal representative, 
without supervising his activities for a limited time, without 
ordering a .distribution of the property, and without passing 
upon an accounting and finally discharging him. Indeed, 
legislation �uthorizing summary settlements of this more 
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abbreviated character has been slowly developing over a 
period of three quarters of a century. Its merits may be ob­
served in states where it has been in operation and has been 
subjected to the test of time and experience. 
The first legislation of this kind was adopted in Missouri 
in r 8 77  149 at the suggestion and sponsorship of  Judge J .  G. 
Woerner, judge of the probate court of the city of St. 
Louis/50 and author of the well known work on A merican 
Law of A dministration. Under this statute, if the estate of 
the decedent is less than that allowed by law as the absolute 
property of the widower, widow or minor children, the court 
may officially determine that administration is unnecessary 
and order that no letters of administration be issued. Under 
such an order the property of the estate is set off to the 
widower, widow or minor children who are entitled to col­
lect, and to sue for and retain all property belonging to the es­
tate in the same manner as a personal representative would 
if functioning in. an official capacity. The existence of debts 
against the estate is immaterial, since the surviving spouse 
or minor children are entitled to the entire estate absolutely 
and irrespective of claims against it. In a suit to collect as­
sets ·no proof as to the non-existence of creditors' claims is 
necessary, since the order of the court that no letters be is­
sued confers this right upon them independent of the exist­
ence of creditors. Such statutes, however, are necessarily 
confined in their operation to small estates. Nevertheless 
they offer another inexpensive and expeditious procedure 
for simplifying the problem of the surviving spouse and 
minor children in such cases. 
In addition to Missouri, where such legislation had its or'" 
igin, similar statutes are now found in Arizona, California, 
, "" Mo. Laws, 1 87 7, p. 4· This statute has been amended by subsequent 
legislatures, the last amendment being in 1 941 . For the present wording of 
the statute see Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) § z. 
150 See Z WOERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1 9 2 3 )  669, note, 
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Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, 
, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont 
and Virginia. Many of them have been modeled after the 
Missouri statute. All of them represent attempts to provide 
a direct and highly desirable method for the collection and 
distribution of small estates, thus enabling the family of the 
decedent to have the estate immediately for their support. 
Distribution is immediate and direct from the decedent to 
the heirs. The slight amount of judicial contact and judi­
cial control over the estate under all these statutes is to be 
contrasted with that under the summary procedure of the 
statutes previously discussed wherein a personal representa­
tive was appointed. 
The Missouri statute 151 was amended somewhat in I 9 I 7. 
It now provides for an immediate setting off or distribution 
of the estate when the estate is not greater in amount than is 
allowed as the absolute property of the widow, widower or 
minor children under eighteen years of age, or at the instance 
of a creditor when the estate does not exceed $ I  oo and there 
is no widow, widower or minor children under eighteen years 
of age, and the creditor gives a bond conditioned upon the 
creditor paying the debts of the decedent in the order of their 
preference so far as the assets of the estate will permit. The 
order of the court not only operates to dispense with an of­
ficial administration but also authorizes and empowers the 
widower, widow, minor children or creditor, as the case may 
be, to collect and sue for all the property belonging to the 
estate in the same manner and with the same effect as a per­
sonal representative. This statute was among the first to 
provide that in this particular instance the title of the de­
cedent's property could pass directly to the heirs, distributees 
or other persons entitled thereto without the interposition ·Of 
161 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( z 942) § 2. 
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a personal representative.152 At the same time it answered 
a definite need in small estates by affording adequate protec­
tion to debtors of the estate who ordinarily would be entitled 
to insist on making payment only to a duly appointed per­
sonal representative.153 The procedure is quite informal. 
Ordinarily the surviving spouse presents a verified petition 
to the probate court, setting forth the necessary facts pre­
scribed in the statute together with an itemized list of the 
property left by the decedent and the value of each piece. 
Upon proof the court thereupon makes an order granting the 
petition, determines that no administration is necessary and 
orders that no letters be issued, and that the widower, widow, 
minor children or creditor shall have full authority to col­
lect and sue for all property belonging to the estate. 
A statute of Arizona 154 provides for the summary settle­
ment and distribution of any estate where the value does not 
exceed $300. Any person desiring to settle such an estate 
may make and file an affidavit in the superior court setting 
forth the death of the decedent and stating that the estate 
does not exceed $300 in value. Unlike the Missouri provi-
102 Statutes in California, North Dakota, Oklalloma, South Dakota, Texas, 
Utah and Washington provide that the title to a decedent's property shall pass 
directly to the heirs, legatees or persons entitled to succeed to the estate by 
intestacy but that such property shall be subject to the possession of the executor 
or administrator and to the control of the court for the purposes of administra­
tion, sale or other disposition under the law, and shall be chargeable with the 
expenses of administration, debts and family allowance.' However, the totality 
of rights and powers possessed by a personal representative under such statutes 
as these is the substantial equivalent of ownership by him. 
153 Parsons v. Harvey, 2 8 1  Mo. 4 1 3  at 427, 22 I S. W. ZI ,  (r 920) . In this case 
it was said : "It is manifest that Section 34 of Article 6 of our Constitution confers 
upon probate courts complete jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to probate 
business. There is nothing in our Constitution which forbids the General As­
sembly from passing practical and common sense statutes, like Section 1 0, supra, 
which facilitate the transaction and convenience of public business, at a minimum 
expense, and that, too, without doing an injury to creditors and other persons, 
whose rights may still be asserted before the court. . • . These statutes 
are enacted because of their public convenience. They simplify the business 
before such courts, at a minimum cost, and without injury to anyone." 
"" Ariz. Code ( 1 9 3 9) § 3 8-1 90 1 .  
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sion, the survival of particular members of the decedent's 
family, or the exi'3tence of a creditor, is unnecessary in order 
to invoke the statute. The superior court is authorized to 
prescribe rules and regulations for the procedure to be fol­
lowed in such cases. The statute requires the filing of an 
accounting of all property received and disbursed. No fee 
is permitted to be charged or collected on account of the sum­
mary settlement of such small estates. 
In California a statute 155 was enacted in 1929 providing 
that if a decedent leaves a surviving spouse or minor child 
or children, and the net value of the whole estate over and 
above all liens or encumbrances does not exceed $2,500, the 
person petitioning for probate of the will or for letters of ad­
ministration may add an allegation to this effect in his or her 
petition the�efor, together with a specific description of all 
of the decedent's property, the liens and encumbrances 
thereon and an estimate of its value, and may pray, as an · 
alternative, if the court finds the net value of the estate not 
to exceed $2,500, for the assignment of the property to the 
surviving spouse or minor children as the case may be. Such 
a petition must be verified and the notice thereof must ap­
propriately refer to the prayer for summary distribution. 
Another section 156 provides that if the original petition for 
probate of the will or for letters of administration does not 
contain such an allegation, a separate or supplementary peti­
tion therefor may be filed at any time prior to the hearing on 
such petition, but at least ten days' notice thereon must be 
given and. the hearing on the original petition continued if 
necessary. If, upon the hear'ing on the petition, it appears 
that the value of all property of the estate does not exceed 
$2,500, .the decree or order rendered thereon vest� title to al� 
155 Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 640.
' 
,.. Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 641 . 
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property of the estate, subject, of  course, to any mortgages,­
liens or encumbrances, in the surviving spouse, if any, and 
otherwise, in the minor child or children of the decedent.157 
No further proceedings are to be taken in the estate unless 
additional estate be discovered. By a provision in this stat­
ute passed in I 929 any surviving spouse or minor child hav­
ing other estate of $5,000 in value is excluded from the bene­
fits of the statute. Another section 158 provides that if upon 
the hearing the court determines that the net value of the es­
tate exceeds $2,500, or that the surviving spouse or minor 
child has other estate of $5 ,ooo in value, or that there is 
neither a surviving spouse nor minor child, it shall act upon 
the petition for probate or for letters of administration and 
cause the estate to be administered upon in the·usual manner. 
A Colorado statute 159 prescribes a similar procedure in 
estates of the value of $300 or less. Upon a verified applica­
tion the court may authorize the payment, transfer or de­
livery of the estate to the surviving spouse, other heirs or to 
the creditors of the decedent in the discretion of the court. 
Like the Arizona statute, the survival of any particular mem­
bers of the family is not necessary to its application. The 
statutory fee for such estates is limited to five dollars. 
Extensive provisions rendering administration unnecessary 
in estates less than $2,ooo in value are contained in recent 
amendments to the new Florida Probate Code/60 which rep­
resents a distinct departure from the widely held theory that 
the heirs can obtain title only through a personal representa­
tive. Several situations are said to justify dispensing with 
administration. The statute 161 provides that 
157 Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 645 . . 
158 Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 646. 
159 Colo, Stat. ( I 935 )  c. I 7 6, § 77 ·  
100 Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. I 945) §§ 7 35.0I to  7 35 · I J .  
161 Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. I 94S) § 735.04. 
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"The county judge may dispense with administration upon 
the estate of any testate or intestate who died a resident of 
this state : 
"( I )  When the entire estate is exempt from the claims of 
creditors under the constitution and statutes of the State of 
Florida ; or 
" ( 2) When the estate is not indebted and does not, in the 
judgment of the county judge, exceed in the aggregate two 
thousand dollars in value, exclusive of property exempt un­
der the constitution and statutes of the State of Florida, and 
there is a sole heir or surviving spouse, or the surviving 
spouse and all the heirs of such an estate agree upon the dis­
tribution of the estate, or the decedent died testate leaving 
an estate, and the legatees and devisees, and the widow, if 
any, agree upon the distribution of the estate after the probate 
of the will of the deceased." 
A verified petition is required to be filed in the county 
judge's court by the surviving spouse and all the heirs, or by 
the guardians of any heirs who are not sui juris, setting forth 
their respective relationships to the decedent, a schedule of 
- .all of the decedent's property and its value, a statement of 
the agreed distribution of it among the petitioners, and, if 
it is claimed to be exempt, the names of all creditors.162 Wh6n 
a decedent has died leaving a will, such a petition may be 
filed only after the will has been probated. If the entire 
estate is claimed to be exempt, all known creditors must be 
notified. If the judge finds the facts contained in the peti­
tion to be true, he shall make a finding of the true cash value 
of the estate and order that administration is unnecessary, and, 
as a part of the order, make findings as to the heirs or devisees 
entitled to di�tribution of the estate, what property shall be 
distributed to each · and, if the entire estate is exempt, of what 
the estate consists and what debts are known to exist against 
the estate.163 It" is always within the discretion of the judge 
162 Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 945) § 735.05. 
163 Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 945) §§ 735.o6, 735·07· 
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t o  deny the petition if he is  in doubt as to the truth of any of 
the facts alleged in the petition, 164 in which case administra­
tion may be had in the usual manner. If the petition is 
granted, the distributees are then entitled to receive and col­
lect the respective parts assigned to them, to have the same 
transferred to them and to maintain suits therefor; but they 
thereby become jointly and severally liable to creditors to 
the extent of the estate received by them, exclusive of exempt 
property.165 This liability to creditors persists for three· 
years/66 which is the same period creditors are allowed to en­
force their claims in the absence of administration.167 How­
ever, the distributees may publish a notice 'to �reditors notify­
ing them of the entering of the order and of the distribution 
of the estate without formal administration and thereby re­
duce to eight months the time for creditors to present their 
claims.168 Any heir or devisee under a will already admitted 
to probate, or a devisee under a will subsequently discovered, 
may likewise enforce his rights, in the same manner as credi­
tors, against those who procured the order dispensing with 
administrati�n and received the property of the decedent.169 
The entire cost of a proceeding dispensing with administra­
tion is seven dollars and fifty cents and an additional fifty 
cents for each notice given by registered mail.170 
A recent Idaho statute 171 authorizes the probate court, ' 
upon verified petition, to set aside and assign bank accounts 
of a total not exceeding $300 to the surviving widow of a de­
cedent where no administrator has been appointed. Such 
deposits up to that amount are declared to be exempt from 
1 .. Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 945) § 7 35.08. 
165 Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 945) § 7 35 .09. 
166 Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 7 35 .09. 
167 Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 941 ) § 734.29. 
168 Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 945) § 735 . 1 0. 
169 Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) §§ 7 3 5. 1 1 , 7 3 5 . 1 2 .  
17° Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1945) § 7 3 5 . 1 3 .  
171 Idaho Laws Ann. ( 1 943) § 1 5-1406. 
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probate, administration, claims of creditors and heirs, and 
from inheritance taxes. This statute, however, does not ap­
pear to be confined to small estates, although it doubtless is 
so confined in its practical operation. It would appear to 
authorize such a procedure in any estate, however large, but 
to limit payments therefor to $300 or less to the widow. 
An Indiana statute 172 authorizes the circuit court in cases 
where a decedent has left an estate not worth over $sao and 
is survived by a widow to vest the entire estate in the widow 
absolutely. Upon filing a petition therefor the clerk is di­
rected to appoint a disinterested householder to make an in­
ventory and appraisal of the estate, both real and personal, 
which must be verified by the widow as to its completeness. 
Upon the return of the inventory the clerk is directed not to 
issue letters but to continue further proceedings until the 
next term of the court thereafter when the court shall, if no 
opposition be made, enter a decree vesting in the widow all 
the title and interest of the decedent in such estate at his 
death and directing that no letters issue thereon. Notice 
thereof must be given by the widow by publishing or posting. 
Creditors may contest the petition at the time set for its hear­
ing upon the ground that the inventory does not contain all 
property belonging to the estate or that the estate was im­
properly valued, and that in either case the total value of the 
estate exceeds $500. In thi� event, the court must appoint 
two other disinterested householders who will proceed to re­
appraise the property. The final action of the court is made 
upon this second inventory and appraisement. The order of 
the court vesting the title to the estate in the widow is de­
clared to be sufficient authority to enable her to sue for and 
recover debts and property belonging to the estate. She is 
exempted from liability for any of the decedent'� debts, ex­
cept real estate mortgages, but she is made liable for his 
172 Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 9  3 3 )  §§ 6-1 701 to 6-1 704. 
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reasonable funeral expenses and the expenses of his last sick­
ness. 
Under the Kentucky statutes 173 the county court has juris­
diction to dispense with administration of small estates if the 
personal property on hand or in bank does not exceed the 
amount to which the widow or surviving minor children are 
entitled to have set aside to them as exempt. After such an 
order is made the widow or minor children (through their 
guardian) may sue for and obtain all property belonging to 
the estate, and shall thereafter settle accounts in the same 
manner as a personal representative. 
A recent Maryland statute 174 provides that if a decedent 
dies intestate and leaves a small estate consisting solely of 
personal property, the person entitled to be appointed ad­
ministrator may file a petition in the Orphans' Court request­
ing that administration be disp�nsed with. The court may 
make a preliminary order declaring that no formal administra­
tion is necessary and instructing the petitioner to publish notice 
to creditors to exhibit their claims within thirty days. Upon 
the expiration of the thirty-day period the court may then 
render a final order relieving the estate of formal administra­
tion and directing distribution of the estate. 
The Michigan Probate Code 175 provides that if the estate 
of a decedent consists solely of a pay check or other personal 
property less than $200, the probate judge may order such 
property turned over to t):J.e widow or widower, or, if there 
be no surviving spouse, upon the showing of evidence that 
funeral expenses have been paid, to the nearest of kin or the 
person who shall have paid such expenses. This kind of 
order may be made without the appointment of an adminis­
trator or the giving of a bond. 
173 Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) §§ 3.95·450, 3 95.46o. 
m Md. Code (Supp. 1 945) art. 93, § 1 5 1A, as added by Md. Laws, 1 945, 
c. 458· 
176 Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 945) § 2 70:i 1 78 (45 1 ) .  
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Nebraska 176 provides for tl].e summary settlement of small 
estates by authorizing the filing of a petition showing the usual 
facts as to the death of a decedent, the names of his heirs and -
an allegation that his estate is wholly exempt from attach­
ment, execution or other process and is not liable for the pay­
ment of decedent's debts. After published notice of the time 
set for the hearing on such a petition and a finding that the 
facts alleged in the petition are true, the court is directed to 
make an order dispensing �with regular administration and 
distributing the estate directly to the heirs or devisees. These 
statutes are called the "Small Estates Act." 
Nevada 177 classifies estates into two groups for the purpose 
of dispensing with administration. If the decedent leaves a 
surviving spouse or a minor child or children and his estate 
does not exceed $ r ,ooo in value, the statute directs that his 
estate shall not be administe�ed upon but that it shall be as­
signed and set apart for the support of the spouse or minor 
children. Even though there be a surviving spouse the court 
may in its discretion set aside the whole estate for the benefit 
of the minor children, after directing such payments as may 
be deemed just. This may be compared with the provisions 
of the California, Arizona and Utah statutes 178 which ex­
clude from the benefits of participation in small estates a sur­
viving spouse who has separate estate of her own. But if the 
decedent leaves neither a spouse nor minor children, adminis­
tration may be dispensed with only when the estate does not 
exceed $400 in value. But even here the court may direct 
the payment of funeral expenses, the expenses of the decedent's 
last illness and other claims. All proceedings taken under 
this statute are initiated by a verified petition, containing a 
list of all property belonging to' the estate together with its 
176 Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 943) §§ 30-3 34 to 3o-338.  
177 Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 941 ) § 988z.1 1 7. 
178 See notes 7 z, 7 3 and 7 4> supra. 
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estimated value and a statement of all debts of the decedent 
so far as known. Notice is given by posting upon the bulletin 
board of the county courthouse. The costs of publishing notice 
are limited to $5.00 and court costs to $ I  5 .oo. 
In New Jersey,179 when the total value of the real and 
personal property of an intestate estate does not exceed $ I OO 
and there is no surviving spouse, a statute permits one of the 
next of kin, with the written consent of the remaining next 
of kin, to petition the surrogate for permission to collect the' 
personal assets for the benefit of all the next of kin. No 
formal administration is required and no bond need be given. 
Such petitioning next of kin has the same rights, powers and 
duties as does an administrator and mfy be sued and required 
to account. A related statute 180 authorizes the payment or 
delivery of �ebts or property not exceeding $ 1 00 to the next 
of kin upon receipt of a copy of the affidavit furnished to the 
surrogate marked a true copy by the surrogate, and that such 
person so paying or delivering shall be forever discharged 
from all claims by any administrator who may be appointed or 
by any other person, notwithstanding that it may thereafter 
occur that the intestate had left an estate exceeding $ I  oo, or 
a surviving spouse or next of kin not consenting, or that the 
allegations of the affidavit are erroneous. Because of the 
limitation of amount and the restriction that there must be no 
spouse surviving, it would seem that these statutes have but 
little practical value. 
Under the North Carolina statutes 181 debts not exceeding 
$300 owing to a decedent may be paid into the hands of the 
clerk of the court whose receipt is declared to be a full and 
complete release and discharge for such debts. The clerk 
is then authorized and empowered to pay out such collected 
179 N. J. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 945) § 3 :7-8 . 1 .  
180 N. J. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 945) § 3 :7-8.2. 
181 N. C. G�n. Stat. ( 1 943) § 2 8-68. 
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sums first, for the family allowance, se<;:ond, for funeral ex­
penses, and any other surplus as the law provides. This 
statute applies only to certain counties and does not include the 
entire stat�. The primary purpose is to provide a method by 
which a debtor of the decedent may discharge his debt by 
paying the amount to the clerk of the superior court. How­
ever, the statute is permissive only and is not mandatory upon 
the debtor.182 In small estates where all parties are in agree­
ment such a procedure is valuable for providing a means of 
settlement without formal administration. Its permissive 
character would seem to be a serious drawback to a full 
realization of its possibilities. 
A similar statute in South Carolina 183 provides that when 
a person dies intestate and leaves personal property only, of 
the value of $sao or less, it shaH be the duty of the probate 
judge to receive such estate, pay funeral expenses and ex­
penses of last illness and to distribute the residue, if any, to 
' the distributees without the requirement of administration. 
Any person, firm or corporation having money or other prop­
erty belonging to the estate of the decedent is required to 
turn the same upon demand over to the probate judge whose 
receipt shall be a discharge of such liability. In Mitchell v. 
Dreher, 184 the Supreme Court of South Carolina expressed 
an opinion that this section was probably intended to apply 
only to those estates in which creditors were not concerned, 
but involved "simply the distribution of untrammelled as­
sets." If this be true a small estate which is indebted could 
not be thus set off to the heirs by summary procedure. 
A much broader and more inclusive Virginia statute 185 
authorizes the payment of money up to $sao into th� court 
of the county in which such fund accrued or arose, whereupon 
182 In re Franks' Estate, :uo N. C. 1 76, 1 6  S. E. (zd) 8 3 1  ( 1 94 1) .  
183 8. C. Code (1 942) § 9028. 
1 .. I SO s. c. us, 147 s. E. 646 ( 1 929) . 
183 Va. Code ( 1 942) § 6 143 (a) . 
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the court may authorize its expenditure or use for the benefit 
of the person entitled to it without the intervention of a per­
sonal representative. No reported cases have arisen under 
this statute. It is not a part of the probate statutes of Virginia 
and it may be somewhat doubtful how effective it is for the 
purpose of dispensing with administration. 
In one sense these statutes of North Carolina, South 
Carolina and Virginia provide for a summary administration 
through a personal representative, the clerk or judge acting 
as a kind of substitute for the perso�al representative in this 
case. In actuality, however, no personal representative is 
appointed and the distribution is made in as summary and as 
direct a manner as possible, the purpose being to conserve 
time, expense and unnecessary procedure in small estates. 
An Ohio statute 186 authorizes the court to order an estate 
relieved from administration when the value of the assets of 
the estate is less than $500 and creditors will not be prejudiced 
thereby. A petition is filed praying for such an order, setting 
forth the distributees, the character and value of the property 
comprising the estate and a list of all known creditors. If 
the court orders the estate relieved from administration, it 
also orders the property delivered and transferred to the per­
sons entitled thereto. For this purpose the court fixes the 
amount of property to be delivered or transferred to the sur­
viving spouse or minor children of the decedent, in. lieu of 
property not deemed assets, and of an allowance for a year's 
support. A commissioner may be appointed to execute in­
struments of conveyances when necessary. Such an order re­
lieving an estate from administration has the same effect as 
administration proceedings in freeing land in the hands of an 
innocent purchaser for value from the possible claims of 
unsecured creditors. A comment 187 on this section by the 
'"" Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 93 7 )  § 1 0509-5. 
,.., See comment in annotations to this section. 
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Committee on Probate and Trust Law of the Ohio State Bar 
Association at the time of the adoption of the new Ohio Probate 
Code in 1 933 indicates that the purpose of this summary 
procedure was to relieve small estates from the expenses of 
administration. 
A Pennsylvania statute 188 authorizes the Orphans' Court 
to distribute estates not exceeding $200 in value without grant­
ing formal letters of administration. Nevertheless, an ac­
counting must be filed and audited. Distribution may be 
made under such rule of court as may be established by gen­
eral order or by special order made in each estate. 
Another Pennsylvania statute 189 provides that when any 
decedent shall leave a widow or children surviving him and an 
estate not exceeding $500 in value, such widow or children 
may petition the Orphans' Court to set aside such property 
to them as exempt. The court may act upon the petition and 
set aside such property without notice or appraisement and 
irrespective of whether letters have been issued or a will pro­
bated. The purpose of this statute, it has been said, is to avoid 
the cost of administration on small estates where the entire 
property would be consumed in being set off as exempt prop­
erty, if administration were to be granted.190 
The South Dakota <;ode 191 contains extensive provisions 
for the summary administration of small estates or estates of 
such a size and character that creditors are not likely to share 
in them. It provides that summary administration may be 
had ( I )  when the gross estate of the decedent, including both 
real and personal property, does not exceed $ r ,soo, or (2) 
when the gross value of the estate, exclusive of homestead 
188 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1 944) t. zo, § 343·  
189 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1 944) t. zo,  § 477· 
190 ln re Madeira's Estate (Pa. Orphans' Court, 1 9 3 8 ) ,  33 D. & C. 7 1 7, 52 
York 1 3 7. 
191 S. D. Code ( 1 939)  §§ 3 5·0701 to 3 5.07o8 (amended by S. D. Laws 1 945, 
C. 152), 
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not exceeding $s,ooo, does not exceed $750 and the decedent 
is survived by a spouse or one or more minor children. A 
verified petition for such summary administration may be 
filed by an heir, legatee, devisee or creditor, setting forth the 
fact of decedent's death and whether he left a will; the names 
and addresses of all heirs, legatees and devisees, and also, so 
far as known, of creditors with the amounts owing to each ; 
a statement of the character and value of all property left by 
the decedent ; and the facts in regard to any homestead and 
the persons entitled thereto. Notice of the hearing on such 
petition must be published for three weeks and mailed to all 
heirs, legatees, devisees and creditors at least ten days prior 
to the date set for hearing. If  upon the hearing the court 
determines that the essential facts exist, it may proceed in a 
summary manner to adjust and determine the respective 
rights of all persons interested including creditors and the 
rights in regard to homestead and exempt property. It may 
also probate a will if there be one. It is authorized to make 
findings of facts and conclusions of law and to distribute the 
estate, first, in payment of court costs incurred, second, to 
those entitled to exempt property and homestead, third, to 
creditors, and fourth, to heirs, legatees and devisees. Such 
decree has the same effect as a final judgment and may be 
recorded. No further action is required for the distribution of 
the estate. If necessary for such distribution, the court may 
order the sale of any property other than the homestead. 
The entire responsibility for collecting and distfibuting the 
estate is upon the judge. He may not appoint an agent for 
these purposes.192 If such petition is dismissed, regular pro­
bate proceedings may be instituted. Even in an appropriate 
case, summary administration is not an absolute requirement ; 
the court may, in its discretion, require regular administration -
'''" Smith v. Terry Peak Miners' Union, x 6  S. D. 6 3 1 ,  94 N. W. 694 ( 1 903) .  
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if it finds that the circumstances are such as to render it for 
the best interests of those interested in the estate. 
A Vermont statute 193 provides that if a husband dies leav­
ing a widow or minor children or both, or if a wife dies and 
leaves minor children and no surviving husband, and the 
estate does not exceed $300 or is not sufficient to pay the debts 
and expenses of settlement and leave a balance of $300, the 
court in its discretion may assign the estate to the value of , 
$300 to the minor children or to the widow or for their joint 
use and benefit. 
As previously mentioned:, the prime purpose of this kind of 
legislation is to make available to a decedent's family a modi­
cum of economic resources without delay and at a time when 
the cessation of regular earnings are likely to be felt most 
acutely ,by them. To the family of small means the value of 
such procedure is at once apparent. To compel the surviving 
family to await the termination of a usual administration 
would be most unjust ; and in addition, it would decrease the 
amount distributable to them by the expenses of administra­
tion and would keep the property out of commerce for an 
interval of time. "Practical and common sense statutes . . . 
which facilitate the transaction and convenience of public busi­
ness, at a minimum expense, and that, too, without doing an 
injury to creditors and other persons" is the characterization 
of these statutes by the Supreme Court of the state of their 
origin.194 
The restrictions on the rights of heirs generally to collect 
and sue for debts due a decedent, in the absence of administra­
tion, will be discussed h�reafter. Suffice it to say at this point 
that such actions are ordifl:arily not permitted, but the heirs . 
are required to have a personal representative appointed in 
order to make an effective collection of the assets belonging 
to the estate. Under statutes of the kind now under con-
193 Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 933)  § z 8 3 1 .  
""' Parsons v .  Harvey, z 8 1  Mo. 4 1 3  at 42-7, 2.2 1  S .  W .  z r  ( r9:w) . 
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. sideration, however, the heir becomes the "authorized agent 
'of the law to collect debts and give acquittances." 195 With­
out such authority, having its genesis in a denial rather than 
a grant of administration, the heir is powerless to make col­
lection of property to which he and others will ultimately be 
entitled. An estate of sufficiently small quantity to come 
under the statutory amount will not of itself entitle the heir 
to sue to collect assets. He must first secure a j udicial de­
termination that such facts exist and the corresponding author­
ity to proceed in this fashion.196 
Upon slight reflection the reasonableness of such a require­
ment appears. Some sort of showing is necessary to call this 
. exceptional short-cut into play. A court having control over 
such functions will respond upon proper proof. Creditors 
are entitled to this amount of protection, at least. Further­
more, more .than one person may claim to be the heir or next 
of kin entitled to the estate. This slight judicial supervision 
will stave off potential controversies among heirs and creditors 
in the vast maj ority of cases. In addition, debtors are af­
forded explicit assurance of the discharge of their obligations 
upon making payment to the one thus authorized to make 
collection. It would, of course, be unsafe to make the heirs 
the exclusive judges o{the applicability of the statute to the 
facts of a particular case.197 
The order of the court denying administration is the equiva­
lent of a judgment or decree, it is entitled to corresponding 
1'" Bradley v. Raulerson, 66 Fla. 6or,  64 So. 2 3 7  ( r 9 r 4) ; Coral Gables 
First National Bank v. Hart (Fla. 1 945) , 20 So. (2d) 647 at 648.  And the 
person to whom it is set off may perfect his or her title as by a suit to quiet title. 
Bassett v. South, 8 7  Ind. App. 1 3 6, 1 5 6  N. E. 4 1 0, r 5 8  N. E. 229  ( r 9 2 7 ) .  
196 Chenoweth v. McDowell, 26  Ariz. 420, 2 2 6  P. 5 3 5  ( r 924) ; Phifer v. 
Abbot, 68 Fla. r o, 65 So. 869 ( 1 9 1 4) ; Noblett v. Dillinger, 2 3  Ind. 505 
( r 864) ; Griswold v. Mattix) 21 Mo. App. 282 ( r 8 86) ; McMillan v. Wacker, 
5 7  Mo. App. 220 ( r 894) ; Adey v. Adey, 5 8  Mo. App. 408 ( r 894) . But in 
Mahoney v. Nevins, 1 90  Mo . .  36o, 8 8  S. W. 7 3 1  ( r 9o5) it was held that a 
surviving widow was entitled in equity to be recognized as the owner of an 
estate less than $4oo without proceeding to have it set off to her. 
U'I Br�dley v. Raulerson, 66 Fla. 6o r ,  64 So. 2 3 7  ( 1 9 14) .  
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recognition/98 and it cannot be collaterally attacked.199 While 
such an order or decree remains in force a personal represent­
ative may not be appointed. 200 Nor may the valuation of the 
property set aside be assailed in a different proceeding.201 
Nor may an action to collec:t assets by the next of kin be de­
feated by showing an indebtedness against the estate.202 Like­
wise the setting off of the estate to a person erroneously 
determined to be an heir cannot be questioned in a different 
proceeding.203 If the decree is to-be assailed at all, it must be 
done directly, by appeal or by steps appropriate to revok<:; it. 
Such a procedure is expressly provided in the statutes of 
Florida, Kentucky and Missouri and is to be found in the 
general procedure sections of other probate codes. 204 
It is conceivable that regular administration might be pref­
erable to the summary setting off of a small estate in a given 
case due to the existence of certain problems or conflicts of 
interest. The statutes of Kentucky, South Dakota and V er­
mont expressly make their use discretionary with the judge, 
while all others appear to be subject to invocation as of 
right.205 
198 Eisenmayer v. Thompson, 1 8 6  Cal. 5 3 8, 1 99 P. 798 ( 1 92 1 ) ;  McMillan 
v. Boese, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 764, 1 1 5 P. (2d) 3 7  ( 1 94 1 ) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 
5 3  Cal. App. (2d) 8os, 1 28 P. (2d) 6 1 7  ( 1 942), ; Downs v. Downs, 1 7  Ind. 9 5  
( r 86 r ) ; Boyden' v. Ward, 3 8  Vt. 628  ( r 866) . 
199 Although often called inferior courts, probate courts are courts of record 
in almost every state, and, within the orbit of their jurisdiction, their decrees are 
entitled to the same weight as those of courts of general jurisdiction. See Simes 
and Basye, "Organization of the Probate Court in America," 42 MICH. L. REV. 
965 at 990-992 (1 944) , pp. 4 1 5-41 7, supra. 
200 Nelson v. Troll, 1 7 3 Mo. App. 5 1 , 1 56 S. W. 1 6  ( 1 9 1 3 ) .  
201 Downs v. Downs, 1 7  Ind. 95 ( r 86 1 ) .  
202 Coral Gables First National Bank v. Colee (Fla. 1 945) ,  20  So. (2d) 675. 
203 Coral Gables First National Bank v. Hart (Fla. 1 945) ,  20 So. (2d) 647• 
20' Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 945) § 7 3 5.09 ;  Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) §§ 395 .46o, 
395 .500 ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) § 2. The rights of creditors and other 
persons may still be asserted ,in the court ordering summary distribution. Fla. 
Stat. Ann (Supp. 1 945) § 7 35·" ;  Parsons v. Harvey, 2 8 1  Mo. 4 1 3 ,  2 2 1  S. W. 
2 1  ( 1 9 20) , 1 
205 The discretionary character of these statutes will not permit a successful 
appeal from an order denying a petition filed to obtain summary distribution. 
Frost v. Estate of Harlow Frost, 40 Vt. 625 ( r 868) . 
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Several variations are to be noted among these statutes. 
Some are predicated primarily upon the existence of a small 
estate and the survival of particular members of the decedent's 
family who would be entitled to the entire estat.e as exempt 
property, homestead, or as a family allowance if administra­
tion were had in the usual manner, while others are predicated 
solely upon the existence of a small estate and attempt to 
provide for its distribution to those entitled, whether they 
be the surviving family, next of kin or creditors, or some of 
each.206 The first group of statutes is limited in its application 
primarily to those estates in which. creditors are not entitle� 
to share ; the second group is intended to apply when the 
estate is of such small size that it should be administered 
simply, summarily and with the least possible expense and 
delay. In these latter cases, more conflicts of interest as be­
tween distributees are likely to arise, and yet the very size of 
the estate is such as to make real conflicts rare. As in the 
case of summary distribution by a personal representative, 
the rights of distributees are usually made subject to expenses 
of the funeral and last sickness.207 But the rights of other 
creditors are ordinarily subordinated to the paramount social 
interest of providing for the surviving family. 
It may be objected that such statutes open the door to fraud 
upon creditors either through a process of concealing assets 
or by withdrawing assets from judicial inspection such as could 
ordinarily be observed from the inventory. Legislation of this 
""' In the first category are the statutes of California, Idaho, Indiana, Ken- . 
tucky and Missouri. In the second category are those of Arizona, Colorado, 
Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South . 
Carolina .and Virginia. The statutes of Florida, Nevada, South Dakota and 
Vermont must be classified under both types, i.e., as applying when there is a 
small estate and certain members of the decedent's family survive. See Turner 
v. Campbell, 1 24 Mo. App. 1 3 3 ,  1 0 1  S. W. 1 1 9  ( 1 907) , indicating this limita­
tion upon the application of the Missouri statute. 
"'l7 Fleming v. Henderson, 1 2 3  Ind. 234, 24 N. E. 2 36  ( 1 89o) . But see In 
re Ulrice's Estate, 1 77 Mo. App. 584, 1 60 S. W. 8 1 2  ( 1 9 1 3 ) ,  where it was 
held that the widow's allowance of absolute property is paramount even to 
funeral expenses and expenses of administration. 
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kind has also been challenged on the ground that creditors 
are deprived of their property without due process of law. 
As to fraud, such is always a possibility even when an ad­
ministration runs its full course. An examination of the stat­
utes of the kind under consideration reveals that most, if not 
all, of them require a sworn petition or affidavit to be filed 
to entitle the applicant or petitioner to a summary distribution 
of the estate. There is no more reason why the concealment 
of assets could be effected under such circumstances than when 
there is a full administration. The limited judical contact 
.with the surviving family of the decedent furnishes no fertile 
medium for the practice of fraud or the concealment of assets. 
In any case, the statutes provide that the court may revoke 
its order of summary distribution upon a showing of other or 
further assets.208 Creditors would seem to have ample pro­
tection by this provision alone, not to mention their power to 
ask that the order or decree be set aside for fraud, if such is 
found to exist. 
As to the constitutionality of such legislation in the face 
of the objection that such a procedure deprives creditors of 
their rights without due process of law, two things may be 
said. If the rights of the decedent's family in his small estate 
by virtue of homestead, exempt property, family allowance 
and the like are superior to those of creditors, then the latter 
have not been affected adversely. On the other hand, if the 
rights of creditors are superior to those of the decedent's 
family, then the statute authorizing a summary distribution 
to the latter does not extinguish the creditor's right. What­
ever right he had against the decedent is merely transferred 
as a chose in action against the heir who has received distribu­
tion. On this precise point the language of the Supreme Court 
208 The California statute explicitly so provides. A general power of revoca­
tion is contained in the Fl9rida, Kentucky and Missouri statutes. A like power 
doubtless prevails elsewhere under the general power of courts over their own 
judgments. 
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of Florida in the case of Coral Gables First National Bank v. 
Hart 209 is quite explicit : 
"Under the law of this state (Probate Act) personal and 
real property descends to the heirs. Since devolution is a 
matter of legislative discretion, it is entirely competent for the 
legislature to say that any kind of property shall pass direct 
to the heirs rather than be suspended until a personal repre­
sentative be appointed and vest in the heirs through him. 
Unsecured creditors are at all times subject to the caprice of 
the legislature in so far as estates are concerned. While it is 
proper that their claims be paid and they may apply for letters 
of administration but if they fail to do this and the heir secures 
an order of 'No Administration Necessary' then they may sue 
the heir to collect the debt. In other words, the most they 
have at any time is a chose in action and they may sue the heir 
who secured the order to collect the debt. They had no 
property right before the Act was passed and no property right 
was taken from them by it . . , I-1 eirs of Ludlow v. Johnston, 
3 Ohio 553,  1 7  Am. Dec. 609." 
2. A method for distributees who die during administration 
It sometimes happens that an heir or distributee who will 
ultimately be entitled to a portion of an estate being adminis­
tered dies before final distributio� of that estate. The decree 
of final distribution strictly determines only .who are the heirs 
of the senior decedent and makes distribution to them. Proper 
procedure would suggest that the heir's estate should also be 
administered and his share in the ancestor's estate distributed 
to his heirs. On the other hand, it is apparent that the second 
administration may be unnecessary in certain situations. In 
the early California case of McClellan v. Downey/10 a hus­
band died intestate leaving only community property to be 
administered. He was survived by his wife and six children, 
two of the children being by a former marriage. The wife 
""' (Fla. 1 945) ,  :zo So. (:zd) 64-7 at 649. 010 63 Cal. s:zo ( r 883) . 
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died during the administration of her husband's estate. Ad­
ministration on her estate was then had and completed before 
final distribution of her husband's estate. But the decree of 
final distribution did not include her interest in the com­
munity property. Upon the subsequent distribution of the 
husband's estate the wife's interest in the community property 
was ordered distributed directly to her heirs, "no creditor oi 
hers objecting." 211 The court admitted that it would have 
been more orderly to have had her interest in her husband's 
estate distributed to her heirs by the decree of distribution of 
her estate, or to have made distribution of any personalty to 
her administrator for the purposes of administration, but it 
held that it had the power to make distribution of the wife's 
interest in her husband's estate directly to her heirs under the 
. dictate of the statute which required it to distribute the residual 
estate of a decedent "among the persons who by law are en­
titled thereto." 212 The powe� of probate courts to make dis­
tribution to the secondary next of kin has been declared in a 
small.number of cases,213 provided there are no creditors of 
the decedent. 
When the heir cir distributee who dies prior to the final 
distributi,on of the ancestor's estate is an unmarried minor, it 
211 6 3  Cal. 520 at 523  ( r 8 8 J ) .  {Italics the court's.) 212 Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § r 020. 
213 Johnson's .Adm'r v. Longmire, 39  Ala. 1 43 ( r 863 ) ; Fretwell v. McLe­
more, 52 Ala. 1 24 at 1 3 3  ( 1 8 75) ; Ward v. Ives, 75 Conn. 598, 54 A. 730 
( r 9o3) ; In re Sprague's Estate, 1 2 5  Mich. 357, 84 N. W. 293 ( 1 9oo) ; Max­
well v. Craft, 3 2  Miss. 307  (1 856) ; Watson v. Byrd, 5 3  Miss. 480 ( 1 876) ; 
In re Riley's Estate, 92 N. J. Eq. 567, 1 1 3  A. 485 ( 1 9 2 1 ) ; Matter of Losee, 
46 Misc. 363,  94 N. Y. S. r o8z ( r 905) ; Young v. Kennedy, 95 N. C. 265 
( r 886) ; Robertson v. Gillenwaters, 85  Va. I I 6, 7 S. E. 371 ( r 8 8 8 ) ; Cook v. 
· Nelson, 209 Wis. 224, 244 N. W. 6 1 5  (1 932) . In the New Jersey case of In 
re Riley's Estate, supra, the court said that only the Court of Chancery, and not 
the orphans' court, in New Jersey could order distribution to the secondary 
next of kin _and thus dispense with administration. In the Alabama cases it 
was said that it was within the province of equity to thus dispense with ad­
.ministration when it appeared that there were no debts. or that administration 
had not been taken out. 
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may be presumed that he had no capacity to make a will and 
was incapable of contracting binding obligations. Under these 
circumstan�es his estate could safely be distributed to his heirs 
in connection with the final distribution of the primary estate, 
undiminished by debts or expenses of administration. By an 
amendment in r 8 66 to one of its statutes on distribution of 
estates, California provided that if a decedent "shall have left 
him or her surviving several children, or one child and the 
issue of one or more other children, and if any one of such 
surviving children shall before the close of administration 
have died while under age and not having been married, no 
administration on such deceased child's estate shall be neces­
sary, but all the estate �hich come to the deceased child by 
inheritance from such ·deceased parents shall without ad­
ministration be distributed to the other heirs as prescribed by 
law." 214 This statute has since been broadened in Cali­
fornia 215 to include any heir, devisee or legatee who is issue of 
a decedent, and also to authorize distribution directly to his 
heirs at law in the case of his death intestate while under age 
and not having been married, before final distribution of the 
ancestor's estate. The result in most cases will be that dis­
tribution of the ancestor's estate will be made to the other 
heirs of the ancestor whose shares will thus be augmented, 
since they are his heirs also. Similar statutes have since been 
adopted in Arizona,216 Idaho,217 Montana,218 North 
Dakota,219 Oklahoma/20 South Dakota,221 Utah 222 and 
Wyoming/23 all patterned after the early California statute. 
214 Cal. Stat., 1 865-1 866, c. 297, § 2, p. 3 29. 
215 Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 1022 . 
. 216 Ariz. Code ( 1 939)  § 3 8-1504.-
217 ldaho Laws Ann. ( 1 943) § 1 5-qo6. 
218 Mont. Rev. Code ( 1935)  § 1 03 27. 
219 N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943) § 30-21 06. 
= okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t. 5 8, § 63 1 .  
221 S. D. Code ( 1 9 3 9 )  § 3 5•1 705. 
222 Utah Code ( 1 943)  § 1 02-1 2-7. 
223 Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 3 1 )  § 88-3601 .  
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With the exception of Arizona these statutes are limited in 
their operation to unmarried minors and cannot be applied to 
dispense with administration on the estate of a deceased adult 
heir.224 In Arizona it is required only that the heir dying 
before the close of administration be a child of the decedent 
in order for the statute to apply. 
The function of such legislation is to avoid two administra­
tions when the court already has jurisdiction of one estate, and 
in that same proceeding may readily determine the persons 
who are entitled to the share of the deceased heir and order 
distribution directly to them. The in rem nature of the pro­
ceeding is sufficient to justify the cour�'s exercise of such power. 
At the same time it may well be realized that secondary ad­
ministration: may be preferable in large estates of minors, or 
if there be indebtedness of the minor, as for necessaries. But 
if the estate is small, this statutory permission to avoid an ad­
ministration answers a need in a sensible manner. Without 
exception, however, the operation of these statutes is inde­
pendent of the size of the estate. 
3 ·  A method for persons who die while under guardianship 
Another type of statute comparable in function to those just 
discussed but somewhat different in operation concerns minors 
or other persons who die while under guardianship. The 
justification for dispensing with administration upon the estate 
of a minor �r incompetent who dies while his estate is being 
administered by a guardian should depend primarily upon an 
ability to determine with reasonable certainty the existence of 
liabilities against the ward. Since such a ward cannot ordi­
narily incur debts, it may be said that the guardian, who ,has 
incurred and presumably knows of all outstanding obligations 
against the ward, should be permitted to pay them and dis-
220 In re Skelly's Estate, 3 2  S. D. 3 8 1 ,  143 N. W. 274 ( 1 9 1 3 ) .  
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tribute the estate remaining in his hands in much the same 
manner as a personal representative would do. On the con­
trary it may be argued that the ward may be liable on obliga­
tions incurred· before the inception of the guardianship, 
for torts' committed by him or for some other obligation which 
the guardian did not incur or is not aware of. In passing upon 
the merits of the statutes to be discussed in this connection, 
the machinery afforded to creditors to obtain payment of their 
claims during the lifetime of the ward as well as after his 
death will be an important factor. 225 
Upon the termination of a guardianship by the death of a 
ward, a guardian is ordinarily required to make an account­
ing.226 Distribution of the ward's estate is then made to a 
personal representative to be appointed. In an attempt to 
dispense with a formal administration, however, legislation 
has been adopted in several states to provide for distribution 
of the ward's estate by the guardian directly without requiring 
the appointment of a personal representative. According to 
such legislation the guardian, after making the required ac­
counting upon the death of the ward, is authorized to make 
distribution of the residual estate directly to the distributees. 
It is intended to render unnecessary both the appointment of a 
personal representative and a complete formal administration 
on the ward's estate. 
In Arkansas 227 and Missouri 228 it is provided that if a · 
minor under guardianship dies, no letters of administration 
2211 In most states creditors are not notified or afforded an opportunity to 
present their claims in a guardianship proceeding as they are in a probate pro­
ceeding. A few statutes do so provide, however. See Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) 
§ 3 r 9 -4 r .  To enforce payment on contracts or torts of the ward, in most 
states an action must be commenced against the ward personally, which action 
may be defended by the guardian. See George & Ratcliffe v. Dawson's Guard­
ian, r 8  Mo. 407 ( r 8 5 3 ) . 
• 226 Such a provision is a part of most guardianship statutes. 
227 Ark. Dig. Stat. ( r 937)  §§ 6246, 6247. 
228 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( r 942) §§ 427, 428. These statutes formerly pur­
ported to apply to all minors under guardianship. However, they were later 
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need be granted upon his estate unless he leaves obligations, 
or unless he leaves a valid will, but that the probate court shall 
proceed to authorize distribution of the personal estate by the 
guardian among those interested. 
A Pennsylvania statute 229 adopted in 1 93 1  similarly pro­
vides for distribution by the guardian of a deceased minor 
ward to creditors and distributees under the intestate law, 
unless it appears that the estate is involved or is likely to be 
involved in litigation, in which case distribution of the estate 
is made to a personal representative who must be appointed 
for the ward's estate. This statute depends upon judicial 
discretion for its application. Notice to creditors is usually 
given by advertising the final account.230 
A recent Colorado statute 231 applies in the case of the death 
of any person under guardianship, whether a minor or other 
incompetent. The guardianship is continued and the estate 
of the decedent administered in the same proceeding; there­
after the guardian is designated as an administrator, unless 
the decedent dies testate, in which case the executor or other 
personal representative appointed shall administer the estate. 
The court may make any orders necessary to protect creditors 
and other interested parties. 
Statutes in Delaware 232 and Georgia 233 contemplate that 
no new administration shall be opened in the case of the death 
of any incompetent under guardianship, but that the guardian 
shall distribute the estate in the same manner as if he had been 
appointed administrator. 
construed in Norton v. Thompson, 68 Mo. I 43 ( I  8 7 8 )  as inapplicable to 
married minors. The statutes have since been amended accordingly. 
229 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. I 944) t. zo, §. 8 7 z.  
230 Templar's Estate (Pa. Orphans' Ct. I 94o) , 3 8  D. & C. z88. In this case 
the court indicated that it would be inclined to authorize such a distribution 
when it was affirmatively shown that the funeral and medical expenses have 
been paid or provided for and the next of kin joined in the petition for distri­
bution by the guardian. 
2'11 Colo. Stat. (Supp. I 944) c. I 76, § 89 ( s ) .  This statute was adopted in 
I 94I · 
232 Del. Rev. Code ( I 9 3 5) § 3096. 
232 Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) § 49-3 1 6. 
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Likewise in Illinois 234 a guardian or conservator of a 
deceased ward's estate is authorized under the letters of 
guardianship previously issued to him to administer the estate 
of the deceased ward without further letters of administration, 
unless within thirty days after death a petition for letters testa­
mentary or of administration is filed. If letters are so granted, 
the executor or administrator shall supersede the guardian or 
conservat't)r in the administration of the estate. 
An Indiana statute 235 provides that upon the death of a 
ward whose p'ersonal estate does not exceed $ soo, the guardian 
may proceed to settle the ward's estate without letters of ad­
ministration. Claims against the estate may be filed, litigated 
or allowed and paid the same as in cases of executors or admin­
istrators, and distribution of the estate made under the same 
rules and regulations. 
In Wisconsin, 236 a statute provides similarly with respect 
to the estate of any person other than a minor under guardian­
ship whose total estate does not exceed $300. The guardian 
is authorized to pay funeral expenses and expenses of the 
ward's last sickness. In other guardianship matters in which 
notice to creditors has been given and the ward owned only 
personal estate of a value not to exceed $ I  ,ooo, the court, upon 
notice to all interested parties, may order the guardian to pay 
funeral expenses together with expenses of the guardianship 
and all liabilities incurred by the guardian, and distribute the 
balance to the heirs of the deceased ward. 
Statutes in Massachusetts 237 and Vermont 238 authorize the 
guardian of a deceased ward to pay the funeral expenses of 
the ward. When the estate is sufficiently small that the entire 
amount is so consumed, the need for a separate administration 
is thus avoided. 
""' Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § 476. 
235 lnd. Stat. (Burns, 1 9 3 3 )  § 8-1 35 .  ' 
230 Wis. Stat. ( 1 943 )  § 3 1 9. 32. 
231 Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 1 944) c. zor,  § 48A. 
238 Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 9 3 3 )  § 3282. · 
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All of these statutory devices represent bona fide attempts 
to dispense with the necessity for a separate administration pro­
ceeding. They apply only when a guardian has been acting 
under the supervision of the probate court. In most instances 
he is cognizant of all obligations against the ward's estate. In 
all probability he has incurred them. If this is true and it 
can be determined that the guardian has paid and satisfied all 
outstanding indebtedness from funds in his hands, there is 
no reason why distribution of the ward's estate should not be 
made by the guardian directly to the distributees entitled to it. 
Doubtless this could be done as a practical procedure in the 
vast maj ority of instances with reasonable assurance that no 
creditor was overlooked. 
But if there remains some outstanding indebtedness against 
the ward at the time of his death, it may be inquired at this 
point what procedure is available for determining it and what 
devices may be employed by creditors to assert and enforce 
payment of their claims. In an early Missouri case 239 creditors 
of a deceased ward presented their claim to the guardian and 
sought its allowance in the county court which had jurisdiction 
over the guardian and continued to exercise it pursuant to the 
statute authorizing distribution of the ward's estate direct to 
the distributees upon his death. It was held, however, that 
the county court had no j urisdiction to allow claims against 
the estate of the deceased ward, and further, that the statute 
was not intended to apply when there were outstanding debts. 
No indication was made as to how the existence or non­
existence of debts was to be determined. The tacit assumption 
necessary for the application of the Missouri statute was that 
no outstanding indebtedness does actually exist. Its practical 
uselessness in that state may be inferred from the fact that 
there are no reported cases in which use of the statute has been 
attempted in nearly three quarters of a century. 
. 
289 George & Ratcliffe v. Dawson's Guardian, 1 8  Mo. 407 ( 1 85 3 ) .  , 
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The Indiana statute likewise provides for an accounting 
by the guardian upon the ward's death and for settlement of 
the ward's estate without letters of administration. The 
defect of 'the Missouri statute, however, has been prqvided 
against. Express provision is made for the filing and allow­
ance of claims in the settlement of the estate by the guardian 
in the same manner as when settlement is made by an executor 
or administrator. In a recent Indiana case 240 a guardian at­
tempted to function under this statute and refused to allow 
or pay a claim presented after the expiration of some two years 
subsequent to the death of the ward. The creditors excepted 
from his final accounting and also from the non-allowance 
and non-payment of their claims. No notice to creditors had 
been published. The Supreme Court of Indiana declared that 
the statute contemplated merely that new letters of adminis­
tration need not issue to a personal representative but that the 
guardian, under the letters already issued to him, should pro­
ceed to administer the estate under the same rules and regula­
tions applicable to an executor or administrator. In other words, 
he must publish notice to creditors and of final settlement as 
he would do in administering on a decedent's estate. The net 
result of this conception of the Indiana statute is that it operates 
to dispense with the necessity of issuing new letters of ad­
ministration. In function, though not in name, the guardian 
is transformed into an administrator. 
Though statutes of the kind under consideration may have 
contemplated some summary distribution of a deceased ward's 
estate by his guardian, it seems clear that this is not always 
practical. Furthermore, the estate of an insolvent decedent 
is marshalled for creditors quite differently from the estate 
of an insolvent ward under guardianship. Creditors are en­
titled to protection and consideration comparable to that ac-
... Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County v. Pardue, 2 1 4  Ind. 579, r 6  
N .  E. (zd) 884 ( r 9 38 ) .  
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corded them in the administration of a decedent's estate. · To 
permit the guardian to function as an administrator to save 
expenses, and to have the settlement and distribution of the 
estate occur in the -same court and in the same proceeding are 
sensible and sound objectives.241 But to dispense with notice 
to creditors or other safeguards employed in an ordinary ad­
ministration proceeding is neither desirable nor justifiable. 
On the whole, the Indiana and Colorado statutes seem to 
provide a sound method for merging the administration pro­
ceeding with the guardianship proceeding.242 Notice to 
creditors and other safeguards applicable to an ordinary ad­
ministration proceeding are provided for. While the Illinois 
statute seems to permit a short-cut, it authorizes a guardian 
or conservator to make distribution of his deceased ward's 
estate direct to the persons entitled, only if a petition for 
letters testamentary or of administration is not filed within 
thirty days following the ward's death. Creditors and other 
persons are thus afforded a reasonable period of time to apply 
for administration, failing which summary distribution to the 
heirs may be made. White no case has yet arisen in Illinois, 
a personal representative subsequently appointed would 
probably be entit1ed to recover from the heirs the property 
received by them from the guardian. The thirty-day pro­
vision is doubtless a counterpart of another Illinois statute/43 
to be referred to later in another connection, which authorizes 
any person or corporation indebted to or holding personal 
2" Edwards v. Edwards, I 45 Ill. App. 457 at 460 ( I 9o 8 ) .  
242 In Wingate v. James, I 2. I Ind. 69, 2.2. .N. E .  7 35  ( I  8 89) ,  the court ordered 
the sale of a ward's real estate to pay a judgment. Before the sale was made the 
ward died. Nevertheless the guardian sold the land without obtaining a new 
order. In upholding the sale, the court said : "When the fact of the ward's 
death, and the amount and condition of her estate, were reported, the jurisdic­
tion. of the court over the settlement of the ward's estate were continued pre­
cisely as if the ward had remained in life. The proceedings were properly 
continued in the matter of the guardianship ; the guardian proceeding, as such, 
to the settlement and distribution of the estate." , 
""' Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § 478, discussed in subdivision 
III-D-2, infra. ' 
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property of a decedent to turn . it over to certain surviving 
members of his family, provided that no letters are then out­
standing and no petition therefor is thep. pending, and that 
thirty days have elapsed since the death of the decedent. 
If a guardian proceeds to administer and make distributi�n 
of the estate, as is contemplated in the Indiana and Colorado 
statutes, he is entitled to exercise all the powers of an executor 
or administrator and he is subject likewise to the same 
duties. 244 But it should be noted that the effect of sucl_l statutes 
is to alter somewhat the functions of a guardian. Before the 
death of the ward, he carries out various activities for a living 
person. After the death of the ward, he administers and 
accounts for the estate of a deceased person. The statutes add 
nothing to the estate under his management and control. 
They do give him additional power to 'close up the estate.245 
This transformation of function is a small aid, but only a small 
aid, in the simplification of the problem of administration. 
They save the necessity of appointing a personal represent­
ative, but otherwise administration proceeds in the usual man­
ner. If the ward has left a valid will and appointed an ex­
ecutor, such statutes should not and ordinarily do not apply.246 
It is hard to justify such legislation as exists in Arkansas and 
Missouri unless an estate is of such small size as to come under 
the provisions of some other statute justifying summary ad­
ministration or distribution. Thus the Indiana� statute is 
limited in its operation to estates less than $500 and the Wis­
consin statute to estates le�s than $300 and $ r ,ooo, respec­
tively. And the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia has indicated 
· ... This is implied in the Colorado statute. See also Hire v. Hrudicka, 3 79 Ill. 
zor, 40 N. E. (zd) 63 ( 1 942 ) ; Wingate v. James, 1 2 1  Ind. 69, 11. N. E. 7 35  
(1 889) . · 
... People v. Harms, 1 8 7  Ill. App. 140 ( 1 9 14) • 
... Belleville Sav. Bank v. Schrader, 2 1 4  Ill. App. 3&8  ( 1 9 1 9 ) ; Keener v. 
Ochsenrider, 85 Ind. App. 1 5 6, 1 49 N. E. 101  ( 192.5) . But if there is no 
will or if the executor named cannot serve, the guardian has been held entitled 
to administer the estate as against the next of kin. Lang v. Friesenecker, 2. 1 3  
Ill. 598, 73 N .  E .  3 2 9  ( 1 905).  
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that it will apply the Pennsylvania statute only in estates less 
than $ I  ,ooo. 247 
Despite the infrequent application of these statutes, it may 
be possible to increase their utility. If a notice to creditors 
could be combined with a notice of the guardian's final ac­
counting, opportunity would thus be afforded creditors to 
present their claims on or before the hearing on the final ac­
count. If ample time is thus allowed, such a notice may be 
deemed the 'equivalent of notice to creditors in an administra­
tion proceeding, and the period of time so allowed, as a rea­
sonable nonclaim period. This practice is apparently followed 
by the Pennsylvania Orphans' Court of Philadelphia 
County.248 The Wisconsin statute is also applicable to es­
tates of less than $ I  ,ooo worth of personal property where 
notice to creditors has been given in the guardianship pro­
ceedings. 
4· A method for community property 
The administration of community property in those states 
having the community property system presents certain prob­
lems that deserve special consideration 1n dispensing with 
administration on such property. Upon the death of either 
spouse, one-half of the community property is said to go to or 
· belong to the surviving spouse while the other half is subject 
to the testamentary disposition of the deceased spouse.249 In 
some of these states if either spouse dies intestate, the entire 
community property passes to the survivor.250 It  has been 
,.7 Templar's Estate (Pa. Orphans' Ct. I 94o) 3 8  D. & C. 2 8 8  . 
..., Templar's Estate (Pa. Orphans' Ct. I 940) 3 8 D. & C. z 8 8.  
2<o I DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY ( I  94 3 )  §§ I 9 8, 
202, 203·  
""" This is  true in California and Idaho. See r DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF 
. COMMUNITY PROPERTY ( 1 943) § 1 9 9· 
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held in some states that the community property is not liable 
for the wife's separate debts. 251 
As a result of this immunity from the wife's obligations, ad­
ministration on the wife's interest in the community property 
is deemed unnecessary if her surviving husband becomes en­
titled to all of the community property upon her death. Such 
is the implication of the California Probate Code.252 The 
community property under the husband's control remains sub­
ject to the community debts. An Arizona statute 253' specifically 
provides that if community property passes to a surviving 
husband, he may obtain a decree determining his ownership 
which, when recorded, will have the same effect as' a decree of 
distribution. The appointment of a personal representative 
has been held futile under these conditions and properly sub­
ject to revocation.254 Similar statutes apply in Idaho 255 and 
New Mexico 256 when the wife dies intestate. There is also a 
provision in the California Probate Code 257 for the determi­
nation of title to property which is affected by the death of a 
person, but it does not specifically refer to community prop­
erty. A Nevada statute 258 dispenses with administration on 
community property when the husband dies and the surviving 
wife or surviving wife and children pay or secure all the com­
munity debts.259 Similarly, a Texas statute 260 provides that 
., 
''" I  DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY ( 1 943 )  §§ 1 6o-1 62.. 
,,,. Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) §§ zo 1-203. 
263 Ariz. Code (1 9 39 )  § 3 8-201 1 . 
"" In re Anderson, 1 8  Ariz. z66, 1 5 8  P. 457 ( 1 9 1 6 ) .  . 
""" Idaho Laws Ann. ( 1 943)  § 1 4-1 1 3 .  Under the authority of this statute, 
· administration has been held unnecessary upon the wife's estate in State ex rei. 
Gallet v. Naylor, so Idaho 1 1 3, 294 P. 3 3 3  ( 1 930) and Pierson v. Pierson, 63  
Idaho 1 ,  1 1 5 P. (zd) 742 ( 1 941 ) .  · 
""" N. M. Stat. ( 1 941 ) § 3 �-108.  
''" Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1944) - §§ I I 70-I I 75 · 
208 Nev. Comp. Laws ( 1 929) § 3 365 . 
... Wright v. Smith, 1 9  Nev •• 143, 7 P. 3 65 ( I 8 8 s ) .  
"'" Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 9 3 9 )  art. 3 662. Administration has been 
dispensed with under the authority of this statute in the following cases : Wall 
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when either spouse dies intestate without children or separate 
property, the community property passes without administra­
tion to the surviv�r but it is charged with the debts of the 
community. In each case the community property is relieved 
of administration because of its immunity from the separate 
debts of the deceased spouse and its continued liability for com­
munity debts. Only in Nevada is the payment of community 
debts or the securing of their payment a condition precedent 
to the passing of full ownership and control to the surviving 
wife or surviving wife and children. 
In connection with the administration of community prop­
erty an Idaho statute 261 deserves special mention . . It provides 
that "When a marital community is dissolved by the death 
of either member thereof, thereafter, if the survivor shall die 
before proceedings shall have been commenced for the probate 
of the estate of the person who first died, and both have died 
intestate the estates of both o.f the said decedents may, by 
order of the court, be joined for probate in a single proceed­
ing . . . provided the same person is . . . entitled to · 
letters of administration in both estates. . . ." This statute 
seems to be uniqu� in permitting the liquidation in one pro­
ceeding of the two estates of the members of a marital com­
munity. 
" 
D. INFORMAL FAMILY SETTLEMENTS 
Despite the existence of an established procedure for the ad­
ministration of estates heirs do not always avail themselves 
of this procedure. If the decedent leaves no debts or only 
such as the heirs are willing to pay, there may be no one to 
insist upon administratiot).. And if the heirs can gain posses-
v. Clark, 1 9  Tex. 3 2 1  ( 1 857) ; Ross v. Martin, 1 04 Tex. 558, 1 40 S. W. 432, 
14 1  s. w. s z 8  ( I 9 I I ) ; Graves v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App. I 9 I I ) ,  140 s. w. 
487 ; Antone v. Stiles (Tex. Civ. App. 1 944) , 1 7 7  S .. W. (zd) 246. 
:on Idaho Laws Ann. ( 1 943) § 1 5-376. Cf. S. D. Code ( 1 939)  § p.o9o9 ( ro) 
cited at note 148, supra. 
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sion of or divide the decedent's prope.t;ty among themselves 
amicably, there may be no real justification for administration. 
Most states possess no legislation recognizing or condemning 
·such settlements. In fact, it has often been said that the law 
looks with favor upon family agreements for the settlement 
of estates. Justice Cooley expressed this sentiment i.n an early 
Michigan case 262 when he said: "Formal proceedings for the 
settlement of an estate are never necessary if all parties con­
cerned can agree to dispense with them. Family ar­
rangements for this purpose, it is said, are favorites of the 
law, and when fairly made are never allowed to be disturbed 
by the parties, or by any others for them." That countless 
numbers of them have been effected successfully is within the 
experience of most lawyers. Sometimes, however, difficulties 
of collection or distribution are encountered; sometimes un­
expected creditors' claims interpose obstacles ; or problems 
of marketable title to land, registered securities or similar 
property arise long after a decedent's death and the informal 
settlement of his estate among the heirs. At this point it is 
""" Browne v. Forsche, 43 Mich. 492 at soo, 5 N. W. I o i  1 ( t 8 8o ) .  A 
definite sentiment to the contrary was voiced in an early California case, Estate 
of Strong, 1 1 9 Cal. 663, 5 1  P. 1078  ( 1 898 ) ,  wherein it was said at 1 i 9 Cal. 
665-666:  
"Whatever the law may be in other jurisdictions, there i s  nothing in our pro­
bate law which would, either expressly or by implication, exempt the property 
of this estate from the requirement of administration. The whole subject matter 
of dealing with the estates of deceased persons is one of statutory regulation, and 
the policy and intent of our statute very clearly contemplates that property of 
decedents left undisposed of at death • • . shall, for the purposes of as­
certaining and protecting the right of creditors and heirs, and properly trans­
mitting the title of record, be subjected to the process of administration in the 
probate court. Indeed, there is no other method provided by the statute whereby 
the existence of creditors or heirs of decedents may be conclusively established. 
And such administration may be initiated and had at the instance of any person 
entitled under the law to administer upon the estate." 
This statement, made at the time it was, should not be taken to reflect a per­
manent policy in California. Some of the most useful legislation for the purpose 
of dispensing with administration exists there. It is also true that administration 
was necessary in order to confer marketable title to the land in the above case, 
yet neither the vendors nor the vendee were seekiug that objective. The public 
administrator alone desired administration. 
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proposed to examine the efficacy of these settlements as a 
substitute for an official administration. 
In the first place it may be said that the body of law con­
cerning the informal settlement of decedents' estates has been 
largely constructed by the judiciary. That a paucity of legis­
lation exists on the subject is not surprising when it is con­
sidered that such settlements are confined to small estates for 
the most part, and that courts have worked out fairly satis­
factory solutions to most controversies. Areas of doubt and 
uncertainty still remain in which debtors and heirs alike often 
take certain risks when formal administration is omitted. 
When there is a large estate the heirs prefer to have a formal 
administration so that property ultimately distributed to them 
will be free of any possible claims of creditors. Nevertheless 
informal settlements may also be effected in estates that can­
not be classed as small. Only scattered legislation exists which 
explicitly recognizes the propriety and validity of such settle­
ments. There is a wide feeling that our probate codes are in 
need of positive legislation dealing with this subject in its 
varied aspects and giving certainty and assurances instead of 
leaving doubts and compelling parties to assume risks for 
their acts. 
Only a few statutes deal positively with the necessity for 
administration and the duty of the court to grant adminis­
tration upon an estate. An Arkansas statute/63 for example, 
provides that no administration shall be granted unless, in the 
opinion of the court, it shall be necessary to preserve the 
estate from waste or damage or to protect the rights of credi­
tors. Also a Colorado statute 264 provides that administration 
may be dispensed with if there is no property in the state be­
longing to the deceased of sufficient value to justify adminis­
tration, or if the testator at the time of his death was living 
""" Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1 9 3 7) § 6. 
""' Colo. Stat. ( 1 9 35)  c. 1 76, § 52 .  
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outside the state and left no debts there. A Georgia statute 265 
provides that if a husband is the sole heir of his deceased wife, 
he may take possession of her estate without administration 
upon payment of her individual debts. These statutes are a 
recognition that the process of administration is more than an 
empty gesture to fill an office and that it should be required 
only when a real necessity exists therefor. A Texas statute 266 
provides that "No administration upon any estate shall be 
granted unless there exists a necessity therefor, such necessity 
to be determined by the court hearing the application." A 
com-panion statute �67 provides that "such necessity shall be 
demed to exist if two or more debts exist against the estate, 
or if or when it is desired to have the county court partition 
the estate among the owners." 
There are, in addition, several statutes which direct the 
granting of administration unless the heirs desire to settle 
the estate without administration. In Arkansas 268 the heirs 
of an intestate decedent, if all are of full age, may collect, 
manage, control and dispose of an estate if creditors consent 
or the claims of creditors are satisfied. Or if administration 
has already been granted, it may be revoked. Authority is 
conferred upon the heirs to sue for and collect all demands 
and property belonging to the estate. There is no require­
ment of administration under a Georgia statute 269 when the 
heirs, distributees or legatees prefer to settle the estate with­
out admini.stration. If there are no debts, official recognition 
of such settlements has been provided by a new statute 270 
enacted in I 945· It provides that any heir of a decedent who 
... Ga. Code Ann. ( 1 936) § 1 1 3-902 • 
.... Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939)  art. 3 35 6. 
2'17 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 93 9 )  art. 3 3 70 . 
..,. Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1 9 :3 7) §§ 1, z, 3 ·  Such an agreement may be entered 
into after administration has been granted, waiving further accounting by the ' administrator. Herndon v. Adkisson (Ark. 1 945) ,  1 84 S. W. (zd) 953 ·  
llll" Ga. Code Ann. ( 1 936) § 1 1 3-1 3 1 4. 
070 Ga. Laws r 9451 Gov. No. ;o2. 
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has died intestate and upon whose estate no administration has 
been had may file a petition in the court of ordinary stating 
that there are no debts and that the heirs have agreed upon 
a division of the estate amicably among themselves and desire 
to settle the estate without administration, and praying for 
an order that no administration is necessary. The court may 
then make a decree declaring that formal administration is 
unnecessary. In Illinois 271 the court need not issue letters 
testamentary or of administration if it is satisfied that no 
· federal estate or Illinois inheritance tax will be due and finds 
that all claims are paid, that all heirs, legatees or devisees 
are residents of Illinois, and that they are of legal age and 
desire to settle the estate without administration. A Kentucky 
statute 272 authorizes the court to dispense with administration 
on- the estate of an intestate decedent upon the written agree­
ment of. all persons interested in the personal estate, in cases 
where there are no creditors or the heirs designate a trustee 
to collect claims and demands. Such an agreement may be 
executed on behalf of a minor or other person under disability 
by his guardian, curator or committee. And if administration 
has already been granted, it shall be revoked. A Florida 
statute 273 likewise authorizes the court to dispense with ad­
ministration when an estate of not more than $2,000, ex­
clusive of exempt property, is not indebted, and there is a sole 
heir or the heirs make division thereof amicably among them� 
selves. 
These are the legislative reliefs from administration. Ther� 
are, in addition, some legislative prohibitions against adminis-:­
tration after the expiration of a designated period of time.274 
Most legislation of the latter kind is designed to bar claims 
of creditors generally, operating as a kind of special nonclaim 
271 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, § 227.  
'172 Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) §§ 395-450, 395·470, 395·48o, 3'15·490· 
273 Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 945) §§ 735.01 to 735-I 3 • " ' '  
27' See subdivision 111-D-I ,  infra. · · · . _ · ' · .· · 
·- . .  ::: ' ; 
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statute when there has been no administration, alil.ough some 
of the legislation merely relieves land from the lien of credi­
tors' claims. One practical effect of these statutes is to preclude 
creditors from attacking these family settlements and demand­
ing administration after the lapse of a specified time. 
There remains to be considered the extent to which informal 
administrations may be carried out in the performance of the 
functions for which administration is ordinarily granted. 
Even in the absence of a specific statute, many cases have up­
held the right of heirs to proceed without administration where 
assets are applied to the payment of debts. There is no vested 
right to the office of personal representative ; and the state 
possesses no prerogative to demand an administration for the 
mere purpose of carrying out a procedure. 275 
The functions of administration have already been stated as 
being ( r )  to collect assets, (2} to pay debts, and (3 )  to make 
distribution of the residual estate to those entitled to it. It 
is commonly said that the title to a decedent's personalty 
passes to his personal representative. There is some truth 
in this statement. Its universal accuracy may be doubted, 
however. Suppose that no personal representative is ap­
pointed. Does it follow that the heirs do not under any cir­
cumstances become entitled to the decedent's property in the 
absence of administration? Can it be that rights can be thus 
extinguished? Some courts have seen fit to say that the per­
sonal representative possesses only a naked legal title or that 
an exception to the general rule will be made when no adminis­
tration is granted. A different point of view is contained in the 
codes of some western states which provide that the title to a 
decedent's property shall pass directly to his heirs, devisees 
or legatees, but "all of his property shall be subje�tto the pos­
session of the executor or administrator and to the control 
of the . . . court for the purposes of administration, . . . 
�· Christe v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 1 04 Iowa 707, 74 N. W. 697 (189.8). 
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and shall bl chargeable with the expenses of administering 
his estate, and the payment of his debts and the allowance to 
the family." 276 In those states administration is unnecessary 
to the mere vesting of title, but vesting is made subject to 
administration in which liability for payment of debts is de­
termined. Perhaps in the final analysis there is little practical 
difference in these two views. Even under the first view the 
title of the personal representative is very limited, to say the 
least. Under either mode of looking at it, interposition by 
him is but a recognized means of accomplishing the three 
functions of administration. 
It will not be denied that the heirs have an interest in the 
personal property of a decedent and may enter into contracts 
for the division of it, valid as among themselves. Such con­
tracts cannot by their very nature affect the right of creditors. 
It has often been stated as a general principle that the heirs 
may agree to divide and distribute the property of an estate 
when they are all of age and legal capacity and there are no 
debts against the estate. This principle itself is looked upon 
as an exception to the general rule that the title to personalty 
passes to the personal representative. 
This exception, that the heirs by a division of the decedent's 
property among themselves may obtain full ownership of it, 
seems to have taken root from a practice prevailing where 
courts of equity have administered estates. As authority for 
recognizing the legal rights and ownership of heirs who have 
. taken possession of a decedent's property without administra­
tion, courts have frequently cited decisions of Alabama and 
Mississippi. An examiftation of the earlier of these decisions, 
howev:er, indicates that merely the "equitable title," not the 
"'" Cal. Pro b. ·Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 3 oo. The following .contain 
substantially identical language : Okla. Stat. ( 1941)  t. 84, § z u ; S. D. Code 
( 1 93 9 )  § 56.or o2 ; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939)  art. 3 314 ;  Utah Code 
( 1 943) § r cn-4-2 ; Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 3 2) § 1 366. See also N. o: Rev. 
Code (1 943) § s6-o1o3. 
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"legal title," was recognized as being in the heirs in the absence 
of administration. For example, in Miller v. Eatman,277 one 
of the early cases on the subject, the Supreme Court of Alabama 
said : 
"In courts of equity, where it is not necessary that the legal 
title should be vested in the plaintiff, an administration may 
be dispensed with, where the right is asserted by those who 
would be entitled to distribution, and where it is clear that 
there are no creditors to be prejudiced." 278 
In each instance the court required proof and made a deter­
mination that there were no creditors. Moreover, a court 
of equity, if asked to do so, would actually make a decree dis­
tributing the property of the decedent to the heirs so as to give 
them the same indicia of ownership as would be obtainable 
from a personal representative at the close of an administra­
tion. As said in the later Alabama case of Fretwell v. 
McLemore: 279 
"The rule to be extracted from these decisions is, that a 
court of equity will dispense with an administration, and 
decree distribution directly, when it affirmatively appears that, 
if there was an administrator, the only duty devolving on 
him would be distribution. Then administration is regarded 
as 'a useless ceremony.' An administrator or an executor is a 
trustee clothed with the legal title. He holds in trust for 
creditors and distributees or legatees. The creditors are en­
titled to charge the assets with the payment of their debts, 
in priority of the equity of distributees or legatees. When 
there are no debts, the equity of the distributees or legatees is 
perfect ; the legal title, if there was a personal representative, 
would be a naked trust, which a court of equity ought not and 
would not permit to be interposed as a bar to the equitable title 
of the distributee or legatee." 
"'1 I I Ala. 609 (I 84 7 ) .  
"'8 I I  Ala. 609 a t  6 I4  ( I 847) .  
"'" 
s z  Ala. I Z4 at 1 33 ( x 8 75 ) .  See also Watson v. Byrd, 53 Miss. 480 
( 1 876) . 
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These words have often been cited elsewhere 280 as authority 
for dispensing with administration. In applying this prin­
ciple, courts of other states have not been content to accept 
it as one to be applied only in courts of equity. They have 
readily extended it to various actions at law and without any 
antecedent decree of distribution in equity.281 In a wide 
variety of situations heirs have been deemed to possess all the 
elements of legal ownership. What was once regarded as 
purely equitable doctrine to be applied in courts of equity has 
blossomed into full flower as a well recognized legal principle. 
Reverting to the question previously raised, What becomes 
of the decedent's property if administration is not granted? 
May the heirs prevent the. appointment of a personal repre­
sentative? Does it follow that the heirs may never sue for 
and collect the decedent's property? Do they ever become 
entitled to the possession and ownership of it? And may 
they gain a marketable title? Perhaps simple, categorical 
answers are not feasible. The solutions to these inquiries, 
however, will circumscribe the areas in which administration 
may be dispensed with. We turn now to a consideration of 
each of thl! inquiries in relation to the stated functions of ad­
ministration. 
I .  Right of creditors to require administration 
and enforce claims 
Let us .assume that the heirs of a particular decedent have 
agreed upon a division of the estate among themselves, but 
that there are one or more outstanding creditors. Under what 
circumstances may the heirs successfully resist the demands 
of creditors that formal ,administration be granted? Will the . 
claims of creditors also become barred in the absence of ad­
ministration? Several possibilities need to be considered here. 
""" For example, see In re Riley's Estate, 9z N. J. Eq. 567, I 1 3  A. 485 ( I9z1)1  
Murphy v .  Murphy, 4Z Wash. 14z, 84 P .  646 ( 1 906): 
m See the text and cases cited in the discussion following. 
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Fi�st, the heirs may pay the creditor directly and thus 
disable him from further demanding administration. A 
Texas statute 282 provides that they may defeat the applica­
tion of the creditor "by the payment of the claim of such 
creditor." It is also sometimes provided that it may be dd­
feated by proof that such claim is fictitious, fraudulent, illegal · 
or barred by limitation.283 
Second, provision is also made in Texas 284 for the heirs to 
execute a bond conditioned to pay the debt. Creditors are 
thus given a new res as security for their debts in place of the 
estate which can be transmitted to the heirs without an of­
ficial administration. 
Administration has also been refused when the creditor 
had ample security for his debt/85 or where he could bring a 
direct action against the heirs themselves.28� Under a Texas 
statute 287 already mentioned, necessity for administration on 
an estate is determined by the existence of at least two creditors. 
Where there is only one creditor, he is said to be adequately 
protected by permitting him to enforce his claim against the 
estate in the hands of distributees. 288 This procedure re-· 
sembles very closely that of the civil law under which the heir 
takes the decedent's property and at the same time becomes 
liable for his debts. Where several 'debts exist, the problem 
begins to suggest complications which justify a formal ad­
ministration. 
Finally there is a substantial body of legislation designed 
to encourage timely administration proceedings and to bar 
creditors who do not take appropriate steps to enforce their 
claims when others do not apply for administration. First, 
... Tex. Civ . .  Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 939)  art. 3 340. 
283 See, for example, Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 9 39 )  art. 3 340. Similar 
provisions are found in many probate codes. 
· ... Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 9 39)  art. 3 340, 3 341 .  
283 Webb v .  Trimble Bros., 143 Ky. 3 75, 1 3 6  S .  W. 8 70  ( 1 9 1  1 ) .  
• cross v. Hancock's Estate (Tex. Civ. App. 1 943 ) ,  1 76 S. W. (zd) 586. 
181 Tex. Civ. Stat Ann. (Vernon, 19 39)  art. 3 3 70. This statute applies only 
to decedents who die intestate. 
• cross v. Hanco.ck's Estate (Tex. Civ. App. 1 943), 1 76 S. W. (2.d) 5 86. 
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there is the group of statutes already referred to limiting the 
time for the granting of administration. Such statutes exist 
in Connecticut 289 Iowa 29° Kentucky 291 Maine 292 Massa-' ' ' ' 
chusetts/93 Pennsylvania,294 Tennessee 295 and Texas.296 There 
is a difference of opinion as to whether these statutes affect the 
. power or jurisdiction of the court, or whether they are in:.. 
tended merely as statutes of limitation on the granting of 
letters.297 In Idaho it has been held that an administration 
proceeding is regarded as an "action" and is subject to the 
general four-year statute of limitations. 298 
Second, there are statutes in Colorado/99 Florida/00 
Kansas/01 Nebraska,302 Oregon 303 and Wyoming 304 which 
289 Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 9 3o) § 4909 (ten years except for good cause shown) . 
290 Iowa Code ( I 939)  § I I 8 9 I  (five years, except that if death occurs out of 
state, period does not begin to run until death is known ; if property is discovered 
after the expiration of five years, administration may be granted only for the 
purpose of making distribution thereof) . 
291 Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) § 395 .0 I o  (twenty years) .  Administration granted 
thereafter is declared to be void. 
292 Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. I4I ,  §§ I ,  2 (twenty years) . 
293 Mass. Ann. Laws (I 932)  c. I 9 J, �§ 4, 5 (twenty years) . 
294 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 9 3o)  t. 20, § 342 (twenty-one years, except 
upon order of the Orphans' Court upon due cause shown) . But letters granted 
after the expiration of twenty-one years without such an order have been held 
n,ot to be absolutely void for all purposes. Foster v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. St. 
I 48 ( I 86o ) .  
295 Tenn. Code (Michie, I 9 3 8 ) § 8 I 67 (ten years ; twenty-two years · for 
infant distributee) . 
296 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (V�rnorr, I 9 39 )  art. 3 325, 3 3 70 (four years except 
where administration is necessary to recover funds or other property due the 
estate) .  · 
297 In Maine it has been held that the lapse of time deprives the probate 
court of any jurisdiction to grant administration. Bean v. Bumpus, 22 Me. 549 
(I 843 ) .  An early Tennessee case held similarly. Rice v. Henly, 6 Pick. ( 90 
Tenn.) 69, I 5  S. W. 748 ( I 89 I ) .  But see Weaver v. Hughes, 26  Tenn. App. 
436, I 73 S. W. (2d) I 59 ( I 943) which held that an appointment of an execu­
tor after the expiration of ten years could not be attacked collaterally. 
298 Gwinn v. Melvin, 9 Idaho 202, 72 P. 96I  ( I 903 ) .  
299 Colo. Stat. (Supp. I 945) c. I 76, § §  75, 7 6  (one year). 
80° Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 7 34.29 (three years) . 
301 Kan. Gen. Stat ._(Supp. I 943) § 59-2239  (personal representative must be 
appointed within one year) . . 
302 Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 943 )  § 30-609 (two years) . 
308 Ore. Comp. Laws ( I 940) § 1-2 1 6. 
804 Wyo. Laws 1 945, c. 69 (two years) . 
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purport to bar claims of creditors unless administration is 
grart ed within a specified time after death. These are special 
statutes of nonclaim applying in the absence of administra­
ticm. The basic idea behind these statutes is that when th� 
parties immediately interested in an estate fail to have an 
administrator appointed within the time fixed by the statute, 
then any creditor may cause one to be appointed, and · the 
statute of limitations then begins to run against the creditor. 
Failure to apply for administration within the prescribed 
petiod operates to bar the claim as effectively as does the 
statute of nonclaim when administration has been granted.305 
To permit the statutes of limitation to be tolled indefinitely 
in the absence of administration would be to defeat their funda­
mental purpose as statutes of repose. General nonclaim 
statutes operate only after administration is granted. There 
seems no adequate reason to authorize creditors to effect col­
lection of their claims by demanding administration and at 
the same time toll the statute of limitations in their favor 
when they do not employ the means afforded to enforce their 
claims. In Michigan and Minnesota, statutes 306 differing in 
form but not in substance require creditors to file their claims 
in the probate court within a designated period of time or 
be forever barred, implying that they or some other interested 
person must initiate proceedings for administration in ample 
time prior thereto. 307 
""' Gilpen v. Bower, 1 5 2  Fla. 733 ,  12. So. (2d) 8 84 ( 1 943 ) ; Nickel v. Vogel, 
76  Kan. 625, 9 2  P. 1 I 05 (I  907) ; Brown v. Baxter, 7 7  Kan. 97 ,  94 P. 1 5 5, 
574 ( I 9o8) ; Crow v. Hartzler, I 03 Kan. 8oo, I 76 P. 65 I  ( I 9 I 8) ; Timmonds 
v. Messner, 1 09 Kan. 5 1 8, 200 P. 270  ( I 9 2 I ) ; Glathart v. Madden, I 2 2  Kan. 
563, 253  P. 426 ( I 927) ; In re Estate of Dumback, 1 54 Kan. 50 I ,  1 I 9  P. (zd) 
476 ( I 94I ) ; First National Bank of Superior v. Bradshaw, 9I Neb. 7 I 4, 1 3 6  
N. W. I O I 5  ( I 9 1 2) (dictum) ; Crawford State Bank v. McEwen, I 3 2  .Neb. 
399, 272  N. W. 226 ( 1 9 3 7 ) ; Luikart v. Quinn, 1 3 8 Neb. 849, 295  N. W. 89o 
( I 94I ) ; Stander v .  Pankonin, I4 I  Neb. 7 3 8, 4 N. W. (2d) 895  ( I 942 ) ; Luse 
v. Webster, 74 Ore. 489, 1 45 P. I 063 ( 1 9 I 5 ) .  
800 Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943) § 2 7·3 1 7 8 (430) (six years) ; Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  
§ 525.43 1  (five years) . 
301 In re Wisser's Estate, 248 Mich. 393 ,  2.27 N. W. 752  ( I 9 2 9 ) .  
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Third, statutes exist in Missouri,808 Nevada,809 New 
Hampshire,310 New Mexico,311 Rhode Island,312 Washing­
ton 813 and Wisconsin, 314 prohibiting creditors from subjecting 
land of a decedent for the payment of their claims if adminis­
tration is not granted within a designated period of time fol­
lowing death.315 All statutes of this kind do not apply to 
personalty. They are primarily statutes of repose, passed in · 
the interests of marketability of titles of land. Idaho stat­
utes 316 provide a method for a determination of heirship 
after two years have elapsed from the date of death of a de­
cedent upon whose estate administration is not contemplated 
in Idaho. Provision is made for creditors to file their claims 
in that proceeding, failing which all claims are barred. 
In regard to the statute of limitations, it is ordinarily held 
that its running is interrupted from the date of death until the 
appointment of a personal representative. 317 Even if no such 
interruption occurred it would be difficult to determine with 
any great certainty when all debts have become barred, for 
308 Mo. Rev. 'Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) §§ 1 79, r 8o {ten years) . 
300 Nev. Comp. Laws ( 1 929) § 8534  (three years) . 
310 N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c. 3 55, §§ 29, 30 (two years) . 
311 N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 3 3-8o4 (six years) . 
312 R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 9 3 8 )  c. ·5 79, § 30 (six years) . . 
313 Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 32)  §§ 1 368, 1 3 7oa (six years) . ·  
"" Wis. Stat. ( 1 943 ) § 3 1 6.or (three years) . 
315 Austin v. Shipman, r 6o Mo. App. 206, 14 1  S. W. 425 ( 1 9 1 1 )  (dictum) ; 
Kling v. Greef Realty Co., r 66 Mo. App. 1 90, 148  S. W. 203 ( 1 9 1 2) (dictum) ; 
In re Smith's Estate, 25 Wash. 5 39, 66 P. 9 3  ( 1 90 1 ) ; Gleason v. Hawkins, 3 2  
Wash. 464, 73  P .  5 3 3  ( 1 903 ) ; Murphy v .  Murphy, 4 2  Wash. 1 42, 84 P .  646 
( 1 906) ; Fuhrman v. Power, 43 Wash. 533 ,  86 P. 940 ( 1 906) ; State ex rel. 
Speckart v. Superior Court, 48 Wash. 14 1 1  9 2  P. 942 (t9o7) ; Duvall v. 
Healy Lumber Co., 5 7  Wash. 446, 1 0 7  P. 3 5 7, 1 09 P. 305 ( r 9 r o) ; In re 
Mason's Estate, 95 Wash. 564, 1 64 P. 205 ( 1 9 1 7) ; In re Peterson's Estate, 1 3 7  
Wash. r 3 7, 241 P. 964 ( r 926) ; Scott v. Stanley, 1 49 Wash. 291 z io P. u o  
( 1 9 2 8 )  (dictum) ; In r e  Mundt's Estate, r 69 Wash. 593, 1 4  P. (2d) 5 9  ( 1 932) 
(dicl'um) ; In re Patrick's Estate, 1 95 Wash. r os, 79 P. (2d) 969 ( 1 93 8 ) ; 
Scholl v. Adams, 206 Wis. 1 74, 2 3 9  N. W. 452 ( 1 9 3 1 ) ;  Estate of Koebel, :us  
Wis. 3421 274 N. W. 262  ( 1 9 3 7 ) .  
316 Idaho Laws Ann. ( 1 943)  §§ 1 5-1401 to r s-1405. 
317 2 WOERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d ed, 1 9 2 3) § 401.  See also comment, 
"Executors and Administrators--Comparison of Nonclaim Statutes and the 
General Statutes of Limitations," 3 6  MrcH. L. REV. 973 ( 1 93 8) .  
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maturity dates may not occur until long after death, or dis­
abilities of creditors may prevent the continuous running of 
the statute. A North Dakota statute 318 suspends the running 
of the statute of limitations upon death only until a creditor 
is authorized to apply for letters of administration. For the 
reasons mentioned, it is doubtful how effective this statute 
is for the purpose of determining the non-existence of credi­
tors' claims at any particular time. 
Closely associated with the liability of the decedent's prop­
erty for his debts is its liability for inheritance or succession 
taxes. A frequent, though not universal, procedure, is for 
such taxes to be assessed in connection with or as a part of the 
administration proceeding. If administration is not had and 
there is no separate assessment of inheritance taxes, what is 
the duration of liability of the property of the estate in the 
hands of distributees ? A common provision of tax statutes is 
that inheritance taxes remain a lien until paid, which is another 
way of saying that the statute of limitations does not run 
against the state on its claim for inheritance taxes. In some 
states this would compel an entire administration proceeding 
in order to obtain an assessment of inheritance taxes. Several 
states have statutes providing for the assessment and payment 
of taxes in a separate proceeding 'When no administration is 
had, or for a determination that none is due. Some statutes 
now provide that the claim of the state for such taxes is barred 
after the expiration of a stated period of time. 319 Such special 
318 N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943) § 3o-t 8o9. 
810 Ark. Dig. Stat. (Supp. 1 944) p. 549, § 3 3  (seven years) ; Colo. Stat. 
(Supp. 1 945) c. 85, § 3 8  (fifteen years) ; D. C. Code ( 1 940) § 47-1 603 (ten 
years) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 941)  § 1 9 8 .21. (ten years) ; Idaho Laws Ann. ( 1 943) 
§ 14-404 (five years . after state auditor notified of death) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. 
(Smith-Hurd, 1 940) c. uo, § 397  (five years after death as against purchaser) ; 
Ind. Stat. (Burns, Supp. 1 943) § 6-2430 (ten years) ; Iowa Code ( 1939)  
§ 73 1 1  (five years except a s  to  certain classes of beneficiaries succeeding to 
the decedent's estate) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) § 79-1 529  (ten 
years) ; La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1 939) § 8587  (five years after opening of 
succession) ;  Md. Code ( 1939)  art. 8 1 ,  § 1 2 1  (four years) ; Minn. Stat. ( 1941 ) 
§ 29 1 . 14  (as to real estate, ten years after decree of final distribution) ; Miss. 
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limitation statutes are representative of a larger trend toward 
barring the state in respect to certain claims affecting land and. 
promoting marketability. In some cases, however, these 
statutes of limitation bar the state only with respect to prop­
erty in the hands of purchasers. Irrespective of the form of 
these statutes of limitation, they are intended primarily to 
promote marketability of titles and in some instances to give 
repose to the possession of the heirs. 
2. Right of heirs to collect assets 
The problem of making collection of assets belonging to an 
estate is the first concern of heirs where no administration is 
contemplated. It is often said that when there are no debts, 
the heirs may take possession of the estate without administra­
tion.320 An ability to make an effective collection is an es­
sential for a successful informal
.
settlement. If the heirs are 
already in possession of the decedent's property or can make a 
physical assembly o_f it, well and good; but when the assets 
include property in the hands of or claims against third per­
sons, difficulties may be encountered. Immediately the ques­
tion arises as to whether the heirs may successfully sue to 
recover specific property or a debt from the third party. It 
Code ( I 942) § 9284 (three years) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943 )  § 77-2037 (five 
years) ; N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943) § I05-404 (twenty years) ; Ore. Comp. Laws 
( I  940) § 20-1 1 3 (six years after State Treasurer notified ; seven years in case 
of non-resident decedent) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. I 944) t. 72, § 2443 
(five years after death as against purchaser) ; Tenn. Code (Michie, Supp. I 94I ) 
§ I 2 79, subdivision 7 (four years) ; Wash. Rev. Stat. (Supp. I 94o) § I I 20I  
(amended by Wash. Laws I 945, c .  I 84, § I ) (ten years) ; Wyo. Rev. Stat . 
. ( I 9 3 I )  § I I 5-I 2 I O  (five years in case of resident decedents, but limitation 
does not begin to run in case of non-resident until notice of death is filed with 
Inheritance Tax Commissioner) . 
320 Johnson's Administrator v. Longmire, 39 Ala. I43  ( I  863 ) ; Walworth v. 
Abel, 52 Pa. St. 3 7 o ( I  8 6 6) ; McLean's Executors v. Wade, 5 3  Pa. St. I 46 
( I 866) ; Weaver v. Roth, I 05 Pa. St. 408 ( I 8 84) ; Needham v. Gillett, 39  
Mich. 5 74 ( I 8 7 8 ) ; Woodhouse v .  Phelps, 5 1  Conn. 52 1  ( 1 8 84) ; Vail v. Ander­
son, 61 Minn. 552, 64 N. W. 47 ( 1 895) ; Richardson v. Cole, 1 6o Mo. 3 72, 
6 1  S. W. 1 82 . ( 1 90 • l ; Moore v. Brandenburg, 248 Ill. 23 2, 9 3  N. E. 7 3 3  
( 1 9 I O) � 
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will probably be agreed that such actions should not be al­
lowed as a matter of general policy unless all debts have been 
paid or the estate is not subject to them. Suppose, however, 
that it is proved to the satisfaction of the c�urt that all debts 
have been paid. May recovery be permitted? A negative 
answer has been given in most cases 321 on the theory that the 
decedent's creditors, if any, are not parties to the action and 
that the non-existence of debts can only be judicially deter­
mined by an official administration. As was said in one case, 
"One of the purposes of administration is the payment of the 
debts of the deceased and the barring of claims against the 
estate. A mere statement or affidavit that there are no such 
claims cannot establish that fact. Such fact can only be ju­
dicially established by due course of administration." 322 
Such decisions are predicated upon three implicit assump­
tions. First, it is said that the heirs canna� know or prove 
with absolute certainty whether the decedent was indebted 
or not. But absolute proof of a fact is seldom, if ever, re­
quired. Why should it be required in actions of this kind? 
Something less than absolute verity could well be accepted 
here. Should it always be assumed that the decedent's family 
never know of his financial affairs ? In proceedings for the 
summary administration of estates or for an order of "no 
administration" their word is accepted by the probate court as 
a basis for action. Second, it is said that if payment is required 
of a debtor or if payment is voluntarily made by him, he 
would also be liable to a subsequently appointed-administrator. 
321 Sowle v. Potter, ZZJ  Ky. 1 3 6, 3 S. W. {2d) 1 74 ( 1 928 ) ; Brobst v. 
Brobst, 1 90 Mich. 63, 1 55 N. W. 734 ( r 9 r 6) ; Weis v. Kundert, 1 72 Minn. 
274, 2 1 5  N. W. 1 76 ( 1 927) ; Champollion v. Corbin, 71 N. H. 78, 5 1  A. 674 
( r 9o r ) ; McBride v .  Vance, 7 3  Ohio St. zs8, 7 6  N. E. 93 8 ( r 9o6) ; Mears v. 
Smith, 1 9  S. D. 79, 1 02 N. W. 295 ( r 9o5) ; In re Collins' Estate, r oz Wash. 
697, 1 73 P. r o r 6  ( r 9 r 8 ) ; McKenney v. Minahan, 1 1 9  Wis. 65 r ,  9 7  N. W. 
489 ( I  903 ) .  In general, see 2 WOERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d  ed. I 923)  
§ zoo • 
.... State ex rei. Mann v. Superior Court, p. Wash. 149 at rsz, r oo P. 1 98  
( 1909) . 
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This oft-repeated statement has just enough truth in .it to 
justify caution in allowing recovery or to justify a debtor in 
refusing payment voluntarily. But it will be shown later 
that the actual cas� do not support this statement as a general 
proposition. If payment is made, courts will go to unusual 
lengths to relieve the debtor from making a second payment. 
Third, it is assumed that the payment of money to the heirs 
will result in its immediate dissipation by them and that re­
covery of it from them by a subsequently appointed adminis­
trator would be impossible. It is never assumed that the heirs 
might apply it to the payment of claims, particularly to funeral 
expenses or other preferred claims. Insolvency or dishonesty 
on the p�rt of heirs is too readily assumed. Why not assume 
that money or property in their hands would be as safe there 
as in the hands of th� third person? These are the arguments 
advanced to deny recovery by the heirs. They are not with­
out some weight. Their validity, however, as expressions of 
human conduct may be open to some question as a basis for 
an absolute rule of law. 
More courageous courts have seen fit to depart from this 
strict rule and have permitted the heirs to show, by whatever 
evidence available to them, that there are no creditors with 
outstanding claims at the time of trial or that the assets of the 
estate would not be subject thereto. Recovery from debtors is 
permitted upon such proof. 323 The functions of a personal 
representative, if appointed, would be purely formal and per­
functory, it is said, and would serve no useful purpose. Under 
such circumstances the only office of administration would be to 
3 23 Cooper v. Davison, 86 Ala. 367, 5 So. 650 ( 1 8 8 8 ) ; Braun v. Pettyjohn, 
1 7 6  Ala. 592, 58 So. 907 ( 1 9 1 2) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 
1 3 7  Ark. 366, 209 S� W. 77  ( 1 9 19 ) ; Business Men's Accident Ass'n v. Green, 
147  Ark. 1 99, 227 S. W. 388  ( 1 9 2 1 ) ;  Battey v. Meyerhardt, 1 5 7  Ga. Soo, nz 
S. E. 1 9 5  ( 1 924) ; Moore v. Brandenburg, 2.48 Ill. 232., 93 N. E. 733 ( 1 910)  
{lack of  indebtedness admitted by demurrer) ; Merchants' National Bank of 
Muncie v. McClellan, 40 Ind. App. r ,  So N. E. 854 ( 1 907) ; in general, see 
2. WoERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1 92.3) § 201 ; 70 A. L. R. 386  at 389-
393 ·  ', .  
. 
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make distribution, and this may be accomplished _equally well 
in an action to recover assets. Such a rule is found to be in par­
ticular favor in Alabama and Mississippi where courts of . 
equity have traditionally administered estates.324 Courts of 
other states, however, have not hesitated to allow similar 
actions, even though not instituted in equity. 
Even courts which ordinarily refuse recovery from debtors 
generally permit it under special circumstances. For ex­
ample, recovery has been permitted when the decedent was a 
minor 325 or insane person 326 and presumably incapable of con­
tracting debts. Occasional cases have said that the non­
existence of creditors will be presumed from the mere lapse 
of time without administration having been had. 327 Of course, 
the lapse of time required by various statutes for the barring 
of claims when no administration is sought, will serve equally 
well as a sufficient basis for allowing recovery.328 Where a 
formal administration has proceeded beyond the nonclaim 
period, recovery by the heirs has sometimes been permitted.329 
324 See cases from those states cited in note 323, supra. In Weiland v. Weiland, 
297 Ill. App. 2 3 9, 1 7  N. E. (2d) 625 ( 1 93 8 )  it was mentioned that alth9ugh 
this was originally the rule in equity it would be applied in law as well. -
325 Vanzant v. Morris, 
.
25 Ala. 285  ( 1 8 54) ; Graves v. Davenport, 45 Colo. 
270, 1oo P. 429 ( 1 909) ; Lynch v. Rotan, 39 Ill. 14 ( 1 865) ; McCleary v. 
Menke, 109 Ill. 294 ( 1 8 84) ; Hargroves v. Thompson, 3 1  Miss. 2 1 1  ( 1 856) 
(two months' old child) ; Cobb v. Brown, Speers (S. C. Eq.) 564 ( 1 844) . In 
Cobb v. Brown, supra, it was said that this exception dispensing with administra­
tion on estates of deceased infap.ts may be going too far "because even infants 
may be liable for necessaries." 
. "'" Drummond v. Hardaway, 2 1  Ga. 433 ( 1 856) . 
327 Jones v. Brevard, 59 Ala. 499 ( 1 8 77 ) ; Anderson v. Smith (Ky. r 8 1> 1 ) ,  3 
Met. 491  (twenty-eight years) ; Richardson v. Cole, 16o Mo. 3 7 2, 61 S. W. 1 82 
( 1 90 1 )  (twelve years) ; McDowell v. Orphan School, 87 Mo. App. 3 86  ( 1 9 0 1 ) ; 
McLean's Ex'rs v. Wade, 53 Pa. St. 146 ( 1 866) ; Dixon v. Roessler, 76 S. C. 
4 1 5, 5 7  S. E. 203 ( 1 9o6) ; Duncan v. Veal, 49 Tex. 6o3 ( 1 8 78 )  (fourteen 
years); :(\!ott v. Riddell (Tex. 1 88o) 2 Posey, Unrep. Cas. 1 0 7 ; Hill v. "Young, 
7 Wash. 33,  34 P. 1 44 ( 1893)  (eight years) ; Murphy v. Murphy, 42 Wash. 
1 42, 84 P. 646 ( 1 906) ; State ex rei. Speckart v. Superior Court, 48 Wash. 14 1 ,  
92 P. 942 ( 1 907) ; Duvall v. Healy Lumber Co., 5 7  Wash. 446, 107 P. 3 5 7, 
idf'd on rehearing, 5 7  Wash. 452, 1 09 P. 305 ( 1 9 10)  (thirteen years) ; In re 
Peterson's Estate, 1 3 7  Wash. 1 3 7, 241 P. 964 ( 1 926) , (twenty-seven years) . 
328• See notes 2 8 9 to :fl 9, $upra;_ · · . : . . . _ . . . 
829 Powell v. Pennock, 1 8 1  Mich. 5 8 8, 1 4.8 N. W. 430 ( 1 9 1 4 ) .  
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But this seems an unsound practice, for it has the effect of a 
partial distribution in an official administration without satisfy­
ing the ordinary requirements therefor. As long as adminis­
tration has been started, the better practice would seem to be. 
to require its completion before permitting final or partial 
distribution by a process of a direct collection by the heirs. 
As a basis for denying recovery in a direct action by the heirs, 
the argument is frequently made that the debtor might be 
called upon to pay a personal representative who might be ap­
pointed subsequently. This argument is employed not only 
by courts in formulating or applying a rule of policy, but it is 
also constantly reiterated by debtors of the decedent who are 
requested by heirs to make voluntary payment to them. The 
comment made by the Supreme Court of Mississippi on this 
subject is pertinent here : 
"If a presumption may be indulged that creditors are barred, 
or if a reasonable time has elapsed since the death of decedent 
to give creditors a full opportunity to open on administration, 
. . . and they have failed to do so, a stranger, who is called 
to an account at the suit of the distributees, ought not to be 
permitted to defeat a recovery, for the reason that there are 
or may be outstanding debts. A recovery by them does not 
cut off creditors or put them in a worse predicament than they 
were before. . . . After so long atime, with no steps taken 
by the creditors to take out letters, or otherwise move toward 
its collection, it would be inequitable to permit . . . defend­
ant to set up the right which this stale creditor may or may not 
have, might or might not assert, to cut off the right of the 
distributee." 330 
However, where payment has been made voluntarily to 
the heirs, where no creditors appear or demand administra­
tion, and where a personal representative is later appointed 
who brings an action on the debt, courts have seldom hesitated 
330 Ricks v. Hilliard, 45 Miss. 3 59  at 363-364 ( 1 8 7 1 ) .  
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to deny a second recovery.331 For example, in Molendorp 
v. First National Bank of Sibley,332 a decedent by his will left 
all of his estate to his wife. A son was later appointed adminis­
trator with the will annexed and sought recovery of a bank 
deposit which had previously been paid to the widow, al­
though she had not taken out administration. There were 
ample funds in the estate to pay all debts� In denying the 
right of the administrator to make a second collection of the 
deposit from the bank, the court said : 
"The one chief purpose of administration upon: an estate 
is to collect the assets, apply the same to the payment of all 
proper charges and expenses, and turn the remainder over to 
the heirs or legatees entitled thereto. For this purpose, it is 
true that the legal title to the assets is in the administrator, 
and, in strict regularity, one who is indebted to the estate 
should make payment to him ; but if, instead of. so doing, the 
debtor, acting in good faith, should, by mistake of law or fact, 
make payment direct to the person who would be entitled to 
receive it through the administrator, and the money is not 
needed or required by the administrator for the payment of 
claims or expenses, the end of the law is accomplished, and 
it would be little less than ridiculous to hold the debtor liable 
to pay his d�bt over again. . . . The law requires no vain 
things. When the deposit was paid to the widow, the money 
reached the hands of her who was vested with the ultimate 
right to receive it; and, as no part of it was required to meet 
or defray the needs of administration, no one was in any man­
ner injured or wronged by the 'short circuiting' of the deposit 
from the bank to the widow, instead of passing it through the 
hands of the administrator." 
331 Van Meter v. Illinois Merchants Trust Co., 2 39  Ill. App. 6 I 8  ( I 926) ; 
Christe v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., I 04 Iowa 707, 74 N. W. 697 ( I 89 8 ) ; Molen­
dorp v. First National Bank of Sibley, I 8 3  Iowa I 74> I 66 N. W. 7 3 3  ( I 9 I 8 ) ; 
Bell v. Farmers' & Traders' Bank, I 8 8  Mo. App. 3 83, I 74 S. W. I 9 6  ( I 9 I 5) ; 
Northern Trust Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 3 2 9  Pa. I 7, I 96 
A. 497 ( I 93 8) ; McKeigue v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., I 30 Wis. 543, I I O  
N. W. 3 84, I I  L. R. A. (N. S.) I 48 ( I 907) . 
..,. I 83 Iowa I 74 at I 76, I 66 N. W. 7 3 3  ( I 9 I 8 ) .  
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The risk entailed in paying out money to those persons ap­
parently entitled to it can be reduced to a minimum by apply­
ing it or by seeing that it is applied to the payment of funeral 
expenses and other preferred claims. If a personal repre­
sentative is subsequently appointed, the debtor is subrogated 
to the right of the preferred claimant to whom the paym(!nt 
has been made and thus freed from any further liability to 
the estate.333 Thus in Van Meter v. Illinois Merchants Trust 
Co./34 a decedent left $355 on deposit in a Chicago bank. 
At the instance of a sister the deposit was applied in payment 
of the funeral expenses amounting to some $367. Sub­
sequently the public administrator applied for and was granted 
letters and attempted to make a second collection of the deposit. 
In denying recovery and saying that administration should . 
not be granted merely for the sake of administration, the 
court said : 
�'It is stated in defendant's brief that it is a long-established 
and well-known custom among Chicago banks generally, 
voluntarily to pay over, without administration, small balances 
to either the undertaker or heirs of depositors reported dead 
upon being furnished with proper affidavit, inheritance tax 
release, receipted funeral bills, and an undertaker's assign­
ment. Such a custom, especially where the heirs consent, 
would seem to be desirable and commendable and should not 
be disturbed by officious intermeddling for the sake of possible 
administration fees." 
In small estates also where there are but a few debts owing 
to a decedent and these small in amount, the practice of re­
quiring formal administration seems an unnecessary burden 
imposed upon the decedent's family. Ordinarily, such debts 
include nothing more than small bank accounts, wage or in-
333 Van Meter v. Illinois Merchants' Trust Co., 239  Ill, App. 6 1 8  ( 1926) ; 
Goldsmith v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 1 56 Misc. 8 89, 282  N. Y. S. 7 8 3  ( 1 935) • 
... 239  Ill. App. 6r's ( 1 926) . 
· ' 
DISPENSING WITH ADMINISTRATION 647 · 
surance claims, all of which would ordinarily not be more than 
sufficient to pay funeral expenses and perhaps a small family 
allowance. Often they are less than the amount to which the 
surviving family is entitled as exempt property. 
Under such circumstances, methods should be available 
to permit collection of these assets by the surviving family 
or other relatives, irrespective of the existence of debts against 
the estate. Administration could only decrease the net amount 
available to them and prolong the time of its realization. An 
historical survey of existing legislation reveals that numerous 
statutes have been passed, particularly during the last decade, 
authorizing the payment of small bank accounts, 335 wage 
claims,S36 savings and loan shares 337 and proceeds of insurance 
policies 338 to designated surviving members of the decedent's 
= Ariz. Code ( 1 939)  § 5 1-5 1 5  ($5oo) ; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 
1 944) § 630.5  ($5oo) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. ( 1 9 30) § 4970 (amended by Supp. 
1 943, § 67 rg) ($5oo) ; Del. Rev. Code ( 1 93 5 )  § 3 846 ($75) ; Ga. Code Ann. 
(Supp. 1 943)  § r rzo48 ($6oo) ; Idaho Laws Ann. ( 1 943 ) § 1 5-1406 ($3oo) ; 
Ind. Stat. (Burns, Supp. 1 943)  § 6-1 5 1 5  ( $ roo) ; Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 
1 944) c. 1 67, § 3 1 A  ( $500 in bank liquidations) ; Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 5205 
($ 3oo) ; N. J. Stat. Ann. ( 1 93 7) § 3 :7-8 ($zoo) ; N. M. Stat. (Supp. 1 945) 
§ 3 3-1 307  ($3oo) ; N. Y. Banking Law, art. 6, § z 3 9 (4) ( $5oo) ; Ore. Comp. 
Laws ( 1 940) § 4o-roo4 ($5oo) ; Utah Code ( 1 943)  § 7-3-49 ($3oo) ; Va. 
Code ( 1 94z) § 4 149 (34) ($3oo) ; Wash. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) §§  3 Z49-1 
and 3 z49-z ($5oo ) .  
336 Ala. Code ( r 94o) t .  7 ,  § 666 ( $ r oo) ; Ariz. Code ( 1 9 39 )  § 3 8-zoo3 
($3oo) ; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 630 ($ r ,ooo) ; Conn. Gen. 
Stat. ( 1 9 30)  § 4970 (amended by Supp. 1 943, § 6 7 rg) ($5oo) ; Del. Rev. Code 
( 1 935)  § 3 845 ($75) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( 1 94 1 ) §§ 2zz . 1 5 and 2z2 . r 6  (any 
wages and traveling expenses, up to $ 3oo) ; Ga. Code Ann. ( 1 93 7) § 66-ro3 
($3oo) ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, Supp. 1 943) § 6-1 5 1 4  ($ 1 50) ; Minn. Stat. ( 1 941 ) 
§ r 8 r . 5 8  ($zoo) ; Miss. Code ( 1 94z) §§ 653 to 656 ($3oo) ; N. J. Stat. Ann. 
( 1 93 7) § 3 :7-8 ($zoo) ; N. M. Stat. (Supp. 1 945) §§ 3 3-1 3o5 and 3 3-1 306 
($3oo) ; N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, § r ora ( $ r 5o) ; N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943 )  § 34-
o r r z  ( $4oo) ; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1 943)  § 10509-sa ( $ r 5o) ; Ore. 
Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 943) §§ 9 1-r oo5, 1 o z-6o7a ($zoo) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. 
(Purdon, 1 930 )  t. zo, § 867 ( $ 1 50) ; Utah Code (Supp. 1 945) § r oz-8-3 
($3oo) ; Va. Code (1 94z) § 5z78a1  ($3oo) ; .Wash. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1 940) 
§§ 1 464-r,  1 464-z ($3oo) ; Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) § 1 03 . 39  (any amount) . 
837 Conn. Gen. Stat. ( 1 930) § 4970 ;  Ore. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 943 ) §§ 41-
614 to 4r-6 r 6. 
888 Conn. Gen. Stat. ( 1 930) § 4970 ( $5oo) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943)  
§ 4o-z5 8  ( $ r ,ooo) ; N, D.  Rev. Code ( 1 943 ) § 65-o5z7 ($8o  workmen's 
compensation insurance) ;  Utah Code (Supp. 1 945) § 1 oz-8-3 ($3oo) . 
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family. These statutes vary considerably in the kind ofdebts 
and property to which they apply and the amount or value 
which they permit to be paid without administration. All of 
them represent wholesome legislation although the maximum 
amounts of money provided in many of them are often ap­
pallingly small. For example, the amount of wages which· 
may be paid to a surviving widow under such a statute must 
not exceed $7  5 in Delaware, $ I  oo in Alabama, and $ I  50 
in Indiana, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania. The 
Connecticut statute is more liberal, allowing up to $ soo,. 
and the Wisconsin statute does not limit the amount. Cor­
responding variations exist in the amounts of bank deposits 
thus payable. 
The singling out of particular kinds of property or debts 
for allowing payment direct to the heirs seems an unsound 
practice. Much of it appears to be banking or employer legis­
lation, rather than probate legislation. A better method is not 
to restrict the payment of such claims to a particular type of 
property such as bank deposits or wages, but to permit the 
payment, delivery or transfer of any kind of debt or property 
where the total amount of the estate does not exceed a stated 
sum. This has been done in California/39 Florida,340 
Illinois 341 Montana 342 New Jersey 343 North Carolina 344 ' ' ' ' 
South Carolina 345 and Virginia.346 In New Jersey, however, 
the amount thus payable must not exceed $200. A more 
liberal sum is allowed in California and . Illinois where a 
maximum of $ r ,ooo may be paid, transferred or delivered. 
839 Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) §§ 63o, 6 3 1 ,  63 r . 1  ( $ 1 ,ooo) .  
340 Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 945) §§ 735.01 to  7 3 5.09 ($2,ooo ) .  
341 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 941 and Supp. 1 945)  c .  3, §§ 478, 48 1 ,  48z · ( $ 1 ,ooo) . 
""' Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 935)  § 1 oou ($soo) . 
343 N. J. Stat. Ann. ( 1 9 37 )  § 3 :7-8 ($zoo ) .  
"" N. C. Rev. Stat. ( 1 943 ) § z8-68 ($3oo) . 
345 S. C. Code ( 1 942) § 9028 ($soo) . 
... Va. Code ( 1 942) § 6 1 43a ($soo) . 
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The sum thus payable under the California statute is not con­
sidered exempt property, however. It  is payable to a surviv­
ing spouse or other relative as a temporary expedient with 
the expectation that it will be applied to the payment of funeral 
expenses and used as a kind of family allowance. If adminis­
tration is later granted, then the person receiving such funds 
must account for them to the personal representative. In 
Brezzo v .  Brangero/47 the California Court of Appeals said 
that such collection does not give a surviving spouse title to 
the fund but that "the purpose of legislation . . . was to 
provide the family of the deceased with temporary funds for 
such immediate necessities as funeral expenses, and perhaps 
to provide ready money for their support pending the probate 
of their estate. This being so, the husband . . . was en­
titled to withdraw the funds from the bank, but this did not 
give the husband title to the fund, that is to say, it was not 
intended by the provisions of the section that the fund should 
become the property of · the husband." On the contrary, it 
must be accounted for or paid over to the personal represent­
ative, if one is later appointed. It seems probable, however, 
that in the great majority of small estates no administration 
would later be granted, and th;tt the co.IJ.eC:tion and application 
of the money by the surviving spouse or other relative would 
neyer be questioned or disturbed. 
The procedure contemplated by the statutes of California, 
• 
Illinois and New Jersey is for some member of the family to 
present an affidavit to the debtor to the effect that the total 
amount of the decedent's estate does not-exceed the statutory 
amount. The debtor is thereupon entitled to accept and rely 
upon the facts stated in the affidavit. This appears to be a 
highly desirable way of permitting the collection of small 
... 5 1 Cal. App. 79 at 8 r ,  1 96 P. 8 7  ( 1 92 1 ) .  The Washington statute is 
explicit on this point. See Wash. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1 943) §§ 3 249-1 and 
3249-2· 
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estates without resort to some judicial procedure. It pro­
vides a simple and inexpensive method of administration for 
a small estate, and at the same time it provides adequate and 
complete protection to a debtor who is willing to make pay­
merit. The Illinois Act, said Professor Freund at the time 
of its enactment in I 92 7, "legalizes a practice which it is under­
stood has in the past been indulged in to some extent by in­
stitutions at their own risk." 348 
These statutes vary in another respect. Some are obligatory 
upon the debtor while others are only permissive. The Indiana . 
statutes, for example, provide that "It shall be lawful for any 
employer" to pay wages or earnings owing to a decedent 
to the surviving spouse, children over the age of eighteen 
years, or certain other relativ.es. It is further provided that 
"The payment of such wages or personal earnings shall be a 
full discharge and release to the employer." Corresponding 
provisions exist for the payment of bank deposits. Such stat­
utes are to be contrasted with the Illinois statutes which pro­
vide that "Upon receiving an affidavit that a resident of this 
state died leaving personal estate not exceeding one thousand 
dollars in value, that no letters are then outstanding on the 
estate in this state, th.at no petition for letters on the estate 
is pending in this state, that all funeral expenses of the de­
cedent have been paid, that thirty days have elapsed since 
the death of the decedent and that the affiant has knowledge 
of the facts, any person or corporation indebted to or holding 
personal estate of the decedent may pay the indebtedness or 
deliver the personal estate" to certain designated members of 
the decedent's family. This statute,. standing alone, is purely 
voluntary as is the Indiana statute. A companion Illinois 
statute provides, however, that if such person or corporation 
to whom the affidavit is delivered refuses to pay, deliver or 
... Freund, "The Product of the Fifty Fifth General Assembly," 22 ILL L. REV. 
473 at 475 ( 1 928 ) .  . 
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transfer the personal estate, . "it may be recovered i n  a civil 
action by or on behalf of the person entitled to receive it upon 
proof of the facts required to be stated in the affidavit." It 
is also provided that "For the purpose of the action the af­
fidavit is prima facie proof of the facts stated therein." Such 
a statute has the advantage of permitting a recovery of prop­
erty without taking out administration where the heir's are 
actually. entitled to it. It is not only permissive in character, 
but it also permits direct action to be brought to recover money 
or property where the amount is sufficiently small as not to 
justify formal administration. Whether payment or delivery 
is made by the third party voluntarily or pursuant to a judg­
ment rendered in an action by the heirs, such third party is 
adequately protected and becomes fully discharged of his 
obligation to the estate of the decedent. Whether the estate 
actually exceeds the statutory amount does not affect the 
debtor's discharge. He is entitled to rely upon and have the 
benefit of the recitals contained in the affidavit. Similar pro­
visions of this latter kind exist also in the California and New 
Jersey statutes. Another desirable feature of the Illinois 
statute is that it requires a thirty-day waiting period before 
such payment or delivery may be made. If  there are out­
standing creditors and �he family has not applied for adminis­
tration, the creditors would doubtless have taken action by 
this time. Such a requirement operates as a practical protec­
tion to creditors by affording them a reasonable opportunity 
to apply for administration during this period. 
A further difference in these statutes· authorizing the col­
lection of wages, bank deposits and the like, concerns the 
stated maximum amount. In California, Connecticut, Florida, 
Illinois and New Jersey, the entire estate, including the bank 
deposits, wages and all other property must not, in the ag­
gregate, exceed the amount specified in the statute. On the 
other hand, the statutes of Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, New 
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Mexico, New Y ark, Oregon, Utah and Washington treat 
each item separately. As a result, it is possible in any of these 
latter states for the family of the decedent to collect bank 
deposits, wages, insurance and building and loan shares each 
in the maximum amount stated in the statute. This selection 
of different kinds of property as a basis for allowing recovery 
by the heirs seems unjustified in view of the primary purpose 
of these statutes. The total amount of the estate, not · the 
separate amounts of different kinds of property, should be the 
basis for their application. 
3· Distribution of residue 
Assuming that neither heirs nor creditors have demanded 
administration or that they have been successfully resisted, 
and that the heirs have been able to make a full collection of 
all' assets belonging to the estate, the next question concerns 
the efficacy of distribution and partition of the assets of the 
estate among the heirs. With the property in their possession 
there might seem to be no obstacle to its distribution as long 
as all of the parties in interest are sui juris and have reached 
an agreement as to its division. So long as no one is adversely 
affected by such a family settlement, such a procedure is a 
commendable one. It relieves the burden of the courts, cit 
promotes good feeling among the heirs, and it returns prop-
. erty to commerce sooner than would ordinarily be possible 
by the processes of an administration proceeding. 
The solution of the problem, however, is not always pos­
sible, or as simple as above stated. As indicated, three con­
ditions must exist : the absence of creditors with existing claims, 
the legal capacity of all heirs who are entitled to share in the 
estate, and their .agreement as to how the property is to be 
distributed. It is assumed that there is a participation by all 
heirs and that no question exists as to their identity or relation-
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ship. Only in relatively rare cases 1149 is there likely to be any 
difficulty as to who is entitled to the estate under the statute 
of descent and distribution, or under any agreement which 
the parties may enter into. It is entirely possible also that 
the nature of the property interests involved is so complex, 
or the rights of the parties so various, that a division may be 
impracticable if an attempt is made to distribute according to 
the statute ; but, of course, there is no requirement that they 
make division in that precise manner. Any agreement among 
the heirs, fairly entered into, will be given full effect as 
between all persons bound by it. Any attempt by an heir 
to withdraw or repudiate such an agreement by seeking the 
appointment of a personal representative will ordinarily meet 
with failure.350 To permit an administrator so appointed to 
recover property from the heirs, only to redistribute it to them 
later, would be utterly futile. 
4· Effectiveness of distribution as conferring 
marketable title 
Another aspect of this problem arises when the assets of the 
estate consist of .land, registered securities or other property 
the title to which is registered. The heirs may te in perfect 
accord as to its division and distribution. They may even make 
division and distribution among themselves. In this con­
nection two matters need consideration, one presently, the 
other prospectively. For registered securities or other similar 
property immediate transfer will usually be desired. The 
heirs will ordinarily have physical possession of such securities 
849 See, for example, Bennett v. Morris, I I I  Ill. App. I SO ( I 903)  where an 
agreement between the widow and heirs to distribute the estate became impossi­
ble to carry out and the court thereupon granted administration and ordered 
distribution made as though no such agreement had been made. 
350 Richardson v. Cole, I 6o Mo. 3 72, 6 I  S. W. I 82 (I 90 I ) ; Estes v. Estes (Mo. 
I 942) I 66 8. W. (2d) 1 06 1 .  In general, see 2 WoERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d 
ed. I 9 2 3 )  663.  
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or property but the transfer agent or public officer must be 
satisfied of the validity and effectiveness of such a family settle­
ment to justify his transfer to those persons entitled to succeed 
to their ownership. This means compliance with the three 
conditions already enumerated. An examination of existing 
legislation discloses several statutes, most of them recently 
enacted, designed to provide for the transfer of such registered 
property without the necessity of formal administration. 
As to registered securities and stock in a corporation, the 
statutes of California 351 and Illinois 352 are specific in author­
izing their transfer upon the furnishing to the corporation or 
transfer agent of an affidavit of the same kind as is required 
for the payment of money or the delivery of property where 
no administration has been had. This would probably also 
be true under the New Jersey statutes,353 although it is not 
explicitly declared. In the absence of such legislation, there 
are those occasional instances in which corporations or transfer 
agents do make transfers of registered securities and stock 
upon evidence satisfactory to them that the transferee is en­
titled thereto and that there is no outstanding indebtedness. 
As to automobiles for which certificates of title are now gen­
erally issuel, a similar problem is presented. The public 
official, whose duty it is to issue a new certificate of title in place 
of the old one issued in the name of the decedent, ordinarily 
relies upon an order of transfer or decree of distribution made 
by the probate court having jurisdiction over the decedent's 
estate. In the absence of administration the transfer of the 
family car involves much the same problem as payment of 
wages or bank deposits. · Within the past decade statutes have 
been adopted in California, 354 Mary land, 355 Michigan, 356 
351 Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) §§ 63o, 6 3 1 ,  6 3 1 . 1 . . 
352 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 941 and Supp. 1 945) c. 3 ,  §§ 478, 481 ,  482. 
353 N. J. Stat. Ann. ( 1 9 37 )  § 3 :7-8 . 
... Cal. Vehicle Code (Deering, 1 943) § 1 85 ( $ 1 ,ooo) . 
855 Md. Code (Supp. 1 943)  art. 9 3, § 243A (amended by Md. Laws 1 945, 
c. 3 5 ) .  By art. 93 ,  § 243B, added by Md. Laws 1 945, c. 466,.the certificate o;f 
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Montana,357 Utah/58 Virginia 359 and Wyoming 360 author­
izing the transfer of a registered title to motor vehicles when 
their value is less than a stated amount, upon presentation of 
an affidavit showing the value of the estate left by the decedent 
and the right of the person seeking the transfer. 361 
As to land, the heirs may make immediate partition or di­
vision among themselves by an exchange of deeds. There is 
no transfer agent or public officer to ques�ion the validity of 
such a procedure. And the respective heirs may continue to 
possess and enjoy the property so allotted to them. Only 
upon a future sale by the heirs to some third party will the 
subject of the validity of the family settlement be presented. 
This future purchaser will want to know that the land is not 
subject to claims against the decedent and that those who par­
ticipated in the settlement constituted all the heirs of the de­
cedent. In some few states the bar of creditors may not be 
possible in the absence of administration, but statutes of the 
kind already discussed 362 may be determinative of the ques­
tion. 
As earlier indicated, a separate determination and assess­
ment of inheritance taxes may be had in most states where no 
official administration is had. Such proceedings will afford 
the basis for a clearance of the state's lien. And in a substantial 
number of states there are statutes 363 which. bar the state in 
the assertion of its tax lien after the lapse of a period of time 
registration of a boat or vessel not exceeding $5oo in value may likewise be trans­
ferred. 
356 Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 93 7 )  § 9 . 1474 ($5oo) . 
""' Mont. Laws 1 943, c. 148, § 2 (e) ( $ I ,ooo) . 
358 Utah Code ( 1 943)  § 5 7-3a-7o ($ 1 ,ooo) . 
859 Va. Code (Supp. I 944) § 2 I 54(74) (f) (when automobile is only per­
sonal property belonging to decedent and his debts have been paid or will be 
paid out of proceeds of sale of motor vehicle) . 
360 Wyo. Laws 1 945, c. I 1 2  (when there is no other property necessitating ad­
ministration and there are no unpaid debts ; and after creditors have been given 
twenty days' notice) . 
861 In general see comment, "A Comparison of Land and Motor Vehicle 
Registration," 4 8  YALE L. ]. I 2 3 8  ( I 93 9 ) .  
862 See notes 2 8 9 to 3 I 9> supra. 
868 See note 3 I 9, supra. • 
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r without administration and without any action having been 
taken by the state to make collection. 
The determination of heirship alone remains. In some 
states there is an official and conclusive determination of heir­
ship in an administration proceeding.364 Elsewhere, where 
the land passes directly to the heirs and the personal repre­
sentative obtains no jurisdiction over it unless needed for the 
payment of debts, an affidavit is employed or the heirship is 
inferred from th� record or from recitals in a conveyance 
from the heirs.365 The absence of administration does not af­
fect the problem of determining heirship except in those states 
where there is an official determination of heirship in con­
nection with the administration proceeding or as a part of the 
decree of final distribution. And, of course, where it is in­
ferred in some manner from the record in the administration 
proceedings, some substitute is needed when no administration 
is had. 
Where an affidavit or a recital in a deed from the heirs is 
customarily employed to prove heirship and is accepted as a 
basis for marketable title, the same procedure should be fol­
lowed where no administration has been had. But when a 
decree of heirship in an administration proceeding is custom­
arily relied on, obviously some substitute for it will be nec­
e!ssary here. In several states statutes 366 have accordingly 
364 3 WOERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d ed . .  1 9 2 3 )  § 56 1 ; 3 BANCROFT'S PRO­
BATE PRACTICE ( 1 928)  § 1 147· 
366 PATTON, LAND TITLES ( 1 93 8 )  § 288 .  
366 Colo. Stat. ( 1 9 3 5  and Supp. 1 944) c. 1'76, §§ 2 8-34 ;  Fla. Stat. Arin. 
( 1 94 1 )  § 734.2 5 ;  Idaho Laws Ann. ( 1 943)  §§ 1 5-1401 to 1 5-1405 ; Ill. Ann. 
Stat.' (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 )  c. 3, §§ 209-2 1 0 ;  Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943)  
§§ 59-2250 to  59-225 2 ;  Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) §§ 27 .3 1 7 8 ( 1 45)  to  27 .3 1 7 8  
( 1 49 ) ; Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § §  525 ·3 1 ,  525.3 1 1 , 525 .3 1 2 ;  Miss. Code ( 1 942) 
§§ 1 270-1 272 ; Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 943 )  §§ 30-1 701 to 30-1 708 ; N. J. Stat. Ann. 
( 1 937)  § 3 :4-1 to 3 :4-3 ; N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  §§ 3 3-1 2 1 3  to 3 3-1 2 1 8 ;  N. Y. 
Surr. Ct. Act, §§ 3 1 1  to 3 1 3 ;  N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943)  §§ 3 0-2201  to 30-22 1 3 ;  
Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t. 84, §§ 25 1-261 ; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939)  art. 
3 590 to 3597a;  Utah Code ( 1 943)  §§ 102-1 2-34 to 1 oz-1 2-3 5 ;  W. Va. Code 
( 1 943) § 4088 ;  Wis. Stat. ( 1 943) §§ 23 7.o9, 3 1 5 .02-3 1 5.06 ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. 
( 1 9 3 1 )  §§ 88-4 10 1  to 8 8-4103  (amended Laws 1 945, c. 79) . 
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been passed providing for a summary determination of heir­
ship where there has been no administration proceeding. Some 
of these statutes purport to make the determination conclusive 
in the same manner as a similar decree made in connection 
with an administration proceeding. Usually, however, decrees 
of heirship have only prima facie effect as to their correctness. 
Despite this shortcoming, they do have some value and are 
readily accepted as evidence of heirship by title examiners. 
Special statutes have been enacted in Idaho/67 Nebraska 368 
and New Mexico 369 providing that where a certain period has 
elapsed since the death of a person owning real property in 
such state, and upon whose estate no administration has been 
had or applied for, the heirs of the decedent or Qther person 
having an interest in said real property, may file a petition 
in the probate court and ask for a determination of heirship. 
After notice by publication, the court makes an official deter­
mination of heirship which has the same effect as a decree of 
final distribution in those states where such a decree is re­
garded as having full effect with respect to the decedent's 
property. Under the Idaho statute, if a creditor appears and 
presents a claim, ' then the court must grant administration 
in the usual manner; otherwise the decree of heirship is final. 
Under the Nebraska and New Mexico statutes, however, no 
such permission is given for creditors to present their claims, 
for the reason that their claims, insofar as land of the decedent 
is concerned, have ceased to be a lien thereon. Since there 
is no such statute in Idaho parring claims after the lapse of 
two years when there has been no administration, it is only 
proper that creditors be given the right to present their claims 
in connection with such a proceeding and ask for administra­
tion in the usual manner. Being afforded such an opportunity, 
...  Idaho Laws. Ann. ( 1 943)  §§ r s-r40I to r s-1405. 
866 Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 943 )  §§ 30-1 705 to 30-t 7o8.  
""" N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  §§ 3 3-:r z r J  to 3 3-1 2 r 8 .  
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creditors are not deprived of any right without due process of 
law. 
E. DISPENSING WITH ANCILLARY ADM INISTRATION 370 
When a decedent dies owning property in states other than 
that of his domicile, it is conceivable that one administration 
upon his estate would suffice. The domiciliary representative 
would need powers to collect assets throughout all the states ; 
and local creditors in each state would be required to come 
to the state of domicile where administration is being had to 
present their claims. The law has not developed in this 
fashion, however. The orthodox view is that, in the absence 
of statute, the powers of a personal representative cease at the 
borders of the state which appointed· him. And other states 
in which the decedent's property may be located have some­
times insisted on local administration in order to simplify the 
problem for the· decedent's creditors residing there. The 
phenomenon of ancillary. administration has resulted. 
Assuming that domiciliary administration is had on the estate 
of a decedent, to what extent may the requirements of ad­
ministration be dispensed with in a second state in which as­
sets are located? The answer to this question will depend on 
two factors : ( I )  how far the second state will give recognition 
to the appointment and powers of the personal representa}ive 
of the state of domicile ; and ( 2 ) to what degree and for what 
duration it desires to protect local creditors by making assets 
located there available to their claims. 
If a personal representative could make physical collection 
of assets located in states other than that of his appointment, 
37° For an extended consideration and analysis of the problems here considered 
from the point of view of conflict of laws, two studies should be mentioned : 
Buchanan and Myers, "The Administration of Intangibles in View of First Na­
tional Bank v. Maine," 48 HARV. L. REv. 9 1 1  ( 1 9  3 5) ; Hopkins, "Conflict of 
Laws in Administration of Decedents' Intangibles," 2 8 IowA L. REV. +ZZ 
( 1 943 ) .  
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administration would then, as a practical matter, be confined 
to that state. This is a practical possibility only if debtors 
and persons in another jurisdiction are willing to make pay­
ment, or deliver property voluntarily to the personal repre­
sentative, or are under a legal obligation to do so. The 
conflict of laws rules of such jurisdiction thus become the 
determining factor in the solution of the whole problem of 
dispensing with ancillary administration. 
If the domiciliary representative be regarded as succeeding 
to the "title" to all property of the decedent, irrespective of 
its location, it would seem to follow that extraterritorial recog­
nition should be given to his rights and powers. Unification 
of administration on decedents' estates would be the rule 
rather than the exception. Opposing this view is the theory 
which confines the official personality of the personal repre­
sentative to the state of his appointment. Multiplication of 
administrations is the result of this latter view. Despite the 
existence of both of these theories it would be untrue to say 
that any state recognizes one to the complete exclusion of the 
other. Often both theories have undergone a measure of 
contemporaneous development in the same jurisdiction. 
As will be shown in the discussion that follows, the pro­
tection of local creditors has been the primary argument for 
denying to foreign domiciliary representatives the right to 
collect assets or to maintain an action therefor. This alleged 
reason· of policy, it is submitted, has little or no basis in fact 
in the great maj ority of estates. The resulting requirement 
of ancillary administration leads only to a wasteful expenditure 
of time, effort and expense. It is time to re-examine the ques­
tion whether the alternative of requiring all creditors to file 
their claims in the domiciliary administration would not be a 
more desirable solution from every point of view. 
Despite the risks involved in making payments or deliver­
ing property to foreign domiciliary personal representatives 
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in the absence of statutory authority, the fact is that many 
debtors and persons having possession of property take such 
risks and make payments or deliver property to the foreign 
administrator. It is seldom that such persons are called upon 
to account again to a local administrator. The problem in­
volved is similar to that which arises when a debtor of a 
decedent makes payment direct to the heirs when no personal 
representative has been appointed and administration is not 
contemplated. 
I .  Voluntary payment to foreign personal representattves 
Behind such cases as Crohn v. Clay County State Bank,311 
in which a M·issouri debtor was held not discharged in making 
voluntary payment to an Iowa administrator, lies a policy 
of protecting local creditors. Such a rc:sult is often explained 
by saying that the legal personality of the administrator does 
not extend beyond the borders of the state from which he 
derives his authority. While there is a logical basis for such 
a view, the alleged protection oflocal creditors is more often 
a myth than a reality. An early decision of the Supreme Court 
' 
of the United States, Wilkins v. Ellett,372 gave momentum 
to a contrary view when it held that voluntary payment by a 
debtor to a foreign administrator was a valid discharge ·of the 
debt. Reference was made in the opinion to the doctrine of 
mobilia sequuntur personam. This time-worn rule, so often 
of late disregarded in matters of taxation, was thought to be 
socially serviceable in that situation. Fortunately this decision 
has influenced others and today its rule serves as the controlling 
guide in most states.373 
It should be said, however, that most of the decisions which 
have upheld voluntary payments to a foreign administrator 
371 1 3 7  Mo. App. 7 1 2, I 1 8  S. W. 498 ( 1 909) . 
372 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 740 ( 1 869) .  
373 3 BEALE, CoNFLICT oi<'  LAws (1 935)  147 2 ;  GooDRICH, CoNFLICT oF 
LAWS (2d ed. 1 9 3 8 )  § 1 83 ; Beale, "Voluntary Payment to a Foreign Admin­
istrator," 42 HARV. L. REV. 597 ( 1 929 ) .  
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have been those in which creditors did not exist or did not 
assert their rights in the state where payment was being made. 
When creditors do exist or when an ancillary personal repre­
sentative has been appointed, it may be arguable that a contrary 
decision would be justified. In either of these events, two 
other inquiries become pertinent. First, the existence of local 
creditors may not be known to the debtor ; indeed, it is often 
said that local administration is a prerequisite to the determi­
nation of the existence or absence of creditors. Second, the 
appointment of a local ancillary administrator may not be 
known, especially since the venue for administration on the 
estate of a non-resident decedent may be the result of a wide 
choice on the part of those applying for it.374 The New York 
Court of Appeals remarked in one case 375 that to require that 
there be no local administrator as a prerequisite for discharg­
ing a debtor who made voluntary payment to a foreign per­
sonal representative would, in effect, require the debtor to 
examine the records of every surrogate's office in the state. 
Such a rule, it' was most appropriately said, would be exceed­
ingly burdensome to debtors and seriously interfere with the 
collection of debts. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws 376 
has adopted the pronouncement of the New York court by 
making the lack of knowledge on the part of the debtor of 
the appointment of a local personal representative the sole 
condition for his discharge. But while voluntary payments 
made to a foreign personal representative have in some in­
stances been recognized as a valid discharge of the debtor's 
obligation if he has received no notice of the appointment of 
an ancillary representative, 377 some states are willing to give 
374 See Basye, "The Venue of Probate and Administration Proceedings," 43 
MrcH. L. REV. 47 1 at 477 et seq. ( 1 944) , p. 5 3 5  et seq., supra. 
315 Maas v. German Savings Bank, 1 76 N. Y. 3 77, 3 82, 68 N. E. 658  ( 1 903) .  
876 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS ( 1 934)  § 482.  
317 Maas v. German Savings Bank, 176 N. Y. 3 77, 68 N. E. 658 ( 1 903 ) ; 
Compton v. Borderline Coal Co., 1 79 Ky. 695, 201  S. W. 20 ( 1 9 1 8 ) .  See also 
Mersch, "Voluntary Payment to Foreign Administrator," I 8 GEo. L. J. qo 
(1 930) and statutes cited in note 389, infra, , 
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an acquittance to the debtor only in the event that no ancillary 
representative has in fact been appointed,378 and still others 
only in the event that an ancillary representative is not ap­
pointed later. 379 
In a few states 380 legislation expressly provides that local 
debtors may pay debts to a decedent's personal representative 
in another state if they have no knowledge of local adminis­
tration proceedings. · Of this legislation, the Ohio and Rhode 
Island statutes permit payment at any time ; the Oregon stat­
ute requires thirty days' notice to the state treasurer ; and the 
Virginia statute authorizes such a procedure only after ninety 
days from the death of the decedent, unless the amount is 
more than $ 1  ,ooo, in which event public notice for four weeks 
is required followed by an additional thirty days before mak­
ing such payment. In the Illinois statute provision is made 
for the debtor to rely upon an affidavit furnished by the foreign 
personal representative that he has no knowledge of any letters 
issued in that state. 
This rule is also contained in the Uniform Powers of 
Foreign Representatives Act in which it is provided 381 that, in 
the absence of local administration or application therefor, a 
foreign personal representative may exercise all powers which 
would exist in favor of a local personal representative. Pay-
378 Rice v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., I 52 Ark. 498, 2 3 8  S. W. 772 ( I 922) ; 
Union Trust Co. of San Francisco v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 3 I 
Cal. App. 64, I 59 P. 820 ( I 9 I 6) ; Selleck v. Rusco, 46 Conn. 3 70 ( I 8 78) ; 
Cameron v. Riggs National Bank (D. C. Dist. Col. I 943) ,  5 3  F. Supp. 56-(after 
one year) ; McNamara v. McNamara, 62 Ga. 200 ( I  8 79)  ; In re Williams' 
Es�ate, I 30 Iowa 553, I 07 N. W. 6o8 ( I 9o6) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Williams, 
3 2  Ky. L. Rep. 303, I 05 S. W. 952  ( I 907) ; Citizens' National Bank v. Sharp, 
53 Md. 5 Z I  ( I 8 8o) ; Morrison v. Berkshire Loan & Trust Co., 229 Mass. 5 I 9, 
I I 8  N. E. 895 ( I 9 I 8 ) ; Reynolds v. McMullen, 55 Mich. 568, 22 N. w. 4I  
( I 885) ; Dexter v .  Berge, 76 Minn. 2 I 6, 78  N .  W.  I I I I  ( I 899) ; Willard v. 
Hammond, 2 I  N. H. 3 8 2  ( I 85o) ; Gray's Appeals, I I 6 Pa. 256, I I  A. 66 
( I 88 7 ) .  
37° Crohn v. Clay County State Bank, I 3 7 Mo. App. 7 1 2, I I  8 S .  W .  498 
( I 909) ; Young v. O'Neal, 3 Sneed (35 Tenn.) 55 ( I 855 ) .  . . 
380 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § 4 I 6 ;  Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 
I 9 3 7 )  § I05 I  I-3 ; Ore. Comp. Laws ( I  940) § I 9-302 ; R . . I:Gen. Laws ( 1 9 '3 8) ' c. 5 75, § 2 6 ;  Va. Code ( I 942) § 5349a. · · · · . 
381 Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act;§· 2.  
· · 
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ment by the debtor is clearly obligatory and- his acquittance, 
upon payment, is equally certain. The debtor is thus relieved 
of any uncertainty as to the effect of payment by him under 
such circumstances. Another section 382 of this Act expressly 
provides that no person who makes payment to the foreign 
representative before receiving actual notice of local adminis­
tration or application therefor shall be prejudiced, al­
though local proceedings have been begun or applied for. 
Simplification and unification of administration on decedents' 
estates are thus rendered possible. 
A larger number of statutes 383 authorize such payments 
only if no administration has in fact been commenced. In 
most instances authenticated copies of domiciliary letters must 
be filed in local probate courts or furnished to the debtor. The 
Alabama statute permits such payments only after sixty days, 
the Oregon statute after ninety days, and the Maine statute 
after six months. The Vermont statute is unnecessarily nar­
row �n confining its application to bank deposits. Notice to 
local creditors or other interested persons is required in Maine 
and New Hampshire ; and in Maine the foreign personal 
representative must obtain permission from the local probate 
court to entitle him to receive such payment. 
382 Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act, § 5· 
383 Ala. Code ( 1 940) t. 6 r ,  § 1 4 1  (after sixty days) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 
1 945) § 7 34.30 (after three months) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943) § 5 9-I 707 ; 
Me. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) c. I 4 1 ,  § 82 (after six months and no objection by local 
creditors) ; Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 622 ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942) § 2 72 (after 
six months' notice and payment to any local creditors who may appear and file 
claims) and §. 6024 (insurance proceeds) ; N. H. Rev. Laws ( I 942)  c. 353, 
§§ 28, 29  (after notice to residents and authorization by local probate court after 
expiration of six months after death) ; N. J. Stat. Ann. ( I 9 3 7) § 3 : 1 4-1 ; Pa. 
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1 944) t. 2o, § 995 (upon filing an affidavit by the 
foreign personal representative with the register of wills that decedent is not 
indebted to any person in Pennsylvania and that the receipt is not made for the 
purpose of removing assets beyond the reach of Pennsylvania creditors) ; S. C. 
Code ( 1 942) § 895 5 ;  Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 93 8 )  § 1 288 ; Vt. Pub. Laws 
( I 9 3 3 )  § 6 7 1 9  (as to bank deposits 9nly, but by § 2726  the tax commission must 
be notified, which will in turn notify the bank whether any personal representa­
tive has been appointed in Vermont) ;  Wis. Stat. ( I 943)  § 2 8 7. 1 6  (upon filing 
certified copy of appointment in Wisconsin) .  
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2 .  Actions by foreign personal representatives 
One might expect to find that. the right of foreign personal 
, 
representatives to enforce payment of debts due their decedents 
would follow this same pattern as in the cases of voluntary 
payment by debtors. While it might be agreed that the foreign 
personal representative had such title to his decedent's prop­
erty as to entitle him to give a valid receipt for voluntary 
payment by the debtor, it is another thing to say that he may 
sue to enforce payment in the courts of another state. In its 
early stages the law developed the rule that a personal repre­
sentative could not maintain an action outside the state of his 
appointment in the absence of statutory permission. 384 It is 
still generally accepted that a personal representative is an 
officer only in the jurisdiction of the court which appointed 
him, although he has authority extending throughout the state. 
He has no authority outside tlie borders of that state by virtue 
of his appointment there. Consequently, unless a statute of 
the debtor's state authorizes actions by foreign personal repre­
sentatives, the domiciliary representative is powerless to en­




period of years, however, states have gradually 
opened their doors and given permission to a foreign personal 
representative to sue in the local courts. 385 The general tenor 
of legislation on this subject is to grant power to foreign repre-
384 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS ( 1 935)  § 507. 1 ,  
""" Ala. Code { 1 940) t. 6 1 ,  § 1 5 1 ; Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1 9 3 7) § 1 3 99 ;  Colo. Stat. 
( 1 9 35 and Supp. 1 944) c. q6, §§ 14 1 ,  142 ; Del. Rev. Code ( 1 935)  § 3868 ; 
D. C. Code (1 940) t. zo, § 505 ; Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1 945) § 7 34.30 ;  Ga. 
Code Ann. ( 1 936)  §§ I I J-2401 to I I 3-2404 ; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 
1 94 1 )  c. 3, § 41 9 ;  Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 9 3 3 )  § 6-908 ; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 
1 943 ) § 59-1 708 ; Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) § 395 . 1 7 0 ;  Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) 
c. 14 1 ,  § 8 2 ;  Minn. Stat. ( 1 941 )  § 573 .05 ; Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 622 ; Neb. ' 
Rev. Stat. ( 1 943) § 3o-8o7 ; N. J. Stat. Ann. ( 1 93 7 )  § 3 : 1 3-7 ; N. M. Stat. 
( 1 941 ) § 3 3-209 ; Ohio Gen. Co4e (Page, 1 9 3 7 )  § 1 0509-1 65 i  Okla. Stat. 
( 1 94 1 )  t. 5 8, § 262 ; R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 9 3 8 )  c. 5 75, § 2 7 ;  S. D. Code ( 1 939) 
§ 35 . 1 1 03 ;  Wis. Stat. ( 1 943)  § z8p 6. 
. 
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sentatives to maintain actions in much the same manner as 
local representatives are authorized to do. The recent Uni­
form Powers of Foreign Representatives Act/86 authorizing 
such actions in the absence of local administration or applica- . 
tion therefor, should give added impetus to this desirable 
method of procedure; A needless administration is thus 
dispensed with in many cases where the only function of a 
personal representative is to enforce payment of a debt. Un­
less there are local creditors whose interests also deserve local 
protection, there is no reason why a foreign personal represent­
ative should not be allowed to enforce such payment. 
If it is thought that this does not afford adequate protection 
to local creditors, it may be said that they are or should be 
afforded ample time either before or during the pendency 
of such actions to apply for letters and thus make sure that 
they may receive payment through local administration. If 
local creditors do not take advantage of their right to apply 
for administration within a reasonable time after death, no 
valid objection should be raised against the maintenance of 
actions by the domiciliary representative. If statutes have 
barred the rights of creditors when no local administration 
has been applied for or granted within a reasonable time, this 
right to sue would seem to follow. However, no specific 
stat�te to this effect has been noted. Since only the rights 
of local creditors to local enforcement of their claims is in­
volved, and riot a liability to complete extinction, 387 the period 
allowed to local creditors to apply for administration should 
be quite short, say sixty or ninety days. This would give a 
reasonable amount of protection to local creditors and at the 
same time obviate the requirement of needless administration. 
286 Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act, §§ z, 3 · 
387 The state of domicile must entertain the presentation of claims by all credi­
tors irrespective of their residence. The federal Constitution requires this. 
Blake v. McClung, 1 72 U. S. 2 3 9, 1 9  S. Ct. 1 65 ( 1 898) . 
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A few of the statutes noted above 388 attempt to secure a meas­
ure of convenience to local creditors. Thus, Alabama permits 
local creditors or distributees to intervene ; Colorado, Dela­
ware, the District of Columbia, and Kentucky require a bond 
for the protection of local creditors ; and Illinois requires the 
substitution of a local personal representative if one should be 
appointed pending the action. Actions by a foreign personal 
representative are not permitted in Florida prior to the ex­
piration of three months, nor in Rhode Island prior to the ex-. 
piration of six months· after the decedent's death. This 'much 
of an opportunity is afforded to local creditors to institute an­
cillary administration or otherwise obtain local enforcement 
of their claims. 
If actions , by foreign representatives are not permitted, the 
recovery of assets may be possible by assigning the debt or 
other interest in property to a third party who m:ay then insti­
tute an action in his own name and in his own right. In a 
majority of states where the question has been directly pre­
sented, such actions have been permitted. 389 
3 · Transfer of mercantile specialties 
Much the same considerations apply to the transfer of stock 
or other registered securities by corporations in a state other 
than that of the decedent's domicile. The traditional view has 
been to treat shares of stock as having a situs at the domicile 
of the corporation so as to require administration there. 390 
Opposing. this is the mercantile theory which treats the at-
388 See statutes cited in note 3 8 5, supra. 
389 The leading case on this subject is Petersen v. Chemical Bank, 32 N. Y. 21 
( r 8 6  5 ) .  For a full discussion and collection of authorities, see Buchanan and 
Myers, "The Administration of Intangibles in View of First National Bank v. 
Maine," 48 HARV. L. REV. g r r , 92 1-924 ( 1 93 5 )  and Beale, "Voluntary Pay­
ment to a Foreign Administrator," 42 HARV. L. REv. 597, 6oo-6o4 ( r 929) . 
Some cases have denied the right of an assigne,e for collection to maintain an 
action. See Thacker v. Lindahl (Tex. Comm. App. 1 9 3 2 ) ,  48 S. W. (2d) 5 8 8. 
390 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS ( 1 9 3 5 )  §§ 477 . 1  to 477·4• 
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tributes of ownership of stock certificates and similar instru­
ments which pass by endorsement or delivery as having the 
same situs as the instruments themselves, and which places 
the power of the domiciliary representative to transfer the 
stock on the same basis as other chattels physically located at 
the decedent's domicile. 391 Thus transfers of stock certificates 
by a domiciliary representative, supported by appropriate 
documents showing authority to make such transfers, are 
entitled to recognition in other states. The elimination of 
numerous ancillary administrations would follow as a matter 
of course from this theory. In an attempt to simplify to this 
extent the problem of administering estates, several states 
have passed statutes 392 which specifically authorize corpo­
rations to make transfers of stocks and registered bonds from 
the domiciliary representative in the absence of ancillary ad­
ministration in the state of the corporation's domicile. The 
Restatement 393 has likewise adopted this rule of convenience. 
4· Release of mortgages by foreign p�rsonal representatives 
While local prejudices have tended to confine the activities 
of foreign representatives to the state of their appointment, 
certain situations have operated to extend their activities. For 
example, when a decedent dies owning a mortgage on prop­
erty situated in another state, it may be highly advantageous 
891 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS ( 1 935)  §§ 477 . 1 ,  477.2 .  See also the opinion 
of Mr. Justice Holmes in Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States 
Steel Corporation, 267 U. S. 22, 45 S. Ct. 207 (I 924) . 
892 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1 94 1 )  § J 2 8d ; . Ga. Code Ann. ( 1 9 36) § I I J-
24o6 ;  La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1 9 3 9 )  § 6 1 o ;  Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) c. 1 4 1 ,  § 8 2 ;  
Md. Code ( 1 939)  art. 93, § §  8 1 ,  8 2 ;  Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § 2 9 1 . 1 9 ;  Mo. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) § 2 72 ;  Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 943)  § 77-20 1 7 ;  N. H. Rev. Laws 
( 1 942) c. 353 ,  §§ 28, 29 (upon authority of local probate court) ; N. M. Stat. 
( 1 94 1 )  §§ 34-1 09, 34-I I o ;  Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1 944) t. 20, 
§ 995 ; R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 93 8 )  c. 5 75, § 25 ; S. C. Code ( 1 942) § 8 9 5 5 ;  Tenn. 
Code (Michie, 1 9 3 8 )  § 1 2 8 8 ;  Va. Code ( 1 942) § 5349a ; W. Va. Code ( 1 943)  
§§  4263 ,  '4264 . 
... ,RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAWS ( 1 9 34) § 47 7 (2) . See also 72 A. L. R. 
1 7cj et seq. ( 1 93 1 ) .  
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for the mortgagor to have the mortgage satisfied of record by 
the foreign personal representative, without requiring ancil­
lary administration. This would be especially true if the 
mortgage had been paid prior to the death of the mortgagee 
but formal satisfaction had not been made. No useful purpose 
would be ser.ved by requiring the appointment of an ancillary 
representative for the mere purpose of making formal satis­
faction. If such were required, local land titles would too 
often be clouded with unreleased mortgages. 
As might be expected in this situation, legislation 394 has 
been extremely liberal in authorizing a foreign personal repre­
sentative to satisfy local mortgages left by their decedents, 
upon recording an authenticated copy of his letters. Statutes 
of this kind greatly facilitate land title procedure and obviate 
unnecessary ancillary administration ; it is not surprising, 
therefore, to find that this procedure is authorized irrespective 
of the possibility of the existence of local creditors. The in­
terests of local creditors are subordinated to the paramount 
interests of local mortg�gors. 
S· Collection of tangible personal property 
The preceding discussion has been largely confined to the 
administration of intangibles. The problems incident to the 
reduction to possession or recovery of tangible personal prop­
erty arises much less frequently today than formerly. Never­
theless it is an important part of the larger problem under 
consideration. It has often been said that the domiciliary · 
representative has all the rights of ownership which the de­
cedent had during his lifetime with respect to property owned 
... Ala. Code ( I940) t. 6 I ,  § I4I ; Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, I 94I ) § 2939� ; 
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( I 93o) § 503 I ; Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. I 945) § 734·30 ;  Idaho 
Laws Ann. ( I 943) § I5-8 I 3 j  Iowa Code ( I 9 3 9) §§ I I 897  to I I 900j  Kal). 
Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943 ) § 59-I 707 ; Minn. Stat. (Mason, I 92 7) § 8 792 ;  N. J. 
Stat. Ann. ( I 9 3 7) §§ 3 :7-I r . I ,  3 :I4-I ; Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I ) t. 5 8, § 262 ; Pa. 
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. I 944) t. 20, § 99 5 ;  S. C. Code ( I 942) § ,s 9 5 5 ;  Wyo. 
Rev. Stat. ( I 9 3 I ) § 7 I-224. 
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by him.395 In application, however, this generalization is an 
overstatement, if not a misstatement. Certainly if  a local 
personal representative i� appointed in the jurisdiction where 
tangible personalty belonging to the decedent is located, he 
and he alone is entitled to receive delivery of it or to sue for its 
possession. 396 On the other hand, if no local personal repre­
sentative is appointed, there is authority for permitting the 
voluntary delivery of tangible personal property to the 
domiciliary representative,397 or even to the heirs directly 
under some circumstances.398 There is no substantial dif­
ference in the policies permitting the voluntary payment of a 
debt and those permitting the voluntary delivery of chattels 
under such conditions. But if the person in possession 
or control of the property refuses to deliver it and an action 
for recovery is necessary, the same rules exist as were con­
sidered in the bringing of actions by foreign personal repre­
sentatives. As seen previously, actions by a foreign personal 
representative are not ordinarily allowed in the absence of 
statutory perm1sswn. Whether the denial of this right be 
due to lack of title or is merely a procedural obstacle, the . 
result is the same-an inability to collect assets in a foreign 
jurisdiction without taking out ancillary administration there. 
6. Sale of land by foreign personal representatives 
Another purpose for which foreign personal representatives 
are allowed to extend their activities outside the state of their 
appointment is that of selling, leasing or mortgaging land 399 
395 Wilkins v. Ellett, 9 Wall. ( 76  U. S.) 740 ( 1 869) ; Petersen v. Chemical 
Bank, 32 N. Y. 2 1  at 43 ( 1 865) .  
396 McCully v .  Cooper, 1 14 Cal. 258, 46 P. 82 ( r 896) . 
897 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS ( 1 9 34) §§ 472-47 5 ·  
••• See discussion in  subdivision III-D-2, supra. 
809 Personal powers conferred upon a representative by the will of a decedent 
are not included. The discussion here refers only to statutory powers given to 
foreign personal representatives in their representative capacity and not to per­
sonal powers conferred upon executors. 
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for the purpose of paying debts or legacies. From consider­
ations already discussed, it would seem to follow that in 
carrying out this function the foreign personal representative 
would be encroaching upon local prerogatives. Nevertheless 
the land is an immovable and cannot be removed out of the 
jurisdiction, although the proceeds from its sale may be so 
removed. Several statutes 400 have been passed to authorize 
foreign representatives, without obtaining local letters, to 
apply to local probate courts and obtain authority to sell land 
for these purposes. It is customary to require the foreign 
representative to furnish authenticated copies of the domi­
ciliary proceedings and also to give a bond to secure creditors 
and other interested parties. As in the case of authorizing 
foreign representatives to satisfy mortgages, local creditors 
are not unduly inconvenienced. 
7· Clearing title to land 
It is a well known fact that where a decedent leaves only 
real estate in a foreign jurisdiction, ancillary administration 
is frequently taken out as a formality in order to bar the rights 
of possible creditors and to give a marketable title. In the 
vast majority of these cases no creditors appear and the whole 
procedure becomes a mere formality which serves to restrain 
the alienation of the real estate in the interim. Special statutes 
of nonclaim applying in the absence of administration have al­
ready been discussed.401 These are fully effective for the 
purpose. The practical objection to most of these statutes is 
that the period provided to bar creditors is too long to afford 
free alienability and ma1'ketable title within a reasonable 
")() Ga. Code Ann ( 1 936)  § 1 1 3-2405 ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 9 3 3 )  §§ 6-1 14 1  to 
6-1 143 ; Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) c. 1 50, §§ 14, 1 5 ; Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 932) c. 
202, §§ 3 2  to 3 5 ;  Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 943 ) §§ 30-1 1 3 3  to 3o-r i J 8 ;  N. H. Rev. 
Laws ( 1 942) c. 3 58, § 1 2 ;  Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 93 7) § r o5 I I-2 7 ;  Wis. 
Stat. ( 1 943) §§ 2 8 7 . 1 6, 3 1 6.3o, 3 r 6. 3 r .  
"'1 See notes 2 8 9 t o  3 r 9 ,  supra. 
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period. At the present time the best legislation designed to 
promote marketability and alienability of land left by non­
resident decedents is found in Ohio.402 There it is provided 
that when administration has been granted in any other juris­
diction on the estate of a decedent and no administration has 
been had in Ohio, the domiciliary representative may file 
in any county in Ohio where the decedent left real estate an 
authenticated copy of his letters, whereupon creditors are 
notified by publication for three weeks. If creditors make 
claims within six months and their claims remain unsatisfied 
after reasonable notice to the non-resident personal repre­
sentative, ancillary administration may be had. Otherwise 
the lien of creditors is extinguished. 
A similar procedure is suggested in the U nifdtm Powers 
of Foreign Representatives Act.403 Upon application by a 
foreign representative to the probate court where land of a 
decedent is located, notice of his appointment is published, 
and unless creditors file their claims within a specified time, 
their claims are barred as a lien upon all property of the de­
cedent within such state. If claims are presented and remain 
unpaid after reasonable notice to the foreign representative, 
ancillary administrati'On may be granted. The effect of this 
Act, like the Ohio statute, is to provide an opportunity for 
local creditors to enforce their claims in their own jurisdiction, 
and to specify a period of nonclaim in much the same manner 
· as if ancillary administration were carried out. 
Other statutory methods also exist to facilitate the transfer 
of property in a foreign jurisdiction without requiring ancil­
lary administration there. When a non-resident decedent 
leaves property in South Dakota 404 or Wyoming 405 which 
has a value not to exceed $ IO,ooo and administration has been 
402 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 9 3 7 )  § 1 0 5 1 1-2. 
403 Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act, § 4· 
'04 8. D. Code ( 1 9 39) § 3 5.o8o r .  
405 Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 3 1 )  § 8 8-9 1 8. 
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had in another state, administration in either of the two states 
named may be dispensed with after one year from the de­
cedent's death on filing with the probate court a verified peti­
tion therefor with certified copies of the petition, the order 
of appointment of the domiciliary representative, and the 
inventory and final decree of distribution therein. After 
notice by publication for three weeks, the court is authorized 
to have the domiciliary probate proceedings admitted as a 
probate or administration of the estate in those states. If 
creditors appear, the hearing is postponed to permit such 
creditors to apply for letters of administration. But if no 
creditors appear, this summary procedure affords a satisfactory 
substitute for full ancillary administration. 
Proceed�gs to determine heirship or distributees have al­
ready been di�cussed 406 in another co�nection. Proceedings 
of this kind are particularly useful in the case of non-resident 
decedents, although they are applicable to resident and non­
resident decedents alike. Where administration proceedings 
have not been had in a state other than the decedent's domicile 
and creditors have become barred by the lapse of time, such 
proceedings will often furnish a simple and effective method 
of supplying the final indicia of marketable title to land 
located in the other state. 407 
IV. CoNCLUSIONS AND REcoMMENDATIONs 
The current demand for the improvement of probate pro­
cedure is toward two objectives : clarity and simplicity. Much 
has been done in the past decade in revising, and also in re­
writing entire probate codes. Much will be done in the 
years just ahead. In undertaking the task of simplification 
the primary functions of administration should be constantly 
'06 See subdivision III-D-4, supra. 
407 There is also always the question of the determination and discharge of the 
state's lien for inheritance taxes. See note 3 6 3, supra. 
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kept in mind. By way of summary and recommendations for 
methods to dispense with administration in whole or in part, 
several things may be said. 
First, when an estate is small and administration is neither 
had nor contemplated, statutes should afford the surviving 
family of a decedent a means of collecting the assets of the 
estate without the necessity of resorting to administration. 
Estates up to some agreed value should be embr11ced within 
such legislation. This amount should not be so small as to 
render such legislation useless except in insignificant estates. 
Furthermore, the family of the decedent entitled to invoke 
its provisions should not be limited to those entitled to home­
stead, exemptions or· family allowance, but should include 
all persons who would be classed as distributees. The Model 
Probate Code 408 contains concrete suggestions for legislation 
of this kind. A lapse of thirty days after death is required 
before invoking its provisions in order to afford creditors an 
opportunity to apply for administration. The payment or 
delivery of assets to the heirs pursuant to the terms of such 
statutes is not intended, however, to preclude administration 
at a subsequent date. If letters are granted later, . only the 
heirs to whom such payment or delivery may have been made 
should be accountable to the personal representative who is 
appointed. 409 In the absence of administration, such statutory 
devices supply a much needed method for the small estate 
which is not indebted. For several years statutes of this 
kind 410 have functioned well in California and Illinois where 
they are primarily utilized to collect bank deposits, wage 
claims, insurance proceeds and the like, and to transfer the 
family automobile and small amounts of registered securities. 
Statutes in some states authorizing the payment of wages, 
..,. §§ 8 6, 8 7. 
""' See Brezzo v. Brangero, 51 Cal. App. 79, 1 96 P. 8 7  ( 1 92 1 ) ; Wash. Rev. 
Stat. (Supp. 1 943 )  §§ 3 249-1 and 3 249-2. 
. no See discussion in subdivision IU-D-2, supra. 
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bank accounts or only one kind of debt are unnecessarily re­
stricted in function. 
Second, if the value of the estate does not exceed that to 
which the surviving family of the decedent would be entitled 
as homestead, exempt property and a family allowance, a 
wholesome provision would authorize the surviving spouse or 
minor children to petition the probate court asking that the 
same be set aside to them for these purposes, and that an order 
then be made that no administration is necessary. Procedure 
of this kind should be as simple as possible, eliminating all 
unnecessary formalities. Inasmuch as notices may not be 
required to creditors and others who may have a possible 
interest, such an order may well be macle subject to revision, 
correction or annulment within a substantial period of time 
after it has been made. This will encourage full disclosure 
and an opportunity to all interested persons who may not 
have had an opportunity to be heard at the time the order was 
made. The Model Probate Code contains such provisions 411 
and places an upper limit of $2,500 upon the value of estates, 
exclusive of homestead and exempt property, to which it ap­
plies. Since the expenses of the last illness and funeral charges 
must be paid by the surviving family as a condition precedent 
to invoking these provisions, the amount of $2,500 will do 
no more than furnish a minimum of a family allowance. Such 
an estate should not be subjected to the expense of formal ad­
ministration. 
Third, if letters have been granted to a personal repre­
sentative and it later appears that the estate of a decedent, 
exclusive of homestead, exemptions and family allowances does 
not exceed the amount of preferred claims, the personal repre­
sentative should be authorized to distribute the estate for these 
purposes so far as may be done and thereupon present his 
report and account for final settlement, and upon the approval 
411 §§ 8 8-9 I .  
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and allowance thereof, be discharged. As already mentioned, 
statutes of this kind or some variation thereof exist in many 
states at the present time. 412 A similar section is contained in 
the Model Probate Code. 413 
All of the foregoing methods, it will be noted, are intended 
to aid the summary administration or to eliminate the neces­
sity of administration on small estates. To require the family 
or dependents of a decedent of small means to pursue the 
regular routine of administration, with its delays in transmit­
ting the property to those entitled to it, and subject to the ex­
penses incidental thereto, seems obviously unfair and 
unnecessary in an enlightened age. In none of these situations 
are the interests of creditors adversely affected. In the third 
method, court supervision is fully provided for. In the second 
method, court inspection and authorization are required. And 
in the first method, resort to judicial administration is always 
possible by a creditor or other person interested, to the end that 
the interests of every interested person are amply protected. 
In larger estates it is true that all the heirs may make 
distribution of the decedent's property by an informal family 
settlement,414 if they are able to make collection of all the 
assets and there are no creditors to insist upon administration. 
It is also true that most states recognize the validity of such 
settlements when made, insofar as the parties to them are con­
cerned. In view of the possible interests of creditors in all 
cases, and of distributees in some cases, the advisability of 
authorizing such a procedure by statute seems questionable. 
A contrary opinion may be supported from the experience of 
those few states 415 which do authorize such a procedure but, 
412 See discussion in subdivision III-B-r-a, supra. 
41S § 92•  
•u An informal family administration and distribution is meant here, not a 
compromise settlement involving adversary rights of distributees under a will 
or by the laws of intestacy. 
. "� See discussion in subdivision III-B--:3 and. 41 supra. 
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generally speaking, it is likely that a more orderly and satis­
factory distribution of a large estate can be effected by a formal 
administration. This is not to say that informal family settle­
ments should not be recognized. On the contrary they should 
be fully recognized when made. But problems arising in con­
nection with such settlements are probably better solved by 
ordinary case law, as they have largely been solved in the 
pa9t. 
As to actions by the heirs to enforce payment of debts due 
the decedent, without resorting to administration, an argument 
can be made for ·permitting or for denying them. While it 
is true that in rare instances creditors may be_ prejudiced, it is 
also true that creditors may invoke their right to apply for 
administration. And if such debts are collected by the heirs, 
it does not follow that they are lost to creditors. In fact, they 
are subject to .administration, if a personal representative is 
subsequently appointed. The more pertinent inquiry is 
whether the proceeds are more likely to be lost or dissipated 
in the hands of the debtor or in the hands of the heirs. 
In addition to these three basic methods for dispensing with 
admiri1stration, various other devices have been discussed in 
the preceding pages. Some of. these, such as the independent 
executor under a nonintervention will and the withdrawal 
of an estate from administration, are said to work satisfactorily 
in the states where they are used. Others, in particular 
instances, are no more than alternative ways of accomplishing 
the objectives outlined and authorized by the basic methods 
above described. This is often true in such matters as making 
distribution to the heirs of a distributee who dies during ad­
ministration, or in making distribution of an estate of a person 
who dies while under guardianship. In both of these latter 
instances, there is the added advantage of having distribution 
made pursuant to the order of a probate court having juris­
diction of a decedent's estate in one case and of a ward's estate 
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in  the other. In the final analysis, the virtue of  any given 
method for dispensing with administration is dependent upon 
the extent to which the basic functions of administration are 
accomplished in the particular situation. 
Administration may be dispensed with in any case in which 
the heirs can and do make collection and distribution of assets, 
irrespective of amount, to all those entitled. to them, including 
creditors, and to the federal and state governments for estate 
and inheritance taxes. The efficacy of any such informal settle­
ment will depend upon the agreement of all the heirs and the 
actual satisfaction of all creditors. In no case should it be 
said that administration is a required proceeding. An adminis­
tration proceeding is intended to secure useful functions in 
society-to be a servant, not a dictator of procedure for its 
own sake. 
The dominant function of administration in Anglo­
American law has been the protection of creditors; It is sub­
mitted, however, that we have carried this to an extreme. 
Ordinarily the running of the statute of limitations is stopped 
upon death. The statute of nonclaim is substituted. after ad­
ministration is granted. But ordinarily no general nonclaim 
statute operates against creditors in the absence of administra­
tion. Whatever arguments may be made in favor of the re­
tention of this as a rule, the fact remains that the marketability 
of property, both real and personal, is usually impaired. In 
a commercial satiety free marketability is an objective in itself. 
Statutes in a number of states 416 have barred the claims of 
creditors after the expiration of specified periods of time fol­
lowing the death of a decedent when administration has not 
been had. Such a statute should exist in every state. It should 
apply to personal as well as to real property, and it should 
bar any creditor from applying for administration.417 The 
"" See discussion in subdivision III-D-r,  supra. 
m See Model Probate Code, § r 35 (d) • 
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trend toward shortening the period of time could well be 
carried further. 
Similarly the state should be required to be diligent in as­
serting its lien for estate or inheritance taxes. Failure to take 
steps for their determination and collection within some rea­
sonable period of time should likewise operate to free the 
assets of the estate from the state's lien. 
When a decedent leaves property located in several juris­
dictions, administration in more than one jurisdiction should 
be rendered unnecessary as far as possible. If domiciliary 
letters are granted, payments to, actions by, and the transfer 
and delivery of property to the domiciliary representative in 
any state should be an established procedure upon some rea­
sonable basis. The rights of local creditors and distributees 
are important, but their assumed existence has been emphasized 
to the point of making ancillary administration a requirement 
all too often to no real end. It is suggested that the lapse of 
some short period of time without the commencement of 
proceedings for local administration should be sufficient to 
justify full recognition of the powers and authority of the 
demiciliary representative in that state. Thus the interests 
of local creditors and distributees are not extinguished but are 
merely relegated to the domiciliary state for assertion.418 
The problem of clearing title to land in a state other than 
that in which the decedent was domiciled remains. The ex­
perience under the Ohio statute,419 which has been followed 
in the Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act/20 
r�eveals a simple expedient for the purpose. 
When. a decedent leaves a will, the question may arise as 
to whether administration may be dispensed with, even though 
the will is probated. A statute, of course, may require the 
.,. For concrete suggestions in
-
this respect see Uniform Powers of Foreign 
Representatives Act, §§ z, 3 ·  
019 Ohio G�n. Code (Page, I 9 3 7) § I o 5 I I-z. 
•20 § 4· See discussion in subdivision III-E-6, supra. 
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delivery of a will by the person in possession of i t  to the court. 
Its probate, however, is not automatic upoiJ. delivery. A 
proceeding to probate the will is distinct from a proceeding to 
administer the estate of a decedent. The fact that the latter 
is customarily carried on in connection with the former, at the 
same time, and in the same court, is likely to lead to the con­
clusion that the two constitute a single proceeding. His­
torically and functionally, however, they are separate. A 
proceeding to administer an estate is not a necessary con­
sequence of the probate of a will. If the devisee;; or legatees 
are able to make physical collection of the assets and agree 
upon a distribution among themselves, and if there are no 
creditors to insist upon administration, their action is clearly 
lawful. Although not usually stated in so many words, it is 
expressed or implied in several statutes 421 t�at a will may be 
probated without being followed by administration. The 
rights to the decedent's property will be governed by the pro­
visions of the will, but subject to the rights of homestead, ex­
emptions and family allowance, which are independent of a 
will. Under the usual statutes dispensing with administra­
tion, the rights of devisees and legatees, as such, are not im­
portant, for the estate of the decedent is entirely consumed 
in setting off homestead and, exempt_ property and in paying 
a family allowance. However, where the beneficiaries of a 
decedent's will, without taking out administration, proceed 
under a statute authorizing the collection by them of assets 
less than a designated sum, they may be permitted to avail 
themselves of this power without first probating the will.422 
421 See, for example, Colo. Stat. (Supp. I 944) c. I 76, § 62 ; Ill. Ann. Stat. 
(Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § 478 ;  N . C. Rev. Stat. ( I 943) §§ 3 I-2 7 to 3 I-29 ;  
Ohio Gen.·Code (Page, I 9 3 7 )  § 1 05 I I-2o ;  Wis. Stat. ( I 943) § 2 3 8 . I 9 . Such 
statutes are particularly common when domiciliary administration has been had 
in one state and the will is then J>robated in a foreign j urisdiction without grant­
ing letters thereon. 
'"' Under Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) §§ 63o and 630 .5  an un­
probated will may be the basis of payment of money or· delivery of assets to the 
beneficiaries designated therein. See also Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. I 945) §§ 73 5.01 
to 735. 1 3 .  
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A general survey of the legislation discussed in this study 
indicates that the eastern states are far more inclined to regard 
administration on a decedent's estate as the normal course of 
procedure. This is particularly true where inheritance taxes 
are applied to successions without allowing more than a bare 
minimum of exemptions. In those states, debtors cannot 
safely pay the heirs without incurring a possible liability to the 
state for inheritance taxes as well as to creditors for their 
claims. The natural tendency of such tax laws is to exert a 
strong pressure upon heirs to take out administration in every 
estate. The tendency in the west is in the other direction, par­
ticularly in small estates. Furthermore, the large majority 
of statutes barring creditors, upon the expiration of a desig­
nated period of time after death and in the absence of ad­
ministration, are in the west. Such devices as the independent 
executor acting under a nonintervention will, the withdrawal 
of estates from administration, and direct distribution to the 
heirs of a distributee who dies during administration may be 
local examples, but they also represent a feeling that the tra­
ditional process of administration is not an absolute for every 
decedent. 
In states where it is felt that administration upon estates 
should be retained as a norm, probate procedure should be 
streamlined. Every method possible should be employed to 
shorten and to simplify the task of the personal representative 
in his duties in order that distribution of the estate may be 
made to those entitled to it as soon as possible. Notices coUld 
be combined ; notices by mail could be substituted for notices 
by publication ; and times of notice could be shortened. And 
most important of all, the nonclaim period should be shortened 
so as not to exceed six months. The trend to reduce 'the non­
claim period which has already acquired a momentum during 
the past decade, will likely continue along with the larger 
movement of procedural reform under way. 
· 
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From a consideration o f  the functions to  be achieved by 
administration, it would seem that legislation for dispensing 
with administration should be confined primarily to the small 
. estate. Other legislation for the same purpose should be valued 
according to the manner in which it permits the accomplish­
ment of the basic purposes of administration. In no event 
should administration be required as a process. If heirs can 
make collection and distribution of an estate and pay all claims, 
legislation should not prohibit it. In larger estates both the 
problems of claims, including the determination of estate and 
inheritance taxes, and of distribution are such as to cause the 
persons interested to pursue the usual course of administration. 
The Function of Will Contests* 
Lewis M. Simes 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
T
O anyone steeped in the doctrines of the common law 
there is something anomalous about the will contest. 
First, the will is duly admitted to probate in a pro­
ceeding which is almost universally conceded to be judicial. 
Then at a subsequent time a so-called contest is brought by 
the heir, in which the precise proposition determined on the 
probate is retried. In most jurisdictions the heir is not bound 
to make any sort of a showing to entitle him to contest. He 
need not allege newly discovered evidence. He need not 
submit any evidence of fraud or mistake. Indeed, in some 
states, he may even have attended the original probate pro­
ceeding and sat by without a murmur of dissent while the will 
was judicially approved. Yet the law says he may now, merely 
for the asking, wipe out the effect of the decree admitting the 
will to probate and have the whole matter heard anew. This 
is not appeal in any true sense of the word, though in many 
jurisdictions it is called an appeal with trial de novo ; nor is 
it a hearing on certiorari, though such a hearing may sometimes 
be granted by a still higher court with respect to the c�ntest 
itself. It is not a new trial for cause ; since, in most states, 
no cause need be shown. It is, in short, a unique sort of hear­
ing which finds its only justification as a part of a legal system 
in the uniqueness of the matters with which it deals. 
It is, of course, obvious that these observations do not ap­
ply to a contest which is a part of, and the same as, the original 
probate proceeding. If a will is presented to the court by a 
devisee or executor to be probated and an heir puts the pro-
* This manuscript is being published simultaneously in the Michigan Law 
Review. 
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ponent's allegations in issue, the trial of that issue at that 
point in the proceeding is quite as much in accord with the 
spirit of our legal system as the trial of the due execution of 
a contract when a promisee brings an action for its breach. 
But no one ever heard of the contest of a contract or of a 
deed, separate and apart from the original action on that con­
tract or deed. And unless the probate of a will possesses 
peculiarities all its own, it is difficult to see why probate should 
be regarded as distinct from contest. 
It is the primary purpose of this paper to consider what are 
the proper functions of will contests. In this connection, stat­
utes and case law dealing with the various aspects of will con­
tests will be considered with a view to determining what is 
the underlying theory of the will contest in the various juris­
dictions and whether various subsidiary rules concerning it 
are consistent with that theory. By way of conclusion, we sha,ll 
attempt to determine what should be the rationale of an ideal 
piece of legislation on will contest. We shall deal chiefly with 
the so-called contest after probate, since contest before probate 
is ordinarily nothing more than a determination of the due 
execution of the will as an issue in the probate proceeding. But 
it should be noted that in some jurisdictions legislation appears 
to indicate that a contest before probate is also more or less 
distinct from probate itself. Certainly that type of legislation 
should come in for consideration in connection with any ade­
quate treatment of the function of contest. 
It is hoped, moreover, that a clear understanding of the 
nature and function of will contests will tend to reduce litiga­
tion and to result in more coherent legislation. Though it 
may not reduce directly the number of will contests, yet, if 
the law is clarified, the number of appeals from will contests 
should be substantially decreased. Moreover, if suitable limi­
tations on will contests are inserted in statutes which deal with 
them, contests should also be less frequent. 
. 
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Up to this point the meaning of the term "will contest" 
has been assumed. But before proceeding, it should be made 
explicit. The expression "will contest," 1 as used in this paper, 
means any proceeding or part of a proceeding in which the 
question whether a given instrument is the duly executed and 
unrevoked will of a competent testator is put in issue. It is 
to be distinguished from a mere ex parte probate proceeding 
in which no allegations of the proponent of a will are con­
troverted. The term is not limited to statutory proceedings 
designated as contests, but is used to include any proceeding 
to admit a will to probate in which its execution or revocation 
is put in issue ; it includes an appeal from an order admitting a 
will to probate in which the issue is tried de novo; a proceed­
ing to revoke the probate of a :will ; a probate in solemn form; 
an action at law in the nature of ejectment or trespass in which 
the issue of will or no will is tried ; a chancery proceeding in 
which the issue is the due execution of a will. In short, prac­
tically any proceeding in which the due execution or revoca­
tion of a will is put in issue is a contest. 
This paper, however, does not deal with the constructive 
trust as a device to give effect to a will discovered after ad­
ministration is closed ; nor with an action of tort brought by a 
devisee of an unprobated will against an heir who has wrong-
1 Although the term "will contest" has come into almost universal use in the 
United States, it has seldom been used in England. However, an early edition of 
Jarman on Wills refers to a legatee as "having contested the validity or effect of 
a will." }ARMAN, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF DEVISES (22 Law 
Library, I 8 38 )  p. *296. It has been suggested that the term comes from the 
"litis contestatio" of Roman law. See In re Cronin's Will, I43 Misc. 559,  257  
N. Y. S .  496 at  503  { I 9 J 2) and Clemens v .  Patterson, 38  Ala. 7 2 I  at  722 ( I 863 ) .  
As t o  the "litis contestatio" i n  Roman law, see BucKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF 
RoMAN LAW (2d ed. I 9 3 2) 695. As to its application to procedure in the ecclesi­
astical courts, see CON SET, PRACTICE OF THE SPIRITUAL COURTS (3d ed. I 708) 
8 5 ;  LANGDELL, EQUITY PLEADING ( I 877)  xv; 3 BURN, EccLESIASTICAl' LAW 
(9th ed. I 842) I 89. CoNSET, op. cit. 3 7 1 ,  refers to the will as being "con­
tested." 
The term "contest" appears in American statute law as early as I 7 r I. See 
Va. Laws, Act of Nov. I 7 I I , c. z, in 4 Statutes at Large of Virgini�, edited by 
Hening ( 1 8 zo) 14. 
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fully destroyed the will. Yet each of these situations may 
involve a determination of the due execution of the will. Nor 
do we consider the contest of foreign wills, or of nuncupative 
wills, or of lost or destroyed wills, since such minor differences 
in the law of contest as may be found there add nothing to 
our understanding of the matter of function. 
II.  PROBATE AND CoNTEST IN ENGLISH LAw 
Since American probate procedure is modeled after the 
English pattern, it is important to consider what constituted 
will contest in England. Prior to I 8 57, wills involving per­
sonalty were probated in the ecclesiastical court. From the 
time when the first edition of Swinburn on Wills appeared 
until courts of probate were set Op shortly after the middle of 
the nineteenth century, the procedure seems not to have 
greatly varied.2 Probate could be either in common form 
or in solemn form, the latter being also described as probate in 
form of law or probate per testes. If in common form, the 
proceeding was summary; no notice was given to anyone. 
The will could be admitted to probate on the mere oath of the 
executor that he believed it to be duly executed, though ad­
ditional proof was sometimes required. It is commonly stated 
that at any time within thirty years 3 after the will had been 
admitted to probate in common form it could be proved anew 
2 SWINBURN, A BRIEFE TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLES ( r 590) 
224, 225. The following discussions of the subject appear to be patterned more 
or less after Swinburn : GODOLPHJN, ORPHANS LEGACY (3d  ed. 1 6 85) 62 ; I 
WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS (Amer. ed. 1 832)  *r 8 8-I 9 5 i  4 BURN, EccLESIASTI­
CAL LAW (9th ed. 1 842) 3 1 5-322 ;  LoVELASS, THE LAW's DISPOSAL OF A PER­
SON'S ESTATE WHO DIES WITHOUT WILL OR TESTAMENT; TO WHICH Is ADDED 
THE DISPOSAL OF A PERSON'S ESTATE BY WILL AND TESTAMENT (25 Law Li­
brary, from the 1 2th London ed. 1 8 39) *4o8-4ro. 
8 Swinburn says there is a presumption of due execution of a will after ten 
years. Most other writers say that the will cannot be proved in solemn form 
after thirty ·years. In 4 BuRN, EcCLESIASTICAL LAW (9th ed. 1 842) 3 1 8  it is 
suggested that the word "ten" in Swiiiburn is a misprint for "thirty." It is 
possible that there may be some connection between this rule and the rule of 
evidence as to the presumed authenticity of documents after thirty yean;. See 
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in solemn form ; although it is not entirely clear that there was 
any time limit. Or the executor or some other interested party 
·could have secured its prpbate in solemn form in the first 
instance and before any other probate was sought. When 
probate was in solemn form, notice was given to interested 
parties who were permitted to oppose the admission of the 
will ; and the attesting witnesses were produced to testify in 
support of the will. 
Until the latter part of the nineteenth century/ a will, inso­
far as it involved freehold interests in land, was not subject 
to probate in the sense in which a will of personalty was said 
to be probated. That is to say the will was regarded as passing 
the title to land automatically on the death of the testator, 
just as a deed passes title on its delivery. The validity of the 
will might be determined incidentally in an action of trespass 
or ejectment involving the land devised. But the judgment 
determined the 
-
matter only as between the parties as of the 
time when the action was brought. Just as in the case of title 
by deed, any number of subsequent aCtions of trespass or eject­
ment might be brought with' varying results. 
It is true, equity would sometimes take steps to have a' 
devise of land proved ; but the result added up to no more 
than what was ' permissible in the court of law. Thus, a 
devisee might, under certain circumstances, go into equity 
7 WIGMORE, EviDENCE (3d ed. 1 940) § z i J8 .  The rule as to wills of per­
sonalty, however, is said to invo!ve a period of thirty years after probate in com­
mon form ; while the evidence ru:e, when applied to wills of land, has been lield 
to mean thirty years from the execution of the will. See Doe d. Oldham v. 
Wolley, 8 B. & C. 22 ( 1 82 8 ) .  It has been said that there is no recognized time 
limit on the probate of wills in solemn form in the ecclesiastical courts. See 
FoURTH REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE 
LAW OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY ( 1 83 3 )  3 9 ;  REPORT BY THE 
CoMMISSIONERs TO INQUiRE INTo THE PRACTICE AND JuRISDICTION oF THE 
EcCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES ( 1 83 2 )  3 7 ;  Richardson v. 
Claney, 2 Phillimore 228  note (a) , at ZJ I ( x 8o2) .  
• In The Goods of John Bootie, L. R. 3 P. & D. 1 77 ( 1 8 74 ) .  
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and ask to have his title determined.C1 Chancery would direct . 
the devisee and heir to frame an issue of devisa'Uit 'Uel non 
and have it tried in an action at law before a jury. When the 
court of equity became satisfied, after one or more verdicts at 
law, that title was in the devisee and that the will was good, 
interference by the heir might be enjoined. The devisee 
might also file a bill in equity to perpetuate testimony and the 
court would compel the attesting witnesses to come in and 
testify. These two procedures were sometimes denominated 
proving the wili in equity/ just as the trespass or ejectment 
action was sometimes described as proving the will at law.7 
The following succinct statement from Adams on Equity indi­
cates the precise extent 1 to which equity established a will 
of land : 8 
"The validity of a will of real estate, and of the consequent 
title of the devisee, is triable only by the Courts of common 
law. If the devisee being out of possession seeks to enforce 
the will, or if the heir being out of possession seeks to set it 
aside, their respective modes of doing so are by ejectment at 
law. If there be outstanding terms or other legal impediment, 
they may respectively come into equity to have them removed. 
If either party being in possession fears that his possession may 
be subsequently disturbed, he tnay perpetuate the testimony 
on a proper bill ; or if after a satisfactory verdict ahd judgment, 
he is harassed by repeated ejectments, he may have an injunc­
tion to restrain them on a bill of peace. But neither party can 
resort to the Court of Chancery as a tribunal for the trial of 
the will. 
. 
If, however, there be 'a  trust to perform or assets 
" Pemberton v. Pemberton, I 3  Vesey 290 ( r 8o7) ; Bootie v. Blundell, 1 9  
Vesey 494 { I  8 1 5 ) ; Tatham v. Wright, 2 Russ & My. r ( r 8 3  I ) ; Lowe v. Joliffe, 
I Wm. Black. 3 6 5  (I 762) ; Mountain v. Bennet, I Cox Ch. 3 5 3  ( I  7 8 7 ) ,  z Dick. 
683  ( I 7 8 7) ; 3 WoODDESSON, LECTURES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 
I 8 34) 4 7 7-479 ; z STORY, EQUITY JuRISPRUDENCE ( I st ed. I 8 36)  6 7 1 .  
" See PoWELL, DEVISES ( rst Am. ed. I 8o 7 )  7 I 4. As to the bill to per­
petuate testimony, see I HARRISON, CHANCERY ( 7th ed. I 790) 784 ; 2 id, 2 82. 
7 See PoWELL, DEVISES { ISt Am. ed. I 807) 702. 
8 ADAMS, EQUITY (2d Am. ed. I 852)  *249• 
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to administer, so that the will is drawn within the cognizance 
of equity, there is an incidental jurisdiction to declare the will 
is established, after first directing an issue devisavit vel non, 
to try its validity at law. By the old practice it was necessary 
to establish a will against the heir, whenever the Court was 
called upon to execute its trusts, but the rule is now abolished. 
The issue devisavit vel non, when a declaration of establish­
ment is asked, is demandable as of right by the heir; for he can 
be disinherited only by the verdict of a jury. But he may 
waive this right by his conduct." 
Such was the system of will contest in England at a time 
when American jurisdictions were taking over English legal 
principles. Clearly illogical in sharply differentiating land 
and personalty, it merely gave ano�her expression to a dis­
tinction which runs all through English common law. It 
may not be possible to state with certainty, and perhaps it  
would be futile to . attempt to do so, why the ecclesiastical 
courts took over the disposition of a dead man's personalty 
but not his realty. Even as to the personalty it was said not 
to be by common right but only by English custom,9-what­
ever that may mean. But the upshot of the matter seems to 
have been that the church desired to have a hand in disposing 
of a dead man's estate, a part df which he commonly wished to 
appropriate for the good of his soul.10 Obviously land was too 
important in a feudal society to be entrusted to religious 
tribunals; for in those days, land was government, land was 
social status, in short, .land was the very foundation of the 
social order. 
Conceding that the interplay of compromise must have re­
sulted · in giving . probate of wills of personalty to the ec­
clesiastical courts and such probate as there was of wills of 
9 GoDOLPHIN, ORPHANS LEGACY (3d ed. I 685)  59,-"de Consuetudine 
Angliae & non de Communi Jure." 
ro See 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. I 9 r I ) 
3 32 ·  ( 
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realty to the secular courts, this does not explain the wide 
diversity in the two concepts of probate. Nor is any adequate 
explanation forthcoming; yet the theory of each was perfectly 
rational. Probate in the ecclesiastical court was the authenti­
cation of a document. This authentication was contempora­
neous with the grant of authority to the personal representa­
tive ; it did not determine the legal effect of the will. But it 
said to the executor: "The testator made this will ; he ap­
pointed you his executor. Take his personal estate and ad­
minister it according to the terms of the will." 
On the other hand, the _ determination of the validity of a 
will of land in a court of law was essentially an inter partes 
determination of the title to a particular piece of land. It 
decided both the validity and the legal effect of the will 
in giving title to the devisee. But it decided this only as it 
decided the validity of a deed when an action of trespass or 
ejectment put in issue the title to particular- land which it 
purported to convey. 
In the -case of the will of personal property, the contest was 
obviously the probate in solemn form. That it could come 
after probate in common form did not in any way indicate that 
the law permitted two trials of the same'issue. Probate in com­
mon form was no trial. Indeed, it has been definitely asserted 
by an eminent authority on English.ecclesiastical law 11 that 
it was not a judicial proceeding. EssentiallY. it was a mere 
formal administrative authentication of the instrument ; 12 
11 In 2. PHILLIMORE, EcCLESIASTICAL LAW ( 1 87 3 )  1 2. 1 0, it is pointed out that 
the voluntary j urisdiction of the ecclesiastical court, including the granting of 
probate of wills, is not a judicial proceeding. The learned author therefore con­
cludes that" when the bishop selects a subordinate to act in voluntary proceedings, 
he is delegating the function ; but if it were a true judicial function, the subordi­
nate would be acting as judge for himself, since a judicial function cannot be 
delegated. 
1ll See FoURTH REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO 
THE LAW, OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY ( 1 9  3 3 )  55 ;  REPORT BY 
THE COMMISSIONERS TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND ]URISDICTION OF 
THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES ( 1 83 2. )  3 7 ·  
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and the contest-the probate in solemn form-was the first 
and only real hearing of the issue of due execution. There 
were two good reasons for permitting probate in common form 
without notice before probate in solemn form. First, in the 
vast majority of cases there would never be any contest or 
any disagreement of interested parties as to the distribution 
of the estate. Hence a system which reduced the formalities 
to a minimum was desirable. Second, even if a later contest 
might take place, the preservation of the estate demanded 
that a responsible person take charge of it as soon as possible 
after the death of the testat,or ; and to delay until notice to 
interested parties and a hearing on the will was had would in 
many instances permit a wasting of the estate.13 
Contest in the case of real estate recognized even more 
fully that no litigation about the will is necessary in the ordi­
nary situation. Its underlying theory was this : Contest takes 
place only when the title to devised land is put in issue. It 
operates to authenticate the instrument only to the extent that 
the judgment in that case is an estoppel between the parties.14 
It thus appears that broadly speaking the theory of contest 
in the case of wills o.f personalty and of realty was not as 
widely divergent as might be supposed. In each type of will 
it is assumed that there is no contest, no adjudication of the 
due execution of the will, in the ordinary case. Only when 
some exceptio?al circumstance gives rise to a dispute is there 
13 "A very little consideration will show that it would be absolutely impossible 
to establish any a priori guards or cautions, which would not, from the delay and 
expense, occasion an infinitely greater loss to the Public, than may sometimes arise 
from what is called snatching Probate of a paper, afterwards found not entitled 
thereto, Any notice to Heirs-at-law, next of Kin, prior Devisees, or Legatees, 
would be found utterly incompatible with that expedition and ·economy, which 
are the most essential ingredients in the administration of every-day justice." 
REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONERS TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND JuRIS­
DICTION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES ( 1 832)  3 7· 
14 See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1 942) § 68 ;  Scott, "Collateral Estoppel 
by Judgment," s6 HARV, L.·REV. I ( 1 942) . 
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any judicial proceeding in the true sense. In the case of  per­
sonalty, it is true, a formal authentication is always given to 
the will and title to the personal estate is handed over to the 
personal representative. In the case of land, the will is ac­
cepted at its face value in the ordinary case, and as vesting 
title in the devisee without even a formal authentication. 
The real nature of probate and contest as applied to various 
kinds of subject matter is nowhere more clearly brought out 
than in the Fourth Report of the Real Property Commis­
sioners of England, made in r 8JJ .15 "Probate in common 
form," they asserted, "is in effect a mere registration of the 
Will, and we apprehend that there is no necessity for the 
machinery of a Court to discharge this office of the present 
Spiritual Courts, and that every advantage of Probate in com­
mon form may be obtained by the establishment of a Register. 
. . ."  They then proposed that all wills, whether involving 
real or personal property, should be registered; but that pro­
bate should be abolished. In the ordinary case, the registra­
tion was to be sufficient. But if a contest was desired, whether 
involving real or personal estate, then a bill in equity to es­
tablish the will might be filed, and in this suit an issue could 
be directed to a court of law. 
As a matter of fact, many of the recommendations of this 
Commission were not adopted. In r 8 57, however, legislation 
was enacted which took away the j urisdiction of the ecclesiasti­
cal courts over probate of wills and vested it in a probate 
court.16 This legislation extended probate to wills involving 
both real and personal estate. By subsequent reorganizations 
of the judiciary, the Probate Division, which was the succes­
sor to the court of probate, became a part of the High Court of 
"' FOURTH REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO 
THE LAW OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY (r 8 3 3 )  55· 
10 20-2 r Viet. c. 77, §§ 3, 4, p. 240. 
692 MONOGRAPHS ON PROBATE LAW 
Justice.17 The Land Transfer Act of 1 897 18 provided for 
the probate of wills involving land only and vested title to 
the realty of decedents in the personal representative rather 
than in the heir or devisee. Although probate in common 
form is still retained in name, it consists essentially in a regis­
tration of the will with the probate registry and an authenti­
.cation of it. Probate in solemn form may be resorted to as 
in early English law except that such probate may be had as to 
wills of real estate as well as of personalty, and the trial of the 
issue takes place in the Probate Division.19 It will thus be 
seen that Parliament did not adopt the idea of the Real Prop­
erty Commissioners of I 8 33, who wished to unify the law of 
will contest by applying the method of contesting wills of 
land to wills of personalty ; instead, the law was unified by 
"applying the method of contesting wills of personalty,­
namely, probate in solemn form,-to wills of land. 
Ill. CoNTEST OF DEvisE OF LAND IN AcTION AT LAw TO 
TRY TITLE BECOMES OBSOLETE 
Perhaps the first sharp veering away from the English 
model was the recognition in America of the jurisdiction of 
courts of probate and similar courts to admit to probate wills 
involving land. Indeed, from the scanty data which has been 
examined, one wonders whether in most of the colonies it 
was ever supposed that one could not probate a will involving 
.real estate. Certainly the probate of wills involving land 
was usual by the early part of the nineteenth. century. In 
Virginia a statute . enacted in I 7 I I 20 express! y provided for 
17 3 6-'3 7 Vict. c. 66, p; I 9 I  ( 1 8 7 3 ) ; I 5-'-I 6 Geo. 5, C· 49> P· I I 9 7  ( 1 925) . For 
a brief statement of the present probate jurisdiction in England, see Simes and 
Basye, "The Organization of the Probate Court in America," 42 MICH. L. REV. 
965 at 9 74-976 ( 1 944) , and pp. 3 9 5-3981 supra. 
18 6o-6 r Viet. c. 6 5, p. I 84. 19 I 5- I6  Geo. 5, c. 491 §§ I 50-1 7 5  ( I 925) ; TRISTAM AND COOTE, PR'oBATE 
PRACTICE ( I  8th ed. I 940) 3 89-399. 
. 
20 4 Statutes at Large of Virginia (Hening, I 820) I 3·  
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the probate of wills involving land. Such wills were subject 
to probate in North Carolina by legislation enacted in 1 784.21 
A Connecticut decision 22 holds that the probate in I 797 of a 
will involving land was conclusive. A Pennsylvania case 23 
decided in I 79 I discusses the effect of the probate of a will 
involving land; and a Maryland case 24 decided in 1 8 1 6  indi­
cates that the probate of wills involving land had long been 
recognized in that state. One cannot say that the English 
view, to the effect that a decree admitting a will to probate 
was without effect as to realty, was never followed in this 
country ; for one early New Jersey case 25 so holds. But it is 
reasonably certaip. that today in every jurisdiction in the United 
States a duly executed testamentary disposition involving land 
may be admitted to probate.26 
• 
Conceding, however, that in all states today a will involving 
land may be admitted to probate, does that exclude the intro­
duction of an unprobated will in an action in the nature of 
ejectment or tre�pass to try title to land? In nearly all juris­
dictions today the answer is clearly in the affirmative. There 
was, however, a period in which there must have been much 
uncertainty about �he matter. The Supreme Judicial Court 
of Mas�achusetts, it is true, in a case decided in I 8 22,27 held 
" Laws of North Carolina (Iredell, 1 79 1 )  528, Acts of Gen. Assembly, rst 
Sess. 1 7 84, c. r o, § 6. 
22 }udson v. Lake, 3 Day (Conn. )  3 1 8  ( r 8o9 ) .  
23 Fenn, Lessee o f  Walmesley v .  Read, r Yeates (Pa.) 8 7  ( 1 79 1 ) .  
"' Massey v. Massey's Lessee, 4 Harr. & }ohnson (Md.) 1 4 1  ( r 8 r 6) .  
25 Den d. Thomas v. Ayres, 1 3  N. J. Law r 5 3  ( 1 8 3 2 ) .  
20 Statutes expressly require probate of a will o f  land in Arkansas, Florida, 
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Vermont and Wisconsin. These statutes are collected in the 
appendix note to the Model Probate Code for §§  8 r and 8 s, p. 304, supra. There 
is clear authority to the same effect in some other states. In the rest the rule is 
not questioned, but the statutory expression of it is not clear. Such authority as 
exists is as follows : Inge v. Johnston, n o  Ala. 65o, zo So. 75 7 ( r 895 ) ; Ariz. 
Code ( r 9 3 9) § 3 8-:-zoz ; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, r 944) § 3 2 3 ; Castro 
v. Richardson, I S  Cal. 478  ( r 86r ) ; Colo. Stat. ( 1 9 3 5 )  c. 1 76, §§ 47, so ; Johnes 
v. Jackson, 6 7  Conn. 8 r ,  34 A. 709 ( 1 895) ; Del. Rev. Code ( 1 9 3 5 )  § 3 799 ;  
D .  C .  Code ( 1 940) § I I-503 ; Rogers v. Rogers, 7 8  Ga. 6 8 8, 3 S .  E .  45 1 
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that the jurisdiction of the probate court to admit to probate 
a will devising land is exclusive, and unless the will has been 
so admitted it cannot be proved in an action to try title. In a 
hote to that decision, moreover, the reporter refers to another 
case in which substantially the same thing had been held some 
thirty years earlier. But in other jurisdictions it was held that 
the decree admitting a will to probate was merely evidence 
in an action to try title but was not conclusive ; and that, if 
the will had not been admitted to probate at all, it could 
nevertheless be proved in an action to try title to the land.28 
Doubtless one potent influence in the direction of eliminat­
ing proof of an unprobated will in an action of trespass or 
ejectment was the decision of Justice Story in Tompkins v. 
Tompkins 29 in 1 841  to the effect that the statutes of Rhode 
Island g�ve the probate court exclusive jurisdiction to deter­
mine the validity of a will involving land and that its deter­
mination could not be attacked collaterally in an action to try 
title. Another significant influence in the same direction was 
' 
the enactment of the following statute as a part of the Massa-
chusetts Revised Statutes of I 8 3 6 :  30 
( I 88 7 ) ; Idaho Laws, Ann. ( I 943) § I 5-zo2 ; Rogers v. Stevens, 8 Ind. 464 
( I 85 7 ) ; Md. Code ( I 9 39 )  art. 93, § 353 ; Rothschild v. Hatch, 54 Miss. 554 
( I 8 7 7 ) ; Farris v. Burchard, 242 Mo. I, I 45 S. W. 825 ( I 9 I 2 ) ; Mont. Rev. 
Code ( I 935)  § I 002 I ; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 1 )  § 9 8 82.06 ; Moss v. · 
Lane, s o N. J. Eq. 295, 2 3  A. 4 8 I  ( I 892) ; N. M. Stat. ( I 94 r )  § I 6-4 I o ;  N. 
Y. Surr. Ct. Act, §§ I 39> I 5 I ; Anderson v. Anderson, I I 2  N. Y.. I 04, I9 N. E. 
427 ( I 8 89) ; Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  t. 5 8, § zz ; Jones v. Dove, 6 Ore. I 8 8 ( I 8 76) ; 
Cochran v. Young, I04 Pa. St. 3 3 3  ( I 8 83 ) ; S. D. Code ( I 939)  § 3 5.020 2 ;  
Taylor v. Taylor, 2 Humph. (2 I  Tenn.) 5 9 7  ( I 84 I ) ; Lagow v .  Glover, 7 7  
Tex. 448, I 4  S .  W. I 4 I  ( I 89o) ; Utah Code ( I 943) § Io2-3-2 ; Va. Code 
( I 942) § 5262 ; Wash. Rev. Stat. ( I 932)  § 1 3 7 ' ; W. Va. Code ( I 943) § 407 8 ;  
Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( I 9 3 I )  § 88-2 I O. 
z; Shumway v. Holbrook, I Pick. ( I  8 Mass.) I I 4 ( I  8 2 2) . And see Laughton 
v. Atkins, I Pick. ( I 8  Mass.) 535  at 548 ( I 823) . 
28 Jackson ex dem. Le Grange v. Le Grange, I 9  Johns. (N. Y..) 3 86  ( I 822) ; 
Smith's Lessee v. Steele, I Harr. & McH. (Md.) 4 I 9  ( I ?? I ) ; Smith v. Bonsall, 
5 Rawle (Pa.) 8o ( I 835) ; Executors of Crosland v. Murdock, 4 McCord (S. 
C.) 2 I 7 ( r 8 2 7 ) .  And see cases cited in 2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE ( I st ed. I 846) 
§ 672·  
29 1  Story 547,  Fed. Cas. No. I4,09 I ( r 84I ) .  
80 c. 62, § 32 ·  
THE FUNCTION OF WILL CONTESTS 695 
"No will shall be effectual to pass either real or personal 
estate, unless it shall have been duly proved and allowed in 
the probate court ; and the probate of a will devising real 
estate shall be conclusive as to the due execution of the will, 
in like manner' as it is of a will of personal estate." 
That this was already the common law of Massachusetts is 
pointed out in the Revisers' notes as follows: 31 
"This is in accordance with the established law in this 
state ; but as it differs from the law in other places, and is a 
provision of very extensive and important influence, it may be 
useful to insert it in the text of our statutes." 
Today the state of the law is about as follows.32 In twelve 
states statutes similar to the Massachusetts legislation just 
quoted are in force, which make it clear that a will involving 
land must be probated in order to be admitted to prove a title. 
In seven other states legislation in a different form undoubt­
edly has the same effect. Then there is authority to the effect 
that, since the probate court has been given jurisdiction to ad­
mit to probate wills involving land, that jurisdiction is im­
pliedly exclusive and therefore an unprobated will cannot be 
used to prove a title in an action in the nature of trespass or 
ejectment.33 As the Connecticut court said : 34 "Our statutes 
commit the probate of all wills to the Courts of Probate ; and it 
has been held in this State that that court is the only tribunal 
competent to decide the question of the due execution of a 
will-including the testamentary capacity of the testator. 
. . . Hence a party who desires to show title by a will, to 
81, REPORT OF THE CoMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO REVISE THE STATUTES, 
Part U ( 1 834) 2.8 .  The statement appears in the note to c. 62., § 20. 
, 82, See Model Probate Code, Appendix A, note to §§ 8 I  and 8 5, p. 304, supra. 
"" See Swazey's Heirs v. Blackman, 8 Ohio 5 ( 1 8 3 7 ) ; Jones v. Dove, 6 Ore. 
1 8 8  ( 1 8 76) ; Cummins v. Cummins, I Marvel ( 1 5  Del.) 423 at 440, 3 1  A. 8 x 6  
( I  8 9  5 ) .  In general, see cases cited in note i n  Ann. Cas. I 91  6 A 8 8 7 • 
.. Johnes v. Jackson, 67 Conn. 8 1  at 90, 3 4  A. 709 ( 1 89 5 ) .  The same view 
is well expressed in Castro v. Richardson, 1 8  Cal. 478  ( t 8 6 x ) .  
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personal property or real estate, can have it received as evi­
dence of such title, only after i t  has been established in die 
proper Court of Probate ; because that is the only way in 
which he can show that the will under which he claims, is 
genuine." 
In New York it appears that, if the will involving real 
estate is admitted to probate, the decree to that effect is con­
clusive as against collateral attack.35 But if it is not offered for 
probate, then apparently the unprobated will may be proved 
i'n an action to try title to the land involved.36 The same also 
appears to be the rule in Virginia.37 In Tennessee there is a 
line of authority indicating that a will involving land cannot 
be proved until it is admitted to probate ; 38 there are, how­
ever, indications in the statutes and cases 39 that under some 
<;:ircumstances, at least, an unprobated will may be proved in 
an action to try title imd that a decree admitting a will to pro­
hate may be attacked collaterally in such an action. It should 
be pointed out that in N ew York 40 and Virginia, 41 and perhaps 
elsewhere, an unprobated will involving land is not entitled 
to be recorded. Therefore, the contest of a will in those juris­
dictions in an action in the nature of ejectment would seem 
to have small practical value, and is probably a little used 
device. 
· It thus appears that the contest of a will, in an ac;tion to try 
title to land, is, for most practical purposes, obsolete in the 
United States. The remainder of the discussion proceeds upon 
this assumption. 
35 See N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § So . 
.. Corley v. McElmeel, 149 N. Y. :u8, 43 N. E. 62.8 ( 1 896) . 
87 Bagwell v. Elliott, 2. Rand. (2.3  Va.) 190  ( 1 82.4) . 
38 Taylor v. Taylor, 2. Humph. (2.1 Tenn.) 597 ( 1 84 1 ) ;  Weaver v. Hughes, 
:;6 Tenn. App. 436 at 443, 1 7 3  S. W. (zd) 1 59 ( 1 943 ) .  · 
••·weatherhead v. Sewell, 9 Humph. (z8  Tenn.) 2. 72.  ( 1 848) ; Tenn. Code 
(Michie, 1 9 3 8 )  § 8 1 2.7.  . 
"' N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 1 52.. 
·. " Va. Code (1 942. )  § 52.62.. 
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IV. TYPES oF WILL CoNTESTS DEvELOPED IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
So far the evolution of Anglo-American law of will contest · 
is all to the credit of the American states. There was no good ­
reason why a will of land should not be probated once and' 
for all j ust as a will of personalty. If it was desirable to have 
the matter settled finally as to the personal property, it was 
even more desirable to have a final determination as to real 
estate. Thus, our legislatures and courts determined that a 
will involving land must be probated; and they reached this 
rational conclusion decades before the same reform took place 
in England. 42 
But here our favorable balance in the ledger of history 
ends. As will appear more fully in the survey of legislation 
which follows, in a large number of states the rational basis 
of the will contest was entirely overlooked; and the modifica­
tion of the English system which took place left us with a 
totally anomalous legal device. 
Before embarking upon a survey of American statutes, how..: 
ever, it may be pointed out that the first step in classifying the 
various jurisdictions is . to divide them on the basis of the 
presence or absence of notice for the initial probate. If 
notice is not required and is not given for the initial probate, 
there will necessarily be a basis for contest after probate and 
we shall always find it. On the other_ hand, if notice is re­
quired for the initial probate, either there is no reason for c·on­
test after probate or the reason must be entirely different from 
that which justifies the contest after probate in the other 
group of states. But whether the initial probate proceeding 
is begun with or without notice, contest after probate, if it 
exists at all, follows one of three patterns : ( I  ) 
, 
the hearing is 
'" Wills of land were not subject to probate in England until legislation enacted 
in I ·s 5 7  so provided. See note I 6, supra. 
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like probate in solemn form in that it is before the same 
tribunal which admitted the will to probate ; ( 2)  the hearing is 
in a higher tribunal, usually chancery or the trial court of 
general jurisdiction, and bear<> a superficial resemblance to a 
trial of the issue devisavit vel non as directed by English 
chancery; 43 and (3) though the statutes in terms provide 
only for contest before probate, an appeal with trial de novo 
to the trial court of general jurisdiction has the effect of a 
will contest. As we shall see, the provisions for will contests 
in the respective states 44 involve almost every conceivable 
combination of the various patterns and bases for classification 
which have been suggested. 
Taking up first the jurisdictions in which probate may be 
initiated without notice, we find two groups of states : ( I )  
those which follow the pattern of the English probate in 
common and in solemn form ; and ( 2) those which provide for 
a contest in a higher tribunal than that in which the will was 
probated. This classification is further complicated by the 
£act that an appeal with trial de novo is permitted in some of 
them but not in others, and that, in at least one of them, no 
contest before probate is permitted. 
Second, we shall consider those jurisdictions in which notice 
is required for the initial probate. We shall see that a very 
few of them permit contest only before probate; others pro­
vide expressly for contest both before and after probate in the 
sa�e court ; still others provide for contest after probate in a 
higher tribunal than that in which the will was probated; and 
a very considerable number, while professing to permit contest 
�nly before probate, in fact permit a contest after probate in 
the guise of an appeal with trial de novo 'in the trial court of 
'" But the proceeding in this country, unlike the English prototype, is in rem 
and does not concern any particular land or other estate. This will be apparent 
from the discussion of the law of particular j urisdictions which follows . 
.. In this survey, the law of Louisiana is excluded, since it is o� civil law origin. 
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general jurisdiction. The picture is 
.
further complicated by 
the fact that, in a few states in which probate is always preceded 
by notice, a will contest ca.n take place only after probate. 
A. JURISDICTIONS PERMITTING PROBATE WITHOUT NOTICE 
I .  Common and solemn form probate in same court 
In the following states, the English system of common and 
solemn form probate is rather closely followed: Delaware,45 
Florida/6 Georgia/7 Indiana/8 Maryland/9 Mississippi/0 
New Hampshire,51 North Carolina 52 and South Carolina.53 
In general, this means that the original probate may be with­
out notice, or, if something in the nature of a caveat is filed, 
it is with notice. If the original probate is without notice, 
45 Del. Rev. Code ( 1 935)  §§ 3 799 to 3 802. The statutes are contained in a 
chapter on "Settlement of Personal Estates" but would seem to apply to wills 
involving- land since § 3 799 provides that the record of the probated will "shall 
be sufficient evidence in respect to both real and personal estate." Proof may be 
taken without notice, or notice to interested parties may be given on request ; 
§ 3 8oo provides for a caveat at any time before probate ; § 3 80 1  gives a right 
of review to "any person interested who shall not voluntarily appear at the time 
of taking the proof of a will, or be served with cit:ttion or notice as provided in 
Section [3  799] ." 
"' Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 941 ) §§ 7 J2 .2 3 to 7 3 2.3 I .  Probate is in the county 
judge's court. This may be without notice, § 732 .23, or apparently may be 
initiated with notice, § 732·30. After probate "any interested party" may have 
notice given, § 732 .28 .  An heir or distributee may file a cav"eat, whereupon he 
is given notice, § 73 2.29. Any heir dr distributee, "except those who have been 
served with citation before probate or who are barred under 73 2.29" may peti­
tion for revocation of probate, § 7 3 2.30. 
47 Ga. Code Ann. ( I 936) §§ 1 I J-60I to I I J-6 I 8 .  
"' Ind. Stat. (Burns, I 9 3 3  and Supp. I 943 ) §� 7-5oi to 7-5o8, 7-5 1 1 , 7-5 1 3 .  
Contest may be in the circuit court, either before or after probate. 
•• Md. Code ( 1 9 39) art. 9 3, §§ 353, 357  to 363, for probate and contest in 
the orphans' courts. But see § 3 7o·as to an issue " devisavit vel non sent from a 
court of equity." 
60 Miss. Code ( 1 942) §§ 503 to 508 .  Probate and contest are in equity, § 495 · 
But the general plan is that of probate in common or solemn form. 
61 N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c. 3 5 1 ,  §§ 6 to 9 ·  
52 N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) §§ 3 1-32 to 3 1-37 .  Probate in common form 
takes place before the clerk of the superior court. Probate in solemn form is in 
the superior court. 
68 8. C. Code ( 1 942) §§ 8932  to 89 34· 
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then there may be a contest thereafter on notice to interested 
parties. To this group of states we may add, also, Oregon 54 
and Washington,";; although it is not entirely clear in those 
states whether the original probate can be contested, or whether 
there must first be a probate without notice, followed by 'a 
contest with notice. 56 This, on the whole, would seem to be a 
perfectly rational scheme ; but it should be noted that legis­
lation in at least three of these j urisdictions, 57 namely Georgia, 
New Hampshire, and Oregon, permits a trial de novo on an 
appeal to the trial court of general jurisdiction. 
The following quotation is made from the Georgia legis­
lation, by way of illustrating the kind of statute here con­
sidered : 58 
"I  I 3-601 .  Probate of a will may be either in common or 
solemn form. In the former case, upon the testimony of a 
single subscribing witness, and without notice to anyone, the 
will may be proved and admitted to record. Such probate and 
record is not conclusive upon anyone interested in the estate 
adversely to the will. . . ." 
"I  I 3-602. Probate by the witnesses, or probate in solemn 
form, is the proving of the will, after due notice to all the 
heirs at law, by alLthe witnesses in life and within the juris­
diction of the .court, or by proof of their signatures and that 
of the testator, if the witnesses are dead or inaccessible ; and 
the ordering to record of the will so proved. Such probate is 
conclusive upon all the parties notified, and all the legatees 
under the will who are represented in the executor." 
54 Ore. Comp. Laws ( I 94o) §§ I 9-2o2 to I 9-2o4, I 9-208 (amended Laws 
I 945, � I 85) . , 
55 Wash. Rev. Stat. ( I 9 3 2 )  §§ I J 8 5  to I 3 89.  
"" The statutes and cases do not make the point entirely clear, but see I BAN­
CROFT's PROBATE PRACTICE ( I 928)  § I 09 and note 3 ·  
57 Ga. Code Ann ( I 936)  § 6-50I ; N. H. Rev. Laws ( I 942) ·c. 365, § I  I ;  Ore. 
Comp. Laws ( I  940) § I o-8 I o. And see, in general, Simes and. Basye, "The 
Organization of the Probate Court in' America," 42 MicH. L. REv. 965 at 995, 
footnotes I 5 I and I 52 ( I  944) and p; 42 I ,  supra. It is possible also, that appeal 
with trial de novo may be had in South Carolina. See S. C. Code ( I  942) §§ 2 3 t 
and 2 3 3 ; Muldrow v. Jeffords, I 44 S. C. 509, I42 S. E. 6o2 ( I 9 2 7) ; Ex parte 
White, 3 3  S. C. 442, 1 2  S. E. 5 ( 1 89o) . 
58 See note 47, supra. 
\ 
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" I  1 3-605 . Probate in common form shall become con­
clusive upon all parties at interest after the expiration of seven 
years from the time of such probate, except minor heirs at 
law who require proof in solemn form and interpose a caveat 
within four years after arrival at age. . . ." 
While: there is much variation in the respective statutes re­
ferred to, they all appear to prescribe this same general type 
of contest. 
It would seem also that Arkansas 59 now should belong to 
this group of states, since both probate and contest are in 
chancery. However, its legislation has developed from a 
type of will contest similar to that described in the next sub­
division. 
2. Contest in a higher court after probate 
Much greater variation is found in the legislation involved 
in the seven states which may fairly be classed in this group 
than in the group just discussed. · Hence, the states will be 
considered one by one. In the case of Virginia, the history 
of will contests in that state will be outlined, partly because 
•• The compilation of Arkansas statutes of I 9 3 7 includes provisions for probate 
and contest resembling the English probate in solemn and in common form. Ark. 
Dig. Stat. ( I 9 3 7 )  §§ I4540 to I 4544· The court of probate was empowered to 
grant probate in solemn form without notice. Or probate could take place on 
previous notice. An appeal to the Circuit ·court with trial de novo was recognized. 
Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I9 37) §§ I453o, I 4543· Ark. Dig. Stat. ( I 9 3 7 )  § 1 4545 
provided that certain persons might "within three years after such final decision 
in the circuit court, by a bill in chancery, impeach the decision and have a re­
trial of the question of probate. • . ." In 1 9  3 9 a constitutional provision 
and certain legislation vested probate j urisdiction in the court of chancery. Ark. 
Canst., Amend. 24 ;  Ark. Acts 1 93 9, Act 3, p. 6. It has been said, however, that 
this change did not completely,consolidate the two courts, but provided for "pro­
bate courts in chancery." Lewis v. Smith, I 98 Ark. 244 at 248, I 29 S. W. (2d) 
229 ( 1 9 3 9 ) .  The appeal to the circuit court with trial de novo appears to have 
been taken away. Ark. Acts 1 939,  Act 2 14, p. 526. By Ark. Acts I94I ,  Act 4011 '  
p. I I 691 it was provided : 
"That in any case where a will has been admitted to probate without notice 
havi'ng previously been given to the heirs of the deceased testator, a contest of the 
probation or legality of such will may be heard by the court probating the same. 
Any heir of the deceased testator may, within six months after the probation of 
such will, but not thereafter, file a complaint in said court setting out the grounds 
upon which the legality of such will is contested. . • ." ' 
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it is typical of the sort of evolution which has taken place 
in other states, and partly because the Virginia legislation f�r­
nished the model for other j urisdictions. 
(a) Virginia. Although a brief statute enacted in I 64S 
gave the county courts jurisdiction to probate wills of resi­
dents, 60 the first legislation in Virginia dealing with will con­
tests was enacted in I 7  I r .  61 It provided for the probate of 
wills of land as well as of personalty. If a will involved land, 
the heir was to be summoned to appear at the proving of the 
will "to show forth anything that shall or may be lawfully 
alledged against such proof. . . ." There was also a saving 
clause allowing to persons under disability ten years after 
their disabilities were removed in which they might contest 
the probate of the will. 
In I 744 additional legislation was enacted 62 for the reason 
that, as stated in its preamble, "the proof of wills in the gen­
eral court, or county courts of this colony, where lands are 
devised away from the heir or heirs at law of the decedent, 
is attended with inconveniences to the executors, and losses in 
the personal estate." This enactment provided as follows : 
"That from and after the passing of this act, when any 
wills are exhibited to be proved in the general court, or any 
county court of this dominion, it shall and may be lawful to 
and for the said courts, to proceed immediately to receive 
the proof of such wills ; and to appoint appraisers to value the 
slaves and personal estate of such testator. -
ccProvided always, That where the lands of such testator, 
or any part thereof, shall, by such wills, be devised away from 
the heir or heirs at law, such proof as to him, her, or them, 
shall not be binding; but such heir or heirs shall be sum­
moned, in the manner directed by law, and shall and may be 
at liberty to contest the validity of such will, in the same 
manner as if this act had never been made." 
60 I Virginia Statutes at Large (Hening, I 8o9) 302. 
61 4 Virginia Statutes at Large (Hening, I 82o) I 2. 
62 5 Virginia Statutes at Large (Hening, I 8 I 9 ) .  2 3 I '  
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In I 748 this legislation was amended 63 by adding a provi­
sion extending the time to contest in case of disabilities. The 
amendment also made it reasonably clear that the notice to 
the heirs in the case of a will involving land might take place 
after probate. - After the clause to the effect that the will shall 
not be binding as to the heir, the amendment continued "but 
the court shall cause such heir or heirs to be summoned, to 
appear at the next court, and to contest the validity of such 
will, . . . and if no heir be known . . . then proclama­
tion of such will, being exhibited and proved, shall be made 
by the sheriff . . . and he shall also publish notice thereof, 
in writing, and all persons concerned in interest, who at the 
time of proving any will, shall be under the age of one and 
twenty years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or 
out of this colony, shall have liberty to contest the proof 
thereof, within ten years after their several disabilities and 
incapacities removed, and not afterwards." 
Thus, it would seem that notice before probate, which was 
required as to wills of land in the legislation of I 7 I I ,  had not 
proved satisfactory, and that apparently later amendments 
permitted a return to the old system of probate without 
notice. 
However, the legislation which was to be the basis of all 
subsequent will contest statutes in Virginia was enacted m 
1 78 5. The important provisions of it are as follows : 64 
"XI. When any will shall be exhibited to be proved, the 
court having jurisdiction as aforesaid, may proceed im­
mediately to receive the proof thereof, and grant a certificate 
of such probat : If however, any person interested, shall 
within seven years afterwards appear, and by his bill in chan­
cery contest the validity of the will, an issue shall be made up, 
whether the writing produced be the will of the testator or 
68 5 Virginia Statutes at Large (Hening, 1 8 1 9 )  454· 
.. 1 2  Virginia Statutes at Large (Hening, 1 8 23)  142. 
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not, which shall be tried by a j ury, whose verdict shall be final 
between the parties ; saving to the court a power of granting 
a new trial for good cause, as in other trials ; but no such party 
�-ppearing within that time, the probat shall be forever bind­
mg. 
"XII. In all such trials by jury, the certificate of the oath 
of the witnesses, at the time of the first probat, shall be ad­
mitted as evidence, to have such weight as the jury shall think 
it deserves." 
The significance of this legislation is aptly expressed by the 
court in Coalter's Ex'r v. Bryan/5 as follows : 
"The obvious purpose of these provisions is, I .  To recog­
nize the ex parte probat of wills, both of realty and person­
alty ; 2 .  To extend the privilege of requiring a reprobat, so as 
to embrace both ; 3· To prescribe a period of limitation for 
such repro bat ; 4· To change the citation for repro bat, so as 
to require it to be of those interested in sustaining the will, 
instead of those interested in opposing it ; 5. To shift the 
final probat from the court of original probat to the court of 
chancery, to be there exercised by the instrumentality of a 
jury; 6. To provide against the loss of testimony in support 
of the will, which might result from the delay of the final 
probat, by authorizing, for the consideration of the jury, docu­
mentary evidence of the proof at the first probat." 
Without attempting to list all the statutory modifications 
made from time to time in this legislation, the following im-' 
portapt changes may be noted. In I 8 3 8 66 a provision was 
inserted by which the proponent of a will could institute the 
proceeding for probate with notice to interested parties if he 
so desired. But the provisions for probate without notice and 
a trying of the issue of will or no will 'in chancery were re­
tained, and all are embodied in the Code of I 849.67 The 
I 849 Code permits a devisee to contest a finding adverse to the 
65 I Gratt. (42 Va.) I 8  at 79 ( I 844) . 
66 Va. Acts I 8 38, c. 92, p. 7 1 .  
67 Va. Code (I 849) c. 1 22, § §  29-36. 
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will, 68 just as an heir could contest a finding in favor of the 
will. 
The present legislation in Virginia on will contests may be 
summarized as follows : 69 
Probate jurisdiction is vested in circuit and corporation 
courts and in various clerks of court and their deputies. The 
probate of a will may be instituted either with or without 
notice. If the will is admitted by a clerk, any person interested 
may have an appeal as of right within six months in the same 
court. The appeal is to be heard by the court "as though it 
had been presented to the said court in the first instance." 
Where the original probate is by the court there is no trial de 
novo on appeal. The court or any person interested in the 
probate of the will, may cause interested persons to be sum­
moned; and notice of the hearing as to probate may be given 
by publication. In such a proceeding the final order "shall 
be a bar to a bill in equity to impeach or establish such will, 
unless ,on such ground as would give to a court of equity juris­
diction over other judgmtents at law." It is also provided · 
that any court having jurisdiction to probate wills may pro­
ceed to establish a will ex parte and without notice. In such a 
proceeding, or on an appeal with trial de novo from a decision 
of a clerk, a person not a party to the original proceeding may 
proceed by bill in equity to impeach or establish the will. On 
this bill, a trial by jury is to be ordered to ascertain "whether 
any, and if ap.y, how much of what was so offered for probate, 
be the will of the decedent." Only one year in which to con­
test by bill in equity is allowed, subject to exceptions as to 
persons under disability and others similarly situated. 
It will thus be seen that Virginia has worked out a perfectly 
rational system of will contest. If the original probate is be-
68 Formerly the law was otherwise but the 1 849 Code corrected this discrepancy. 
See REPORT OF REVISORS OF VIRGINIA CODE ( 1 849) 6 3 2.. 
•• va. Code ( 1 94:1.) §§ 52.47, 52.49, 5 2. 5 3  to 5 2.6 1 .  
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fore the court, no one can contest after probate unless he was 
not a party to the original proceeding. Contest after probate 
is ordinarily by bill in equity and thus resembles slightly the 
practice of English equity of framing the issue of will or no 
will. Only in the case of the probate before the clerk can the 
same parties have the issue tried de novo, and this is obviously 
because of the inferior judicial qualifications of the clerk. 
(b) West Virginia. When West Virginia separated from 
Virginia during the war between the states, it took over pretty 
largely the Virginia legal system. Since that time, however, 
modifications have been made in the provisions for will con­
test, but the resemblance to the parent statutes is very sub­
stantial. 
The present legislation 70 provides for either an ex parte 
probate or a probate in solemn form in the county court. A 
contest before probate may be had in connection with the pro­
bate in solemn form if interested parties take the proper steps . 
. The judgment of the county court may be appealed to the 
circuit court and the issue is then tried de novo. The Code 
also provides for a contest in chancery in the circuit court. A 
person who is regarded as a party to a probate in solemn form 
not appealed from or to an appeal with trial de novo in the 
circuit court cannot contest in chancery. Indeed, it would 
seem that the contest in chancery is only possible if the prior 
probate has been ex parte or if the contestant was omitted as a 
party to a probate in solemn form or to an appeal in the circuit 
court. 
From this brief summary it is apparent that West Virginia, 
by making a much greater use of the appeal with trial de novo 
than does Virginia, permits in the ordinary case two trials of 
the issue will or no will, after due notice to i'n.terested parties. 
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(c) Kentucky. Kentucky legislation on will contest, 71 
which appears to stem from the Virginia legislation of 1 785/2 
presents substantially the same set-up as that of West Virginia. 
Wills may be probated in the county court, with or without 
notice to interested parties. There may be a contest before 
probate in the county court. The judgment of the county 
court may be appealed to the circuit court with a trial de novo. 
It is further provided that "Any person interested who, at the 
time of the final decision in the circuit court, resided out of this 
state and was proceeded against by warning order only, with­
out actual appearance or being personally served with process, 
and any other person interested who was not a party to the 
proceeding by actual appearance or being personally served 
with process, may by petition in equity, impeach 
the decision and have a retrial of the question of probate. 
" 73 
(d) Pennsylvania. An ex parte probate may be had be­
fore the register.74 A caveat may be filed prior to probate, 
upon which the register may "issue a precept to either the 
court of common pleas or the orphans' court" directing a trial 
of the issue of will or no will. 75 An appeal with trial de novo 
may be taken, from the register to the orphans' court, or on 
the filing of a caveat prior to probate, the register may certify 
the record to the orphans' court. 76 
(e) Tennessee. Probate is in the county court if there is 
no contest.77 If the will is contested before probate, the case 
71 Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) §§ 394· I 70 to 394.280. 
: :  72 See Case of Wells' Will, 5 Littell ( I 6  Ky.) 273 (I 824) ; Dibble v. Winter; 
247 Ill. 243 at 257, 9 3  N. E. I 45 ( I 9 I o) .  
13 Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) § 394.280. 
7' Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 93o) t . . 2o, § I 86 r .  See, also, 2 HuNTER, PENN­
SYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT COMMONPLACE BOOK ( I  9 3 9) I I 2 2 ;  REMICK, 
PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT PRACTICE (2d ed. I 9 J2 )  §§ I 5, 2 3 .  
"' Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. I 944) t .  20 ,  § I 9 6 I .  
76 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, I 930) t .  20, § §  1 9 8 I ,  I 982, 2005, 2oo6. 
77 Tenn. Code (Michie, I 9J8)  §§ 8099, 8 1 02 .  
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is transferred to the circuit court and there tried. 78 Presum­
ably an appeal from the decision of the county court with trial 
de novo in the circuit court would be possible. 79 
(f) New Jersey. The complicated probate court organi­
zation has been described in another monograph. 80 It is suf­
ficient to state here the important provisions as to contest.81 
Either the surrogate or the prerogative court has original 
jurisdiction to probate wills. If a caveat is filed when the 
will is before the surrogate, the proceeding is removed to the 
orphans' court. An appeal may also be taken to the orphans' 
court from the proceeding before a surrogate respecting the 
probate of a will. In either case, the issue is tried de novo, the 
orphans' court, however, having the/power to certify the ques­
tion of fact to the circuit court for a trial of the issue. 
(g) Missouri. Probate must be in the probate court.82 
There can be no contest until after probate ;  then the contest 
takes place in the circuit court.83 
B. JURISDICTIONS REQUIRING NOTICE BEFORE PROBATE 
For some reason which is not entirely clear at the present 
time a large number of j urisdictions at an early period 
abandoned the English plan· of an ex parte probate in com­
mon form without notice. It may have been because the pro­
bate of wills disposing of land was included in the court's juris­
diction, and traditionally the validity of a devise of land had 
been tested by an action at law which began with notice to the 
defendant. Or it may have been merely that the American 
conception of procedure involved the tacit assumption that 
78 Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 938)  §§ 8 1 03.:_8 u 2. 
79 Tenn. Code (Michie, 1 9 3 8 )  §§ 9028, 9033·  1 
80 Simes and Basye, "Tlie Organization of the Probate Court in America," 42 
MICH. L. REv. 965 at 9 82 ·  ( 1 9-44) and p. 405, supra. 
"' N. J. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 7) §§ 3 :2-20 to 3 :2-36. 
82 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942) § 529.  
83 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942 and Supp. 1 945) §§ 538 to 541.  
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no valid proceeding could be instituted without prior notice to 
interested parties. At any rate it has come about that slightly 
over half the states require some sort of notice before a will 
can be probated. 84 It is believed that in many instances thi� 
change has taken place without a full realization of its rela­
tion to legislation permitting contest after probate. In the dis­
cussion which follows, the statutes will be summarized with 
this in mind. We shall begin with New York and shall 
include a little of the history of its legislation, since the statutes 
of no other state, unless it be California, have had so much 
influence in shaping present day will contest legislation. 
I. Contest only before probate 
In two j urisdictions, New York and Massachusetts, the 
only contest of a will, in the sense herein described, takes place 
before probate. That is to say, will contest is like any other 
issue in any trial court ; the issue must be made up before trial ; 
thereafter, the remedy is by appeal or, in very extraordinary 
situations, by some special proceeding to reopen the judgment 
or decree. As will be pointed out later, the same can be said 
of a will contest in the more populous areas of Wisconsin ;  but, 
since the rule is otherwise in other courts of that state, its pro­
visions for will contest will be considered in another connec­
tion. 
(a) New York. While probate and contest had a long 
prior history in New York,S5 the significant elements of the 
narrative begin with the Revised Statutes of I 828 .  Prior to 
that legislation the English system of probate in common and 
in solemn form was in force. 86 By the Revised Statutes of 
r 8 2 8 separate provisions were made for the probate of wills 
.. See 43 MICH. L. REV. 1 1 53 ( 1 945) and p. z69, supra. . 
'" See Matter of Brick's Estate, 1 5  Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) u ( r 86z) ; REDFIELD, 
LAW AND PRACTICE OF SURROGATES' CoURTS (zd ed. r88 r )  r-r 8 .  
86 REDFIELD, LAW AND PRACTICE OF SURROGATES' COURTS (zd  ed. r 8 8 1 )
. 
zs6. 
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of real and of personal property. In the probate of each kind 
of will, however, notice prior to the hearing was required. In 
the case of the will involving real property, the heirs were to 
be notified; 87 in the case of personalty, the widow and next of 
kin.88 
The article on probate of wills of personal property also con­
tained this provision : 89 
"Notwithstanding a will of personal property may have 
been admitted to probate, any of the next of kin of the testator, 
may, at any time within one year after such probate, contest 
the same, or the validity of such will, in the manner herein 
provided." 
The Code then continued with several sections outlining the 
procedure for will contest. There was no analogous pro­
vision for the contest of the probate of a will involving real 
property. Presumably this was because such probate was not 
conclusive as to the due execution of the will. The Revisers' 
notes give the following explanation for the provision con­
cerning will contest : 90 
"The preceding sections, from . section 3 2 inclusive, , are 
new ; they are prepared in order to provide for a case which 
may often occur, and for which it is at least questionable 
whether there is any provision by the existing law. The 
notice previous to proving a will is necessarily short, and must 
often be inadequate to apprise all of the parties interested, 
and yet it would seem that when once admitted to proof, the 
probate is perfectly conclusive ; vide Phillip's Evidence, I 
vol. p. 245. In England, a practice prevails in the ecclesi­
astical courts, of permitting a second and more solemn proof, 
by the citation of the parties at the instance of a relative. Vide 
2 Phillimore, 224. But there it has the effect of suspending 
87 2 N. Y. Rev. Stat. ( I  829)  Part 2, c. 6, t. 1, a·rt. I , §§ 8 and 9, at p. 57• 
88 2 N. Y. Rev. Stat. ( 1 829)  Part 2, c. 6, t. 11 art. 2, § 24, at p .  6o. 
89 2 N. Y. Rev. Stat. (I 8 29)  Part :t, c. 6, t. t ,  art. 2, § 3 0, at p. 6 1 .  
"" j  N. Y. Rev. Stat. ( 2d  ed. I 8,3 6 )  p .  630, ".Original:note on § 3 2:  to 48," 
in which this statement appears. 
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all the proceedings of the executors ; a result much to be dep­
recated. vVe have adopted that practice, with many modifi­
cations, fitted to our situation, and we propose to limit the 
time for re-examination, so as not to interfere with the pay­
ment of legacies, which cannot be required until one year 
after probate. In the case of a will of real estate, the proof is 
not so conclusive as of personal property, but the heir may 
contest it in a suit at law. The reason would seem equally to 
apply to a will of personal estat�, so far as to provide some 
summary mode, by which he may contest it." 
It is thus apparent that the New York legislation, by requir­
ing notice prior to a hearing on probate of the will, and per­
mitting a contest after probate, had in effect provided for two 
probates in solemn form. 
In Collier v. Idley's Ex'rs,91 Surrogate Bradford explains 
this anomaly by saying that the original plan was to permit 
only ne;xt of kin who were out of the jurisdiction, and there­
fore not personally served, to contest after probate ; but that 
the legislature broadened the contest provision so as to make 
it available to all interested parties. His language is as fol­
lows : 
"Though the practice of proving wills in common form has 
prevailed in other portions of the United States ; and though 
it was customary in the State of New York, previous to the 
revision of the statutes, to prove wills of personalty in that 
manner, still, it was not usual to require a new proof of the will 
in solemn form, on the demand of the next of kin. And yet 
the probate was conclusive. To remedy this difficulty, the 
first step was to provide for notice to the next of kin on the 
original proof of the will. ( 2 R. S., p. 6o, § 24. ) . 
Still, personal service of the citation was requisite, only on 
those who could be served in the county of the Surrogate, and 
next of kin not personally served, might be cut off by construc­
tive notice by advertisement. To meet this case, the Revisers 
reported to the Legislature a series of provisions, designed to 
01 I Brad£. Surr. 94 ( 1 849) . 
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allow proof of the will in solemn form at the call of any of 
the next of kin, upon whom a citation to attend the probate 
had not been personally served. (See Original Section, § 36 .)  
. . . It i s  evident that the statute, as reported to the Legis­
lature, was an adoption of the system of proof in Solemn 
Form, in the case of such of the next of kin as had not been 
cited. . . . But the Legislature determined to make the 
statute much broader,J'nd wpile they retained all the features 
of the English practice, as reported by the Revisers, they ex­
tended the benefit of the statute to all the next kin, whether 
they had been regularly cited on the original probate or not, 
the clause limiting the right to file allegations to those who 
had not been personally cited, being stricken out, and the 
section enacted as it now stands." 
While there were some amendments, 92 this general type 
of will contest was retained until after the turn of the century. 
In I 900 the New York Commissioners of Statutory Revision, 
in their report of that year on "General Procedure," recom­
mended, not an elimination of the requirement of notice for 
the initiation of a probate proceeding, but the repeal of the 
provisions permitting contest after probate. Their reasons 
are expressed in the following words: 93 
"The commissioners think that the unreversed decree of 
the surrogate admitting a will to probate should be conclusive 
everywhere until modified, or reversed on appeal. We think 
the general rule should apply here as in other cases, namely, 
to furnish a tribunal in which one trial of the issues involved 
in a probate proceeding may be had, and that the suitors or 
92 In I 8 3 7 the separate provisions for notice of probate of a will of real and of 
personal property were repealed, and a group of sections covering notice for both 
types of wills was substituted. See N .  Y. Laws I 8 3 7 ,  c. 460. In general as to 
will contest in I 8 8 I ,  see REDFIELD, LAW AND PRACTICE OF SURROGATES' COURTS 
(2d ed;· I 8 8 I )  c. 8. In I 892 a provision for contest in the Supreme Court after 
probate of a will of real or personal property was enacted. N. Y. Laws 1 891, c. 
5 9 1 .  See this section, as amended in N. Y. Code of Civ. Proc. (Parker, 3d ed. 
I 90 3 )  § 2653a. Provisions for a contest after probate in the Surrogates' Court 
were repealed by N. Y. Laws I 9 1 o, c. 57 8 • 
.. 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF STATUTORY REVISION OF 
NEW YORK ( I 9oo) : u 6. 
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persons interested should not be given two tribunals with 
alternative or cumulative jurisdiction ; that is, suitors should 
not be permitted to use one court, and if dissatisfied or if they 
neglect their rights in that tribunal, go into another tribunal 
and try the same issues which were or might have been tried 
in the first. . . . Under the plan proposed any contestant 
may if he wishes submit the issues to the surrogate, or if he 
prefers, he may have the issues tried by a jury; and we think 
that when the issues are so tried and finally determined and 
settled, the adjudication should be final and conclusive ; and 
there should not be any other opportunity to try the same 
issues, unless a new trial is ordered. . . . The will once 
admitted to probate under the plan suggested ought to be 
conclusive, and the estate ought not to be subjected to the 
uncertainty of a possible application for revocation. Ample 
provision is made for obtaining a new trial ." 
In spite of this forceful argument against the double trial of 
the issue of will or no will, it was not until the legislative ses­
sion of I 9 I4  that all provisions for contest after probate were 
repealed. 94 While an appeal from the decree was allowed, 
and the introduction of new evidence was permissible, it was 
in the nature of an equity appeal and not a trial of the issues 
de novo.95 
Under the present New York legislation,96 the will can 
be contested at or before the close of testimony taken on behalf 
of the prqponent, but apparently not later than that time. 
The original proceeding is always initiated with notice. A 
decree does not affect the right or interest of a person . not 
notified :J.S provided in the code. 
It thus appears that New York eventually arrived at quite 
as rational a system of will contest as Virginia, whose history 
we have previously examined on this point, but of a very dif-
"' N. Y. Laws I 9 I4, c. 443· See particularly § 26I 7 thereof. 
95 See }ESSUP-REDFIELD, LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE SURROGATES' COURTS 
( ed. of I 9 2 5 )  § I 89 ; Taft, "Comments on Will Contest in New York," 30 YALE 
L. J. 593  at 6oi ( I 9 2 1 ) .  
96 N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § §  141 ,  1 47-149. 
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ferent sort. Briefly stated, it is this : the requirement of 
notice before probate is imposed; but there can be no contest 
after probate. Therefore, the trial of the issue of will or no 
will can only occur once. 
(b) Massachusetts. The story of the development of the 
Massachusetts probate system has been so well presented by 
Professor Atkinson 97 that little need be added here. Al­
though the statutes are not explicit, it appears that the practice 
in Massachusetts is to give notice of the proceeding to probate 
a will when the petition is filed. 98 It has, doubtless, long been 
the rule that contest takes place before probate. 99 But prior 
to 1 9 20, there was an appeal from the decision of the probate 
court which constituted a trial de novo before a single justice 
of the Supreme Judicial Court.100 At the present time, how­
ever, appeals from the decision of the probate court probating 
or rejecting a will are heard as equity appeals before the Su­
preme Judicial Court.101 It is true, the probate court may 
have the issue of will or no will tried before a jury in the 
superior court, but this appears to be merely because it is in­
convenient for the probate court to call a jury and not be­
cause the case is being transferred to a higher court.102 
2. Contest before and after probate in same court 
In  a very considerable number of states, the legislatures 
appear to have modified the old procedure for probate in 
common and solemn form by requiring notice to interested 
parties before any probate at all. Thus, the principal reason 
97 Atkinson, "The Development of the Massachusetts Probate System," 42 
MrcH. L. REv. 425  ( r 943 ) .  , 
98 See NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF EsTATES ( 3d ed. 1 9 37)  § z 8 ;  MoTTLA, 
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE (I 942) § 3 I .  
99 See NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT O F  ESTATES ( 3 d  ed. 1 9 3 7) § 30, and cases 
therein cited ; Mass. Rev. Stat. ( r 8 36) c. 8 3, § 47· 
100 See Mass. Rev. Laws ( r 9o2) c. r 6z, § 25. 
101 Mass. Ann. Laws ( r 93 2 )  c. z r s, § 9 and following. See Mass. Gen. Acts, 
1 9 1 9, c. 274· 
102 Mass. Ann. Laws ( 1 9 3 2 )  c. z r s, § r 6. 
THE FUNCTION OF WILL CONTESTS 7 1 5  
for contest after probate under the English system,-namely 
that interested parties had no notice of the first probate,-is 
gone. And it is not easy to find a satisfactory reason for the 
retention of the contest after probate. 
(a) The California group. The states whose legislation 
on will contest presents the greatest amount of similarity 
are those which follow the pattern found in California. With­
out doubt this was influenced by some stage of development 
of the New York legislation already described, yet it presents 
a form an.! content all its own. The legislation of eleven 
states may fairly be classed in this group, namely: Arizona, 
California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. As 
legislation in three of these, North and South Dakota and 
Oklahoma, presents certain common characteristics, their stat­
utes will be discussed togetf:ler after the others are considered. 
(b) California. In r 8 so, the year in which California be­
came a state, its legislature passed "An Act to regulate the 
Settlement of the Estates of Deceased Persons." 103 This 
legislation constitutes the beginning of the present California 
law of will contest. Prior to that time the Mexican law of 
wills and administration was in force.104 This Act consisted of 
fourteen chapters, the second of which was entitled "Of the 
Proof of Wills." Important features of this chapter, for our 
purpose, are as follows : no distinction is made between wills of 
real and of personal property; notice by publication, and by 
citation, prior to the hearing on the probate of a will, was 
provided for ; 105 the will could be contested before probate 
by filing written grounds of opposition.106 Without doubt 
the legislation was influenced by that in force in New York. 
",. Cal. Stat. I 8 so, c. I 29. 
11" Castro v. Castro, 6 Cal. I 5 8  (z 8s6) ; Coppinger v .  Rice, 33 Cal. 408 
( I 867) . 
"'" Cal. Stat. I 85o, c. 1 29, §§ I J-zs .  
1 .. Cal. Stat. I 8so, c .  1 29, § 20. 
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This is particularly indicated by the section dealing with con­
test after probate, which is as follows : 107 "When a will has 
been admitted to probate, any person interested may, at any 
time within one year after such probate, contest the same, or 
the validity of the will. For that purpose he shall file in the 
Court before which the will was proved, a petition in writing, 
containing his allegations against the validity of the will, or 
against the sufficiency of the proof, and praying that the pro­
bate may be revoked." 
A revised "Act to Regulate the Settlement of th� Estates of 
Deceased Persons" was passed in I 8 5 I ,  108 but, so far as the law 
of will contest is concerned, its changes were not significant. 
An amendment in I 8 55 109 provided for a jury trial of will 
contests. 
The California Code of Civil Procedure of I 8 72, still fol­
lowing, in general, the scheme of the enactment of I 8 50 as 
to will contests, presents elaborate provisions for contest before 
probate in a separate article.110 The contestant is specifically 
declared to be the plaintiff and the petitioner the defendant.111 
The petitioner may demur or answer and issues of fact which 
may be raised are stated. Another article of seven sections 112 
entitled "Contesting Will After Probate" is chiefly a rear­
rangement of materials contained in the Act of I 8 5 I .  
I n  I 929,113 the provision permitting any interested person 
to contest after probate was changed so that such a contest . 
could be instituted only by "any interested person, other than 
a party to a contest filed before probate pursuant to section 
I 3 I 2 of this code and other than a person who had actual 
notice of contest thereunder in time to have j oined therein." 
107 Cal. Stat. I 85o, c. I z9, § 30. 
108 Cal. Stat. I 8 5 I, c. u4. 
"'" Cal. Stat. I 8 55, c. I I  o. 
11° Cal. Code Civ. Proc. ( I 87z)  §§ I J I Z  to I J I 8 . 
111 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. ( I 8p) § I J I Z. 
112 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. ( I 8 p )  §§ I JZ7-I 333 ·  
113 Cal. Stat. I 9z9, c .  495 ·  
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The period for contest after probate was, by the same act, 
reduced from one year to six months. 
In I 9 3 I the provisions for will contest appear as a part of 
a Probate Code in a chapter entitled "Contests of Wills," 114 
consisting of two articles, one on "Contests before Probate" and 
one on "Contests after Probate." This chapter has remained 
practically unchanged since that time.115 
At the present time, as in prior legislation, two will con­
tests are possible, although the first as well as the second is 
instituted with notice. But this anomaly is mitigated to a 
large extent by the provision enacted in I 929 denying a 
second contest to those who were parties to the first contest 
or who had actual notice in time to participate. The most 
significant sections of the present legislation on will contest, 
for the purposes of this discussion, are as follows : 116 
"Sec. 3 70. Any person interested may contest the will by 
filing written grounds of opposition to the probate thereof 
at any time before the hearing of the petition for probate, and 
thereupon a citation shall be issued directed to the heirs of 
the decedent and to all persons interested in the will, includ­
ing minors and incompetents, wherever residing, directing 
them to plead to the contest within thirty days after service 
of the citation, which shall be made personally or by publica­
tion in the maJ'ner provided by law for the service of sum­
mons in civil actions. Any person so served may demur to 
the contest upon any of the grounds of demurrer available in 
civil actions. If the demurrer is sustained, the court may 
allow the contestant a reasonabl� time, not exceeding ten days, 
within which to amend his contest. If the demurrer is over­
ruled, the petitioner and others interested, within ten days 
after the receipt of written notice thereof, may j ointly or 
separately answer the contest." 
"Sec. 3 7 r .  On the trial, the contestant is plaintiff and the 
petitioner is defendant. Any issue of fact involving the com­
m Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1 9 3 1 )  Div. 3, c. z, §§ 37o-385 .  
m eal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) §§ 370  to  3 85 .  
u• Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) §§  3 7o, 3 7 1 and 3 80. 
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petency of the decedent to make a last will and testament, 
the freedom of the decedent at the time of the execution of the 
will from duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, the due 
execution and attestation of the will, or any other question sub­
stantially affecting the validity of the will, must be tried by 
a jury, unless a jury is waived as provided by the Code of Civil 
Procedure. If no jury is demanded, the court must try and 
determine the issues j oined." 
"Sec. 3 80. When a will has been admitted to probate, any 
interested person, other than a party to a contest before pro­
bate and other than a person who had actual notice of such 
previous contest in time to have joined therein, may, at any 
time within six months after such probate, contest the same or 
the validity of the will. For that purpose he must file in the 
court in which the will was proved a petition in writing, con­
taining his allegations against the validity of the will or against 
the sufficiency of the proof, and praying that the probate be 
revoked." 
(c) Arizona. The Arizona statutes on contest 117 follow 
closely the language of the California statutes of I 872 and 
are obviously copied from them. The separate provisions 
for contest before and after probate are set out as in the Cali­
fornia statutes. The time for contest after probate is one 
year with additional time for persons under disabilities.118 
Arizona did p.ot adopt the California amendment of I 929 re­
stricting the parties who can contest after probate.119 Ac­
cording to one section 120 of the Arizona Code, any interested 
person may contest after probate. Indeed, in Estate of 
Biehn 121 the proponent of the will was permitted to contest 
117 Ariz. Code ( I  9 39) §§ 3 8-:-z I o to 3 8-z 1 2, 3 8-:1.1 6 to 3 8-22 I .  
118 Ariz. Code ( I  9 39) §§ 3 8-z I 6, 3 8-22 I .  
119 This is now Cal. Pro b .  Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 3 8 o, and provides that 
"any interested person, other than a party to a contest before probate and other 
than a person who had actual notice of such previous contest in time to have 
joined therein" may contest after probate. 
"'" Ariz. Code ( I 939) § 3 8-2 I 6. 
121 4I Ariz. 403, I 8  P. (zd) I I I 2  ( I 93 3) . 
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after probate. But according to another section, 122 it may be 
inferred that, if a person sui juris contested before probate, 
in person or by an attorney of his own selection, he would be 
estopped to contest after probate. 
(d) Idaho. Idaho provisions on contest 123 are almost the 
same as those contained in the California Code of Civil Pro­
cedure of I 872, except that the time for contest after probate 
is shorter.124 Like. Arizona, they do not include the Cali­
fornia amendment of I 929, which limits the persons who can 
contest after probate where there has been a contest before 
probate. Under the Idaho code, an appeal from the probate 
court to the district court is de novo unless it is an appeal on a 
question of law alone and the error appears on the face of the 
record.125 Thus it appears that it is possible to have three 
trials of the issue of will or no will, although notice to in-. 
terested parties p�ecedes each of them. 
(e) Utah. The Utah provisions 126 follow closely the 
California Code of Civil Procedure of I 872, although some 
of the provisions of the latter on will contest are omitted. 
Contest after probate is limited to "any person who has not 
contested a wiJl, or who has contested by attorney appointed 
by the court without his knowledge." The time limit for con-
w Ariz. Code ( 1 939)  § 3 8-:1.08 : "Any person interested may appear and 
contest the will by himself or by his guardian or attorney, appointed by himself 
or by the court for that purpose ; but a contest made by an attorney appointed by 
the court does not bar a contest after probate by the party so represented, if com­
menced within the time provided for the contest of wills after probate. . • ." 
And see Estate of Cunningham, 54 Cal. 55 6 ( r 8 8o),  interpreting a provision in 
the California Code similar to this. 
00 Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) §§ I 5-2 I O, r s-2 I J  to r s-21 7, I S-22 3  to rs-
229· 
"" According to Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § 1 5-223, the time is four months 
after probate. But compare Idaho Laws Ann. ( I  943) § I 5-229,  which seems 
to refer to a period of eight months after probate with a saving clause as to per­
sons under disability. 
125 Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943) § I  I-+o6. See, also, Lemp v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 
393,  r 84 P. 222  ( 1 9 1 9) .  
126 Utah Code (1 943 and Supp. I 945) § §  I o2-3-7 to I oz-3-1 3 ·  
720 MONOGRAPHS ON PROBATE LAW 
test after probate was reduced from one year after probate 
to six months in 1 943 .127 
(f) }.1.ontana and Wyoming. The provisions for will con­
test in Montana 128 and Wyoming 129 follow very closely the 
California Code of Civil Procedure· of I 872 .  In Wyoming, 
however, the period for contest after probate is six months 
after probate, and there is no �xtension of time for persons 
under disabilities. 
(g) New Mexico. While the New Mexico legislation on 
will contests 130 shows the influence of the California Code of 
Civil Procedure of I 872, it also shows marked variations. 
Probate is with notice in the probate court.131 A contest before 
probate may take place in that court. 132 B1,1t if that court 
finds against the will, the case is then removed to the district 
court and tried de novo, "the same as on appeal." 133 . A find­
ing favorable to the will in the probate court may be contested 
in that court at any time within six months, by "any person 
interested." 134 Appeal to the district court from a decision 
of the probate court approving or disapproving a will is per­
mitted to "any party aggrieved." 135 This appeal is with a 
trial de novo.136 It is evident that, under this legislation, it 
is possible to have three trials of the issue of will or no will. 
(h) Nevada. The recently enacted Nevada legislation on 
will contests 137 follows closely the language of the California 
probate code of I 9 3 I .  However, there are important vari-
w Utah Code (Supp. 1 945) � I O:z-3-1 2, 
1.28 Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 935 )  §� 1 0029, 100JZ-10o3 8, 1 o042-I 0048. 
120 Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 3 1 )  §§ 88-6o l to 88-6o7, 8 8-701 to 8 8-707 
(amended Laws I 945> c. 3 and 5 2 ) .  
'"" N. M .  Stat. ( 1 94 1  and Supp. 1.945) § §  3 2-208  to 3 2-220. Many of the 
sections were first enacted in New Mexico Laws 1 889, c. 90. 
131 N. M. Stat. ( r 94 r )  § 3 2-204. 
132 N, M. Stat. ( 194 1 )  § 3 2-209. 
:wa N. M. Stat. ( r 94 r )  § ] 2-2 10. And see, also, § 32-2 14. 
13' N. M. Stat. ( r 94 r )  § 3 2-2 1 2. 
135 N. M. Stat. ( r 94 r )  §§ 3 2-2 1 5, 32-2 1 6. 
136 N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § x g-1oo r .  
137 Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 r )  § §  g8 82.r 8 to 9 882.2.7 .  
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ations. I t  is expressly provided that the attorney general, and 
also a devisee or legatee under a former will, may contest 
before probate.138 The time limit for contest after probate 
is three months after the will was admitted to probate/39 and 
there is no saving clause for persons under disabilities as in 
the corresponding California legislation.140 Like the Cali­
fornia probate code, this legislation permits a contest after 
probate only by "any interested person, other than a party 
to a contest before probate and other than a person who had · 
actual notice of such previous contest in time to have j oined 
therein." 141 
(i) The Dakota sub-group. Three states, North Dakota, 
South Dakota and Oklahoma, have statutes on will contest 
which follow closely the language of the California Code of 
Civil Procedure of I 8 72, but which also have some important 
variations in common. The Dakota Revised Codes of I 8 77  142 
follow the familiar pattern of the California Code of I 8 72, 
with a group of sections entitled "Contesting probate of wills" 
followed by a group on "Probate of foreign wills," after 
which is found the subdivision on "Contesting will after pro­
bate." Two important departures from the California pat­
tern, which are still retained by the three states referred to, 
are as follows. Contest, both before and after probate, is 
tried by the court and not by a jury.143 Contest after probate 
is permitted only on a showing of "evidence discovered since 
the probate of the will." 144 The present Oklahoma. stat­
utes 145 foll�w somewhat more closely than do those of the 
138 Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  § 9 8 82. I 8. 
139 Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 r )  §§ 9 8 82 .22, 9882.26. 
"" Cal. Pro b. Code (Deering, I 9 3 I )  § 3 84. 
w Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  § 9 8 8 2.22 .  This clause is the same as that 
contained in Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, I 93 I )  § 3 80. 
142 Dakota Probate Code ( I 877)  §§ I 9, 22-27, 3 I-37· 
' "  Dakota Probate Code (I  8 77)  § § 2 z, 34· 
1 44  Dakota Probate Code (I 8 77)  § 3 I .  
"" Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  t .  58, §§ 2 9, 4I-46, 6 I-67. Trial by the court is pro­
vided for by §§ 4I ,  64. The requirement that the contest after probate be based 
on newly discovered evidence is contained in § 6 I ,  
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two Dakotas the language of the Dakota Revised Codes of 
r 8n. 
The present North Dakota and South Dakota legislation 146 
on will contests shows some rearrangement and rewording, 
but on the whole differs but slightly from that found in the 
Revised Codes of r 8 77. 
It should be noted that, in North Dakota, South Dakota 
and Oklahoma the order admitting or denying probate of a 
will can be appealed to the trial court of general jurisdiction 
and the case can there be tried de novo.147 Thus, although 
the statutes on will contest might lead one to suppose that a 
second trial of the issue is permitted only if there is newly 
discovered evidence, in fact a second trial is permitted by the 
device of an appeal with trial de novo. 
(j ) Other states in this class. In three other jurisdictions, 
namely Colorado, 148 the District of Columbia 149 and Iowa/50 
the general plan of permitting a will contest both before and 
after probate in the same court is followed, although probate 
is always p"receded by notice to interested parties. The 
Colorado and District of Columbia statutes expressly provide 
for the caveat and look a little like the system of probate in 
common and in solemn form with the addition of notice in 
all cases to precede probate. In Colorado, in addition to con­
test before and after probate in the county court, an appeal 
with trial de novo to the trial court of general jurisdiction is 
"" N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 94 3 )  §§ 3 o-o6or to 30-06 1 3 ;  S. D. Code ( 1 9 39 )  
§ §  3 5.030 1  to 3 5·03 1 Z• 
147 N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943)  § 3 o-Z6Z3 ; Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t. zo, § Z75 and 
t. 5 8, § 7 3 5 ;  S. D. Code ( 1 9 39 )  § 3 5-Z I I I .  
148 Colo. Stat. ( 1 93 5 )  c. 1 76, §§ so, s r ,  54 to 56, 6 3  to 65. The right to con­
test after probate is limited to persons who were not summoned by actual service 
of process and who did not appear at the probate. As to appeal with trial de 
novo, see Colo. Stat. ( 1 9 3 5 )  c. 1 76, § Z43 · 
149 D. C. Code ( 1 940) §§ 1 9-30 8  to I 9-J I Z. 
150 1owa Code ( 1 939)  §§ I I 86J-r r 867, r r 8 8z, and se� § r r oo7. The con­
test after probate is apparently a suit to set aside the will. See 1 McCARTY, IoWA 
PROBATE ( 1 94z) § 3 1 8 .  
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permitted. Texas legislation may also be classified here.151 
There is an express provision for contest before probate. 
There is also a provision to the effect that, when a will has been 
probated, a proceeding may be instituted to annul its pro­
VISIOns. Another statute lim
.
its the period within which a 
contest can be instituted to four years after the will is admitted 
to probate. It is further provided that a suit to cancel a will 
for forgery or fraud may be instituted within four years after 
the discovery of the forgery or fraud. It would seem that the 
proceeding to annul a will is broader than an ordinary pro­
ceeding to contest. Texas, however, also recognizes the ap­
peal from the county court to the district court with trial de 
novo. If we regard this appeal as the will contest, we should 
classify Texas legislation at a later point. 
3· Contest in a higher court after probate 
Three states come under this general classification, although 
they present substantial difference� among themselves. They 
are Alabama, Illinois and Ohio. 
161 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 939)  art. 3 3 I 5 .  "Any person interested in 
an estate may, at any time before any character of proceeding is decided upon by 
the court, file opposition thereto in writing. . . ." 
As to notice before probate, see Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 9 3 9 )  art. 3 3 3 3 ·  
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 939)  art. 34 3 3  provides that "When a will has 
been probated, its provisions and directions shall be specifically executed, unless · 
annulled or suspended by order of the court probating the same .in a proceeding 
instituted for that purpose by some person interested in the estate. " 
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 9 3 9) art. 55 34 provides that "Any person in­
terested in any will which shall have been probated under the laws of this State 
may institute suit in the proper court to contest the validity thereof, within four 
years after such will shall have been admitted to probate, and not afterward." 
Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, I 9 39 )  art. 5 5 3 6  provides that an interested per­
son "rna y institute suit in the proper court to cancel a will for forgery or other 
fraud within four years after the discovery of such forgery or fraud. • . ." 
To the effect that there is a trial de novo on an appeal from the county court 
to the district court, see Tex. Rules Civ. Proc. (Supp. 1 944) Rule 3 34· 
That the proceeding to annul is broader than the ordinary will contest, is 
indicated in Prather v. McClelland, 76 Tex. 5 74, I 3 S. W. 543 ( I  89o) ; Walker 
v. Irby (Tex. Civ. App. 1 920) ,  2 29  S. W. 3 3 1 ,  rev'd in (Tex. Comm. App. 
I 922 ) ,  2 3 8  S. W. 8 84 ;  Mason v. Brown (Tex. Civ. App. 1 944) ,  I 8 2  S. W. (2d) 
729. To the effect that art. 3433, quoted above, refers to the same subject matter 
as art. 5 5 3 4, supra, see Cryer v. Duren (Tex. Civ. App. 1 942) , 1 64 S. W. (2d) 
752· 
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(a) A labama. The scheme for will contest in Alabama 
resembles somewhat the Virginia provisions already de­
scribed.152 However, unlike Virginia, the Alabama legis­
lation provides for notice prior to probate of the will in all 
cases. 153 Contest before probate 154 may take place if written 
objections to the probate of the will are filed in the probate 
court. On the filing of such objections "an issue must be made 
up, under the direction of the court, between the person mak­
ing the application, as plaintiff, and the person contesting the 
validity of the will, as defendant ; and such issue must, on 
application of either party, be tried by a jury." Any interested 
party who has not contested the will may, at any time within 
six months after the will has been admitted to probate, contest 
it by bill in equity in the circuit court.155 It is further pro­
vided that 156 "The circuit court may, in such case, direct an 
issue to be tried by a jury, and on the trial before the jury, or 
hearing before the circuit judge, the testimony of the witnesses 
reduced to writing by the judge of probate, according to sec­
tion 42 of this title is evidence to be considered by the judge 
or jury." 
It is noticeable that Alabama still retains the two trials of 
the issue of will or no will, in spite of the fact that notice of 
the first hearing as well as the second is always given. It is 
true, a person cannot contest after probate, if he has done so 
before probate, but the mere fact that he was a party to the 
first proceeding, or a witness, does not preclude him from 
contesting after probate.157 In Knox v. Paull 158 the court 
152 See Johnston v. Glasscock, 2 Ala. 2 I 8 at 2 3 7 ( I  84 I ) .  
153 Ala. Code ( I 94o) t. 6 I ,  §§ 48-so. 
"" Ala. Code ( I 94o) t. 6 I ,  § 52.  And see § 63, which provides for a transfer 
of the contest to the circuit court. 
,.. Ala. Code ( I  940) t. 6 I ,  § 64. An extension of time is given to persons 
under disabilities, t. 6 I ,  § 66. 
156 Ala. Code ( I 94o) t. 6 I ,  § 67. 
157 Breeding v. Grantland, � 3 5  Ala. 497, 33 So. 545 ( I 9oz) ; Knox v. Paull, 
9 5  Ala. 505, I I  So. I 56 ( I 8 9 I ) .  
156 9 5  Ala. 505 at 509, I I  So. I 5 6  ( I 8 9 I ) .  
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sought to defend the anomaly of two trials of the same issue 
of fact in these words : "Good reasons may be suggested for 
affording this additional opportunity to contest the validity 
of a will which has been regularly admitted to probate after 
due notice to all parties in interest. The application to prove 
the will usually follows close upon the death of the testator. 
The application comes on for hearing as soon as the short pre­
scribed terms of notice have expired. It must frequently hap­
pen that persons interested in the proceeding are wholly 
unable, while it is pending, to inform themselves as to the 
instruments offered for probate, or of the circumstances at­
tending its execution. Facts affecting its validity may be 
developed afterwards, and the failure to discover them, or to 
obtain the evidence to prove them, may have been without 
the fault or any lack of diligence on the part of those interested 
in making a contest." 
(b) Illinois. Illinois, like Kentucky, took over the Vir­
ginia plan .of contest in chancery.159 It, however, added not 
only a provision for an appeal to the trial court of general 
jurisdiction with trial de novo, but also a requirement of 
notice for the initiation of the first probate.160 Under an 
earlier form of the Illinois statute it was held that a contestant 
could carry on one contest by appeal from the probate c�urt 
decision and another at the same time by bill in chancery. 
And he might also move to have the probate in the county 
court set aside.161 Apparently much the same thing is possible 
1150 Luther v. Luther, I zz Ill. 558, I 3  N. E. I 6 6  ( r 8 87 ) ; Dibble v. Winter, :1.47 
Ill. :1.43, 93 N. E. 145 ( I 9 r o ) .  � 
160 The provision for notice seems to have appeared in 1 897 .  See Ill. Laws 
I 8971 p. 304. As to the present provision, see Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94I)  
c. 3, § 2 I 6. 
161 See Wright v. Simpson, 2oo Ill. 5 6, 65 N. E. 628 ( r 9o2) ; Buergner v. 
Buergner, 3 1 7  Ill. 40 I 1  I48 N. E. 2 74 ( I 925) ; r HoRNER, PROBATE PRACTICE 
AND ESTATES (4th ed. I940) § 89 .  
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under the probate code of 1 9 3 9,162 although the contest is not 
called a contest in chancery. At the present time there may 
be a contest in the county or probate court before probate 
solely on the ground of "fraud, forgery, compulsion, or other 
improper conduct which in the opinion of the probate court 
is deemed sufficient to invalidate or destroy the will.'; 163 
Otherwise there is a statutory contest after probate in the cir­
cuit court.164 An appeal from the decision of the probate 
court with trial de novo is still possible.165 
(c) Ohio. In Ohio there can be no contest until after 
probate. The will is probated in, the probate court after 
notice.166 Then the statute provides for a contest within six 
months in the common pleas court.167 This proceeding is 
with trial de novo.168 There can be no appeal, however, 
from the order of the probate court admitting the will to 
probate, since that is not regarded as a final order.169 
4· Contest before probate; appeal with trial de novo 
in a higher court 
One of the most numerous groups of states is that in which 
the proceeding to probate is initiated with notice and, in terms, 
contest is permitted only before probate ;  but in fact by per­
mitting an appeal with trial de novo in the trial court of 
general jurisdiction a contest after probate in a higher court is 
162 Handley v. Conlan, 342 Ill. 5 62,  I 7 4 N. E. 8 55 (I 9 3 I )  ; I HoRNER, PRo­
BATE PRACTICE AND ESTATES (4th ed. I 940) § 89.  
163 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94I ) c .  3 ,  § 2 2 I ; I HORNER, PROBATE 
PRACTICE AND ESTATES (4th ed. I 940) § 66. 
1 .. Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3 ,  § 242. ' 
165 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, §§ 223 ,  484 and 487 .  
166 0hio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. I94. § I0504-I 7. 
167 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 9 3 7  and Supp. I 945) §§  I0504-3 2  and 1 0504-
3 3 · 168 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 9 3 7  and Supp. I 945) §§ I 2o79 to 1 2085 .  
169 ln re Estate of Frey, 1 39 Ohio St. 3 54, 40 N. E. (2d) I 45 ( I 942) .  But 
there is an appeal to the common pleas court with trial de novo from an order 
of the probate court denying probate, i� there was no record taken at the hearing 
in probate. See Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. I 945) § I o5 o i-56.  
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recognized. Besides the states already mentioned in other 
groups which superimpose the device of an appeal with trial de 
novo, the following jurisdictions may fairly be classified here ; 
Connecticut 17° Kansas 171 Maine 172 Michigan 173 Min-' ' ' . ' 
nesota 174 Nebraska 175 Rhode Island 176 Vermont 177 and ' ' ' 
Wisconsin.178 In Michigan, the probate may not only be 
appealed to the trial court of general jurisdiction, but the 
case may be transferred to that court as soon as the heirs file 
a contest and before the will has been probated.179 As has 
been said, Wisconsin only in part comes within this classifica­
tion. In its more populous areas, the appeal is direct to the 
supreme court and is on the record.180 If we do not regard the 
Texas proceeding to annul a will as a contest after probate, 
Texas might well be classified here.181 
V. THE RATIONALE OF THE WI LL CoNTEST 
From the foregoing survey of will contest legislation, in 
which a few glimpses of historical development are inter­
spersed, the legislative trends should be apparent. Many of 
our legislatures appear to have approached the problem on the 
assumption that the contest after probate in the manner of the 
17° Conn. Gen. Stat. ( 1 930) § 4884 ;  trial de novo, § 5624. 
171 Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 94 3 )  §§ 59-2220 to 59-2225 ; trial de novo, 
§ 59-2408 (amended by Laws I 9451 c. 237 ) . 
172 Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) c. 1 4 1 1  §§ 5 to 8 ;  trial de novo, c. I 40, § 3 7· 
173 Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943) §§ 2 7. 3 1 78 (9o)  to 27 .3 1 7 8 (94) ; trial de novo, 
§ 27·3 1 7 & (42 ) .  
174 Minn. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  §§ 5 25 .23  to 5 25.24 I ; trial de novo, § 52 5·72. 
175 Neb. Rev. Stat. ( 1 943) § 30-2 1 7 ;  trial de novo, § 30-1 6o6. 
176 R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 9 3 8 )  c. 572 ,  § 7 ;  trial de novo, c. 573 ,  §§ I1 4· 
177 Vt. Pub. Laws ( I 9 3 3 )  § 2763 ; trial de novo, § 30I 6 (amended Laws I 94 I ,  
No. 42) . 
178 Wis. Stat. ( 1 943 ) §§ 3 r 0.04 to 3 I o.o6 ; trial de novo, § 3 24.0 3 (on appeal 
to circuit court from county court in counties of less than I s,ooo population ) .  
179 Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943 )  § 2 7.3 1 7 8 (36) . 180 Wis. Stat. ( I  94 3) § 3 24.0 r .  In these more populous counties, the contest 
may be removed from the county court to the circuit court for trial when a j ury 
is demanded. Wis. Stat. ( I 943)  § 324.1 7, subd. 8 .  
181 See note r 5 I ,  supra. 
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probate in solemn form is an accepted legal device, without 
realizing why that is true. They thereupon took that device 
and amended it, by adding a requirement of notice for the 
original probate or by permitting an appeal with trial de novo, 
so that the resulting product allowed, not one trial after notice, 
but two, and in some instances even three, trials of the issue 
of will or no will. In a ·  few isolated instances,-notably in 
the case of New Y ark and Virginia,-we find an eventual 
return to the norm of one trial of the issue. In still other 
states the pattern apparently is based on the assumption' that 
the issue of will or no will is like any other issue ; that notice 
must be given to interested parties prior to probate and then 
any contest must take place before probate. But to this 
perfectly rational conception of the will contest is commonly 
added the appeal with trial de novo in the trial court of general 
jurisdiction. 
Taking up in order the types of will contest legislation in 
accordance with the preceding survey, it is clear that a rational 
basis exists for those which follow the pattern of the English 
probate without notice, first, because estates commonly need 
the supervision of the executor immediately on the death of 
the testator ; and, second, because in the vast majority of cases 
there is not the remotest possibility of a contest and the probate 
of the will can be reduced to an administrative formality. But 
since the heir then has no opportunity to contest before pro­
bate, he must be given that opportunity afterward. 
Moreover, the same reasons would justify a contest in chan­
cery after probate where no notice · is given for the initial 
probate. The fact that it is in chancery may be explained on 
the ground that a more competent tribunal is needed for a 
contested than for an uncontested probate ; and that if the heir 
wishes to have a contest after probate in such a tribunal, he 
may do so. Parenthetically, it should be pointed out, how­
ever, that the resemblance of this device to the framing of 
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the issue of devisavit vel non in English chancery in the case 
of litigation over the title to devised land is largely superficiaL 
' Unlike the English historical counterpart, the American con­
test in chancery is commonly in rem and is a part of the orig­
inal probate proceeding.182 
Where the proceeding is initiated with notice, we must 
seek a different rationalization. It is true, the Alabama 
court 183 suggested that, even with notice before probate, the 
time prior to the hearing would be so short that little opportu­
nity would be afforded to the heirs to ascertain facts on which a 
contest could be based. However, it is difficult to see why that · 
should be so. The facts existing at the time of the execution of 
the will or at the testat'or's death are just as readily ascertain­
able as the facts involving a suit relative to the execution of a 
contract or deed. And the action with respect to the contract 
or deed may be tried just as speedily after notice as the suit for 
the probate of a will. Thus it would seem that in those juris­
dictions, such as the California group, :where there may be 
contest both before and after probate, there is no satisfactory 
basis for contest after probate. ·  It is largely an historical sur­
vival of probate in solemn form, the reason for which dis­
appeared when probate with notice to interested parties was 
required. 
It is true, in several states of the California group, the 
same person cannot initiate a contest both before and after 
probate. Thus, in California, in order to contest after probate, 
it must appear that the contestant was not a party to the first 
contest and did not have actual notice of it in time to par­
ticipate.184 There is nothing in this statute, however, which 
bars an heir from contesting after probate where he had notice 
before probate but there was no contest. In the Dakota 
182 See Simes, "The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in 
Rem," 43 MICH. L. REv. 675 at 679 and 6 8 8  to 6 9 1  ( 1 94 5 ) ,  and pp. 494 and 
so6 to 509, supra. 
"" See note 1 5  8, supra. 
"' See p. 7 1 6, supra. 
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group the opportunity to contest after probate is further 
limited by the requirement of showing of "evidence dis­
covered since the probate of the will." 185 It would look as 
if the contest after probate in this group of states could be 
justified on the ground that its operation is about as restricted 
as the motion for a new trial in a civil action. However, in 
all three states of the Dakota group, legislation permits an 
appeal with trial de novo as well as a contest after probate. 
This appeal is objectionable on the grounds hereafter to be 
pointed out. 
Is there any justification for the contest after probate, in 
jurisdictions which require notice before probate, if that contest 
is in a high�r tribunal? And is there ·any justification in such 
jurisdictions, for an appeal with trial de novo in a higher 
tribunal ? It would seem that the answer to these questions 
is the same. Doubtless the reason for the appeal with trial 
de novo in the trial court of general jurisdiction is the same as 
that for the typical provision for appeal from the judgment of 
a justice court. Th� legislature has very little confidence in 
the competency of the judge ; he might be a layman, and rules 
of law might be disregarded ; if anybody objects, his case can 
be tried before a judge who is learned in the law. The same 
explanation could be given for the jurisdictions which permit 
a proceeding called a contest in a higher tribunal. In either 
type of contest, it would seem that the retrial of the issue in 
the higher court is unjustified, if it can also be tried in the 
probate court. That is to say, if the probate judge is not 
competent to preside over a contested probate, he ought not 
to be allowed to do so at all. If he is competent, then the 
case does not need to be tried anew in another court. 
It should be pointed out that the Ohio provisions for con­
test are distinguishable and are perfectly rational. There the 
will is admitted to probate in the probate court on notice, and 
185 See p. 7z 1 ,  supra. 
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the contest can take place only after probate and only i n  the 
common pleas court. A lay judge may be competent to handle 
an uncontested probate though h� could not pr9perly preside 
over a will contest case. Hence, the Ohio legislation provides 
for an uncontested probate in the probate court, and a contest 
in the common pleas court. But one criticism of this plan 
may be suggested : in theory it gives an advantage to the pro­
ponent of the will as against the contestant for the contestant 
must always oppose an already probated will. But it is be­
lieved that this advantage is more theoretical than actual. 
What types of will contest legislation, then, will stand the 
test of rational analysis? From the foregoing discussion, we 
may conclude that there are essentially three. First, in juris­
dictions which permit probate without notice, contest can 
take place after probate, either in the same or in another 
tribunal, if initiated by persons .who had no notice of the first 
probate. But the addition to this pattern of an appeal with 
trial de novo is without justification. Second, in jurisdictions 
which require notice to interested parties before probate and 
which permit contest before probate, there is no reason for 
contest after probate either by that name or in the guise of an , 
appeal with trial de nov6. Such a jurisdiction should regard 
the issue of will or no will just like any issue raised in a civil 
action ; it must be raised before trial and determined by the 
judgment or decree. Third, the Ohio pattern of an uncon­
tested probate in the probate court and a contest in the common 
pleas court only after probate is perfectly rational in that it 
recognizes that the common pleas court is competent to try a 
contest but that the probate court is not. 
VI. THE FcNcTION oF CoNTEST AFTER PRoBATE IN 
RELATION TO CERTAIN SPECIFIC PROBLEMS 
A considerable body of litigation has arisen involving this 
question : What is the relation of contest after probate to the 
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prior proceeding for probate of the will? Is it like an appeal? 
Is it like a proceeding to vacate a judgment? Is it a proceeding 
in rem like the original proceeding to probate? Is it in fact 
a part of the proceeding to· probate and not an independent 
proceeding? Of course, in jurisdictions where the contest is 
an appeal with trial de novo, the character of the proceeding 
is in part determined by its name: it ·is an appeal and for most 
purposes, therefore, is a part of the original proceeding to 
probate. Indeed, as to most types of contest, it is commonly 
held that the contest is in rem and is for most purposes a part 
of the original proceeding to probate.186 
However, the function and character of the contest after 
probate cannot be determined in a vacuum. It must be con­
sidered in the light of its application to concrete problems 
which have faced the courts. We shall, therefore, examine 
some of these problems in order to ascertain whether they 
throw light on our analysis of the function of contest after 
probate. 
1 .  Federal jurisdiction arising from diversity in citizenship 
The Federal Code provides 187 th;:tt the district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction "of all suits of a civil nature, at 
common law or in equity, . . . between citizens of dif­
ferent states" where the matter in controversy is within the 
jurisdictional amount. It likewise provides 188 for the removal 
to the federal district courts, by a non-resident defendant, of 
"any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity" of which the 
federal district courts have original j urisdiction. It is uni­
formly held that a proceeding to probate a will, or to adminis­
ter the estate of a decedent, is not a suit of a civil nature at 
common law or in equity within the meaning of these stat-
""' See note 1 8 z, supra. 
187 Fed. Code Ann., t. 2. 8, § 4 1 .  
188 Fed. Code Ann., t. 2.8, § 7 1 .  
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utes.189 The reason doubtless is that Congress contemplated 
the various English tribunals in which suits were once tried,­
chancery, common law courts, ecclesiastical courts, and admi­
ralty courts,-and that, in this historical classification, the 
ordinary function of the ecclesiastical tribunal in probating 
wills was regarded as outside the purview of suits at common 
law or in equity. While the meaning of these terms · is not 
wholly tied down to the historical English division of juris­
diction, it is clear that history determined once and for all that 
a proceeding in the nature of a hearing in an English ec­
clesiastical court to determine whether a will should be ad­
mitted to probate is not within the jurisdiction of the federal 
district courts. " 
Hence, our question is this : Is the proceeding to contest a 
will to such an extent ancillary to, a part of, or the same as, 
the proceeding to probate the will that the federal courts will 
likewise refuse to take jurisdiction? The answer, of course, 
depends upon the nature of will contests in the particular 
state. In general, the federal decisions indicate that the will 
contest cannot be tried in the federal courts unless it is a pro­
ceeding independent of the . proceeding to probate the will 
and unfess it is inter partes. The precise meaning of this test 
will be clarified by consideration of four leading decisions of 
the Supreme Court of the United States relati�e thereto. 
Gaines v. Fuentes 190 involved the removal, on grounds of 
diverse citizenship, of a suit brought in the courts of Louisiana 
to annul a will as a muniment of title to real estate. Mr . • 
Justice Field, speaking for the maj ority of the court, expressed 
the view that the jurisdiction of federal courts in removal 
cases was more extensive than their original jurisdiction where 
diverse citizenship was involved, and concluded that this case 
. could be removed solely on the ground of diversity of citizen-
189 Sutton v. English, 246 U. S. /99 at 205, 3 8  S. Ct. 254 ( 1 9 1 8 ) .  
190 9 2  U. S. I O  ( 1 8 7 5 ) .  
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ship and without regard to the character of the controversy. 
He, however, went on to indicate that the federal courts would 
have had original jurisdiction. He observed : "The suit in 
the parish court is not a proceeding to establish a will, but to 
annul it as a muniment of title, and to limit the operation of 
the decree admitting it to probate. It is, in all essential par­
ticulars, a suit for equitable relief,-to cancel an instrument 
alleged to be void, and to restrain the enforcement of a decree 
alleged to have been obtained upon false and insufficient testi­
mony." He conceded that the federal courts have no original 
probate jurisdiction to establish wills. "The reason lies," he 
said, "in the nature of the proceeding to probate a will as 
one in rf!fn, which does not necessarily involve any controversy 
between parties : indeed, in the majority of instances, no such 
controversy exists." Three j ustices dissented on the ground 
that the proceeding was essentially to revoke the probate of the 
will, and that the jurisdiction of the federal courts in removal 
cases was limited by their original jurisdiction in cases be­
tween citizens of different states. It is to be noted that, what­
ever the scope of the removal statute may have been at that 
time, it was modified in I 8 8 7  so that its scope was thereafter 
limited, in most situations, in the same way as the court's 
original j urisdiction.191 
In Ellis v. Davis,192 a bill in equity was instituted in the 
federal court of Louisiana to recover possession of real estate 
and to set aside a will which had been admitted to probate by 
191 The e�rlier statute permitted removal of "any suit of a civil nature at law 
or in equity . . . where the matter in dispute exceeds . . . and aris­
ing under the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . or in which 
the United States shall be plaintiff or petitioner, or in which there shall be a con­
troversy between citizens of different states," but limited original j urisdiction to 
"suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity" involving federal questions. 
1 8  Stat. L. 470, §§ 1, 2 ( 1 8 7 5 ) .  In 1 8 8 7  the removal statute expressly limited 
removal to cases over which the federal courts are given otiginal j urisdiction. :24 
Stat. L. 553 ,  § 2 ( � 8 8 7  ) .  See the discussion of these statutes in In re Cilley (C. 
c. N. H.  1 89 3 ) ,  58 F. 9n. 
192 109  u. s. 485, 3 s. Ct. 327 ( I 88J) . 
THE FUNCTION OF WILL CONTESTS 735 
the state courts of Louisiana. On a demurrer, the bill was 
dismissed. Th.is decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court · 
of the United States . . The basis of the decision was merely 
that, under Louisiana law, there is no jurisdiction in equity to 
revoke a probate and that the proper proceeding is by an action 
of revendication, which could be brought in the federal court. 
The Court pointed out that, under the English practice, the 
validity of wills involving real estate could be determined 
as to a particular piece of land by an action of ejectment ; and 
that in jurisdictions where this action is still permissible to 
determine the validity of a will, it could doubtless be instituted 
in the federal court, provided diversity of citizenship exists. 
The court further observed, however, that in many states the 
probate of wills involving land had been given conclusive force 
until set aside and that "In states where it 1s held to have a 
conclusive force, formal modes are prescribed of contesting 
the validity of the instrument as a will, and of the regularity 
and legality of the probate, by suits regularly instituted solely 
for that purpose, and inter partes ; but such proceedings are 
generally regarded as the exercise of probate jurisdiction, even 
if administered in courts other than that of original probate, 
but the judgment, as in other cases inter partes, binds only 
parties and privies." 
In Farrell v. O'Brien,193 a bill in equity was filed in the 
federal court to enj oin distribution under a will probated in 
the state of Washington on the ground that the will was not 
validly executed. The court determined that the suit, if 
considered as a Washington proceeding to contest the will, 
could not be brought in the federal court. The test laid down 
was as follows : "That where a state law, statutory or custom­
ary, gives to citizens of the State, in an action or suit inter 
partes, the right to question at law the probate of a will or to 
assail probate in a suit in equity the courts of the United States 
193 1 99 U. S. 89, zs S. Ct. 727 (1905) .  
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in administering the rights of citizens of other States or aliens 
will enforce such remedies." The court then inquired what 
was meant by the expression "action or suit inter partes," and 
..::oncluded that "the words referred to must relate only to 
independent controversies inter partes, and not to mere con­
troversies which may arise on an application to probate a will 
because the state law provides for notice, or to disputes con­
cerning the setting aside of a probate, when the remedy to set 
aside afforded by the state law is a mere continuation of the 
probate proceeding, that is to say, merely a method of pro­
cedure ancillary to the original probate, allowed by the state 
law for the purpose of giving to the probate its ultimate and 
final effect." The court than pointed out that if the require­
ment of an independent suit were not imposed, all inter partes 
proceedings to contest a will could be removed to the federal 
court. It should be observed that in the state of Washington, 
probate and contest are in the trial court of general jurisdiction. 
Yet the court stated that, under the Washington law, the 
contest was "special in character" and the decree revoking a 
will already admitted to probate would "inure not only to the 
benefit of the particular contestant," but was "operative as to 
the whole world." 
In Sutton v. English,194 the federal court was held to be 
without jurisdiction of a bill in equity to set aside a will pro­
bated in Texas, where the requisite diversity of citizenship 
existed. The court stated the rule thus : "By a series of de­
cisions in this court it has been established that since it does 
not pertain to the general jurisdiction of a court of equity to 
set aside a will or the probate thereof, or to administer upon 
the estates of decedents in rem, matters of this character are 
not within the ordinary equity jurisdiction of the federal 
courts ; . that where a State, by statute or custom, 
gives to parties interested the right to bring an action or suit 
m 246 U. S. 1 99, 38 S. Ct. 254 ( 1 9 1 8) .  
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inter partes, either at law or in equity, to  annul a will or to set 
aside the probate, the courts of the United States, where diver­
sity of citizenship and a sufficient amount in controversy appear, 
can enforce the same remedy, but that this relates only to in­
dependent suits, and not to procedure merely incidental or 
ancillary to the probate. . . ." The court then determined 
that the Texas proceeding in the district court to contest a will 
was essentially a proceeding to review by appeal or certiorari 
and was supplemental to the original probate proceeding. 
What these decisions appear to mean is this : A proceeding 
to determine whether a will should be admitted to probate is 
not a civil suit at law or in equity. Any proceeding after pro­
bate, which is ancillary to the original probate proceeding is 
so much a proceeding to probate that it likewise cannot be 
within the federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizen­
ship. But if it is an independent proceeding, and if it is inter 
partes, and if it is in the court of law or of equity, then it may 
be within the federal jurisdiction. The court seems to have 
wavered with respect to its meaning of the term "inter partes." 
Does it mean that the proceeding is not in rem? Or does it 
mean that there are parties who are contesting and that the 
suit is not ex parte? It would seem that the latter is meant. 
If it is, then every will contest, whether before or after pro­
bate, is inter partes, since there are parties who are opposing 
each other, even though its judgment operates in rem. Thus 
the court is compelled to limit the jurisdiction to those suits 
inter partes which are independent proceeqings. 
Parenthetically it should be observed that the court ap­
parently assumes that, even though the proceeding operates 
in rem, the diversity of citizenship requirement can be met. 
Of course, a formal argument could be made to the effect that, 
since ali persons in the world are parties, it can never be true 
that all the plaintiffs will be citizens of different states from 
all the defendants. But it is believed that, if the point were 
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raised, the court would have to conclude that "parties" for 
this purpose does not mean all persons bound by the judg­
ment, but merely those actively participating in the litigation 
or named and served as parties.195 
It should further be pointed out that the requirement of 
an independent proceeding is not a generalization as to all 
federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship. 
Doubtless there are situations outside the probate field where 
the reverse might be held.196 Apparently what is meant is 
that, unless we lay down the requirement of an independent 
proceeding, we bring all will contest cases within the federaJ 
jurisdiction, and since it is clear that this was not the legislative 
purpose, we must lay down this special restriction as to will 
cases. 
Our final question is : How may we classify the various 
types of contest after probate ? Are they excluded from the 
federal jurisdiction by the rule which the Supreme Court of 
the United States has laid down? As to the contest on an ap­
peal with trial de novo, the decision in the case of Sutton v. 
English, supra, in which that type of contest was discussed, 
makes it clear that it is not removable. Moreover, •a contest 
which is in the nature of probate in solemn form, or of a stat­
utory proceeding to contest in the same court as that in which 
the original probate was had, would seem, under the decision 
in Farrell v. O'Brien, supra, with respect to the Washington 
procedure, to be outside the federal jurisdiction. Decisions 
of lower federal courts denying jurisdiction as to one or the 
other of these varieties of contests are found with respect to 
195 See Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., I 96 U. S. 2.39, 
2.5 S. Ct. 2. 5 1  ( I 905) ,  in which a statutory proceeding to take land by eminent 
domain was held removable ; New Orleans v. Gaines' Adm'r, I 3 8 U. S. 59 5, I I 
S. Ct. 42.8 ( I  89 I ) ,  involving a representative suit in which the court said that 
"representatives may stand upon their own citizenship in the federal courts ir­
respective of the citizenship of the persons whom they represent, - such as execu­
tors, administrators, guardians; trustees, receivers, etc." 
100 See Boom Co. v. Patterson, 9 8  U. S. 403 ( I 8 79 ) .  
THE FUNCTION OF WILL CONTESTS 739 
rontest proceedings in Arkansas/97 Indiana/98 Penn­
sylvania,199 New Hampshire,200 Maine,201 and Mississippi.202 
In the federal court for Georgia,203 the jurisdiction of the fed­
eral court was recognized in a removal of an appeal with 
trial de novo on probate in solemn form in the superior court. 
But a later decision 204 as to a Georgia contest denied removal 
where there had been no probate but only a caveat in the 
court of ordinary for the purpose of securing probate in solemn 
form. Moreover, decisions of the federal courts with respect 
to Iowa 205 and Oregon 206 contest procedure recognize fed­
eral jurisdiction ; but they, like the earlier Georgia case, were 
decided before the decision of the Supreme Court in  the case 
of Farrell v. O'Brien emphasized the requirement that the 
contest must be an independent proceeding. Where the con­
test consists of a statutory proceeding either at law or in equity 
in a higher court which is a court of general jurisdiction, the 
lower federal decisions show a still greater conflict. It is held 
that a contest under Virginia 207 or Ohio 208 procedure is not 
removable; but that a contest under Illinois 209 or New 
York 210 procedure is removable. Decisions as to the Missouri 
procedure are in conflict ; 211 but the 
.
most recent is in  favor of 
permitting removal to the federal court. However, all these 
197 Wahl v. Franz (C. C. A. 8th, r 9oo) ,  r oo F. 68o. 
198 Copeland v. Bruning (C. C. Ind. 1 896) , 72 F. 5· 
199 In re Aspinwall's Estate (C. C. Pa. 1 897 ) ,  8 3  F. 85  r .  
200 In r e  Cilley (C. C. N. H. 1 89 3 ) ,  5 8  F .  9 7 7 ·  
''" Thompson v .  Nichols ( D .  C .  Me. 1 9 1 9 ) ,  2 54 F .  973 ·  
""' In re  Armistead's Estate (D. C. Miss. 1 9 3 3 ) ,  4- F.  Supp. 6o6. 
""' Brodhead v. Shoemaker (C. C. Ga. r 890 ) ,  4-4- F. 5 r 8.  
""' Meadow v. Nash (D. C. Ga. 1 9 1 8) ,  250 F. 9 I I . 
""" Wart v. Wart (C. C. Iowa r 902) ,  r r 7 F. 766. The court termed the Iowa 
contest proceeding an "original proceeding." 
""' Richardson v. Green (C. C. A. 9th, 1 894-) , 6 r  F. 4-23. 
m Guilfoil v. Hayes (C. C. A. 4th, 1 9 36) ,  86 F. ( 2d) 544-· 
208 Reed v. Reed (C. C. Ohio r 88 7 ) ,  3 1  F. 4-9· 
200 Williams v. Crabb (C. C. A. 7th, 1 902 ) ,  1 1 7  F. 193 .  
210 McDermott v. Hannon (D. C. N. Y. 1 9 1 3 ) ,  203 F. r o r s. 
211 Not permitting removal : Oakley v. Taylor (C. C. Mo. r 894) , 64 F. 245 ; 
permitting removal : Sawyer v. White (C. C. A. 8th, 1 90 3 ) ,  x u  F. 223 .  
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decisions, except that concerning the New York procedure, 
were rendered prior to Farrell v. O'Brien, supra. The New 
York decision, rendered j ust after Farrell v. 0' Brien was 
decided, is concerned with a procedure not now existing in 
New York. 212 
In conclusion, it is reasonably clear, on the one hand, that 
contest by appeal with trial de novo, or by probate in solemn 
form, is regarded as a part of the original probate for purposes 
of federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. It 
would seem, also, that the usual statutory contest proceeding 
whether it be brought in the same court in which the probate 
proceeding was initiated, or in a higher court, is sufficiently a 
part of the original probate that the federal courts would not 
take jurisdiction.213 Certainly, the fact that a statutory con­
test is brought in the trial court of general jurisdiction or in 
chancery does not make the case removable on the ground 
of diversity of citizenship.214 On the other hand, the prac­
tically obsolete contest of a will by means of an action at law 
in the nature of ejectment, which is purely inter partes and 
has no operation in rem, could doubtless be tried in the federal 
. courts in a proper case. And the peculiar Louisiana proceed-
ing to annul probate, which seems to resemble that procedure, 
is likewise within the federal jurisdiction.215 Doubtless, a 
case such as Creek v. Laski/16 in which a legatee sued an heir 
in a tort action for wrongfully destroying an unprobated will, 
could be tried in the federal court on grounds of diversity of 
citizenship, though the due execution of the will is in issue. 
While, as has been seen, the federal decisions indicate that 
212 Since 1 9 1 4, contest after probate has not existed in New York. See p. 7 1 3 ,  
supra. 
213 This seems to be the import of the observation of the court, already quoted, 
in Ellis v. Davis, 1 09 U. S. 485 at 496, 3 S. Ct. 3 2 7  ( 1 8 8 3 ) .  
m• rn re Armistead's Estate (D. C .  Miss. 1 9 3 3 ) ,  4 F. Supp. 6o6 ; Guilfoil v. 
Hayes (C. C. A. 4th, 1 9 3 6 ) ,  86  F. (�d) 544· 
= Fakouri v. Cadais (C. C. A. 5th, 1 945) ,  147  F. (2d)  667. 
216 248 Mich. 425, '1.27 N. W. 8 1 7, 65 A. L. R. 1 1 1 3  ( 1 929) . 
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there is still some uncertainty about the statutory contest pro­
ceeding brought in a higher court than that in which the 
probate was initiated, it is believed to be a reasonable deduction 
from the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
on this subject to say this :· In most states in which a proceed­
ing to contest after probate exists, the action cannot be tried 
in the federal court on grounds of diversity of citizenship, 
because it is a part of the original proceeding to probate the 
will. 
2. Who has the affirmative of the issue? 
One question which we shall raise, only to discard, as  an 
aid in determining the character of contest after probate, is 
this : Who is plaintiff in such a contest ? Who has the affirm­
ative of the issue will or no will? The answer to this question 
should aid us in determining who has the right to open and 
close ; who has the burden of proof; and what is the relation 
between the original probate and contest after probate. 
Frequently the matter comes up in connection with instructions 
or rulings on burden of proof. Of course, general questions, 
such as whether or not mental incapacity or undue influence 
are affirmative defenses, are not relevant here. The only 
question which is related to the .nature of the contest after 
probate is this : Is there a different rule as to the burden of 
proof in a contest after probate as compared with a contest be­
fore probate? Concededly, the proponent, in the absence of a 
statute to the contrary, would have the affirmative of all issues 
which are not matters of affirmative defense, and the true 
burden of proving whatever is necessary to make out a case 
in a contest before probate. But does he still have that burden 
in a contest after probate? Is he still the plaintiff, or is the 
contestant the plaintiff? The answer in the cases is confusing 
and unsatisfactory. Often, we are not told whether burden of 
proof means burden of going forward with the evidence, or 
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the true burden of proof which Professor Wigmore has 
referred to as the risk of non-persuasion.217 Moreover, dis­
cussions of burden of proof commonly make no distinction be­
tween the situations before and after probate. Furthermore, 
statutes in a number of states produce a result which is dif­
ficult to rationalize. 
Conceivably, courts might analyze the contest after probate 
in either one of two ways. Th�y might say : this is like pro­
bate in solemn form ; the idea is that the first proof was in­
adequate and was without notice ; hence we should have, as 
completely as possible, a retrial of the issue and should make 
it correspond to the original probate as to parties and as to 
burden of proof. Thus, the proponent would still be the 
plaintiff and would have the burden of showing the due ex­
ecution of the will. Or the courts might approach the matter 
somewhat as follows : the will has already been admitted to 
probate ; any attack on the decree admitting it can be regarded 
as in the nature of a proceeding to set aside a judgment ; hence 
the contestant is plaintiff and has the burden of proving that 
the will should be set aside. In so far as it is possible to deter­
mine from the decisions, each of these two methods of ap­
proach has been followed in a number of jurisdictions.218 
217 9 WIGMORE, EviDENCE (3rd ed. 1 940) §§ 248 5-2489.  
218 Estate of Hayes, 5 5  Colo. 340, 1 3  5 P. 449 ( 1 9 1  3 )  (contestant has burden 
of proof on issues raised by him) ; Wheeler v. Rockett, 9 1  Conn. 3 8 8, 1 oo A. 1 3  
( 1 9 1  7 )  (proponent has burden of proof) ; Mobley v. Lyon, 1 34 Ga. 1 2  5, 67 S. 
E. 668 ( 1 909) (proponent has burden of proof) ; Miller v. Blumenshine, 343 
Ill. 53 1, 1 7 5 N. E. 8 14 ( 1 9 3 1 )  (burden of proof does not shift from proponents 
to contestants) ;  Pepper v. Martin, 1 7 5  Ind. 5 8o, 92 N. E. 7 7 7  ( 1 9 10 )  (con­
testants have burden of proof) ; Convey v. Murphy, I46 Iowa I 54, I 24 N. E. 
I o7 3 ( I  91 o) (contestant has burden of proof, the contest is an independent ac­
tion) ; Taff v. Hosmer, I4  Mich. 309 ( 1 866) (proponent has burden of proof) ; 
but see In re Reed's Estate, 273  Mich. 3 34, 263  N. W. 7 6  ( I 9 3 5 ) ; Isom v. 
Canedy, I Z8 Miss. 64, 8 8  So. 485  ( I 92 I )  (proponent has burden of proof) ; 
Rock v. Keller, 3 1 2  Mo. 458, 2 7 8  S. W. 759 ( 1 9 26) (proponent has burden of 
proof) ; In re Estate of Bayer, I 19 Neb. 1 9 I 1  227 N. W. 928 ( 1 929)  (on appeal 
with trial de novo, burden of proof is on proponent) ; Patten v. Cilley, 67 N. H. 
520, 4 2  A. · 47 ( r 89 3 )  (proponent has burden of proof) ; In re Sturtevant's 
Estate, 9 2  Ore. 2 69, 1 78 P. 1 92 ( 1 9 1 9 )  (proponent must reprobate the will by 
original proof) ; Renn v. Samos, 3 3  Tex. 760 ( 1 87 1 )  (contestant has burden 
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There seems to be also a third approach found in statements 
'of the courts to the effect that the proponent must make a 
prima facie case by proving formal execution of the will, after 
which the contestant has the burden of proving all his grounds 
of contest. 219 The latter approach is inconsistent with the 
proposition that the true burden of proof never shifts ; and it 
is not clear that, in the absence of statute, these statements are 
meant to deny that proposition.220 
A few illustrations will demonstrate how little relation 
exists between the decisions on such questions as burden of 
proof and right to open and close and the question of the true 
function of contest after probate. • 
In the contest after probate in Missouri, the contestant is 
referred to as plaintiff and the proponent as defendant. Yet 
it is held that the proponent has the true burden of proof and 
the right to open and close. 221 On the other hand in Ohio 
the cases indicate that the contestant has the burden of proof 222 
and that "in order to set aside a will the evidence adduced in 
the . case against the will must outweigh both the evidence 
adduced in favor of the will and the presumption arising from 
of proof) ; Williams v. Robinson, 42 Vt. 658  ( r 87o) (on appeal with trial de 
novo, burden of proof is on proponent, as if the proceeding were commenced in 
that court) ; Dickens v. Bonnewell, r 6o Va. 1 94, r68  S. E. 6 1 0  ( r 9 3 3 )  (pro­
. ponent has burden of proof) ; In re Estate of McKachney, 1 4 3  Wash. z 8, 2 54 P. 
455 ( 1 9 2 7 )  (contestant has burden of proof, as provided by Wash. Rev. Stat. 
( 1 93 2) § 1 3 8 7 ) ; Kerr v. Lunsford, 3 1  W. Va. 659 ( 1 8 8 8 )  (proponent has 
bun;len of proof) . 
:n• Fernstrom v. Taylor, 107  Fla. 490 at 494, 1 45 So. zo8 ( r 93 3) ; May v. 
May, 1 7  5 Ga. 693, 1 65 S. E. 6 1 7  ( 1 9 3 2 ) ; but see Mobley v. Lyon, 1 34 Ga. 1 25, 
67 S. E. 668  ( 1 909) ; In re Estate of Wallace, 1 5 8 Kan. 633, 1 49 P. (2d) 595  
( 1 944) ; Brehony v .  Brehony, 2 89 Pa. 267 ,  1 37  A. z6o  ( 1 927) ; see also cases 
under the California type of statute, discussed infra. See annotation, 76  A. L. 
R. 3 7 3 · 
220 To the effect that the burden of proof may be said to shift in certain ex­
ceptional situations, see Morgan, "Some Observations Concerning Presumptions," 
44 HARV. L. REV. 906 ( 193 1 ) .  
ll21 Morrow v. Board of Trustees of Park College (Mo. 1 944) , 1 8 1  S .  W. (zd) 
945· · 
""' McFarland v. Clark, 8 Ohio App. p6 at 3 3 1  ( 1 9 1 8 ) .  In general, see cases 
to this effect cited in DEIBEL, OHIO PROBATE LAW ( 1 936) 622 .  
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the order of the probate court admitting the will to probate as 
the valid last will and testament of the testator." 223 Yet the 
Ohio statutes on will contest include the following pro­
vision : 224 "The party sustaining the will shall be entitled to 
open and close the evidence and argument. He must offer 
the will and probate, and rest. The opposite party then shall 
offer his evidence ; the party sustaining the will then must offer 
his other evidence. Rebutting evidence may be offered as in 
other cases." While this statute is primarily concerned with 
the burden of going forward with the evidence, it would seem 
also to indicate a view as to the party who has the affirmative 
of the issue, which is har" to reconcile with some of the ju­
dicial pronouncements. 
One would suppose that, where contest after probate con­
sists in probate in solemn form, the proponent would always 
have the affirmative of the issue. In South Carolina the 
proponent is the petitioner and presumably would have the 
burden of proof,225 but the Maryland court has indicated that 
the caveator is plaintiff.226 In Virginia the court has held that 
the burden is on the proponent in a proceeding on the issue 
devisavit vel no·n/21 it being suggested that the analogous 
English proceeding to determine title to land in an action of 
ejectment would place the burden on the devisee. 
The most extraordinary situation is found in California and 
other states which have enacted similar provisions as to will 
contests. A provision found in the codes of these states is to the 
effect that "the contestant is plaintiff and the petitioner is 
defendant." 228 It should be observed that this provision ap-
223 Van Demark v. Tompkins, 1 2 1 Ohio St. 1 29 at 1 3 3 ,  1 6 7  N. E. 3 70  ( 1 929) . 
224 0hio Gen. Code (Page, I 9 3 7 ) § 1 2085 .  
""' Mordecai v.  Canty, 86  S. C.  470, 68 S .  E. 1049 ( 1 9 10) . 
"'"' Townshend v. Townshend, 7 Gill. ( 32  Md.) 1 0  ( 1 84 8 ) .  
227 Dickens v. Bonn ewell, I 6 o  Va. I 94, I 68 S .  E .  6I  o ( I 9 3 3 ) .  
228 Cal. Pro b. Code Ann. (Deering, I 944) § 3 7 I .  This section appears in the 
chapter on contest before probate, but see also Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 
I 944) § 3 8 2, providing that proceedings on a contest after probate are to be had 
"as in the case of a contest before · probate." 
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plies equally to contest before probate and to contest after 
probate. Hence, if taken literally one might reach the absurd 
conclusion that, if no evidence at all were introduced at the 
contest before probate, the will would in all cases be admitted 
to probate. In order to avoid such a conclusion, the California 
courts have held that there are two separate proceedings in 
the hearing on the will before probate ; there is an ex parte 
proceeding in which the proponent has the burden of proof 
and there is at the same time the contest in which the con­
testant has the burden of proof. In Estate of Relph/29 the 
court stated this doctrine in these words : "When a will is 
contested before probate there are two separate and distinct 
proceedings pending before the court. · One is the petition 
for the probate of the will ; the other is the contest �f the pro­
bate of the will. . . . The petitioner or proponent appears 
therein as plaintiff and tenders to all of the world all of the 
issues of fact relevant to the ultimate question of the validity of 
the will. While all persons interested in the estate are in a 
sense parties defendant thereto, there are no defendants in the 
sense of active parties litigant in this proceeding. It is in a sense 
an ex parte proceeding, in which the burden rests upon the 
petitioner to prove all the material allegations of his petition. 
. . . The contest of a will, on the other hand, while a pro­
ceeding in rem, is at the same time an adversary proceeding. 
. . . The only issues of fact involved therein are those which 
are framed by the allegations of the contest and the denials 
of the answer. . . . As to those issues the burden of proof 
rests upon the contestants. " Like conclusions are 
reached by the courts of other states which follow the Cali­
fornia type of statute just quoted.230 It is not easy, however, 
,.,. 1 92 Cal. 45 1 at 458, 2 2 1  P. 36 r  ( r 9 2 3 ) . 
230 Head v. Nixon, 22 Idaho 765, 1 2 8  P. 557  ( 1 9 1 2 ) ; In re Bragg's Estate, 
1 06 Mont. r p, 7 6  P. (zd) 5 7  ( 1 9 3 8 ) ; In re Hanson's Will, so Utah 207, r 67 
P. 256  ( 1 9 1 7 ) ; Wood v. Wood, 2 5  Wyo. z 6, 1 64 P. 844 ( 1 9 1 7 ) (the Wyoming 
statute does not state that the contestant is plaintiff) . See also r BANCROFT's PRo­
BATE PRACTICE ( 1 928) § 204, 
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to give a rational explanation of such legislation. As the 
California court observed in its opinion in Estate of Latour/31 
"We are unable to see any good reason for our somewhat 
peculiar statutory provisions so far as a contest before probate 
is concerned, but we must take the law as we find it." 
J. Effect of prior decree admitting V.)ill to probate 
Whether the prior decree admitting the will to prClbate is 
to be regarded as competent evidence in a contest after probate 
is believed to be of some significance in determining the char­
acter of that contest. If the contest is to be regarded as es­
sentially a retrial of the issue of will or no will, then the decree 
on the former hearing would not be admissible. On the other 
hand, if the contest after probate is essentially a proceeding 
to set aside a perfectly valid decree, then we may admit that 
decree as evidence of the due execution of the will. Of course, 
as pointed out by the North Carolina court/32 the fact that a 
statute declares that the decree in the first probate is "con­
clusive in evidence of the validity of the will" can have ap­
plication only to a collateral attack on the will and not to the 
contest after probate, which is a direct attack. 
In the absence of statute, courts have generally held that the 
decree admitting the will to probate is not admissible. 233 The 
argument against admitting the decree is particularly strong 
where the hearing on the original probate was ex parte or 
was without notice to interested parties. As was observed by 
the North Carolina court, 234 "The proceedings in common 
231 q.o Cal. 4I 4 at 42 I , 7 3 P. I 070, 74 P. 44I ( I 90J ) .  
232 Wells v. Odum, 205 N. C. I I o  at r I r ,  I 70 S. E. 145 ( 1 9 3 3 ) .  
""' Craig v. Southard, 148 Ill. 3 7, 3 5  N .  E. 3 6 1  ( 1 8 93 ) ; Davis v. Upson, 209 
Ill. 2o6, 7 0  N. E. 602 ( 1 904) ; Edwards v. Gaulding, 38 Miss. I I 8  ( r 859)  
(now overruled by statute) ; Wells v .  Odum, 205 N. C. I I o, qo S .  E .  1 45 
( r 9 3 3 ) ; In re Will of Williams, 2 1 5  N. C. 259, I S. E. (2d) 8 5 7  ( r 9 39 ) ; 
Dickens v. Bonnewell, I 6o  Va. 1 94, 1 6 8  S. E. 6 ro  ( 1 9 3 3 ) . Contra : In re 
Estate of Holloway, 1 95 Cal. 7 1  r, 2 3 5  P. r o r z  ( r  92 5 ) .  See also Frazie's Execu­
trix v. Frazie, r 86 Ky. 6 1 3  at 623,  2 1 7  S; W. 668 ( 1 9 1 9 ) .  
"'• I n  re Will of Chisman, 1 75 N. C. 420 at 42 1 ,  95  S .  E .  7 6 9  ( r 9 r 8) . 
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form before the clerk are ex parte, and not binding on the 
caveators, who were not parties." In a few states statutes 
expressly provide that the decree admitting the will to probate 
is evidence to prove the due execution of the will in the contest 
after probate. 235 Perhaps, also, the California statute making 
the contestant the plaintiff, may have that effect.236 
The precise question here considered should be distinguished 
from the question whether the testimony of the subscribing 
witnesses as given in the original hearing can. be introduced in 
the contest after probate. A number of statutes do allow the 
admission of such evidence/37 although most of them restrict 
it to cases where the witnesses are not available in the proceed­
ing before probate. It is interesting to note that, in at least 
two states, it has been held that a statute permitting the intro­
duction of the testimony of subscribing witnesses as given on 
the original probate should not be construed to permit the 
introduction of the decree admitting the will to probate. 238 
The reason apparently was that the contest was a retrial of the 
issue as far as possible, and that to inform the jury of the 
decree in the former hearing would be unduly prejudicial 
to the contestants. 
235 Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 507 ; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 9 3 7 )  § 1 208 3 ;  Wash. 
Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 3 2 )  § 1 3 87 .  
""" In re  Estate of Holloway, 1 95 Cal. 7 I I , 235  P.  1 0 1 2  ( 1 92 5 ) . 
= Ala. Code ( 1 940) t. 6 1 ,  § 6 7 ;  Ariz. Code ( 1 939) § 3 8-2 1 2 ;  Ark. Dig. 
Stat. ( 1 9 3 7 )  § 1 4 5 39 ;  Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 3 7 4 ;  Idaho 
Laws Ann. ( 1 94 3 )  § 1 5-2 1 7 ;  Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 941 ) c. 3, § 223 ; 
Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1 9 3 3 )  § 7-6o2 ;  Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) § 3 94.2 70 ;  Miss. Code 
( 1 942)  § so& ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942)  § 541 ; Mont. Rev. Code ( 1 9 3 5 )  
§ 1 00 3 6 ;  Nev. Comp. Laws (Su�p. 1 94 1 )  § 9 882 .2 1 ;  N. M.  Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  § p-
209 ; N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1 943) § 3 1-3 5 ;  N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943) § 3 o-o6o6 ;  
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1 9 37)  § 1 2084 ; Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t .  5 8 , § 44 ; S . D. 
Code ( 1 939 )  § 3 5.0304 ; Utah Code ( 1 94 3 )  § 1 02-3-9 ; Va. Code ( 1 942)  
§ 526 1 ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 3 1 )  § 8 8-6o6.  All of these states except Alabama 
and Illinois limit the use of such testimony to cases where the witness is unavailable 
for stated reasons ; in these two states, however, the testimony can apparently be 
used regardless of the availability of the witness. 
038 Craig v. Southard, 1 48 Ill. 3 7, 3 5 N. E. 3 6 1  ( I 89 3 )  ; Dickens v. Bonnewell, 
I 6o Va. 1 94, 1 6 8  S. E. 6 1 0  ( 1 9 3 3 ) .  See also Kay v. Elston, 205 Ala. 307, 8 7  
So. 5 2 5  ( 1 9 20) . 
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4· Jury trial in contest after probate 
While it is generally held that the constitutional right to 
jury trial does not include a j ury in a will contest,239 the stat­
utes of a majority of the states do give the right to a jury trial 
in such a proceeding.240 Sometimes it is provided that a jury 
trial may be had either in contest before probate or in contest 
after probate, but not in both contests .241 Sometimes, though 
the provision for contest after probate calls for trial before a 
court, a jury trial may be had on an appeal with trial de 
novo.242 In a few states a jury trial cannot be had as a matter 
of right ; 243 and it is interesting to note that among these are 
239 Cummins v. Cummins, r Marv. ( r s  Del.) 423, 3 1  A. 8 r 6  ( r 895 ) ; Wain­
wright v. Bartlett, 5 1  Nev. r 7o, 27 1  P. 689 ( 1 928 ) ; Fleming's Estate, 265 Pa. 
3 99> r o9 A. 265 ( r 9 r 9 ) ; State v. Nieuwenhuis, 49. S. D. r 8 r , 207 N. W. 77  
( 1 926) ; Will of  Weidman, r 89 Wis. 3 1 8, 207 N. W.  950 ( 1 926) . See annota­
tion in 62 A. L. R. 82 .  
240 Ala. Code ( 1 940) t. 6 r ,  §§ 52 , 63 ,  6? ;  Ariz. Code ( 1 9 3 9) §§ 3 8-z ro, 3 8-
2 I I 1 3 8-2 r 8 ;  Ark. Dig. Stat. ( 1 9 3 7 ) §§ 14543, 14545 ; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. 
(Deering, 1 944) §§ 3 7 1 ,  3 8 2 ;  Colo. Stat. ( 1 935 ) c. 1 76, § 63 ; Del. Rev. Code 
( 1 9 3 5 ) § 3 802 (register "shall have power" to order a j ury) ; D. C. Code 
( 1 940) § I 9-3 I 2 j  Idaho Laws Ann. ( 1 943 ) §§ r s-2 1 3, I S-2 14, r s-zz6 ;  Ill. 
Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1 94 1 ) c. 3, § 244 ; Iowa Code ( 1 9 3 9 ) § r r 864; Kan. 
Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943 ) §§ 59-2 2 1 2, 5 9-2408 (amended Laws 1 945, c. 23 7) (no 
jury unless court calls one in an advisory capacity) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) 
§§ 3 94.260, 3 94.290 ;  Me. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) c. 140, § 3 7  (jury "may" be 
ordered) ; Mass. Ann. J;.aws ( 1 93 2) c. 2 1 5, § r 6  (issues "may" be sent to superior 
court for trial by jury) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. ( 1 943 ) § 27 .3 1 78 (42 ) ; Minn. Stat. 
( 1 94 1 ) § 525 .72 (no .jury unless court orders one) ; Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 503 ; 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1 942 and Supp. 1 945 ) §§ 5 3 8, 5 3 9 ; Mont. Rev. Code 
1 9 3 5 ) §§ 1 0032, 1 0045 ; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1 94 1 ) §§ 9882 . 1 8, 9 882.24 ; 
N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1 942) c. 3 65, § r r ;  N. ]. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 3 7 ) §§ 3 :2-3 1 , 3 :2-
3 3 ;  N. M. Stat. ( 1 94 1 ) § 3 2-2 r o ;  N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, § 147 ; Ohio Gen. Code 
(Page, Supp. 1 945) § 1 2082 ;  Okla. Stat. ( r 94r ) t. 5 8, § 7 3 5  (discretionary) ; 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1 944) t, 20, § 1961 ; R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 9 3 8) 
c. 5 73, § 4 ;  S. D. Code ( 1 93 9 ) § 35 .2 1 r r ;  Te11n. Code (Michie, 1 9 3 8 ) § 8 r  r o ;  
Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 9 3 3 ) § §  3003, 3 0 1 6  (amended Laws 1 94 1 ,  No. 42 ) ; Va. Code 
( 1 942 ) § 525 7 ;  W. Va. Code ( 1 943 ) § 4068 ;  Wis. Stat. ( 1 943 ) § 324- 1 7 ;  
Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 3 1 ) § 88-6o2. 
241 Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) §§ 3 7 1 ,  3 8 2. 
""' S. D. Code ( 1 9 3 9) § J5 .2 r r r .  
""' Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1 943 ) § §  5 9-22 1 2, 59-2408 (amended Laws 1 945, 
c. 2 3 7) ; Bell v. Skinner, 1 1 9  Kan,. 286 , 2 3 9  P. 965 ( 1 925) ; Maddy v. Hock, 
1 34 Kan. r s, 4 P. (2d) 408 ( 1 9 3 1 ) ; Minn. Stat. ( r 94 1 ) § 5 25 .7 2 ;  Okla. Stat. 
(r 94 1 ) t. 58, § 735 ; In re DeVine's Estate, r 8 8  Okla. 423, 1 09 P. (2d) ro78  
( 1 94 1 ) . 
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two states which have recently revised completely their pro­
bate codes, namely Minnesota and Kansas. 
One may well inquire why the jury trial in will contest 
cases is so universal in the United States in view of the fact 
that no such procedure was followed by the English ecclesiasti­
cal courts, on which to some extent our probate procedure is 
modeled. The answer would seem to be that, when wills in­
volving land came to be probated in this country j ust as wills 
of personalty, it was felt that the jury trial, which was always 
assured in an action of ejectment in England to try title to 
devised land, should be incorporated into our probate pro­
cedure. It will be recalled that, though English chancery 
sometimes compelled heirs and devisees to conduct a contest 
in a common law court to determine the validity of a devi�e 
of land, the chancellor did not undertake to override the 
institution of jury trial in the common law court. If the jury 
in the action of ejectment on feigned issues did not reach a 
result pleasing to the chancellor, he did not undertake to 
decide the facts himself, but sent the case back to the common 
law court for another trial by another jury.244 
In this country a variety of answers can be made to the ques­
tion, what kind of jury trial is provided for in a contest. Some­
times the conclusion of the courts is that a common law j ury 
trial has been provided; 245 sometimes that a trial before an 
equity j ury is called for and that therefore the verdict is purely 
advisory.246 It has also been said that the statutory provisions 
"" Pemberton v. Pemberton, I J  Vesey 290  ( r 8o7 ) .  After three juries had 
found in favor of the will, the court refused to direct a fourth trial, saying that 
if a fourth trial should result in a verdict against the will he would have to direct 
a fifth trial. 
... Lambert v. Foley, 2 3 7  Ala. 1 3 1 ,  1 86 So. 1 3 8  ( 1 939 ) ; Estate of Green, 2 5  
Cal. (2d) 5 3 5, 1 54 P. (2d) 6 9 2  ( 1 944) ; Smith v .  Henline, 1 74 Ill. 1 84, 5 1  N. 
E. 227 ( r 89 8 ) ; Beatty v. Caldwell, 2 1 0  Ky. 5 59, 276  S. W. 547 ( 1 9 2 5 ) ; Struth 
v. Decker, r o 2  Md. 496 at soo, 6 2  A. 709 ( r 9o6) ; Dowling v. Luisetti, 3 5 1  
Mo. 5 14, 1 7 3 S .  W. (2d) 3 8 1  ( 1 943 ) ; Barnes v. Bess, 1 7 1  Va. r ,  1 97 S .  E. 403 
( 1 9 3 8 )  (devisavit vel non) . 
""' Cummins v. Cummins, r Marvel ( 1 5  Del.) 423, 3 1  A. 8 r 6  ( r 8 9  5) ; Maddy 
v. Hock, 1 34 Kan. 1 5, 4 P. (2d) 408 ( 1 93 1 ) ; Hannon v. Gorman, 296  Mass. 
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for jury trial preserve the historical situation just described 
in which a court of equity sends the issue of devisavit vel non 
to the law court to be tried. 247 If that be true, the court may 
or may not accept the finding of the jury; but if it does not, 
then the case must be tried before another jury. Essentially, 
however, it is regarded as a common law jury trial. 
One may well conclude that the retention of jury trial as a 
matter of right in will contests is largely due to historical rea­
sons. But the issues of fact would seem to be of a sort which 
could better be-dealt with by a court than by a jury. 
5· Time limitations on contest after probate 
.C.Statutory provisions limiting the time within which a con­
test can be initiated are practically universaJ.248 The time 
437, 6 N. E. (zd) 433  ( 1 9 3 7 ) ; Wainwright v. Bartlett, 5 1  Nev. 1 70, 
2 7 1  P. 689  ( r 928 ) ; In re DeVine's Estate, r 8 8 Okla. 423, 1 09 P. (zd) 1 078  
( 1 94 1 ) ;  Keller v .  Lawson, 26 1  Pa. 489, 1 04 A. 6 7 8  ( r 9 r 8 ) ; State v .  Nieuwen­
huis, 49 S. D. r 8 r ,  207 N. W. 77 ( r 926) ; Redford v. Booker, r 66 Va. 5 6 r ,  r 8 5  
S .  E. 8 79  ( 1 936)  (distinguishing a n  issue out of chancery from an action of 
devisavit vel non) ; In re Jolly's Estate, 1 97 Wash. 3 49, 85 P. (2d) 267  ( r 9 3 8 ) ; 
Will of Weidman, r 8 9  Wis. 3 1 8, 207  N. W. 950 ( 1 926)  . 
.., In re Gleason, 96 Misc. 3 9 7, r 6o N. Y. S. 220 ( r 9 r 6 ) ; In re Barlow's Will, 
r 8o App. Div. 86o, r 68 N. Y. S. 1 3 1  ( 1 9 1 7 ) .  
248 I n  the following list the period given is that for contest after probate unless 
otherwise stated ; in states having both contest after probate and appeal with trial 
de novo, only the former period is given unless otherwise indicated. Ala. Code 
( 1 940) t. 6 r ,  §§ 64, 66  (six months ; and if no contest has been had, infants and 
persons of unsound mind have r 2 months after a gu:.rdian is appointed or disa­
bilities removed, but in no case over twenty years) ; Ariz. Code ( 1 939)  §§ 3 8-
2 r 6, 3 8-22 1  (one year ; infants and persons of unsound mind have one year after 
removal of disability) ; Ark. Laws 1 941 ,  Act 401  (appears in Ark. Dig. Stat. 
(Supp. 1 944) at p. 5 5 3 )  (six months after a probate without notice) ; Ark. Dig. 
Stat. ( r 93 7 )  § r 4545 (persons not personally served may contest in chancery 
within three years, and infant not a party to such a suit is not bound until twelve 
months after attaining majority) ; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, r 944) §§ 3 8o, 
3 84 (six months ; infants and persons of unsound mind who were not parties to 
the proceeding have six months after removal of disability) ; Colo. Stat. ( 1 9 3 5 )  
c .  r 76, § 65  ( a  person not summoned o n  the probate has one year t o  contest ; in­
fants and persons non compos mentis have one year after removal of disability) ; 
Conn. Gen. Stat. ( 1 930)  §§ 499 1 , 4992 (amended Supp. 1 9 3 9, § I J06e) (appeal 
with trial de novo : one month, or twelve months for persons who had no notice ; 
minors have twelve months after attaining majority) ; Del. Rev. Code ( r 9 3 5 )  
§ 3 8 o r  (one year) ; D .  C .  Code ( 1 940) § 1 9-309 (three months for a will of 
personalty ; one year for a will of realty · as to persons actually served or per-
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limitation for contest after probate designated as such runs 
from a period under twelve months in most of the states in 
the California group to seven years in some of the southern 
states. As might ·be expected, the period in which a contest 
sonally appearing, and two years as to other persons ; minors have one year after 
attaining majority) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. ( I 94 I )  § 732.30 (any time befqre final 
discharge of the personal representative) ; Ga. Code ( I 936)  § I  I 3-605 (seven 
years ; minors have four years after attaining majority, but a contest by a minor 
after the general period of limitation does not affect any rights other than the 
minor's) ; Idaho Laws Ann. ( I 943)  §§ I 5-223, I 5-229  (the first section states 
a limitation of four months ; the second allows eight months, and infants and 
persons of unsound mind have eight months after removal of disability) ; Ill. 
Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, I 94 I )  c. 3, § 242 (nine months) ; Ind. Stat. (Burns, 
Supp. I 943 )  § 7-504 (one year after the will is offered for probate ; infants, 
persons of unsound mind and persons absent from the state have three years after 
the will is offered for probate) ; Iowa Code ( I 939)  § I  I oo7, subd. 3 (two years 
from the time the will is filed in the clerk's office and notice thereof is given ; but 
if after probate the executor causes personal notice of the probate to be served, the 
limitation is one year after such service) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. I 943 ) § 59-
2404 (amended Laws I 945, c. 2 3 7 )  (appeal with trial de novo : nine months) ; 
Ky. Rev. Stat. ( I 944) §§ 394.240, 3 94.280 (appeal with trial de novo : five 
years ; a person residing out of the state and proceeded against by warning order 
only, and a person not having personal service and not appearing, may petition 
in equity within three years after the decision on appeal ; infants have twelve 
months after attaining majority to bring a similar action ; these equity actions 
operate no further than necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiff) ; Me. Rev. 
Stat. ( I 944) c. I 4o, § 3 2  (appeal with trial de novo : twenty days; a person 
beyond the sea or out of the United States, with no attorney in the state has twenty 
days after his return or appointment of an attorney) ; Md. Code ( I 9 39)  art. 93 ,  
§ 357  (one year) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. ( I 943)  §§ 27 .3 I 7 8 (36 ) ,  27 .3 I 78 (45)  (ap� 
peal with trial de novo : twenty days, and court may extend for an additional 
forty days ; a person out of the United States at the time of the decree has three 
months after his return, if within two years after the decree and administration 
has not been completed) ; Minn. Stat. ( I 94 I )  § 525.7 I Z  (appeal with trial de 
n�vo : thirty days after service of notice of filing the order appealed from, or six 
months in the absence of such notice) ; Miss. Code ( 1 942) § 505 (two years ; in­
fants and persons of unsound mind have two years after removal of disability) ; 
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ( I 942 and Supp. I 945)  §§ 5 38, 540 (one year ; infants and 
persons of unsound mind have one year after removal of disabilities) ; Mont. 
Rev. Code (I 9 3 5 )  §§ I 0042, I oo48 (one year ; infants and persons of unsound 
mind have one year after removal of disabilities) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. ( I 943)  § 30-
I 6o2 (appeal with trial de novo : thirty days) ; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. I 94 I )  
§ 9882 . 22  (three months) ; N. H.  Rev. Laws ( I 942) c. J S I ,  § §  7 ,  9 (one year, if 
no appeal has been prosecuted ; infants, insane persons or those out of the United 
States have one year after removal of disability) ; N. J. Rev. Stat. ( I  9 3 7) § 3 :2-
52 (appeal, which may be de novo : three months, or six months if the appellant 
resided out of the state at the time of death of the testator) ; N. M. Stat. ( I  94 I 
and Supp. I 945)  §§ 32-2 1 2, J 2>2 I 5, p-220 (six months for contest in the 
probate court ; three months for appeal to the district court with trial de novo) ; 
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( I 943)  § 3 I-32 (seven years ; minors, insane and imprisoned 
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may be had in the form of an appeal with trial de novo is 
usually very short. While it may not at first be entirely ap­
parent why it is true, it would seem that the length of the 
period in which the contest may be brought has a direct rela­
tion to the function of contest after probate. If the period is 
short, we may expect to have the contest before final distribu­
tion in practically all cases. And if, also, the final order of 
distribution is the significant decree in determining the suc­
cessors in interest to the title of the decedent, then we can 
have no questions about the rights of persons claiming under 
the first probate.249 The contest would be regarded as a com-
persons have three years after removal of disability) ; N. D. Rev. Code ( I  943 ) 
§ 3o-o6o& (one year) ; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, I 9 3  7 and Supp. I 945) §§ I 0504-
3 2, 1 2087  (six months ; persons under disability have six months after removal 
of disability, but bona fide purchasers not affected) ; Okla. Stat. ( I 94 I )  t. 5 8, 
§§ 6 I ,  67 (one year ; infants and persons of unsound mind have one year after 
removal of disability) ; Ore. Comp. Laws ( I 940) § 1 9-208 (amended Laws 
1 945, c. I 8 5) (six months after entry of court order in court journal ; persons 
under disability have six months after removal of disability) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. 
(Purdon, 1 930) t. zo, § zoos (appeal with trial de novo : two years, but the 
court may cite anyone to show cause why he should not appeal within six months 
from the date of such citation) ; R. I. Gen. Laws ( 1 9 3 8) c. 5 7  3, § I (appeal with 
trial de novo : forty days) ; S. C. Code ( I 942) § 8932, subd. 3 (one year; in­
fants have one year after removal of disability) ; S. D. Code ( I 939)  §§ 35.0306, 
35 .0 3 1 2  (one year ; infants and persons of unsound mind have one year after 
removal of disability) ; Tenn. Code (Michie, I 93 8) §§ 8 I 1 2, 8 5 74 (seven years ; 
infants and persons of unsound mind have three years from removal of disa­
bility) ; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1 94 I )  art. 5534 (contest : four years) ; 
Tex. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 332  (appeal with trial de novo : fifteen days) ; Utah 
Code (Supp. I 945) § 1 02-3-1 2  (six months) ; Vt. Pub. Laws ( 1 93 3 )  § 3005 
(appeal with trial de novo : twenty days) ; Va. Code ( 1 942)  §§  5259, sz6o (one 
year ; infants and persons of unsound mind have one year after removal of dis­
ability; persons residing out of the state or notified only by publication have two 
years after the order appealed from) ; Wash. Rev. Stat. ( 1 9 32) § 1 3 85  (six 
months) ; W. Va. Code ( I 943)  §§ 407 I ,  4072 (two years ; infants, convicts and 
insane persons have one year after removal of disability ; persons residing out of 
the state or proceeded against by publication have two years after the order ap­
pealed from) ; Wis. Stat. ( I 943)  § 324.01 (appeal with trial de novo in counties 
under 1 5,ooo population : sixty days) ; Wyo. Rev. Stat. ( 1 93 1 )  §§ 8 8-7011 8 8-
707 (amended Laws 1 945, c. 3 and 52) (six months) . 
... Since it is generally the law i:hat the personal representative has title to 
personalty of the estate, a distribution of personalty by him under a decree ad­
mitting a will to probate or ordering distribution of the estate wou1d clearly pass 
title. If, however, the subject matter in question is land, the heir or devisee 
would have title. If the order admitting the will to probate is the significant 
order, a difficult question arises as to whether a bona fide purchaser from the dev-
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plete retrial of the issue, and would supersede the decree in 
the first probate. But no real hardship would result because 
no decree of distribution would be made prior to the contest. 
If the period is long, we may still look upon the contest as a 
retrial of the issue as did the English lawyers with respect to 
the probate in solemn form in the ecclesiastical courts ; 250 but, 
on the other hand, modern demands for a speedy, final distri­
bution are likely to result in having the contest treated as a 
kind of proceeding to set aside a valid judgment. Thus a 
bona fide purchaser from a distributee under the original pro­
bate may well be protected even though the property in­
volved is land.251 
· One of the most readily discernible trends in will contest 
legislation is the tendency to shorten the period of limitation. 
Thus the California type of legislation, which originally pro­
vided for a time limitation of one year /52 has been changed to 
provide for a limitation of six months in California and Utah, 
and three months in Nevada. Virginia, which at one time 
imposed a limitation period of seven years,253 now provides 
for a period of one year in most cases. 
In most of the statutes, the period of limitation is extended 
for the benefit of persons under a disability, though in a few 
no such exception exists. Such provisions have been a source 
of litigation. Some courts have concluded that the revocation 
of probate on the petition of a contestant who was under a 
disability after the general limitation period had elapsed 
would apply only to the person who had been under a dis-
isee is protected, when, on a contest, probate is thereafter revoked. See 3 6 
MicH. L. REV. 1 2 0 ( r 9 3 7 ) .  If, however, the significant decree which confirms 
the title of the devisee is the order of distribution, and if contest takes plllfe before 
the order of distribution, this problem does not arise, 
""" In the ecclesiastical courts the period for instituting probate in solemn form 
was probably thirty years after probate in common form. See note 3, supra. 
251 See 3 6 MICH. L. REv. no ( I  9 3 7) and note 249, supra. 
= see note 1 07, supra • 
... See note 641 supra. 
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ability. 254 Thus we would have the surprising conclusion 
that, though in general the contest proceeding is in rem,255 
the will is held valid as to some persons and void as to others. 
Other courts have reached the more rational conclusion that, 
if the will is set aside after the general limitation period has 
expired, it is nevertheless set aside as to all interested 
persons. 256 
In discussing time limitations, it should not be ·overlooked 
that in many states an after discovered will can be produced 
after the statutory period of limitation has expired/57 since 
the probate of the after discovered will is not regarded as a 
. cqntest within the meaning of the statute. Indeed, in some 
states the production of an after discovered will is expressly 
excepted from the operation of the limitation statute.258 
Without going into this problem to any extent, it may be ob­
served that the production of an after discovered will should 
be considered a contest. Since a probate should determine 
that the instrument is the l�st will of the testator, the probate 
of a later will is a contest of the first probate. Moreover, no 
good reason is perceived why the production of an after dis­
covered will should be treated differently from any other after 
discovered evidence. It is true, wills are frequently concealed 
and cannot be found at the time of the first hearing, but so is 
other evidence. In some jurisdictions the contest statute ex­
pressly applies to the· production of an after discovered will, 
and the time limitation, therefore, is also applicable. 259 
""' Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Superior Court, 2 1  Cal. App. (2d) 5 5 1 ,  
69 P .  (2d) 92 1  ( 1 9 3 7) ; Spencer v. Spencer, 3 1  Mont. 6 3 1 ,  7 9  P .  3 20 ( 1 905) . 
See also Ga. Code ( 1 9 3 6) § 1 1 J-6o5 ; Ky. Rev. Stat. ( 1 944) § 394.280. 
255 See Simes, "The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in 
Rem," 43 MICH. L. REv. 675 at 6 8o ( 1 945) . 
""' Mc(;:ann v. Ellis, 1 72 Ala. 6o, 55 So. 303 ( 1 9 1 1 ) .  
257 See Appendix note for § 73, p .  275, supra. Abdill v. Abdill, 295 Ill. 40, 1 2 8  
N .  E .  741 ( 1 920) ; Waters v. Stickney, 1 2  Allen (94 Mass.) 1 ,  9 0  Am. Dec. 1 2 2  
( 1 866) ; In re Elliott's Estate (Wash., 1 945) 1 5 6  P .  (2d) 427 .  
258 Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (Deering, 1 944) § 3 8 5 ;  Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 
1 94 1 )  § 9 8 82.27· 
""' N. D. Rev. Code ( 1 943)  § 3 o-o6o8 ;  Okla. Stat. ( 1 94 1 )  t. 5 8, § 6 1 ; S. D. 
Code ( 1 939) § J5.03o6. 
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VII. CoNcLusiON : IM PROVING AM ERICAN TYPES oF 
CoNTESTs ; RECOM MENDED LEGISLATION 
We have seen that in a considerable number of states the 
will contest after probate constitutes a procedural anomaly : 
legislators do not appear to have realized whence it came nor 
whither it is going. Adapting the English probate in solemn 
form, they have added provisions for notice before probate 
and sometimes also provisions for an appeal with trial de novo 
after probate. Thus they have permitted two, or even three, 
contests although notice to interested parties is given prior to 
the first contest. In so doing, they appear to have lost sight 
of the only reason justifying a contest after probate, the ab­
sence of notice and the summary character of the first probate. 
Whether we should provide for contest after probate in 
any case will depend, then, upon whether we desire to permit 
probate without notice. Without going into that issue ex­
haustively, it is possible to observe that strong arguments do 
exist for the initiation of probate without notice. It is a pro­
cedure which permits an immediate supervision of the estate 
without the appointment of a special administrator ; it saves 
expense in the vast majority of cases where there is no desire 
on the part of anyone to contest the will ; it is in accord with 
the present English practice which has been followed in that 
country for centuries. 
By way of summary, it may be suggested that legislation 
on will contests should accord with the following propositions : 
I .  If original probate is without notice, then notice to in­
terested parties should immediately follow; and a short period 
for contest should be permitted. 
2. This period should not be extended beyond the time of 
the final order of distribution. 
3· No extension of time should be permitted in the case of · 
persons under disability. After all, they can act through 
guardians ; and it seems unreasonable to hold up the ultimate 
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determination of title to the estate until after their disabilities 
are removed. 
4· A jury trial should be permitted only in the sound dis­
cretion of the court ; it should not be a matter of right. 
5· The contest after probate should be regarded as a retrial 
of the issue of will or no will which was presented at the 
original probate; not a proceeding to set aside a judgment. 
Thus it will be a part of a single proceeding to probate the will 
and administer the estate ; proponents will have the same 
burden of proof which they had on the initial probate ; evi­
dence introduced at the original probate will only be ad­
mitted in exceptional cases where the witnesses cannot be 
produced to testify anew, or where the proposition to be proved 
is not controverted by the contestants. 
6. The production of an after discovered will should be 
barred at the time of the decree of distribution just as other 
grounds of contest. 
I f  these principles are embodied in contest legislation, it 
will cease to be an amended edition of a procedural institution 
which is forgotten ; and will become merely a device neces­
sitated by the fact that probate is commonly administrative 
and without notice, and that a trial of the issue of will or no 
will is the exception and not the rule. 
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Anti-lapse statute, 85. 
Appeal 
Applicability of .general appellate 
rules, 58. 
Appointment of special adminis­
trator, 120. 
Appointment of special guardian, 
203. 
Bond, 58. 
In general, 56, 24 I .  
Nature, 247. 
Proceeding at law, 247· 
Proceeding in equity, 248. 
Time limit, 58, 248.. 
Trial de novo, 4 I 9, 42 I, 442, 
726. 
When all errors considered, 57, 
2 5  I .  
Appearance, what constitutes, 54. 
Appointment of guardian 
Notice for, 198. 
Order, 201.  
Petition, 196. 
INDEX 759 
Appointment of guardian 
(continued) 
Proof required, 200. 
Veterans' guardianship, 222, 
224. 
Appointment of personal representa-
tive 
Demand for notice, 94. 
Notice for, 96, 269. 
Notice of, 97. 
Petition, 92, 93·. 
Proof required, 103. 
When n�tice not required, 95, 
269. 
Appointment of special administra­
tor, 120. 
Appointment of successor repre­
sentative, 117. 
Appraisement 
Decedents' estates, see Inventory 
and appraisement. 
Order of no administration, 11 I .  
Sale o f  realty, 161. 
Approval of bond, 124. 
Arizona 
Dispensing with administration, 
5 9 5 ·  
Will contest, 7 I 8 .  
Arkansas 
Court organization, 436. 
Death of ward, 6 I 7.  
Will contest, 70 1 .  
Assets 
Collection, 133, 5 6 I ,  668. 
Collection by heirs, 640. 
Debt... of executor, 133. 
Deposit in lieu of bond, 122. 
Deposit under control of surety, 
123. 
Management, 133. 
Payment of claims, 134. 
Unclaimed, 178. 
Assignee of distributee, 3 50. 
Attachment, estate under guardian­
ship, 211.  
Attesting witnesses, see Subscribing 
witnesses. 
Attorney 
Compensation, 119, 214. 
Compensation, defending will, 
120. 
Service on, 53. 
Auction sales, 161. 
Auctioneers' fees, 164. 
Automobile, transfer without ad­
ministration, 107, 6 54. 
Bank, bond as personal representa­
tive, 122, 3 I 5 ·  
Bank deposits, 141 .  . 
Payment without administration, 
107, 647· 
Bankruptcy Act, 129. 
Benefits defined, veterans' guard­
ianship, 221 .  
Bona notabilia, 5 z 8 .  
Bond, see also Surety. 
Alternative provisions, 126. 
Amount, viii, 121, 3 1 0. 
Appeal, 58. 
Approval of, 124. 
Corporate fiduciary, 122, 3 I 5 .  
Debt of executor not assets m 
determining liability, 133. 
Failure to give, 126. 
Foreign representative, 237. 
Guardian, 201.  
Guardian, dispensing with, 201, 
202. 
Guardian �f deceased ward, 218. 
Joint personal representative, 
124. 
Liability of sureties, 123. 
· Liability on new bond, x. 
Modification of amount, 126. 
Not void on first recovery, 129. 
Notice to surety, ix. 
Obligees, 123. 
Personal representative, 121. 
Record, 59. 
Release of lien, 127. 
Re!ease of �ureties, accounting, 
IX. 
Suit on, 128, 3 1 7. 
Time limit for suits, 129, 3 1 7. 




Veterans' guardianship, 224. 
When lien on realty, 125. 
When not required, 122. 
Brokers' fees, 164. 
Building and loan shares, 6 5 2. 
Burden of proof, will contests, 743· 
Business of court, distribution, 47. 
Business of decedent, continuation, 
138. 
Business of ward, continuation, 206. 
California 
Court organization, 445· 
Dispensing with administration, 
5 68, 576, 5 89, 5 96. 
Later will, 2 77. 
Unified court, 423. 
Will contest, 7 I 5·  
Care and custody, use of terms, 
195. 
Cash, distribution in, 176. 
Caveat, 94, 269. 
Certificate of probate, 105. 
Certificate of title, automobiles, 
1 07, 6 54. 
Certified copy 
Order of confirmation, 163. 
Order to convey or lease, 139. 
Chancery 
Devise of land, 394· 
Guardianship in, 184, 192. 
Jurisdiction, 46, 393, 4 3 5, 686. 
Proof of lost will, 299· 
Change in circumstances, revoca­
tion, 83. 
Change of venue, see also Venue. 
Decedents' estates, 89. 
Guardianship, 193. 
Chattel mortgage, see Mortgage. 
Chattels real, not real property, 44. 
Child 
Adopted, 42, 65. 
Defined, 42. 
• 
Exempt property, 79. 
Family allowance, 80. 
Illegitimate, 42, 65. 
Posthumous, 64, 76. 
Pretermitted, 76, 172, 3 6o. 
Chivalry, guardian in, 183. 
Chose in action 
Recovery by representative, 138. 
Testator against executor, 132. 
Within definition of personal 
property, 44. 
Circumstances, change in, as revoca­
tion, 83. 
Citizenship, diversity, 7 3 2. 
Civil procedure, applicability of 
rules, 49. 
Claims 
Abatement to pay, 172, 3_5 3 · 
Action equivalent to filing, 143. 
Allowance, 149. 
Assets for payment, 134. 
Barred without administration, 
3 3 4· 63 5 ·  
Classification, 148. 
Compromise, 135, 152. 
Compromise by guardian, 212. 
Contingent, 146, 147. 
Defined, 42. 
Encumbered assets, 153. 
Execution prohibited, 151. 
Form and verification, 144. 
Founded on written instrument, 
144. 
Guardianship, 209, 210. 
Guardianship differentiated from 
decedents' estates, 209, 210. 
In general, 142. 
Nonclaim period, 141, 3 2 5 .  
Nonclaim period, foreign repre-
sentatives, 237. 
Of personal representative, 150, 
151. 
Offsets, 150. 
Payment, 152, 5 6 2. 
Payment without administration, 
634· 
Secured, 145. 
Transfer to pay, 154. 
Unmatured, 144. 
Verification, 144. 
Whether decree m rem, 503. 
INDEX 
Claims (continued} 
Whether included m inventory, 
132. 
Class gifts, effect of lapse, 85, 86. 
Classification of claims, 148. 
Clearing title, 159, 670. 
Clerk 
Jurisdiction, 446. 
One in each county, 50. 
Powers, 50, 408, 477· 
Closing estate, 166, 169, 3 3 8. 
Cloud on title, 159, 670. 
Codicil, within definition of will, 
44. 
Collateral, deposit in lieu of bond, 
122. 
Collateral attack 
Alleged decedent, 99. 
· Death, 104, 5 3 9· 
Domicile of decedent, 5 3  2. 
In general, 50 5. 
Probate and grant of administra­
tion, 104, 105. 
Venue, 540. 
Collateral «!Stoppel, probate decrees, 
5 23 ·  
Collection of  assets, 133, 56 1 .  
Colorado 
Death of ward, 6 I 8. 
Dispensing with administration, 
5 97· 
Later will, 2 77. 
Will contest, 722.  
Commission to take testimony, 103. 
Commitment, 188, 232. 
Common and solemn form, 95, 96, 
269, 3 8 8, 437> 439, 5 1  I, 
6 8 5 ,  699. 
Due process, 5 I 2. 
Common-law courts, jurisdiction, 
3 9 1 .  
Community property 
Dispensing with administration, 
6 24. 
. Whether inventoried, 132. 
Compensation 
Appraisers, 130. 
Attorney, 119, 214. 
Brokers, 164. 
Guardian, 214. 
Personal representative, 118. 
Probate judges, 45, 475·  
Veterans' guardianship, 229. 
Compromise, l l 2, 135. 
Claims, 152. 
Guardianship, 212. 
Concealment,· see Disclosure pro­
ceedings. 
Conclusiveness 
Accounting, 168, 3 44· 
Decree of final distribution, 172, 
348. 
Confirmation 
Sales, mortgages, leases, 162. 
Transfer to personal representa­
tive, 156. 
Conflict of laws 
Probate decrees, 5 I 8. 
Restatement, 66 I .  
Confusion of goods, duty of repre-
sentative, 165, 166. 
Connecticut, later will, 278.  
Consolidated courts, 4 I I .  
Consolidation, two or more estates, 
5 9 1 .  
Constitutional right t o  j ury trial 
Disclosure proceeding, 138. 
Will contest, 55. 
Constitutionality 
Abolition of dower, 68. ' 
Abolition of j ury trial on claims, 
150. 
Code under single title, 41. 
Common form probate, 5 I 2. 
Dispensing with administration, 
6 1 2. 
Foreign probate decrees, 5 I 8.  
Guardianship for physical dis-
ability, 1 90. 
Model Code provisions, 12. 
Severability, 42. 
Statute as to claims not due, 145 . 
Construction of wills, 45, 88. 
Constructive trust 
· 
Later will, 2 76. 
INDEX 
Constructive trust (continued) 
U nprobated will, to establish, 
106. 
Consul, waiver of notice by, 54. 
Contentious and non-contentious 
business, 4-37· 
Contest of wills, see Will contest. 
Contingent claims, 141, 142, 146, 
147. -
Continuation of decedent's business, 
138. 
Continuation· of ward's business, 
206. 
Contract to convey or lease land, 
139. 
Contribution, - 174. 
Payment of contingent claims, 
147. 
Conversion, equitable; 135. 
Conversion of property, 1 36. 
Conveyance 
By personal representative, 139, 
163. 
Fraud of creditors, 134. 
Validity of proceedings, 157. 
Coordinate courts, 4-30. 
Corporate fiduciary, bond, 122, 
3 I 5 ·  
Corporations, within definition of 
person, 44. 
Counsel fees, see Attorney. 
Counterclaim, see Offsets to claims. 
County, clerk of court in each, 50. 
Court organization 
American colonies, 3 99, 4-0 1 .  
English, 3 97, 4-39, 440. 
Court rules, power to make, 49. 
Courts, see also Probate court. 
Contentious and non-contentious 
business, 4-39· 
Coord inate probate j urisdiction, 
4-30· 
Distribution of business, 47. 
Inferior, 4- 2 1 .  , 
Open at reasonable hours, 47. 
Probate not inferior, 46. 
Terms, 47. 
Unified, 4-23. 
Courts of general j urisdiction, 4- I 3· 
Courts of record, 3 8 8,  4- I 6. 
Credit, sale of assets, 155. 
Creditors 
Barring, foreign representative, 
237. 
Conveyance in fraud of, 134. 
Notice to, 96, 97, 98. 
Notice to, combined with origi­
nal notice, 17. 
Notice to, form , 96, 97, 98. 
Rights on renunciation by dis­
tributee, 86. 
Creditors' rights, see also Claims. 
Ancillary administration, 237. 
Compelling administration, 634-. 
How determined on death of 
ward, 217. 
Procedure against estates under 
guardianship, 210, 21 1.  
Curtesy abolished, 68. 
Custodian of will, 92, 267. 
Custody, use of term, 195. 
Custody of ward, 205. 
Dakota group, will contests, 7 2 1 .  
Death 
As jurisdictional, 104, 5 3  9· 
Distributee, 171, 3 50, 6 I 3 .  
Ward, 217, 218, 6 I 6. 
When finding conclusive, 104, 
5 3 9· 
Debt 
Collection by heirs, 64-0. 
Compromise, 1 35. 
Decedent's, see Claims. 
Executor's included in inventory, 
132. 
Payment, 562.  
Deceased distributees, 171, 3 5 0, 
6 I  3·  
Decedent, alleged, see Alleged de­
cedent. 
Decedents' estate law, when ap­
plicable to guardianship, 213, 
216. 
Decedents' estates 
Appeal, see Appeal. 
INDEX 
Decedents' estates (continued) 
Inventory, see Inventory and ap­
praisement. 
Jurisdiction, 45. 




Summary settlement, 565 .  
Time schedule, 3 Jb. 
Venue, see Venue. 
Declaratory j udgments, uniform 
act, 47. 
Decree, foreign, 5 I 8 .  
Decree, · probate 
What bound, 5 I 6. 
Who bound, 5 I 6.  
Decree, record, 59. 
Decree of distribution 
Wheth er in rem, 497· 
Whether land included, 456. 
Decree of final distribution, see also 
Final distribution. 
Advancements to be specified, 
174. 
Conclusiveness, 172, 348. 
Contents, 171. 
Deceased distributees, 171, 3 50, 
6 I  3 ·  
Determines title, 18. 
Petition, 170. 
Decree probating will 
Effect, 746. 
In rem, 493· 
Deed of trust, within definition of 
mortgage, 43. 
De facto guardian, 183. 
Defects in petition, 51. 
Defendant in will contest, 741 .  
Defending will, allowance for, 
120. 
Definitions 
Applicable to entire Code, 42. 
Applicable to Foreign Repre­
sentatives Act, 236. 
Applicable to guardianship; 189, 
221. 
Degrees of kinship, 6l; 63. 
Delaware, death of ward, 6 I 8. 
Delivery of will to court, 92, 267. 
Demonstrative legacies, abatement, 
172, 173. 
Dependents of ward, support, 206, 
207. 
Deposit 
Assets in lieu of bond, 122. 
Assets under control of surety, 
123. 
Bank, 141. 
Collateral in lieu of bond, 122. 
Estate of incompetent, 220. 
Deposit of will with court, 87. 
Depositions, subscribing witnesses, 
103, 297· 
Depreciable property, sale, 158. 
Descent, see Intestate succession. 
De son tort 
Executor, 136. 
Guardian, 1 83. 
Destroyed wills, 20, 93, 298. 
Determination of heirship, 45, 181, 
366, 6 s 6. 
Determination of incompetency, 
201 .  
Devisavit vel non, 3 94, 395, 494, 
687.  
Devise, defined, 42. 
Devisee 
Defined, 42. 
Of distributee, 171, 3 50, 6 I 3 . 
Renunciation of succession, 86. 




Ti�e for will contest, 7 5 3 · 
Disappeared persons, 98, 99, 178. 
Discharge 
Guardian, 2 1 9. 
Personal representative, 179, 
365 .  
Surety, see Surety, release. 
Veterans' guardian, 231.  
Disclosure proceedings, 137, 3 2 I .  
Disinheritance of  surviving spouse, 
75, 76. 
Dispensing with administration, 19, 
107, 5 5 7· 
lNDEX 
Dispensing with administration 
(continued) 
Ancillary administration, 6 5 8 .  
Ante-mortem devices, 5 64-. 
Community property, 624-. 
Constitutionality, 6 1 2. 
Death of distributee, 171, 3 50, 
6 1 3 .  
Death of ward, 218, 6 1 6. 
Distribution, 652 .  
Executor as residuary legatee, 
5 77· 
Family settlements, 6 26. 
Heirs to collect assets, 108, 64-0. 
No personal representative, 108, 
1()9, 592.  
Nonintervention will, 584-. 
Small estates, 108, 109, 5 66, 
568.  
Summary settlement, I l l, 5 6 5 .  
Title t o  estate, 6 3 I .  
Dispensing with appraisers, 130. 
Dispensing with guardianship, 212, 
219. 
• 
Disqualification of j udge, 48. 
Disqualification to be personal rep­
resentative, 1 15. 
Distri bu tees 
Deceased, 171,  3 50, 6 1 3. 
Defined, 42. 
Determination of, 181, 3 66, 
6 5 6. 
Liability for contingent claims, 
147. 
Distribution 
Abatement, 1 72. 
Contingent claims, f46, 147. 
Exempt property, 79. , 
Final, 1 70, 34-8 ; see also Final 
distribution. 
Function of administration, 5 6 3 .  
Partial, 1 69, 34-6. 
Transfer to make, 154. 
Without administration, 19, 1 07, 
5 5 7, 6sz .  
Distribution and discharge, 169. 
Distribution of business of court, 
47. 
District of Columbia 
Court organization, 4-34-· 
Will contest, 722 .  
Diversity of  citizenship, 7 3 2 .  
Divorce as revocation, 83. 
Domicile 
Residence construed as, 5 34-· 
Whether j urisdictional, 5 3 2· 
Dower abolished, 68, 2 5 6. 
Drugs, when user incompetent, 
190. 
Drunkard, habitual, when incompe-
tent, 190. 
Due process, see Constitutionality. 
Duties of custodian of will, 92. 
Duties of guardians, 204. 
Duties of personal representative 
Account, 165, 166, 3 3 8 .  
Appraisal, 132. 
As to property not part of estate, 
165. 
Close estate, 166, 3 3 8 .  
Insure, 133. 
Possess assets, 1 33. 
Repair buildings, J33. 
Ecclesiastical courts 
Jurisdiction, 3 8 7. 
Notice, 5 1 I .  
Procedure, 3 90. 
Proceedings in rem, 4-92. 
Venue, p8. 
Education 
Allowance for ward, 206, 207. 
As advancement, 2 5 5 .  
Effect of local proceedings on 
foreign representative, 237. 
Effect of probate or grant of ad­
ministration, 104, 306. 
Effective date, 41. 
Election against will 
Applied to gifts in fraud of 
marital rights, 72. 
Filing, 73, 74. 
Form, 74. 
I n  general, 2 5 8. 
Misconduct as bar, 263� 
INDEX 
Election against will (continued) 
Not subject to change, 75. 
Notice, 73. 
Personal to spouse, 74. 
Pretermitted children, 76. 
Surviving spouse, 68. 
Time limit, 73. 
Waiver of right, 75. 
Election to take under will, effect, 
75. 
Embezzlement of property, 136. 
Encumbered assets, 153. 
Exoneration, 175. 
Purchase by holder of lien, 156. 
English law 
Court organization, 439, 440. 
Probate and administration, 386. 
Statutory probate reforms, 3 95·  
Entirety, tenancy by, whether in-
ventoried, 132. 
Equitable conversion, 135. 




Defined for veterans' guardian-
ship, 221. 
Devolution of, 106. 
Duty to close, 166, 338.  
Guardian of, see Guardian ; 
Guardian of Estate ; Guardian­
ship. 
Location giving venue, 5 3  5 .  
Net, defined, 44. 
Possession, 133. 
Estate taxes, see Taxes. 
Estoppel, collateral, probate de­
crees, 5 2 3 .  
Evidence 
Certified copy of decree deter­
mining heirship, 182. 
Certified copy of order of con­
firmation, 163. 
Certified copy of order to convey 
or lease, 139. 
Certified copy of will, 105. 
Inventory and appraisement as, 
133. 
Lost wills, 298. 
Necessity for guardianship, 223. 
Testimony of subscribing wit-
nesses, 102, 103, 295 ·  
Exchanges 
Brokers' fees, 164. 
By guardian not ademption, 214. 
Guardianship, 213. 
In general, 153, 1 65. 
No priority between realty and 
personalty, 153. 
Personal representative may take 
by, 156. 
Power given in will, 154. 
Purposes, 154. 
Title documents, 1 64. 
Validity of proceedings, 157. 
Execution 
Guardianship, 21 1 .  
Prohibited, 151. 
Execution of wills, 8 1 .  
Executor, see also Personal repre­
sentative. 
As residuary legatee, 5 7 7· 
Debt of, included in inventory, 
132. 
De son tort, 136 . . 
Independent, 5 84. 




No appeal from order setting 
aside, 57. 
Not a claim, 149. 
Not within definition of net 
estate, 44. 
Relation to dispensing with ad­
ministration, 109, 566. 
Exhibition of assets, 167, 216, 225, 
227. 
Exoneration, 175. 
Expectancies, release of, 67. 
Failure to give bond, removal, 126. 
Family allowance, 80, 566. 
Abatement to pay, 1 72. 
. INDEX 
Family allowance (continued) 
No appeal from order, 57. 
Not within net estate, 44. 
Priority of payment, 148. 
Transfer to pay, 154. 
Family settlements, 626. 
Federal j urisdiction, will contests, 
732 .  
Fees, see Compensation. 
Feminine, included in masculine, 
44. 
Fiduciary, see also Administrator ; 
Executor; Guardian ; Personal 
representative. 
Appeal bond, 58. 
Defined, 43. 
Execution of compromise agree­
ment, 113, 1 14. 
Removal, when no appeal, 57. 




Appeal includes other appeals, 
57, 2 5 1 .  
Conclusiveness of decree, 172, 
348.  
Contribution, 174. 
Decree, 170; see also Decree of 
final distribution. 
Escheat, 178. 
In general, 348. 
Interest, 175. 
Partition, 177. 
Payment in kind, 176. 
Petition filed with final account, 
167. 
Real property, 3 49· 
Recording of decree, 172. 
Retainer, 174. 
Successor of distributee, 171, 
3 50, 6 1 3 . 
Unclaimed assets, 178. 
Unknown heirs, 178. 
Florida 
Court organization, 443· 
Dispensing with administration, 
5 97· 
Guardianship law, 189. 
Later will, 2 79· 
Foreign executed wills, 82. 
Foreign probate decrees, 5 I 8.  
Foreign probated wills, uniform 
act, 238. 
Foreign representative 
Actions by, 664. 
Barring creditors, 237. 
Bond, 237. 
Definitions, 236. 
Effect of local proceedings, 237. 
Payment to, 66o. 
Powers, 236. 
Proof of authority, 237. 
Release of mortgages, 667. 
Sale of land, 669. 
Uniform act, 234, 236. 
Form, defect, 5 1 .  
Forms 
Election against will, 74. 
Filing claims, 144. 
Notice of appointment of repre­
sentative, 97. 
Notice of probate and adminis­
tration, 96, 97. 
Notice to creditors, 96, 97, 98. 
Fraud of creditors, conveyance, 
134. 
Fraud on marital rights, gifts, 72. 
Fraudulent Conveyances Act, Uni­
form, 135. 
Function 
Administration, 5 5 9, 5 64. 
Will contests, 6 8 2. 
Funeral expenses 
As claims, 42. 
Priority, 148. 
Garnishment, estate under guard-
ianship, 211.  
Gender, use of  terms, 44. 
General j urisdiction, courts of, 41 3 · 
Georgia 
Court organization, 444· 
Death of ward, 6 1 8. 
Later will, 2 79· 
Will contest, 700. 
INDEX 
Gifts in fraud of marital rights, 72. 
Grandchild, not within definition 
of child, 42. 




Allowance for ward's dependents, 
206, 207, 230. 
Allowance for ward's support, 
206, 207, 230. 
Appointment, 196, 222. 
Bond, 201 .  
Chancery, 184, 192. 
Compensation, 214. 
Compromise, 212. 
Continuation of business, 206. 
Custody, 205. 
De facto, 183. 
Defined, 189. 
Defined, veterans' guardianship, 
221.  
D e  son tort, 183. 
Discharge, 219. 
Duties, 204. 
Election against will by, 74. 
In chivalry, 183. 
In socage, 183. 
Investments, 207. 
Limit on number, 201.  
Limit o n  number of veteran 
wards, 222. 
Natural, 183. 
Nomination by ward, 195, 203. 
Notice for appointment, 198. 
One for sever.al wards, 197. 
Order appointing, 201 .  
Petition for appointment, 196. 
Priority, 195. 
Proof required for appointment, 
200. 




Sale not ademption, 214. 
Successor, 204. 
Temporary, 202. 
Testamentary, 184, 192, 195. 
Title and possession, 205. 
Waiver of notice by, 53. 
When letters issue, 202. 
When to purchase at sale, 213. 
Guardian ad litem 
Appointment for compromise 
agreement, l l3, 1 14. 
Defined, 190. 
Guardian of estate 
Duties, 204. 
When appointed, 192. 
Guardian of person, powers, 205. 




Death of ward, 218, 6 16. 
Determination of incompetency, 
201. 
Dispensing with, 219. 
Exchanges, 213. 
Florida Code, 189. 
Important provisions of Code, 
185 . . 
Introduction, 1 83. 
Inventory and appraisal, 204. 
Jurisdiction, 1 92, 4 5 9· 
Kinds of incompetents, 188. 
Leases, 213. 
Mortgages, 213. 
Non-statutory, abolished, 192. · 
Notice of hearings, 198, ,199. 
Participation by State Welfare 
Department, 197. 
Probate j urisdiction includes, 45. 
Relation to decedents' estates, 
186, 191.  
Relation to trusts, 187. 
Relation to Uniform Veterans' 
Guardianship Act, 190. 
Request for notice, 199. 
Sales, 213. 
Termination, 2 17. 
Time schedule, 3 So. 
Venue, 1 93. 
Veterans', ·unifortn act, 220. 
INDEX 
Guardianship (continued) 
When decedents' estate law ap­
plicable, 216. 
Who subject to, 192. 
Habitual drunkard, when incompe­
tent, 190. 
Half blood, inheritance, 64. 
Hearing 
Settlement of account, 168. 
Special request for notice, 94, 
1 99. 




Of distributee, 171, 3 50, 6 I 3 .  
Renunciation of succession, 86. 
Right tb collect assets, 108, 64-0 .  
Surviving spouse as, 69. 
Unknown, 178. 
Heirship, determination of, 45, 
181, 3 66, 6 56. 
History 
American court organization, 
3 99· 
Dispensing with administration, 
568,  5 78, 593·  
English court organization, 439·  
English venue, 5 2 7· 
English will contest, 68 5 .  
Guardianship, 183. 
Probate and adlp.inistration, 3 86. 
Requirement of notice, 269. 





Purchase for veteran ward, 230. 
Purchase for ward, 208. 
Homestead, 77. 
Not a claim, 149. 
Not within net estate, 44. 
Sale, 78, 79. 
· 
Hospital, commitment of veteran, 
232. 
Hours, court open, 47. 
Idaho 
Dispensing with administration, 
5 99· 
Will contest, 7 I 9· 
lllegitimate child 
Definition of child, 42. 
Inheritance, 65. 
Illinois-
Court organization, 4 3 5 ·  
Death o f  ward, 6 I 9 ·  
Later will, 2 80. 
Will contest, 7 2 5 .  
Imbecile, when incompetent, 190. 
Implied revocation of will, 83. 
In rem proceeding, 91, 4-89, 49 I ,  
5 I 5, 7 3 7· 
Income, defined, veterans' guard­
ianship, 221 .  
Incompetency, determination of, 
201. 
Incompetents 
Action against, 210, 211.  
Defined, 190. 
Kinds, 188. 
Mental illness, 188. 
Incorporeal interests, within defini­
tion of real property, 44. 
Independent executor, 5 84-. 
Independent proceeding, disclosure 
proceeding, 137. 
Index 
Deposited wills, 88. 
Included in records, 59. 
Record of liens on realty of 
sureties, 125. 
Indiana 
Court organization, 409, 433 ·  
Death of  ward, 6 I 9 ,  6 2 1 .  
Dispensing with administration, 
6oo. 
Later will, 2 8 2 .  
Infant, see M inors. 
Inferior j urisdiction, courts of, 4 1 2, 
4I 3 ·  
Inheritance, see Intestate succession. 
Inheritance taxes, see Taxes. 
Insane person, when incompetent, 
190. 
INDEX 
I nsolvent estates, I l l. 
Inspection of assets, 167, 216, 225, 
227. 
I nsurance policies, proceeds, 107, 
1 66, 647· 
Interest 
When allowed on claims, 150. 
When legacies bear, 175. 
Interested person 
Defined, 43. 
Petition for probate or adminis­
tration, 92, 93. 
Inter partes, 7 3 7· 
Inter vivos trusts, see Trusts, inter 
VIVOS. 
Intestacy, partial, 64, 2 5 5 .  
Intestate succession 
Adopted children, 65. 
Advancements, 65, 2 5 3 .  
Afterborn children, 64. 
Aliens, 68. 
Ancestral and non-ancestral, 62. 
Degrees of kinship, 61, 63. 
Half blood, 64. 
Illegitimates, 65. 
In general, 59. 
Parentelic system, 63. 
Partial intestacy, 64, 2 5 5 .  
Persons related through two 
lines, 65. 
Pretermitted children, 76. 
Renunciation by heir, 86. 
Surviving spouse taking against 
will, 69. 
Introduction 
Ancillary administration, 234. 
· Guardianship, 183. 
Model Probate Code, 9. 
Inventory and appraisement, see 
also Appraisement. 
Community property and other 
j oint interests, 132. 
Debt of executor, 1 32. 
Decedents' estates, 129, 3 20. 
Dispensing with appraisers, 130. 
Evidence, 133. 
Guardianship, 204. 
In general, 129. 
Supplementary, 132. 
Whether claims included, 132. 
Whether land inclu.ded, 130, 
3 20, 4 5 3 ·  
Investments 
Decedents' estates, 140. 
Guardianship, 207. 
Veterans' guardianship, 230. 
Iowa, will contest, 7 2 2 .  
Issue 
Birth, revoking will, 83, 84. 
Defined, 43. 
Joinder, action against guardian, 
211.  
Joint liability of  sureties, 123. 
Joint personal representatives, bond, 
124. 
Joint powers of personal representa­
tives, l iS. 




Qualifications, 44, 469. 
Salary, 45, 475·  
Same as  trial j udge, 15, 44. 
Saving clause for prior incum-
bents, 45. 
Selection, 47 I .  
Tenure, 473·  
Judgment 
Allowance of claim as, 150. 
Equitable relief against, 56. 
Notice to prevent collateral at-
tack, 505. 
Record, 59. 
Vacation or modification, 55. 
Judgment lien, not barred by non­
claim statute, 1 43. 
Judgments Restatement, 489, 49I, 
5 I 3, 5 24. 
Judicature i\cts, 3 96. 
Jurisdiction 
Chancery, 46, 3 93 ,  4 3 5 ,  68o. 
Chancery, over guardianship, 
184, 192. 
Colonial courts, 3 99, 40 I. 
no INDEX 
Jurisdiction (continued) 
Common-law courts, 3 9 1 .  
Construction of wills, 88. 
Distinguished from venue, 5 30. 
Domicile, 5 3 2 ·  
Ecclesiastical, 3 8 7. 
Federal, will contests, 7 3 2 .  
General, 4I  3·  
Guardianship, 192. 
Inter vivos trusts, 21, 46, 46 3 .  
Juvenile delinquents, 462. 
Limited, 4I 3· 
Minors, 459· 
Notice required, 505.  
Presumption of, 4 I 4·  
Probate, scope, 45. 
Real property, 16, 45, 394, 448 .  
When acquired, 548. 
Jurisdictional facts, 53  9· 
Jury, 54, 429. 
Action on claims, 150. 
Contest after probate, 748. 
Disclosure proceedings, 138, 3 2 I .  
Juvenile delinquents, probate j uris­
diction, 462.  
Kansas, later will, 2 8 2 .  
Kentucky 
Dispensing with administration, 
60 1 .  
Later will, 2 8 3 .  
Will contest, 707. 
Killing of testator or intestate, 21. 
Kind, distribution in, 176. 
Land, j urisdiction, 16, 45, 3 94, 
448 ; see also Real property. 
Lapse, 85. 
Last illness, expenses, priority, 148, 
149. . • 
Later will, 99, 101, 107, 2 7 5, 7 5 4· 
Lease · 
Appraisement, 161, 
Brokers' fees, 164. 
By personal representative, 139. 
Decedents' estates, 1 53. 
Defined, 43. 
Guardianship, 213. 
No pnonty between realty and 
personalty, 153. 
Order; 160. 
Personal representative may take 
by, 156. 
Personalty, 157. 
Power given in will, 154. 
Purposes, 154. 
Realty, 159. 
Realty and personalty as unit, 
158. 
Refused if bond given, 155. 
Report and confirmation, 162. 
Taxes not liens on interest 
leased, 164. 
Title documents, 164. 
Validity of proceedings, 157. 
When personal representative to 
execute, 163. 
Legacies 
Abatement to pay, 172. 
Ademption, 20, 214. 
Defined, 43. 
General, interest on, 175. 
Transfer to pay, 154. 





Revocation, 101, 126, 166, 167, 
203, 229. 
When to issue, 1 17, 202. 
Who entitled, 1 14, 194, 195, 
223. 
Levies prohibited, 151. 
Lien 
Compromise by transfer, 135. 
Creditor's, 145. 
Enforcement during adminis-
tration, 151.  
Nonclaim statute, 142. 
Payment, 153. 
Purchase by holder, 156. 
Realty of personal surety, 125. 
Release of surety's realty, 127. 
Vendor's, 43. 
Life insurance, 1 07, 166, 647. 
INDEX 
Limited j urisdiction, courts of, 41 2,  
4 I  3 ·  
Lineal descendants, within defini­
tion of issue, 43. 
Local proceedings, effect on foreign 
representative, 237. 
Local representative, defined, 236. 
Lost wills, 20, 93, 298. 
Maine, later will, 28 3· 
Maintenance of ward, 206, 207, 
230. 
Management of assets, 133. 
Marketable title, 653 ,  670. 
Marriage, revocation by, 83, 84. 
Married minor, when not subject 
to guardianship, 192. 
Marshalling, see Exoneration. 
Maryland 
Court organization, 43 I .  
Dispensing with administration, 
60 1 .  
Later will, 284. 
Masculine includes feminine, 44. 
1\1 assach usetts 
Contest before probate, 7 I 4· 
Court organization, 430, 44 5 ·  
Death of ward, 6 I 9· 
Final distribution to executor, 
5 79· 
Later will, 2 84. 
Mental illness 
-
Basis for guardianship, 190 
Use of term, 188. 
1\Jercantile specialties, transfer, 666. 
Michigan 
Dispensing with administration, 
6o i .  
Later will, z 8 5 .  
Mineral lease, within definition of 
lease, 43. 
Minors 
Incompetent defined to include, 
190. 
Married, 192. 
Probate j urisdiction, 4 5 9· 
Time for will contest, 753 · 
Misnomer, action against guardian, 
2l l .  
Missing persons, see Alleged de­
cedent ; Unknown heirs. 
Mississippi 
Court organization, 436. 
Later will, z8 5 ·  
Missouri 
Court organization, 444· 
Death of ward, 6 I 7. 
Dispensing with administration, 
593·  
Judges not admitted to bar, 45. 
Later will, 286.  
Will contest, 708 . 
Model Execution of Wills Act, 
Uniform, 81.  
Model Probate Code 
Adaptation to local legislation, 12. 
Alternative recommendation, see 
Alternative provisiOns of 
Model Probate Code. 
Characteristics of guardianship 
provisions, 185. 
Constitutionality, 12; see also 
Constitutionality. 
Effect of partial invalidity, 42. 
How to take effect, 41. 
Important features, 15. 
Introduction, 9. 
Omitted matters, I 9. 
Plan, 14. 
Preparation, 5, 10. 
Presen�ation of report, 5. 
Relation of guardianship to de-
cedents' estates, 186. 
Relation to uniform laws, II .  
Short title! 41. 
Modification of orders and j udg­
ments, 55, 104. 
Montana, will contest, 7 20. 
Mortgage 
Brokers' fees, 164. 
Compromise by conveyance, 135. 
Decedents' estates, 153. 






No priority between realty and 
personalty, 153. 
Order for; 160. 
Payment, 153. 
Personal representative may take 
by, 156. 
Personal representative to execute, 
163. 
Personalty, 157. 
Power in will, 154. 
Purposes, 154. 
Quieting adverse claims, 159. 
Realty, 159. 
Realty and personalty as unit, 
158. 
Refused if bond given, 155. 
Release by foreign representa-
tive, 667. _ 
Report and confirmation, 162. 
Taxes not liens on interest mort­
gaged, 164. 
Title documents, 164. 
Validity of proceedings, 157. 
Mortgagee as purchaser at sale, 156. 
Murder of testator or intestate, 21. 
Natural guardian, 183. 
Nebraska 
Dispensing with administration, 
602. 
Later will, 286. 
Necessity of probate, 104, 106, 
304. 
Net estate 
Defined, 44. • 
Passes by intestate succession, 6 1, 
63. 
Nevada 
Dispensing with administration, 
602. 
Later will, 2 8 7 .  
Unified court, 424. 
Will contest, no. 
New Jersey 
Court organization, 405, 43 2.  
Dispensing with administration, 
603. 
Will contest, 708. 
New Mexico 
Court organization, 409. 
Will contest, 7 20. 
New York 
Court organization, 4 I I ,  4 3 I,  
445 ·  
Later will, 2 8 7. 
Will contest, 709. 
Next friend, actions by, 212. 
No administration, ,  order of, 109, 
no. 
Nomination of guardian by ward, 
195, 203. 
Nonclaim statute 
Decedents' estates, 141. 
Estate of deceased ward, 218, 
620. 
Foreign representatives, 237. 
In general, 3 2 5 .  
None for guardianship, 210. 
Nonintervention will, 5 84. 
Non-resident 
Decedent, venue, 5 3 5, 545·  
When disqualified as  personal 
representative, l l5, 1 16. 
North Carolina 
Court organization, 407. 
Dispensing with administration, 
603. 
Later will, 2 8 8. 
North Dakota 
Later will, 2 8 8 .  
Will contest, 7 2 I .  
Notice 
Accounting, 168. 
Accounting in veterans' guardian­
ship, 225, 227. 
Appointment of guardian, 198. 
Appointment of personal repre­
sentative, 97. 
Appointment of veterans' guard­
ian, 224. 
Collateral attack, 505 .  
Continuing decedent's business, 
138. 
INDEX 7 73 
Notice (continued) 
Creditors, 96, 97, 98. 
Creditors, combined with original 
notice, 1 7. 
Creditors, estate of · deceased 
ward, 218, 6 20, 62 I .  
Demand, 94. 
Disclosure proceedings, 137. 
Election against will, 73. 
Form for probate, 96, 97. 
Guardianship, 198, 199. 
Guardianship, request for, 199. 
In general, 51, 52. 
Kinds, 51.  
Not required t o  initiate adminis-
tration, 1 6. 
Power of clerk to issue, 50. 
Probate, 96, 269. 
Probate of after-discovered will, 
101. 
Probate with, 708. 
Probate without, 699. 
Publication, sufficiency, 5 1 4·· 
Sale of perishable property, 158. 
Special request, 94, 199. 
Sureties, ix, 128. 
Veterans' guardianship, 222, 224, 
225, 227. 
Waiver, 53. 
When not j urisdictional, 91. 
When required, 51, 95, 5 90. 
Will contest, 100. 
Number of wards, limitation, 222. 
Nuncupative will 
Execution, 82. 
Petition for probate, 93. 
Proof, 103. 
Revocation, 83. 
Objections to petition, 51. 
Obligees of bond, 123. 
Offsets to claims, 150, 151. 
Ohio 
Court organization, 4 1 1 ,  432.  
Dispensing with administration, 
. 6os. 
Judges not admitted to bar, 45. 
Later will, 2 8 8 .  
Will contest, 7 26. 
Oil or gas lease, within definition 
of lease, 43. 
Oklahoma 
Later will, 289. 
Will contest, 7 2 I .  
Oral will, see Nuncupative will. 
Order of distribution, see Decree 
of final distribution. 
Orders 
Appealable, 56, 242.  
Appointing guardian, 201, 222. 
Appointing personal representa-
tive, 1 17, 496. 
No administration, 109, 1 10. 
Presumption of validity, 46. 
Record, 59. 
Sale, mortgage, lease of real prop­
erty, 160. 
Oregon 
Court organization, 409. 
Later will, 2 89. 
Organization, probate court, 3 8 5, 
405 ·  
Orphans' courts, 401 ,  .of-02.  
Parent 
Compromising claim of minor, 
212. 
Notice to, 198. 
Partial distribution, 169, 3 46. 
Partial intestacy, 64. 
Parties 
Administrator of Veterans Ad­
ministration, 221.  
Will contests, 74 1 .  
Partition, 177. 
Partnership estates, 22. 
Payment 
Claims, 152, 5 62. 
Claims, assets for, 134. 
Contingent claims, 146, 147. 
Liens, 153. 
To foreign representatives, 660. 
Pennsylvania 
Court organization, 41 I .  
Death o f  ward, 6 1 8 .  
7 74 INDEX 
Pennsylvania (continued) 
Dispensing with administration, 
6o6. 
Later will, 289. 
Will contest, 707. 
Pension bureau, notice, 198, 1 99. 
Perishable property, sales, 158. 
Person , 
Defined, 44, 221. 
Guardian of, duties, 204. 
Guardian of, powers, 205. 
Guardian of, when appointed, 
192. 
Personal inj ury, compromise of 
minor's claim, 212. 
Personal notice, 51, 52. 
Personal property 
Advancements, 254· 
Collection without ancillary ad-
ministration, 668. 
Defined, 44. 
Sales, bond for, 126. 
Sales, mortgages, leases, 157. 
Sales of perishables, 158. 
When treated as realty, 136. 
Personal property and realty 
No priority between, 153. 
Sale, mortgage, lease as a unit, 
158. 
Personal representative 
Administration without, 108, 
109, l lO, 592. 
Bond, 121. 
Claims, 150, 151, 152. 
Compensation, 1 1 8. 
Corporate, 1 14, 1 15. 
Deceased or incompetent, 169. 
Defined, 44. 
Demand for notice before ap-
pointment, 94. 
Discharge, 179, 365 .  
Disqualifications, ll5. 
Duties, · see Duties of personal 
representative. 
Execution of conveyance, mort­
gage, lease, 163. · 
Foreign, uniform act, 234, 236. 
Letters revoked if no bond, 126. 
Liabilities, 165. 
Notice as to appointment, 95, 
96, 97, 299· 
Order appointing, in rem, 496. 
Order of persons entitled, 1 14. 
Penalties for failure to inventory, 
132. 
Petition for appointment, 92, 93. 
Possession, 133. 
Powers, see Powers. 
Proof for appointment, 103. 
Qualifications, 1 15. 
Removal, 1 17. 
Right to recover property, 134. 
Substituted for guardian, 211.  
Successor, 1 17, 1 18. 
Taking by sale, mortgage, lease, 
exchange, 156. 
Testamentary power, 154. 
Title to land, 450. 
When letters issued, 1 17. 
Personal surety 
Affidavit, 124. 
Lien on realty, 125. 
Release of lien, 127. 
Personnel, probate courts, 4 1 8. 
Per testes, probate, 6 8 5 .  
Petition 
Appointment of guardian, 196. 
Appointment of personal repre-
sentative, 92, 93. 
Objections to, 51.  
Probate, 92, 93. 
Verified, 51.  
Physical disability, guardianship, 
190. 
Place of trial, see Venue. 
Plaintiff, will contest, 741 .  
Platting, 164. 
Pledge 
Compromise by transfer, 135. 
Enforcement during administra­
tion, 151.  
Payment, 153. 
Plural, includes singular, 44. 
Possession 
Decedents' estates, 106, 133. 




Taking against will, 76. 
Powers 
Clerk, 50. 
Foreign representative, 236. 
Guardian of person, 205. 
Personal representative 
Bank deposits, 141. 
Compromising Claims, 152. 
Continuing business, 138. 
Conveyance from mortg�r, 
135. 
Encumbered assets, 153. 
Joint and several, 1'18. 
Successor, 1 18. 
Testamentary, 140. 
Powers of Foreign Representatives 
Act, Uniform, 234, 236, 662, 
665, 6 7 I ,  678. 
Presentation of report, Model Code, 
5. 
Presumed decedent, see Alleged de­
cedent. 
Presumption 
Jurisdiction, 4 I 4· 
Validity of orders, 46. 
Pretermitted grandchildren, 77. 
Pretermitted heirs, 76. 
Abatement, 172, 3 6o. 
Priority 
Creditors, 148 . . 
Guardian, 195. 
Personal representative, 1 14. 




Chancery, 4 3 5 ·  
Demand for notice, 94. 
Effect, 104, 304. 
, , English law, 3 86. · · Evidence, 102, 103. 
History, 3 86. 
_ � g_olographic wills, 103. 
· Nece�ity, 106, 304. 
Notice, 16, 95, 96, 269, 699, 
708. 
Nuncupative wills, 82, 103. 
Petition, 92, 93. 
Revocation of, 101.  
Time limit, 105, 307.  
Will of  land, 4-50. 
Probate code, see Model Probate 
Code. 
Probate court, see also Courts. 
Clerk, see Clerk. 
Jurisdiction, see Jurisdiction. 
Miscellaneous functions, 4-64. 
Organization of, 3 8 5 ,  405 .  
Personnel, 4- I 8,  4-66. 
Standards, 4-8 2. 
Probate decrees 
Collateral estoppel, 5 2  3 .  
Persons and things bound, 5 I 6 .  
Probate judge 
Disqualification, 48. 
Qualifications, 44, 4-69. 
Salary, 45, 4 7 5 .  
Same as trial j udge, 15, 44. 
Saving clause for prior, 45. 
Selection, 4 7 I .  
Tenure, 4-73 · 
Probate j urisdiction, see Jurisdic­
tion. 
Probate of will, in rem, 4-93· 
Probate proceedings, see Proceed­
ing, Proceedings. 
Probate reform, 9, 3 9 5 ·  
Procedure 
Affirmative of issue, 74- 1 .  
Ecclesiastical, 3 90. 
Proceeding, Proceedings 
Administration as a unit, 91, 506. 
Decedents' estates, transfer, 89; 
see also Venue. 
Disclosure, 137. 
Guardianship, transfer, 193; see 
also Venue. 
In rem, 91, 4-89, 4-9I ,  7 3 7· 





Use of. term, 92. 
When commenced, 89, 548. 
Process, service of, see Service of 
process. 
Prohibition, writ of, 3 92 . 
Proof 
Grant of administration, 103. 
Holographic will, 1 03. 
Nuncupati�-e will, 103. 
Probate of will, 103. 
Will, certified copy, 105. 
Proof of service, 53. 
Property 
Abandonment of, 1 36. 
After-acquired, 84. 
Defined, 44. 
Embezzled or converted, 136. 
Exempt, see Exempt property. 
Public administrator, 20. 
Public welfare agencies, see also 
State Welfare Department. 
Notification on search for de­
cedent, 99. 
Publication of notice, 52, 5 I 4· 
Purchase 
By lien holder, 156. 
By personal representative, 156. 
Home for ward, 208, 230. 
Qualifications 
Guardian, 194. 
Judge, 44, 4'69. 
Personal representative, 1 15. 
Quieting title, 159, 670. 
Real property 
Advancements, 2 54. 
Affidavit of personal surety, 124. 
Appraisement for sale, 161.  
Bond of personal surety a lien, 
125. 
Chancery j urisdiction, 3 94· 
Decree of distribution, 349· 
Defined, 44. 
Devise, action at law, 692. 
For what purpose transfer 
ordered, 154. 
Included in inventory, 3 20, 453·  
Probate j urisdiction, 45, 448. 
Rights and powers of personal 
representative, 133. 
Sales, bond for, 126. 
Sales, mortgages, leases, 159. 
Title of personal representative, 
450. 
Transfer without administration, 
6 5 5 .  
When treated as personalty, 135. 
Whether sale in rem, 499· 
Will, 686. 
Real property and personalty 
No priority between, 153. 
Sale, mortgage, lease as a unit, 
158. 
Record, court of, 388, 4 1 6. 
Recording 
Certified copy 
Decree determining heirship, 
182. 
Decree of distribution, 172. 
Order of confirmation, 163. 
Conveyance by representative, 
139. 
Lien of surety bond, 125. 
Release of lien on surety's 
realty, 127. 
Records 
Certified copies furnished to 
Veterans Administration, 231. 
Probate court, 59, 2 5 2. 
Stenographic, 54. 
Reform, probate law, 9, 395·  
Register, see Records. 
Register of deeds 
Cancellation of lien on surety's 
realty, 1 27. 
To record lien of surety bond, 
125. 
Register of wills, powers, 480. 
Registered mail, notice, 52. 
Registered securities, 107, 6 54· 
Rehearing, no appeal froiD. order 
granting, 57. _ �-
Release of -expectancies,_ 67. _ �,� 
Release of mortgages, foreign repre­
sentatives, 667. 
Release of sureties, 126, 231. 
INDEX . 7 7 7  
Removal 
Failure to account, 229. 
Failure to give bond, 126. 
Guardian, 203. 
Personal representative, 1 17. 
When no appeal from, 57. 
Renunciation 
By heir or devisee, 86. 
By spouse, 68. 
Fees of personal representative, 
1 18. 
Reopening administration, 180. 
Report, sales, mortgages, leases, 
162. 
Representation, defined, 61.  
Representative, see also Personal 
representative. 
Ancillary administration, 235. 
Defined, 236. 
Request for notice, 94, 199. 
Res, seizure of, 5 I 5, 55 4· 
Residence 
Construed as domicile, 5 34· 
Venue, 5 3 3 ·  
Resident decedents, venue, 5 3  3 ,  
540· 
Residuary devises and bequests, 173. 
Residuary legatee, executor as, 5 77· 
Resignation of guardian, 204. 
Resignation of personal representa-
tive, 1 17. 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 
66 I .  
Restatement of Judgments, 48 9, 
4 9 I ,  5 1 3> 5 24. 
Retainer, 174. 
Revival of revoked will, 84. 
Revivor of action, equivalent to fil-
ing claim, 143. 
Revocation 
Letters, 101, 126, 166, 167, 
203, 229. 
Order of no administration, 1 10. 
Probate, 101.  ' 
Wills, 83, 84. 
Rhode Island, later will, 29 I .  
Rights not affected when Code 
takes effect, 41. 
Roman law, decedents' estates, 55 7. 
Rules of civil procedure, applica­
bility, 49. 
Rules of court 
As to notice, 96. 
Disposition of claims, 150. 
Power of court to make, 49. 




Bond for, 126. 
Brokers' fees, 164. 
By foreign representative, 669. 
Decedents' estates, 153. 
Guardianship, 213. 
Homestead, 78, 79. 
No priority between realty and 
personalty, 153. 
Order for, 160. 
Perishable property, 158. 




Power given in will, 154. 
Purchase by holder of lien, 156. 
Purposes, 154. 
Quieting adverse claims, 159. 
Realty, 159. 
As part of administration, 509. 
Probate j urisdiction, 4 5 5 .  
Realty and personalty as a unit, 
158. 
Refused if bond given, 155. 
Report and confirmation, 162. 
Taxes, when not liens, 164. 
Terms, 155. 
Title documents, 1 64. 
Validity of proceedings, 157. 
When not ademption, 214. 
When proceeds treated as realty, 
136. 
Whether in rem, 499· 
Saving clause, qualifying lay j udges, 
45. 
Search for alleged decedent, 98. 
Secured claims, 145. 
INDEX 
Secured creditors' dividends, uni­
form act, 146. 
Securities, transfer without adminis­
tration, 107, 654. 
1 Seizure of res, 5 I 5, 5 54· 
Selection, probate judges, 4 7 I .  
Senility, basis for guardianship, 190. 
Service of process 
By whom made, 52. 
On attorney, 53. 
Petition for guardianship, 198. 
Proof of, 53. 
Set-off to claims, 150. 
Settlement, family, 626. 
Settlement of account, see Account­
ing. 
Settlement of controversies, 1 12. 
Settlement of decedents' estates, 
summary, 107, I l l, 5 6 5 .  
Severability, invalidity of part of 
Code, 42. 
Several liability of sureties, 123. 
Several powers of personal repre-
sentatives, 118. 
Short ti tie, 41. 
Singular, includes plural, 44. 
Small estates, 107, 108, 219, 5 66, 
s6s,  5 92. 
Socage tenure, guardian · for one 
holding, 183. 
Solemn form, see Common and 
solemn form. 
South Carolina 
Dispensing with administration, 
604. 
Later will, 292. 
South Dakota 
Dispensing �ith administration, 
6o6. 
Later will, 292. 
Will contest, 7 2 1 .  
Special administrator, 120. 
Appeal from appointment, 57, 
246. 
Within definition of personal 
representative, 44. 
Special guardian, 202. 
Special notice, request for, 94, 199. 
Specific devises and bequests, abate-
ment, 173. 
Specific performance, 139. 
Spouse 
Included in definition of heir, 
43. 
Notice of petition for guardian­
ship, 198. 
Surviving 
Abatement to pay, 172. 
As heir, 60, 69. 
Election against will, 68, 2 5 8, 
263 ; see also Election against 
will. 
Exempt property, 79. 
Family allowance, 80, 148. 
When entitled as personal 
representative, 1 15. 
State treasurer, unclaimed assets 
paid to, 177. 
State Welfare Department 
As guardian, 1 94. 
Participating in guardianship 
matters, 1 97. 
Status, as res, 5 I 7. 
Statute of limitation, see Time 
limit. 
Stay on appeal, 57, 58. 
Stenographer, 54. 
Stenographic record, 54. 
Stock, corporate, transfer without 
administration, 107, 6 54. 
Subscribing witnesses, 81.  
Commission t o  take testimony, 
103. 
Testimony, 102, 295,  747· 
Substance, defect of, 51.  
Substitution, guardian as defendant, 
211.  
Succession, see Intestate succession. 
Successor 
Guardian, 204. 
Personal representative, 1 17, 
1 18. 
Suit on bond, ix, 128. . 
Summary administration, 107, I l l ,  
s 6s . 
Summary hearing, petition fpr 
probate, 95. 
INDEX 7 79 
Summary , proceeding to enforce 
bond, 128. 
Supervision, control or custody, use 
of terms, 195. 
Supplementary inventory, 132. 
Support 
Allowance for ward, 206, 207. 
Ward in veterans' guardianship, 
230. 
Supposed d�cedent, see Alleged de­
cedent. 
Supreme court 
Power to make rules, 49. 
Use of term in Code, 49. 
Surety, see also Bond. 
Bound by prior adjudication of 
representative's liability, 129. 
Control of deposited assets, 123. 
Extent of liability, 127. 
Joint and several liability, 123. 
May intervene when representa-




Lien on realty, 125. 
Release of lien, 127. 
Release, ix, 126. 
Release, veterans' guardianship, 
231.  
Surviving personal representative, 
powers, I I 8.  





Estate and inheritance, 42, 3 5 2, 
465 .  
Not lien i n  hands of transferee, 
I 64. 
Priority of claims 'for, 148, 149. 
Transfer to pay, 154. 
Temporary administrator, see Spe­
cial administrator. 
Temporary guardian, 202. 
Tennessee 
Court organization, 4 I O, 434· 
Later will, 292. 
Will contest, 707. 
Tenure, probate judges, 473·  
Termination 
Guardianship, 217. 
Veterans' guardianship, 231. 
Terms of court, 47. 
Terms of sale, 155. 
Terms used in Model Code, see 
Definitions. 
Testamentary guardian, 184, 192, 
195. 
Testamentary trusts, see Trusts, 
testamentary. 
Testimony of subscribing witnesses, 
102, 295> 747· 
Commissio!! to take, 1 03. 
Texas 
Later will, 293. 
Summary administration, 5 8  3 .  
Will contest, 723.  
Time limit 
Accounting, 3 39· 
Action on bond, 129, 3 I 7. 
Appeal, 58, 248. 
As affected by nonclaim statute, 
141. 
Closing estate, 166, 3 3 8. 
Contingent claims, 146, 147. 
Election ilgainst will, 73. 
Filing claims, 141, 3 2 5 ·  
Inventory, 129. 
Probate of after-discovered will, 
99, 101 , 2 7 5 ·  . 
Probate or administration, 105, 
307. 
Reopening guardian's accounting, 
216. 
Will contest, 99, 7 50. 
Time schedule, 18, 3 76. 
Title 
Action as to decedent's realty, 
133. 
Clearing, 159, 670. 
Decree of distribution deter­
mines, 1 8. 
Distribution without administra­
tion, 6 5 3 .  
Guardianship, 205. 
780  INDEX 
Title (continued} 
Insurance, expense of, 164. 
Short, 41. 
Single, constitutionality of Code 
under, 41. 
When in personal representa­
tive, 133. 
When no administration, 63 I .  
Tombstone, expense of, 42. 
Tort action, proof of unprobated 
will, 106. 
Transfer of proceedings, see Venue. 
Trial by jury, see Jury. 
Trial de novo, . p g, 4-2 I ,  4-4-2, 726. 
Trust, deed of, within definition of 
mortgage, 43. 
Trust company, bond as personal 
representative, 122, 3 I 5 ·  
Trustee 
Testamentary, as fiduciary, 43. 
Waiver of notice by, 53. 
Trusts 
Inter vivos, j urisdiction over, 21, 
46, 4-6 3.  
Relation to  guardianship, 187. 
Testamentary 
No special provisions, 21. 
Probate j urisdiction, 45, 46, 
4-62. 
Unborn person, guardian ad litem 
for, 1 14, 190. 
Unclaimed assets, 178, 179. 
Unified court, 4 I I . 
-Uniform and model acts 
Absence as Evidence of Death 
and Absentees' Property Act, 
99. 
Act Governing Secured Creditors' 
Dividends in Liquidation Pro­
ceedings, 146. 
Ancillary Administration of 
Estates Act, 235, 238. 
Declaratory Judgments Act, 47. 
Execution of Wills Act, 81: 
Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 
135. 
Partnership Act, 22. 
Powers of Foreign Representa­
tives Act, 234, 236, 662, 665, 
6 7 I ,  678. 
Relation to Model Probate Code, 
1 1 .  
Veterans' Guardianship Act, 186, 
190, 220, 4-6 I .  
Wills Act, Foreign Probated, 
235, 238. 
United States, priority of claims, 
148. 
Unknown heirs, 178. 
Unmatured claims, 144. 
Utah, will contest, 7 I g. 
Vacation of orders and judgments, 
55, 104. 
Validity of orders, presumption, 46. 
Validity of proceedings for sale, 
mortgage, lease, exchange, 
157. 
Valuation, advancements, 66, 2 5 3 ·  
Vendor's lien, within definition of 
mortgage, 43. 
Venue 
Conflicts, 5 4-0. 
Decedents' estates, 89. 
Determining factors, 5 3  I .  
Distinguished from jurisdiction, 
5 30. 
English history, 527.  
Guardianship, 193. 
Judicial power to determine, 
5 3 8. 
Non-resident decedents, 5 3 5, 
54-5· 
Probate, 5 27. 
Resident decedents, 5 3 3, 54-0. 
Statutes determining conflicts, 
542. 
When proceeding first com­
menced, 548. 
Whether Jurisdictional, 54-0. 
Verification of claims, 144. 
Verification of petition, 51. , 
Vermont 
Court organization,- 4- I O, 434· 
Death of ward, 6 I 9· 
INDEX 
• 
Vermont ( continut-d) 
- Dispensing with administration, 
6oS. 
Veterans Administration 
Defined, 221.  
Guardian t o  furnish papers, 229. 
Veterans' guardianship 
Accounting, 225, 227, 229. 
Administrator as party in m-
terest, 221. 








Limit on number of wards, 222. 
Notice for appointment, 224. 
Proof necessary for appointment, 
223. 
Purchase of home, 230. 
Release of sureties, 231. 
Removal for failure to account, 
229. 
Removal for failure to furnish 
papers, 229. 
Support of ward, 230. 
Veterans' Guardianship Act, Uni­
form, 186, 220, 4-6 1 .  
Application, 222. 
Relation to other guardianship 
provisions, 190. 
Virginia 
Court organization, 4-07. 
Dispensing with administration, 
604. 
Later will, Z94-· 
Will contest, 70 1 .  
Wage claims, 107, 64-7. 
Waiver of notice, 53. 
Waiver of right of election, 75. 
Ward, Wards 
Custody of, 205. 
Deceased, 217, 218, 6 1 6. 
Defined, 190. 
Defined for veterans' guardian­
ship, 221. 
Limit on number in veterans' 
guardianship, 222. 
Nomination of guardian, 195, 
" 203. 
Purchase of home for, 208, 230. 
Several, of one guardian, 197, 
222. 
Title to estate, 205. 
Use of specific property of estate, 
208. 
Who may be, 192. 
Warranty, conveyance by repre­
sentative, 139. 
Washington 
Later will, Z95·  
Unified court, 4-27.  
Welfare Department, see State W el­
fare Department. 
West Virginia, will contest, 706. 
Will 
After-acquired property, 84. 
After-discovered, 99, 101, 275,  
754-· 
Allowance for defending, 120. 
As res, 5 1 7. 
Certified copy, 105. 
Construction, 45, 88. 
Custodian, 92, z67. 
Decree admitting, 7 4-6. 
Defined, 44. 
Deposit with court, 87. 
Duty to deliver to court, 92, 
z67. 
Election against 
By pretermitted heirs, 76. 
By spouse, 68. 
When barred, z63.  
Execution, 81. 
Foreign executed, 82. 
Foreign .-probated, uniform act, 
235, 238. 
Holographic, 82, 103. 
Ineffectual until probated, 106. 
Lapse, 85: 
Lost or destroyed, 20, 93, 298. 
Nonintervention, 5 84., 
INDEX 
Will (continued) 
Nuncupative, see Nuncupative 
will. 
Power to sell given in, 154. 
Probate in rem, 493· 
Real property, 450, 686. 
Record, 59. 
Renunciation, 68, 2 5 8. 
Revival after revocation, 84. 
Revocation, 83, 84. 
Subscribing witnesses, 81, 102, 
103, 295 ·  
Who may make, 81.  
Will contest, 99, 100, 4-4-3·. 
Allowance for defending will, 
120. 
Before probate, 726. 
Burden of proof, 743· 
California group, 71  5 ·  
Compromise, 112. 
Effect of prior decree, 7 46. 
English law, 68 5· 
Federal j urisdiction, 7 3 2 .  
Function, 682.  
In higher court, 70 1 ,  7 2 3 .  
In rem, 494· 
In same court, 699, 7 I 4· 
Jury trial, 55, 748. 
Later will, 99, 101, 2 76, 7 5 4· 
Meaning of term, 684. 
Notice, 100. 
One only, 17. 
Only before probate, 709. 
Parties, 74 1 .  
Probate with notice, 708. 
Probate without notice, 699. 
Rationale, 7 2 7. 
Recommended legislation, 7 5 5 . 
Time extension for disability, 
7 5 3 ·  
Time limitations, 99, 7 50 . 
. Trial de novo, 726.  
Types, 697. 
Wills Act, Foreign Probated, Uni­
form, 235, 238. 
Wisconsin 
Court organization, 4 1 0, 432 .  
Death of  ward, 61  9· 
Judges not admitted to bar, 45. 
• 
Withdrawal of estate from adminis­
tration, 5 8  2 .  
Witnesses, see Subscribing witnesses. 
Woerner, statute dispensing with 
administration, 593 ·  
Words and phrases, see Definitions. 
Writing, ad\·ancements, 67, 2 5 3 .  
Written instrument, claims founded 
on, 144. 
Wrongful death statutes, damages 
received by representative, 
166. 
Wyoming, will contest, 720. 
